ML20062H619
| ML20062H619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 08/02/1982 |
| From: | Kalivianakis N COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Case E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NJK-82-338, NUDOCS 8208160116 | |
| Download: ML20062H619 (4) | |
Text
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s N'MV x Commonw=lth Edison o#
O
) Quad Citiss Nuctsar Powsr Stetion gg
,' 22710 206 Avenue North s
Corcova, Illinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241 t
NJK-82-338 t
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+
August 2, 1982 i
I Mr. Edson G. Case, Deputy Director j
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 l
Dear Mr. Case:
Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experi-ments completed during the month of July,1982, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2, DPR-29 and DPR-30.
A summary of the safety evaluation is being reported in compliance with 10 CFR 50.59.
Thirty-nine copies are provided for your use.
i l
Very truly yours, l
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION i
9 7
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J &
l N. J. Kalivianakis l
Station Superintendent bb Enclosu re cc:
T. J. Rausch l
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i 8200160116 820802 PDR ADOCK 05000254 R
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Special Test Special Test 1-60 was completed on July 9, 1982. This test involved racking the 1/2 Diesel Generator to Bus 13-1 and 23-1 feed breakers out one at a time to the " Test" position to verify proper. action of the local breaker control.
Summary of Safety Evaluation 1.
The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the 1/2 Diesel Generator and Unit One RHR Systems have been restored to the status they were in before November 1981.
2.
The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR is not created because the 1/2 Diesel Generator can only be loaded by one Bus at a time as originally designed.
3 The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced because the 1/2 Diesel Generator and Unit One RHR systems are capable of performing their full intended functions per the Technical Specifications.
o M-4-1(2)-76-23 ACAD/ CAM System Description The Atmospheric Containment Atmosphere Dilution System (ACAD) and the Containment Atmosphere Monitor System (CAM) were installed to prevent the hydrogen concentration in the Containnent from exceeding the allowable levels as established in Safety Guide 1.7 and Branch Technical Position CSB-2 following a loss of coolant accident. The ACAD System uses compressed air to dilute the Containment Atmosphere by way of two independent compressor and piping systems.
Excess pressure in the Containment is relieved by the ACAD Pressure Bleed Subsystem.
This subsystem consists of redundant piping, valves, and instruments to allow a small bleed flow from the Containnent to the Standby Gas Treatment System. The CAM System consists of redundant Containment' radiation and hydrogen monitors.
The system is automatically initiated on a Core Spray initiation signal to monitor hydrogen and radiation levels inside the Containment following a loss of coolant accident.
Evaluation Although the installation of this modification required penetrating the Primary Containment pressure vessel, all piping, valves, and penetrations have been installed as seismic Class I and have double isolation. valves.
The two independent systems for both the ACAD and CAM System allows sufficient redundancy should one subsystem fall to operate properly.
The ACAD System, together with the normal nitrogen inerting of the Containment and the ability to add nitrogen make-up following an accident, will assure adequate control of the post LOCA long term hydrogen buildup in the Containment.
Reference:
Supplenent I to Quad-Cities Special Report Number 14.
L M-4-1-82-4 RHR Service Water Reroute Description An isolated section of the 16 inch RHR Service Water Line was rerouted as a result of a leak in the underground section. The leaking section has been rerouted to an above ground location.
Evaluation During construction, a crosstle allowed Unit Two RHP pumps to be available in Unit One.
After completion of the reroute, Service Water was returned to its previous availability.
H-4-1-81-32 Cut and Cap 1A RHR Service Water Line Description This modification involved cutting and capping the lA Residual Heat Removal Service Water Line to enable use of a crosstie to supply cooling water to the 1 A RHR Heat Exchanger through the Unit Two pumps.
This modification was initiated af ter discovery of a leak in an under-ground section of the line on November 21, 1981.
This modification was
[
required prior to installation and operation of a new rerouted section of pipe.
The modification was accomplished by isolating the affected section of pipe and installing pipe caps and a vent line.
Rerouting the line was performed under Modification M-4-1-82-4.
Evaluation The Residual Heat Removal System consists of two Containment Cooling Loops.
A minimum of one loop is required to provide adequate cooling, if required.
By using the crosstie, additional cooling capacity is available through the Unit Two pumps without affecting operation of Unit Two or its own RHR cooling capacity.
Because of the s/ stem's inherent redundancy and the additional availability of the Unit Two RHR System, this modification will not affect the safe operation of the Station.
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