ML20063B913
| ML20063B913 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1982 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, CDR-82--5, CDR-82-00-05, SBN-311, NUDOCS 8208260281 | |
| Download: ML20063B913 (3) | |
Text
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SEABROM SMM IPUBLIC SERVICE Engineedng Office:
Companyof NewHamph 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Mossochusetts 01701 (617) - 872 - 8100 August 19, 1982 SEN-311 T.F. Q 2.2.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention:
Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Resident and Project Inspection Feferences:
(a) Construction Permits CPFR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos.
50-443 and 50-444 (b) Telecon of July 23, 1982, A. L. Legendre (YAEC) to Eugene Kelley (NRC Region I)
Subject:
Final 10CFR50.55(e) Report; Non-Seismically Supported Conduit
Dear Sir:
On July 27, 1982, a reportable 10CFR50.55(e) item was reported [ Reference (b)] regarding non-seisnically supported conduit.
The following information is provided per 10CFR50.55(e)(3) and is considered to be the final report on this item.
DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY Raceways in the Refueling Water Storage Tank area were not specified to be seismically supported.
This deficiency was discovered during an analysis of all cables traversing between the nuclear island and the non-ntelear island, to provide an assurance that these cables will not degrade Class IE circuits. During this analysis, safety-related cables associated with the refueling water storage tank instruments and valves (See Attachment 1) were found to traverse between the primary auxiliary building (nuclear island) and the tank farm area, which has not been included in the nuclear island. Consequently, in the tank farm area, these cables were scheduled to run in raceways which would not have been seismically supported.
These conduits and supports have not yet been installed.
ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Failure of these valve circuits could result in loss of water supply for the charging pumps and eefety injection pumps. The Spray Additive Tank could also be isolated from the RWST.
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%'1 8208260281 820819 PDR ADOCK 05000443 S
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United States !!uclear Reguletory Cormission August 19, 1982 Attention:
Mr. Richard W. Starontecki Pega 2 Failure of these instrurent circuits could result in loss of level indication for the semiautomatic changeover from the injection to the recirculation phase.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN The analysis of the cables which traverse the nuclear island boundaries has been completed. The Refueling Water Storage Tank portion of the tank farm will he specified to te in the nuclear island. We consider this occurrence an isolated deficiency caused by the improper designation of the area as not part of the nuclear island. All other safety-related equipment in this area was properly designed and installed.
An Engineering Change Authorization has been issued to revise the drawings to specify seismically qualified supports for all conduits in the Refueling Water Storage Tank area.
Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY J. DeVincentis Project Manager i
Ces Attachment l
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l ATTACHMENT I REF. 9763-F-301254 CLASS 1E LEVEL TRANSMITTERS NODE TAG NUMBER RB6 CBS-LT-930 4
a RB7 CBS-LT-931 RB8 CBS-LT-932 t
RBO CBS-LT-933 RH8 CBS-LT-2380 RHO CBS-LT-2383 NUCLEAR SAFETY-RELATED VALVES NODE TAC NUMBER VA1 CBS-V38 VA2 CBS-V43 VE5 CS-LCV-112E VE6 CS-LCV-112D i
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