ML20059N590

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Special Rept 90-13:on 900910,auxiliary Bldg Fire Door A-75 Breached & Instrument Room CO2 Fire Suppression Sys Inoperable.Caused by Refueling Outage Activities.Continuous Fire Watch Established W/Backup Fire Suppression Equipment
ML20059N590
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 10/04/1990
From: Wallace E
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-13, NUDOCS 9010160321
Download: ML20059N590 (4)


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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY- )

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374ol 5N 1575 Lookout Place  :

i 00T 041990 i o U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission ATTN: Document Control Desk -

Washington. D.C. 20555 I

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of' ) Docket Nos. 50-327 1 Tennessee Valley,Authorityl )> '

50-328  ;

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50'-328 -  !

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79:- SPECIAL. REPORT 90-13  !

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This special report provides details concerning the auxiliary building Fire l

- Door A-75 being breached and the. Unit 2 auxiliary instrument room carbon [

dioxide (00 ) fire suppression system being inoperable. The fire door has- 't been breached to facilitate personnel movement during-the Unit 2 Cycle 4 .i refueling' outage activities, and the 00: system has been rendered inoperable- i for the protection of personnel working in the auxiliary instrument room to j support additional outage activities.' These conditions will remain in effect t for the duration of the outage.  ;

Enclosure 1 contains the details concerning the . fire door, and: Enclosure 2 l contains the details concerning:the Con system.' This report is being made in accordance with the Technical Specification Action-Statementsi3.7.12.a and 3.7.11.3.b. {

.If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please' telephone M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6422.

i Very truly yours.

' TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY m ' ,,,,C

+E. G. Wallace. Phnager  :

, Nuclear Licensing and  !

. Regulatory Affairs )

't Enclosures ces' See page 2 l C.1bb .

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conssission g a  !

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^i cc (Enclosures): l Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director  ;

Project Directorate 11-4  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i One White Flint, North j 11555 Rockville Pike '

Rockville Maryland 20852 j Mr. J. N. Donohew, Project' Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 'I One White. Flint, North ' .

11555 Rockville Pike i Rockville, Maryland: 20852 l

'NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant- l l

2600 Igou Ferry Road- .

Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379- ,

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Mr. B.1A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission' Region II I 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 l Atlanta, Georgia 30323 '

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. ENCLOSURE 1 )

SQN UNIT 2 ,

SPECIAL REPORT 90-13 Description of Condition i i

On September 8,1990, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 (0 percent power, 2,235 pounds per i square inch gauge, and 547 degrees Fahrenheit) being shutdown for the planned ,

Cycle 4 refueling outage, the auxiliary building Fire Door A-75 was breached to facilitate traffic entering and exiting the Unit 2 penetration room on i Elevation 690. The fire door will be nonfunctional for the duration of the refueling outage in excess of the seven days allowed by Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12 Action Statement a. This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement 3.7.12.a.  ;

cause of Condition Auxiliary building Fire Door A-75 is a double door, and half of the door will ,

be roped off for a contamination zone (C-zone) corridor that leads to an i expanded C-zone entry and exit area outside the penetration room. This modified C-zone arrangement will greatly facilitate personnel entry into and .

out of the Unit 2 lower containment. The door will remain breached for the  !

duration of the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling outage. '

Corrective Action i In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement a, the fire detectors-inside  ;

the Unit 2 penetration room were verified operable, a roving fire watch was immediately established and will be maintained until the breach is removed, and the fire door is reestablished at the end of the outage. ,

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. ENCLOSURE 2 SQN UNIT 2 l SPECIAL REPORT 90-13  ;

1 Description of Condition On Septe'berm 10,1990, at 1055 Eastern daylight time (EDT) with Unit 2 )

shutdown in Mode 5 (0 percent power, 325 pounds per square inch gauge, and  !

145 degrees Fahrenheit), the Unit 2 auxiliary instrument room carbon dioxide '

(C03 ) fire suppression system was removed from service to facilitate outage l activities and to prevent any accidental discharge of'CO in the instrument a room. The CO: system will be inoperable for the duration of the refueling j outage. 'This condition is being reported in accordance with SQN Technical  !

Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.3.a. i cause of condition >

Refueling outage modification activities in the-Unit 2 auxiliary building i instrument room require an increased number of personnel to be present at the

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same' time in order to accomplish the assigned tasks, e.g., cable pulling. l Additionally, personnel will be required to perform some tasks 'in cramped'  !

positions between cable trays and on top of scaffolding. In the event of an activation of the CO: fire suppression system, the evacuation of personnel i from the room in 20 seconds would be difficult. Therefore, for the safety of.

personnel working in the instrument room, the 00: fire suppression system .

has been removed from service for the duration of the Unit 2 Cycle 4 refueling-

  • outage.

Corrective Action [

R Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.11.3.was entered at 1055 EDT on- t September- 10, 1990. A continuous fire watch was'immediately established with  !

backup fire suppression equipment available for fire protection while the ,

00: system is inoperable. The fire watch will remain in effect.until the outage-related activities in the room have been completed, an'.the d CO  ;

system is returned to service.

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