ML20059K739

Summary of 931209 Meeting W/Numarc & NSSS OGs to Discuss Status Re BWROG Methodologies Re Flexible Assignment of Accident Mgt Strategies (EOPs or ERO Severe Accident Mgt Procedures).W/Flow Chart.Flow Chart Withheld

ML20059K739
Person / Time
Issue date:	01/14/1994
From:	Palla R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19303F802	List: ML20059K739
References
NUDOCS 9402020240
Download: ML20059K739 (49)

Text

'T m

pacto..

't UNITED STATES x

f[

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

-[

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20566-0001 ho

• • • +*

January 14, 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ashok C. Thadani, Director Division of Systems Safety and Analysis THRU:

James W. Johnson, Acting Chief Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch Division of Systems Safety and Analysis FROM:

Robert L. Palla, Jr.

Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

SUBJECT:

DECEMBER 9, 1993 MEETING WITH NUMARC AND THE NSSS OWNERS GROUPS REGARDING ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES On December 9, 1993, the NRC staff met with representatives of the. Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) and the NSSS owners groups. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the status of several ongoing industry activities. These consist of:

(1) BWROG methodologies for flexible assign-ment of accident managemnt strategies (to either the E0Ps or ER0 Severe.

Accident Management Precedures), and for prioritizing training.and examination on new severe accident-related material, (2) BWROG progress toward development of Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) and associated EPG changes, (3) industry (INPO and owners group) development of severe accident training materials, and (4) recent HUMARC letters regarding CFR 50.59 applicability to SAMG, and the industry initiative on accident management. A list of attendees-is presented in Enclosure 1.

A copy of the presentation materials is provided as Enclosures 2 and 3.

A summary of the major points made during the presentations and discussions follows.

BWROG Methodolooies The BWROG characterized utility use of the methodology for flexible assignment of EPG/ accident management strategies as essential:to successful implementation of severe accident management guidelines and related EPG changes. The NRC staff was encouraged to accept the methodology.

There are no limitations on the EPG material that would be subject to~

relocation ~from the EPGs (control-room) to the accident management--

guidelines (Technical' Support Center), however, F. Emerson indicated that the thinking in the owners group-is that it will be more difficult

~

to justify relocation of material than originally envisioned.

<h Utilities will be expected to fully document their application of the flexible assignment criteria.

Placement-of an action in the accident

/'

i 0020ES sw Owpovn ypg!-S/6:5(fiUNl,r

~ r.g0:120 suulut.

G -

9402020240 940114 g3,p.j

' g/AudW.

PDR. REV0P ER C-

,ypgy

p u

~

Ashok C. Thadani management guidelines / procedures would not be considered a deviation if this is in accordance with the criteria. However, an action that should

-be located in the E^9s W accordance with the criteria) may not be located in the acci' ". n m ment guidelines / procedures without taking a deviation. Addi'-

' for application of the criteria are provided in Enclosun The staff express.

1. 1 support for the philosophy behind the flexible assignme..

ing/requalification prioritization methodologies. The hi s

.,aff Concern expressed regarding the flexible assignment methodology was that the criteria for flexible assignment i

does not appear to be defined and documented to a degree sufficient to assure uniform application. NRC staff also noted the need to reach resolution on a number of issues (e.g., examination templates and the Part 55 rule change on requalification examinations) before proceeding with future actions related to the training /requalification prioritization methodology, such as additional meetings and staff participation in industry workshops.

BWROG SAMG The development of Technical Support Guidance (TSG) by the BWROG is not

=

yet complete. A working draft TSG document is expected to be completed by February 28, 1994, with the full draft expected by May 1, 1994.

Because of the preliminary nature of the work, the BWR0G was able'to i

provide only limited, draft technical information at this meeting.

This included:

(1) a description of the supporting elements of the TSG and the process for implementation in the technical support center, and (2) general information on the strategy changes in four major areas --

steam cooling, prevention of repressurization, combustible gas control, and containment flooding.

Based on information provided, modifications to the containment flooding strategy will have the greatest impact on EPGs of all of the strategy changes. These modifications involve integrating the containment flooding strategy with degraded core conditions, and incorporating (new) considerations regarding: (1) RPV level above which core debris will be retained in-vessel, (2) RPV injection rate above which core debris will be retained in-vessel, and (3) containment water level below which pressure suppression is maintained.

Strategies for prevention of liner melt-through in Mark I containments were said to be part of the containment flooding strategy change, however, specific operator actions that would be' taken are still under development and were not discussed.

Development of Trainina Materials INP0 is continuing to refine their preliminary task analysis to reflect

=

the PWR owners group SAMG documents, and have completed a draft lesson plan for each of the (approximately 15) major accident management h

e x

\\

Ashok C. Thadani strategies. A video, including computer graphics with narration, is also being developed by INP0 with support from EPRI and the owners groups,.for use in conjunction with the lesson plans.

The scope of initial severe accident management training is expected to vary depending upon the position (evaluator, decision-maker, and implementor). The most extensive training is envisioned for evaluator positions and may involve a total of 2 to 3 days of classroom training.

Initial training on all strategies is expected to require about 10 to 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> of this total.

NUMARC Letters By letter dated October 29, 1993, NUMARC submitted exarnples of how SAMG

=

might be implemented within the context of 10 CFR 50.59, and 10 CFR 50.54(x) and (y).

The staff indicated general agreement with the perspectives and examples provided in this letter.

Considerable discussion focussed on the regulatory basis for SAMG. The NRC pointed out that 10 CFR 50.47(b) planning standards (2), (9), and (16) as amplified by Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 and NUREG-0696 suggests the need for SAMG. 10 CFR 50.54(q) provides the authority for licensees to make unilateral changes to the Emergency Plan using the "no decrease in effectiveness" criterion (10 CFR 50.59 is not used).

Therefore, licensees could develop and implement SAMG under the umbrella of the Emergency Plan without NRC approval as long as the "no decrease in effectiveness" criterion was met.

However, it was noted that licensees are also required by Appendix E(V) to 10 CFR Part 50 to submit changes in the Emergency Plan or Emergency Plan implementing procedures.

Industry stated that they are opposed to any requirements to submit plant-specific SAMG documents. The staff stated that these documents would be useful to the NRC Incident Response teams at Headquarters and the Regions.

Staff indicated that an NRC policy decision on this will be needed.

A number of high level staff comments on the proposed industry initiative on severe accident management (described in NUMARC's November 2, 1993 letter) were provided. The staff indicated that the scope of the proposal is appropriate in that it addresses all major elements of accident management. However, the staff noted that the language and commitments in the document are vague, and that hypothetically, utilities could claim to be in compliance without taking any significant further actions, including performing a systematic assessment of the capability to deal with important sequences identified in the IPE.

D. Modeen (NUMARC) reiterated the standing industry position that licensees require flexibility in assessment and implementation.

He also indicated that the draft formal position-reflects that need and that the wording is consistent with industry positions taken on other issues. The section in the initiative dealing with Utility Self Evaluation was also identified as needing significant 1

v

'Ashok.C. Thadani

--4 additional detail. The staff indicated.that a formal response to the letter will be forthcoming.

It was agreed that major results and staff feedback resulting from this meeting will be discussed at a subsequent management-level NRC-NUMARC meeting on December 21.

Original signed by:

Robert L. Palla, Jr.

Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch 1

Division of Systems Safety and Analysis

Enclosures:

As stated DISTRIBUTION:

JJohnson WRasin (1:UMARC)

AEl-Bassioni DModeen (NUMARC)

RPalla Central Files i

NRC PDR SPSB r/f i

ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT DISTRIBUTION TMurley,12 G 18 FMiraglia, 12 G 18 WRussell, 12 G 18 BBoger, 10 H 5 FGillespie, 12 G 18 AThadani, 8 E 2 MTaylor, 17 G 21 DMarksberry, MNBB 3206 4

EJordan, MNBB 3701 JRosenthal, MNBB 9715 RBarrett, 8 H 7 EBeckjord, NLS 007 TSpeis, NLS 007 BSheron, NLS 007 RJones, 8 E 23 DHouston, P 315 JKudrick, 8 D 1 RErickson, 9 H 19 DDesaulniers, 10 D 24 RGallo,10 D 18 WPasedag, DOE i

0FC SPSB:DSSA:NRR SC:SPSB;,gSS,A, ABC:SPSB DSS,A

.NAME-RPalla:b[k AEl-Ba'sd8 JJohnson D DATE 01/(4/94 01/ / /,/94 Ol/fy/94

?

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: AMDEC9. MET

l l

i

p

),,g(

m

,,, e ow wiuos as i 1

a_--

p.g c 9', if f 3 1

g,qm2 ifM4M77c7/t/

^ 48rd Zd i

f306 s mM mec//wrAl5i"sd

$s,l Sop-io9y o

+

G481 4 E7HA E' coh EX z e t - 8~ S 7 - S T*? T 7

/ WC/NW.edW (3'00CUh/96f 362' 'E2/62 l

%,d M od ee.n-a v m n c.

a o a - 8 7a -118 o foAcer

4. Lau /

Gr Pudue/ ear-ps / - 3/4. -?' SK

//,,$.

Ell /

(E'LL,.- $y yes 725-S'3$$

%w 7u,.na-ep-c..

ys, >11o i

an z -

u a %

\\ncu->

/DAC-lA)hlpeu1pfcl peg Joj-a.q w u-sos-wi 0G k&~~~

L.0 Y

MRlNOLB 30.1-C04-101f Seva 6-O/-f E P R ~L (419 fr5.2dIi :

T>Mt Lea Askp.,s,_/6.2eGr (n.3}4 43%

% csa Ra,g/ww nia a,4-99ze gsw4 6<nw L <J

& Pa V/S+vrG

'?! YT+'n')1 R.

l u y e- $.s u u hm i b Vlhtif-E s cesj f w 1 6 s,/ k A)5 Lot-43127n C

Southern Nuele.ar Gos')s 7o -6,3 9 L

$dtPer Pssp

% mwg-

$,ca' g8/

G

.,,~wn L.,a (Hr)qsr.wnr:p7 L

i% //in ac,rwx,xsexe cso o see2et 4 ht-m_

(r O n2-%

/k4 Emch xxc/M/6 30t-.P4~24-zj 5<, / ],L,2 A/u.f j'30,) 2 ra 2se7-R2ED Ent2sou cm/wess

$19J'g4g-,g,5 l

D o n TTbhbri NR.C_

30) 07 'i GL 1

3

BWR -OWNERS' GROUP SEVERE ACCIDENT' MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND ~

DECEMBER 9,1993-m R.

N' k

k p.

...~..

INTRODUCTION TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED o

Previous NRC discussions o

Accident.-management guidance -products o

Methodology-for flexible. assignment of strategies o

Prioritization of training / requal

^

o.

Status of1TechnicalLSupport Guidance development

~

o, Specific SAM strategies e

_ W f'" m p<

~, _..,., _..

.~.n,

._..-.-._,...-.--.-_.-......m,

...,,. -.., ~...

A if.k DISCUSSIONS TO-DATE WITH NRC o

NRC / Industry meeting on February 2,1993

- BWROG presented conceptual proposal for prioritizing severe accident training f requal responsibility NRC staff agreed with. concept but requested more details o

BWROG performed internal review of-severe accident management guidance development in : March 1993 Found Lapproach. technically sound-

- Directed Accident. Management -Working Group (AMWG) to.. develop methodology for flexibly assigning EPG info to SAMG (EAMPs) because of wide diversityf of BWR accident'managementL philosophies-Directed AMWG to develop training / requal prioritization proposal further i

m.

.m

-__,i-m m

a.--

m,

_.- i......, _ _ _

DISCUSSIONS TO DATE WITH NRC AMWG developed assignment methodology and prioritization proposal in o

April - June ~ 1993 o

NRC./ Industry Senior Management Meeting June 3,1993

.BWROG requested consideration of flexible assignment and prioritized training concepts NRC agreed _ in concept NRClindicated -NUREG 1021.Rev 7 and proposed rule change should-address' concerns over. scenario complexity Industry concerned about consistent implementation: of agreements on training / requal-throughout Regions

-NRC staff indicated;further written guidance and _ workshops could be provided-if,necessary sto assure. consistent implementation i.

t

. ~.

d 1.

- 9,,f DISCUSSIONS TO DATE WITH NRC BWROG presented more detailed information on methodologies to NRC e

o on July 17

'o NRC continued to be receptive -to concepts-l concerned that flexible assignment would lead to inconsistent utility-

- implementation of. EPGs; documentation also an issue a

wanted training / requal prioritization to be based on more than. PRA j

results;.offsite consequences should also be considered wanted more,information on how flexible assignment; methodology-might be applied This ; additional'information was supplied Eto NRC on August 20 ~

o Today: Want to achieve agreement on flexible. assignment.and o-3 training /requal prioritization,:and begin discussing implementation stepsi v., - -

w.

...,e

..e.--,-.,

,..-c.

4.

r-w m v.-y,,

w e..

4

• -+,*m,,.

..r..,.

.m,-

.w w_.,

mm.,-..u.

..-~.-*wv

fi i

BWROG Generic Accident Management Guidelines-l-

L i

i 3

i i

Accident Management Guidelines Overview I

1 i

1 r i f Emergency Procedure Technical Support Guidelines Guidelines i

i i

i7 1 f Plant-Specific 3

Technical ' Guidelines

}

Location. -

Assignment i

I I

i

?

I f

.1 f.

i f. '

s j

Emergency -

ERO. Severe Acci-Plant-Specific.

Operating dent Management:

-Technical Support I

Procedures Procedures Guidelines i

1

j... _._. '. Plant-Specific' implementation of Accident Management Guidelines--

.j

~

[--

'e ab

(

L.,

's

{}M 9

4 BWROG ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE PRODUCTS f

o

- BWROG generic " Accident Management Guidance," or AMGs, which

' includes q

EPGs

. Technical Support Guidelines for.ERO use 1

l L

o Flexible assignment criteria'for utility. use in assigning generic EPG l

actions or strat.egies to EOPs for Control Room portion of management-of:

l severe accident' response, or ERO Accident-Management Procedures (EAMPs)for ERO /TSC portion of management of severe accident-a l

response L

~

o

- Training / requal prioritization criteria

.o Training. materials- (later) 1 n

1. ,.-..-,.w..-+--

U,. -

,,,-e-~-

n--

+ -

e E4 -

v-z-..

-.,.,,,..-i...,,

..,p%.6

,,s,

. u 6,.,

,iw E._,-,..,.u9. e -

an------.e-

- -w-ea r - -w w e

--ve

~

r a i-

-n

w-r-s

y UTILITY SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PRODUCTS Utilities will develop, within the guidelines of the forthcoming NUMARC o

initiative an appropriate combination of EOPs and EAMPs for management of severe accidents, likely within the context of existing Emergency Preparedness procedures appropriate plant-specific technical support guidance to support the procedures noted above training programs (likely within the context of existing training programs) which utilize INPO and BWROG training materials and appropriately prioritize severe accident training with other training needs

~

e-

,e w,

--m

+

y

- METHODOLOGY FOR FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT OF EPG ACTIONS TO EOPs AND EAMPs o

Methodology is generic BWROG product along with Accident Management Guidelines; seen by' BWROG as essential'to successful implementation of-severe accident management-a o

Intended'to provide consistent. approach for utility application of EPG o

Intended for use by. utilities-on individual EPG strategies.(as desired) to

. assure-best location for? strategies (control room or ERO / TSC) without need for documentina as deviations from EPGs o

Methodology: enhances safety..by placing strategy where accident best managed; strategy will be' more likely-used -effectively j

o Transfer to'EAMPs involves ' shift of control; action doesn't go away o

There are' good reasons for plant-specific: differences in strategy locations t

t

~

ee-.-m

--+u.a

• %..nm.ca.ew-*

---ee r=

+.~a.

e=-rm-Ne=-w iw-=.--e

' +

e he-e-i,

+ri

• 's

'ne--v.

4

,e.-

-+av-o mis e

- m a w we a

e--+-

-e ise-=-a-,

yv-eg m-r-e y m e^-4.vesww***,e-.e+-

'e-inr--m-9 m-u-

,e.-*t-

.s 3.

FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA a

o

. Deterministic o

. Mechanistic o

Probabilistic 4

e 9

9

... +

..-- -.- - _-. --._..-_.....,...._,,...-.,~......~:

..,.8

-s.

e-

,...., +

..s.,

~ -.,.,,

+,.~-+..,,,.-.n...

e 1

0 FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA.

I o

DETERMINISTIC

~

If action is assumed in FSAR design-basis -events, determine if moving action -to -EAMPs conflicts with FSAR assumptions If. moving action does not conflict with design basis assumptions,.no

~

..further-action required If moving action conflicts with FSAR design basis-assumptions, utility _ must either leave-action in EOPs or change plant-design basis t

f

m. ---mu.

2.--ma m. %a. -.m u wm um.amm ai>

a-em.,

e

.a1 -.a

$ 4eme,

y e

-e.&4 yhe m

Wu ryh w e

?

e -e w-m wet- ' deb 5 W%e--?-4 err ma ec3 F6-"w.+-i-.

74m ogaw-,,

.e.&geg w-g.-i-*4#4 rwigi-erh-C- Mi e4-m W r-YEM

r FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA o

MECHANISTIC Requires consideration of:

Time' frame in which. action might credibly _ be required Time frame required to activate-the ERO Ability -of Operations / Control Room to perform -action. unaided i

Ability of-ERO to add value to the action Documented engineering judgment or analysis to be used in all cases; l

Majority of actions 'will fall. into. one of two categories

' Action isiplaced'in EOPs fif required before ERO manning. and-

. CR can: perform unaided

? Action may be placed in EAMPs if. not required prior to: ERO.

. formation for credible sequences i

m 1 ww

.-m i ammmm m-m z..m a t.__m_.am____._., _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _,,_ _ _, _, _ _ ___u._

r e.,w m.

auw.

ge u

c-

,e e icy 4 4.e.m.

a 4,,c9 w

y yn

,a

,,.sr mp y a g,. _, _.

c.

n,,.,,w,.p

,3pg g

g i y-4=,

2 FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA l

t o

MECHANISTIC (continued).

For actions requiredSfor credible events-prior to ERO formation' and ERO would enhanceicontrol room.-(CR)_ response, add the enhancement to. the EOPs,- QB provide -a': default in the EOPs for. proper CR management of the event:until ERO formed' Credible events are those in sequences-whose frequency is-greater-than 1 E-6-(per NUMARC 91-04 guidelines) 1 h

4 b

L 4

t

.mm.

m m-on -

=w

.se.w.,=

m s +..-

=*.iv

• • =m-wwen

-+

e

..,n--we w=-wd+

,w v.m-.<

=,-

e.i e e s-w m==e n--- er + e w%.

+-,=,- = =me

-i wr-

=r n---

e.

5-w

' w w

FLEXIBLE' ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA

.o PROBABILISTIC PSA. measures : (risk. significance)

Risk Reduction Worth

' Risk Achievement Worth Fussell - Vesely importance i

Release importance Frequency of need1for action l

May place in LEAMPs-if not risk significant Best location -analysis' (if. action 'Is risk significant)

Parameter-indication availability 1

L-Amount of detailed. attention needed for analysis-

~*-

Training,-experience, background needed to perform action b

,,, aMs. s.

$I.;.

t

- FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA:

o PROBABILISTIC (continued)

- Other factors (ii. action is risk significant)

NUMARC '91-04 guidelines

'.F

. Simple action with' observable symptoms?

. Offsite' consequences -

Confirmation of ' action?

~

Potential' for: equipment damage Future l action 1 precluded?

Management decision on ' risk acceptability needed?

Legallresponsibility 'for control t

5

. )

A i

emirw,-,,

+, - e w y, m s,wm.,.,

,-r-,.., =e4 w

v9i.,.,erew-e.,.,'

• wes ryy w.e-.w.,,..

.-,,e4ev,.rg-.-w-*w4-,.e,=.-.,es.-ew..-we--

-wwwm,w,

-.-ee,...,.m..,

m w--ee.-

>,w.r--,-

-.~.,.2 y--g..

RULES.FOR - APPLICATION OF CRITERIA-o Application 1not required; default is EPG (as revised by BWROG) translated directly' to EOPs-

~

o -

Criteria-may 'be applied to one action or to one or more strategies o

All 3 criteria must be considered; selective application not permitted o

There is no preferred order for. applying _ the criteria o

Actions placed in EAMPs must be fully-documented (checklist under development, but-final documentation up to utility) o-Placement in.EAMPs not considered a deviation ifl criteria used properly o

Based 'on criteria, an action that is not required to -be. located in ther EOPs may be located in the 'EAMPs (or the EOPs ~if the utilityEdesires).

An action. required to be located in the EOPs may nat be: located-in: the

~

EAMPs without,taking a deviation o-If any actions are. located in EAMPs, the utility must document proper coordination of those actions with related EOPs-C{ ~

u z

APPLICATIONS OF FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA o

Different plants can legitimately locate the same strategies in different locations based on plant-specific differences 4

t o

Example of applying criteria to stopping containment flooding when TAF.

is reached

- Plant A: Place in EOPs because action credited in plant FSAR and pla'nt does -not want'.to change design basis, even if. other criteria.

. permit placement in EAMPs Plant B:..May place in-EAMPs because it. would not -conflict with FSAR= to do so; action occurs after'ERO formed and no LEOP' enhancement needed; action is not risk. significant and placing in-3 EAMPs would not make action-risk significant i

5 r - e ve-sw- - we t w w ww w * +-

• w r e-v+e# eww vi

-ww.v--w+<*

n-w = + w w w

• n-,

r ww -

ve w-w - w w'+ e e w--

v.- e v=

<-w-i,wwr, w=w-w w

,a e 4 rwe r..

. -,,= v r'wr-a w,-em*

wwi w-##--

-wrw, w--w w w

,*-,_ws,

-t-wse w sww--we-o w-

• - w m ww**wve=

1 7

L APPLICATIONS OF FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA-Example of criteria to recovery from RPV flooding L

o Plant C:1 Place in EOPs because action may be completed before; TSC. manning- (requires 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />), even 'if other criteria ' allow' placement in EAMPs Plant D: May place in EAMPs because action-required-only. after TSC manning in 45' minutes; action -not. credited in FSAR; action iis not risk significant.and-placing in EAMPs~ would not make action risk significant o

Example ofi applying. criteria to alternate. boration Plant E: Place in-EOPs because alternate boration. is risk significant in IPE and placing inLEAMPsiwould offer less effective management

.of. event even if other criteria permit placement in EAMPs Plant F: May place.in EAMPs..because not risk significant. in IPE and placing: in EAMPs would :not make action riskL significant; action not' a

credited in.FSAR t

'E

'+

g.

ESTIMATE OF' ASSIGNMENT IMPACT ON EXISTING EPG STRATEGIES STRATEGY EOPs EAMPs EITHER/BOTH UNCERTAIN N, and H, Control 3

5 6

1 Containment Flooding 1

7 7

0 2nd Half RPV Flooding 1

11 3

0 Venting due to High 4

7 3

1 Containment Pressure Radiation Release 12 0

2 1

Alternate boration S

9 0

1 ATWS and RPV Flooding 7

2 0

6 Venting CRDs 3

9 0

3 Secondary Containment Water 6

2 3

4 Level Control Alternate Emergency 9

2 2

2 Depressurization l

l l

l l

PRIORITIZATION OF TRAINING / REQUAL o

Basic premises:

BWR EPGs go well into severe accident space Training on'the routine operations which, successfully performed, pre.ventLaccidents from even beginning is more important than training -~on' severe. accident scenarios Training on accident prevention in the early stages of-a transient is more important than training on accident mitiaation once the-core has been damaged Major contributors to core ' damage frequency are' more important to

. train on than' insignificant ones-SomeLlimitation of ERO training in' severe accidents is appropriate;

. suitable. criteria:to be.' coordinated with INPO guidelines.

a 1.-

e.

m 4--

m_.._m____m_._._A-,

.[..-,

.~mc s

-mm'

..-xm m

m.

m m

me o

an,

.-m

..m

,'r__

e-.

m-

-ie.....

ur PRIORITIZATION OF TRAINING / REQUAL o

Basic premises-(continued):

Severe.' accident training for operators not eliminated. but given

. appropriate safety priority and -placed in proper context with other-training requireme'nts Scenario length and _ needLfor getting into multiple branches and contingencies should be considered. In examining. operators on-important actions 9

Requal exams should' reflect the actual frequency, amount, 'and type-of training conducted at-the plant r

Regional-examiners, NRR, and utilities should. have a common L

perspective (supported.by written guidanceL and industry / NRC l

workshops, if necessary) on the " rules" for training and examination

-on - severe. ac_cident material M W

- V"-mP4f N tf ID45EMT YPF W '4+ d**MW

-- 14Prt e

--T M Y T8 P OT R-4

-4 6-'

- W -d w%'"

W'

• 'TF'ut"W=A*C S M T*

Y-W'fD W'-M F

ls*P-@

d'+P*W9+'-"'e fMN e

1NI'A T

W%iW dWe

• • W'W

• • 'w*"* * -**

umd W--

^-b--

-E-----

'AA-A""ha--h

SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT-TRAINING FOR CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS EOPs and EOP Revisions o

initial training o

Requal training (classroom, simulator, JPMs), with frequency, amount, and type of trainir.g based on utility; evaluation of Importance: see flexible assignment criteria l

Consequences: timing,. size, frequency of releases- (as indicated by.

level 2. IPE -results and NUMARC 91-04 criteria =for-containment bypass).' associated with failure ' of action / strategy OtherL criteria I

frequencyLof action difficulty of action current' simulator -capability

-operator requal-template limitations

~

limitations oniactions included in.50-minute simulator scenario historical 1 operator failure causes / rates t

4

,c'

'y

~ SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TRAINING

' FOR CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS t

EAMP/TSG o

initial overview training

~

~

i D

4 4

T

--h v

-%e-t

-eer-e

.A-+i6 ei>c***

e"+=

w-m W

1. W'<W-* Pee-w wa m Me e e m 4 ->d 4 98AmD"-

WM'r' er*M E'

'4e t-Ier usirk

• .'e4 N-we-4 P

Wm"4

='PT8+d e

• W-W-dW4r tr e

'1&-e 4

mit w

9+t MNe bl m

h 4'

SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT TRAINING FOR ERO /TSC PERSONNEL EOPs'/ EOP Revisions o

Initial-overview training.

EAMP / TSG Uses INPO and BWROG training materials within context of existing ERO o-tram,ing -

Amount and frequency of-initial EAMP training and subsequent EAMP' o

training / evaluation for ' plant considers number and type of SA' actions assigned to ERO for decisionmaking.

CDF'importance of actions release ' timing, size, and frequency associated with actions other task-specific considerations Amount l and frequency 'of initial TSG. training and subsequent TSG-

. o

' training / evaluation based on INPO/BWROG training materials, utility-specific rnanpower. assignments, degree of. support needed for specific actions

.m

.-4

...__,_,,,,.m.

~

^

- PRIORITIZATION OF TRAINING / REQUAL.

o Knowledge and training requirements for BWR operators already felt to' be at; upper limit:

i -

o Prioritization of ' training /requal needed-to place severe accident-

~

management--related training and examination in perspective with other training needs and requirements-a o

Requal exams should reflect the actual frequency, amount, and type of training conducted at the plant o-Regional exa' miners, NRR, and utilities:should have a common-i perspective (supported-by written guidance and in'dustry/ NRC workshops, if-necessary).on the " rules" for training and examination: on-severe accident material 4

1

.,-m.-*ieme.~,

-.--ww<.....ew-

- - -, +

,ww--

,,r.

. *,==,. * - - -,ei.e w we, em e s.,

emw e

4~

..,mv..sn,-~v a

4

.--e+

+ -,

s v, >- w

--ee.=-a-,

STATUS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT GUIDANCE (TSG)

Products provided at this meeting o

draft Table of Contents (handout) draft diagram " Product and Supporting Elements of TSG" draft flow chart "TSG Process in the TSC" One example of Control Parameter Assessment Guideline has been o

completed by contractor team TSG draft containing examples of all elements (sufficient to assess how o

elements of TSG work together) intended for completion by February 28, 1994 to support NUMARC initiative schedule Full draft of TSG intended for completion by May 1,1994-o

-NUMARC initiative schedule and NRC review schedule may impact o

BWROG schedule 11~

GENERAL AREAS FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY CHANGES o

Steam cooling o

Prevention of repressurization o

Combustible gas control o

Containment flooding

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION -ON-ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY CHANGES j

l o

Steam Cooling Change reference from TAF to Minimum Steam Cooling. RPV Water Level 1

Allow systems to recover RPV. level if restoration results in level increase between MSCRWL and.MZlRWL o

Prevention of Repressurization Once RPV ' depressurization is required, ensures the RPV. remains depressurized via SRVs or alternate. depressurization methods o-Combustible - Gas.: Control Allows.' purging with. nitrogen Lbefore> high concentrations of hydrogen' exist.-

.T

_d

-L.;

PRELIMINARY-INFORMATION ON ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY CHANGES o

Containment Flooding Integrates containment flooding strategy with degraded core

. conditions

- Specifies appropriate timing and coordination of actions to:

inject 'to the RPV inject.to the containment

- vent the. containment-vent the RPV

- spray the drywell New considerations RPV level-above whichicore debris will be retained in-vessel i

RPV. injection. flow: rate above which core? debris will be Lretained

- in-vessel containment water level. below which pressure suppression is maintained i

--.. a.

.m 2

..e.

2,-

sn. w w - e e -ee - o -

• w we-r w

--w w

-e

--e--

-#,r+

-,+.w-enr-s rwi n --

g-w w - w

+

a,e-.

=

a.

-w

=e.-ww-,-4.

m er....

e,

+

--rm..we.

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON

- ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY CHANGES Integrated Containment Flooding Strategy is the-most significant change

.o o

Considers the.following factors Whether there is sufficient water in -vessel' to _ keep the debris in -

~

vessel-Whether there is a sufficient flow rate in -vessel-to keep -the. debris-in - vessel Whether there is a requirement for pressure suppression' assuming that a vessel breach is possible

- Whether core debris is ex-vessel S

o Coordinated with primary containment venting.

o Entry condition: loss of adequate-core cooling n.,s--

n.

...ve-

- e

- - +, =

w

..w

.,U.

,w m-e,s-n+

o e

+- -

.'er..

=

E.,s

• mi,, -ww-----

m m

v

,n*u__

mm 2

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY CHANGES INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT FLOODING STRATEGY o

Integrates the-following actions RPV -injection Containment injection Containment sprays Containment venting RPV venting m

u.

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON l

ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY. CHANGES lNTEGRATED CONTAINMENT FLOODING STRATEGY if core debris not ex-vessel, and water level.. sufficient to prevent RPV o

breach pressure suppression not required

' damaged' fuel must be submerged for long-term cooling and-a scrubbing in - vessel if core debris not ex-vessel, water -level not sufficient to prevent RPV o

breach, and RPV injection rate sufficient-to prevent RPV breach

.. pressure. suppression not required in vessel core debris -must be. submerged to limit.RCS temperatures and preverit DW-failure 6

]

~

PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON

' ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY CHANGES INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT FLOODING STRATEGY o

If core debris not ex-vessel; water level not sufficient to prevent RPV breach; RPV injection rate-not-sufficient to prevent _RPV breach; SPWL and PC. pressure within -pressure suppression pressure-l pressure suppression required in -vessel core-debris ~ should be submerged to limit RCS temperatures and prevent DW failure if ' pressure suppression can be mamtained o

if core. debris not ex-vessel; water level not sufficient to Lprevent RPV breach';: RPV : injection rate not sufficient to prevent RPV breach; SPWL and PC pressure:not within pressure suppression pressure-pressure suppression -lost-

~

in - vessel-core debrisLmust be submerged to limit--RCS ' temperatures.

and -prevent-DW failure -

i I '

b,, -

m.v.

-E-

,., + -

-v

-- ~

-m*~

+-

em, 2

7---=---

"- - ---- - ------- --- - - - - - -2 12 - ----- "'

,y~.,m.,-

+6

-v.

.--,--,-,w--

4 PRELIMINARY INFORMATION ON

- ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY ~ CHANGES INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT; FLOODING STRATEGY q

o if -core debris. is ex -vessel -

pressure-suppression not required j

debris must.be. submerged to terminate CCI and prevent drywell s

failure i

l d

i l

l f-

-m.-2

.,_~m...

...,s

.n.cc....- *. > < -

,=%,-

..#,~,v

,.s.,e...c.~...

..v..-..

,m,

,..~i,,. - - -...- > -.,, -

.e.s.

.-,,s,,

.~,,.t--

,wr E

o tv

6 POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA TO INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT FLOODING STRATEGY o

Plant G Place in EOPs because some action required before ERO formed, and risk significance is relatively high, and moving to EAMPs would decrease effectiveness of event management o

Plant H Place in EAMPs because action not required until after ERO formed, and risk significance is low and moving to EAMPs would increase effectiveness of event -management

I s

POTENTIAL APPLICATION OF: FLEXIBLE ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA TO INTEGRATED CONTAINMENT FLOODING STRATEGY 4-P o

Plant J

-Portions of ICFS involvina certain or nossible ex-vessel core debris:

Place in EAMPs because. actions not required until after ERO formed, and risk significance is low and ' moving to EAMPs would increase effectiveness of event management

.Po'rtions of ICFS where RPV breach not expected: Place in EOPs because some action required before ERO formed, risk significance is-relatively high, and moving to EAMPs would decrease effectiveness of event management L

Assure-appropriate: interface / communication between CR and ERO

^

L for-.overall~ management of the strategy l-i l-b

-4 c.

m,____.

-.,._.w.

..,..-,-_,._..,,,--,___.-...,u..,

..m,

.s,.....

4

.-s

..m

..,,wve,

w.,

• L _.

FUTURE ACTIONS l-o NRC Staff feedback-on assignment flexibility and training / requal prioritization proposals i

o Agreement on steps.for consistent implementation of assignment flexibility and training /requal prioritization -by industry and -NRC-

Another BWROG / NRC meeting to discuss-implementation details?

Additional written guidance to Regions?

Guidance to industry in revision to-NUMARC 91-047-NRC Land industry workshops?-

o Feedback on strategy changesLand TSG development

4, Topic Subject Mitigation Strategies Inject Water into RCS/RPV Restart the RCPs Depressurize the RCS T

Control. Containment Conditions

--temperature / pressure

--sprays / coolers / venting I

Reduce Containment Hydrogen Inject Water into Containment

{

k t

Accident Management Training Slide I g

- ~..

4 e'

Topic Subject Mitigation Strategies Spray within the RPV (BWR)

Inert Containment (BWR)

Spray / Flood Secondary Cont.

Overview of Mitigation Strategies

• Safety Assessment Overview # Probabilistic Safety Assessment-i m,

Likely Core Damage Sequences e

I l

l frr 1

.\\ccident Management Training Slide 2

Topic Subject Accident Assessmentu RCS Damage Assessment Containment Damage: Assessment F

Decision Makinh Accident Management Plan Development L

Training for Decision Makers Only

1. . Training for Evaluators and Decision Makers i

L..lcin \\l.A.ipeineni l r.uning Slide 3

9-r Accident Management Videotape Three Distinct Segments of Videotape core damage sequences core recovery containment control Production of the videotape will begin in January 1994. Seung Oh and Bob Henry have been contacted as technical consultants.

Accident Management Training l Slide 4

.~....

an Status of Lesson Material l

Draft written material will be made available for review December 1993.

Material will be made available for review by the

~

Academy Council, SPAC, and the INPO Accident Management Working. Group.

The final product is scheduled for delivery March.

1994.

~

The delivery date for the videotape.is September

~

1994.

Accident Management Training Slide 5'

-. =.

j l

"Ashok C. Thadani !

l additional detail. The staff indicated that a formal response to the.

-i letter will be forthcoming.

.j It was agreed that major results and staff feedback resulting from'this meeting will be' discussed at a subsequent management-level NRC-NUMARC meeting

-l on December 21.

i 5

Original signed by:

Robert L. Palla, Jr.

f Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch Division of Systems Safety and Analysis i

Enclosures:

As stated

. DISTRIBUTION:

JJohnson WRasin (NUMARC)

AEl-Bassioni DModeen (NUMARC) l RPalla CentralfFiles:

L NRC PDR SPSB r/f j

l ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT DISTRIBUTION 1

TMurley,12 G 18 FMiraglia, 12 G 18 WRussell, 12 G 18 BBoger, 10 H 5 FGillespie, 12 G 18 AThadani~, 8 E 2 MTaylor, 17 G 21 DMarksberry, MNBB 3206 EJordan, MNBB 3701 JRosenthal, MNBB 9715 RBarrett, 8 H 7 EBeckjord, NLS 007 TSpeis, NLS 007 BSheron, NLS 007 i

RJones, 8 E 23 DHouston, P 315 JKudrick, 8 D 1 RErickson, 9 H 19 DDesaulniers,10 0 24 RGallo,10 D 18 WPasedag, DOE l

0FC SPSB:DSSA:NRR SC:SPSB:DS,SA ABC:SPSB,:DSSA 1

n,

.i o

NAME. RPalla:bd/,[

AEl-BasU1$$f JJohnson O

.j DATE 01/(y/94 01/ /t/94 01/fq/94

]j OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Documerit Name: AMDEC9. MET i

1 l

'_