ML20062K963
| ML20062K963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1981 |
| From: | Tierney R AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | Ahearne J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8101090056 | |
| Download: ML20062K963 (3) | |
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R. E. Tierney
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35 Blue Ridge Drive JAN - 519N P Brick, NJ 08723
' 6"i Offica cf ths feeretsy 00CA4:fy & 34fffC3 Stanck Mr. John F. Ahearne Chairman Commissioner U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 14th Street, NW MD. & M M..[....s ia;* -C ~2hj Washington, DC 20515 DCCL.I.
Dear Mr. Ahearne:
DOCKET 50-289SP TMI - Unit 1 MIDDLETOWN, PA I was recently informed that your agency is presently involved with re-start hearings for Med Ed's TMI Unit 1.
As a consumer of this utilities energy via the GPU System I feel my comments should be expressed.
In the onset I must inform you that I have been involved with Nuclear Energy for almost twenty years.
My interest in writting is relative to the future use of this form of energy.
I have absolutely no concern with respect to the safety aspects because of my background.
In farc, enclosed are my margin comments to your NUREG-0578.
The concern I have is the credit-ability expressed by todays society for the Engineering Sciences.
However, this can be expected when our government regulating agencies license a facility and then restrict its use.
The economic impact that resulted in this idle TMI-1 is reflected in my monthly electric bill.
My fuel adjustment charge has in-creased almost.75%.
I find it hard to comprehend what safety and/or economic benefits were achiaved by the shut down order.
I reviewed the B&W Plant systems and feel that the TMI-2 LOC accident was operator error.
A two year shut down order to corre'ct that condition is totally unnecessary.
In summary my concern now is related to future energy needs of this country and the public opinion of Nuclear Energy.
The shut-down impact of TMI-1 has most certainly effected the continued acceptance of this form of energy.
If you disagree I would ex-pect your response to this letter.
Very truly yours, l
CC Congressman Edwin B. Forsythe Friends of Family of TMI..
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9 TMI-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE,
STATUS REPORT AND SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 9NlhY
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l Manuscript Completed: July 1979
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Date Published: July 1979 l
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- needed safety systams. iirarT v L. Jr I.ae _ Ty
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gu ses, tne N555 ' vendor does not suoply any guidelines on
.The staff nas h.. m in wnich guidelines are su=cliec,
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of ersergency procedures " Even for those cases an.
i licensing cesign.
i the guidelines.are usually based. on the trans en h
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15 FSAR analyses are Y
review.lThis is' not satisf actory since tne Sect onderived from the Cor r
9 perfor ned to demonstrata t4e acceptability o
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to specific and prescriptive design basis eventsMore and a differe in.
b)c #g F
F ining.
developing emergency procecures and operator trade for Three Mile Island regulations.
assumed that the PORY did not opeit.
calculated pressure and was therefore accropriate fo se of the PORV, the l
should hrve oeen emergency procedure for a loss of feedwater dMoreover, it did no
-"h#* 4e ORV cl osure. ** -e G madermr" a3:er.em-v --ecW4'T exoec*ed or that it was immarmt to verifv P weald open.
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% & y p - T-J 4 :xrer, by improving o;erator 42 me A sLostantial improvement in safety can be obtainedThe folicwing steps are 3
j yo $g performance dering transients and accidents.(a) analyte to predict plant resp d it: proper coerator in order to accomplish this objective:
f during abnormal occurrences and to identify proper antions (such as prev
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i ti.on of more serious actions associated with important safety cons dera core uncovery, establishing natural circulation, and ;3revendures; (c accidents); (b) prepare guidelines for emergancy pr rators.
I the short term:
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We have establisned,the _ followtng priorities for
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1 Analysis of small break loss-of-coolant accidents; a...
ling and required L
j Analysis of the symptoms of inadequate core coo d
- W.. a.4C.tions to,.r,gs,tgrp, core cooling; an i
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oerstoe Analysis of transient and accident scenarios including o actions not prev,iously analyzed.
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S&W plants and are The efforts related to small. breaks have been completed forT well under way for other plants. Bulletins. and Order.s. Task Fo
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