ML20062D176
| ML20062D176 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1982 |
| From: | James Shea Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Counsil W NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| References | |
| TASK-02-01.C, TASK-2-1.C, TASK-RR LSO5-82-08-004, LSO5-82-8-4, NUDOCS 8208050480 | |
| Download: ML20062D176 (7) | |
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l August' 4,1982 l'
Docket A 50-245 '
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t Mr. W. G. Cour.sil. Yice President
.t Nuclear Engineerir:g and Operations
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Nor'heast Nuclear Energy Corgany Post Office Box 270 Hartford, Connrecticut 06101 g
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Dear Mr. Counsil:
SUBJECI: MILLSTONE SEP TOPIC II-1.C - POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO
' NEARBY TRANSPORTATION, INSTILL,TIONAL, INDUSTRIAL AND
-9. MILITARY FACILITIES
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Cnclose6.' f7 the staff's revised final evaluation of SEP Topic II-1.C
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for the Ni11 stone Plant._ This, evaluation is based on the safety
. analysis provided by your letter rf April 27,.1981 and as supplemente'd by your letter of May 10, 1982. The, evaluations ccmpare your facility is as described -in Docket Na. 50-245 with the crf teria currently used for
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licensing rew facilities.
G As a asult of your letter.of Ksy 10, 1982, the staff gas concludes that Topic II-1.C meets current licensing criteria'since;the topography of the site would not chanyl a danso esplosive get cloud toward the
. plant in the event of a pt'opane tank cat incident irichin the exclusion area.
/j This MCvution will be F Msic input to the integrated safety assess-ment fJr your facility. Tnis assessment may be revised in the future if yo% facility destga,is changed or if HRC criteria relating to this 5@Y l
, n. subject; is sedified before the integrated assessment is complete.
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Sincerely, 7)gu 65E M
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James Shea, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 g g
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, Millstone Unit 1 Docket No. 50-245 Revised 3/30/82 Mr. W. G. Counsil cc William H. Cuddy, Esquire State of Connecticut Day, Berry & Howard Office of Policy & Management Counselors at Law ATTN:
Under Secretary Energy One Constitution Plaza Division
' Hartford, Connecticut 06103 80 Washington Street Hartford, Connecticut 06115 Ronald'C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I Office l
631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company ATTN:
Superintendent Millstone Plant P. O. Box 128 Waterford, Connecticut 06385 i
Mr. Richard T. Laudenat l
Manager, Generation Facilities Licensing Northeast Utilities Service Company P. O. Boy 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Resident Inspector c/o U. S. NRC P. O. Box Drawer KK Niantic, Connect.icut 06357 First-Selectman of the Town of Waterford Hall.of Records 200 Boston Post Road Waterford, Connecticut 06385 John F. Opeka Systems Superintendent Northeast Utilities Service Ccmpany P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region I Office ATTN:_ Regional Radiation Representative JFK Federal 'uilding Boston, Massachusetts 02203 O
MILLSTONE 1 SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM II-1.C. POTENTIAL HAZARDS DUE TO NEARBY TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTIONAL INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY FACILITIES 1.
INTRODUCTION The safety objective of this topic is to ensure that the integrity of the safety-related structures, systems and components would not be jeopardized due to the potential for hazards originating at nearby facilities.
II.
REVIEW CRITERIA General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Basis,"
of Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to 10 CFR Part 50, " Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,"
requires that nuclear power plant structures, systems and components important to safety be appropriately protected against events and con-ditions that may occur outside the nuclear power plant.
III.
RELATED SAFETY TOPICS Topic III-4.D, " Site Proximity Missiles" reviews the extent to which the facility is protected against missiles originating from offsite facilities.
IV.
REVIEW GUIDELINES The review was conducted in accordance with the guidance given in Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 2.2.1-2.2.2, " Identification of Potential Hazards in Site Vicinity."
V.
EVALUATION Three significant industrial corplexes exist within 10 miles of the Millstone site. These are:
Approximate No.
Name Location of Employees Distance Sector Dow Chemical Corp.
Ledyard 300 10 miles NE (general chemicals)
Pfizer Corp.
Groton 2,700 5.5 miles ENE (general chemicals) l
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Electric Boat Groton 20,000 5.5 miles ENE I
(Division of General l
Dynamics -submarines) l l
- Ir. addition to the submarine base and Coast Guard Academy there is a training headquarters at Camp O'Neil in East Lyme for Connecticut Army National Guard units.
Camp O'Neil is owned and operated by the Military Department of the State of Connecticut.
It consists of 80 acres on which there are located 70 buildings for various purposes.
It is an administrative training center for troops of the Connecticut Army National Guard.
On a full-time basis, besides a small contingent of post operations personnel, it contains the headquarters for the Connecticut Military Academy, the 745th Signal Company, and an Organizational Maintenance Shop (regional maintenance of vehicles and equipment).
On a part-time basis, during various weekends from March through November, it is occupied by troop units for administrative training, billeting, and supply functions.
Because of the administrative nature of its occupancy, the camp's operation has no effect on station operation.
No other military operations such as firing ranges, military airfields, ordinance depots, and missile sites exist near the site.
The area around the Millstone site was investigated and found to contain no explosives, chemicals, airborne pollutants, flammable or dangerous gases, nor tanks or pipelines near enough to the site to pose a danger if they were to explode or burn.
A railroad right-of-way of the Penn Central Company transverses the site from east to west.
The mainline tracks are about 0.5 miles from the Unit 1 Reactor Building and upgrade from the plant.
Traffic on the spur of the mainline track which extends onto the site is controlled to min-imize the possibility of railroad traffic related accidents.
A spur of the Penn Central railroad serves the Millstone Nuclear Power Station exclusively. The switch for that spur is normally set for through traffic.
To reach any station facility, the locomotive must pass through a second switch, which is normally set to direct traffic past the station to a dead end near the sound. Therefore.
the possibility of unauthorized transport of hazardous materials does not' exist on the spur.
Hazardous materials that are shipped on the track which crosses the site between New Haven and New London include Chlorine, Anhydrous Anmonia, Carbon Dioxide, Propane, Ethyl Alcohol, Rosin, Ammonium Nitrate, and Hydrochloric Acid.
Among these materials, only the shipment of propane (about 44 carloads per year) is in the " frequently shipped quantities of hazardous material" category as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.78.
. Propane gas is heavier than air and can form a potentially explosive mixture in air.
However, Map #18990 dated September 8,1981, indi-cates that the rail line on which propane is shipped thru the site runs thru an excavation in the hill which is approximately 20 feet below the natural contour of the ground immediately north of the reactor facilities. This railroad cut would channel a heavier-than-air propane cloud in an east-west direction away from the plant.
The map indicates that the remainder of the topography of the site is about the same grade as the rail line and therefore would not cause a gravity flow of the cloud toward the plant site.
The effect of accidental gaseous releases on control room operators is evaluated as part of the TMI Action Plan Item III.D.3.4, " Control Room Habitability" and as such is independent of the SEP program.
There are no grade grossings on or adjacent to the site at which hazardous materials might be transported across the tracks.
There are no major gas transmission lines within 5 miles of the site.
The nearest low pressure gas distribution line is more than 3 miles from the site and is located at the corner of Clark Lane and the Boston Post Road in Waterford.
The closest oil transmission line is approximately 5 miles from the site in Groton, Connecticut.
Because they are 5 miles or more away from the site, both the gas and oil transmission lines constitute no threat to the se fe operation of Millstone Unit No.1 or to the site in general.
Ships that pass by the site in the shipping channels of Long Island Sound are of two types: general cargo freighters which usually are partially unloaded with drafts of 20 to 25 feet and deep draft tankers with drafts of 35 to 38 feet. Both of these ship classes must remain,
l at least 2 miles offshore for fear of running aground on Bartlett Reef.
No oil barges pass to the shore side of Bartlett Reef; and, since there are no tank farms in Niantic Bay, no oil barges pass within 2 miles of the site.
The possible damage to the pump house by a drifting barge was investi-gated. The barge can only approach the pump house through the intake channel which is perpendicular to the front of the pump house.
The -
relatively shallow bay bottom surrounding the intake channel will pre-vent the barge from hitting the pump house from its sides. Should a barge hit the pump house from the front, damage will be limited to the front wall of the recirculation distribution box which projects seaward l
. from the pump house.
The service water pumps which are the only safety related equipment housed in the pump house are located approximately 40 feet from the front wall.
The operation of these pumps will not be impaired and the water intake source will not be blocked as the water intake source lies between El (-) 28 ft - 0. in. and (-) 8 ft - 0 in.
For these reasons, the staff has concluded that shipping accidents would not adversely affect any safety related facilities.
There are presently two small commercial. airports within 7 miles of the site, New London (Waterford) Airport and Trumbull Airport.
No plans are anticipated by the owners of the airports for expansion of airport facilities.
Tru= bull Airport, approxi=ately T miles east of the site, handles regularly scheduled co==ercial passenger flights, but is inadequate for handling large jets.
New London Airport, h miles north of the site, is relatively s=all and handles no regularly scheduled co==ercial air traffic. Maximum runway length is 2000 feet.
Except for occasional sightseeing trips over the
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site, the landing patterns are such that most planes are at least 3-1/2 miles fro = the site.
Tru= bull Airport has three runways: 5-23 which is 5000 feet long, 15-33 vhich is h000 feet long, and 10-28 which is 3000 feet long and unlighted. Due to limited traffic at Tru= bull, there is no control tower. However, Instru=ent Landing Syste=s (ILS) service is available on runway 5-23 and Very-High Frequency 0=ni Range (VOR) service is available on runway 5-23 from Quonset Approach Control.
The air lane nearest to the site is V58 vhich is approximately b miles northeast of the site.
Other adjacent air lanes include V16, which is approxi=ately 6 miles northwest of the site, and V308, which is approxi=ately 8 miles east of the site. The nearest high-altitude jet route, J121-581, passes approximately 9 miles southeast of the site. A second jet route, J55, passes approximately 12 alles to the northwest of the site.
Based upon the size of the airports and the location of flight paths, the impact of an airplane on Millstone Unit No.1 is highly unlikely.
Topic III-4.D. Site Proximity Missiles contains a more detailed analysis of aircraft hazards to the site.
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. The nearest major highway which would be used for frequent transportation of hazardous materials is U. S. Route 95, which is located at a distance of 4 miles from the Millstone site. This separation distance exceeds the minimum distance criteria given in Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1; and, therefore, provides assurance that any transportation accidents resulting in explosions of truck size shipments of hazardous materials will not have an adverse effect on the safe operation of the plant. This separation distance also eliminates the possibility of a toxic gas release adversely affecting the safe operation of the plant.
VI.
CONCLUSIONS We have concluded that Millstone Unit No.1 is adequately protected and can be operated with an acceptable degree of safety with regard to in-dustrial, transportation, and military activities in the vicinity of the plant.
VII.
REFERENCES 1.
Standard Review Plan Section 2.2.1-2.2.2, Identification of Potential Hazards in Site Vicinity.
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.91, Revision 1.
3.
D. L. Ziemann letter to D. Bixel, dated November 27, 1979.
4.
Millstone Unit No. 3 Preliminary Safety Analysis Report.
5.
D. M. Crutchfield to W. G. Counsil, dated November 27, 1981.
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