ML20059H563
| ML20059H563 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059H560 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9009180073 | |
| Download: ML20059H563 (5) | |
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. UNITED STATES p,!
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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%..... g lJ LSAFETY EhALUATION.BY THE.0FFICE.0F NUCLEAR. REACTOR REGULATIO
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- AMENDNENT.NOS.156.. AND. -158 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE.NOS. DPR-44 and DPR-56 i
PHILADELPHIA-ELECTRIC *.0MPANY PUBLIG 5ERVICE.ELTETET M.GA5 COMPANY DELMARVA.POWEF.. AND.Likfd 5UMPANY r-ATLANTIC. CITY ELEUTRIG.0 N PEACH.BOTTOMATOMIC. POWER. STAT!05.UNITNOS.2.AND3 DOCKET.NOS. 50 277.AND.50-278 I
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 28, 1989 as supplemented on February 16, 1990, i
Philadelphia tiectric Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating =
j License Nos. DPR-44 and'DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit-Nos. 2 and:3. The. licensee's February 16 -1990 letter certified that a.
i copy of'the December 28, 1989' application was provided to'the appropriate o
State' official in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(1). The staff has-1 determined that this information does not citer the actions noticed or affect the proposed determination that the amendments involve no-significant hazards consideration published May 2,-1990. The amendments 1
would modify Technical-Specifications =(TS) to reflect the addition of a-
-.high-high: radiation trip signal ~ requirement for the control circuitry of s containment vent and purge isolation valves located on lines larger than"
-two inches in diameter.
As -discussed in the Buckground section, completion of the staff's ~ review of the proposed TS change constitutes closure of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2,-
" Containment Isolation Dependability." The TS change, which addresses Position 7 of Item II.E.4.2, will be effective as of the date of issuance of the license amendments. The other six positions of Item II.E.4.2 were-addressed in previous reviews.
2;0 BACKGROUND s
Item II.E.4.2 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements,"
.provided the results of the staff's evaluation of features needed to improve containment isolation dependability. The staff's position on Item II.E.4.2, Containment Isolation Dependability, was as follows:
(1) Containment isolation system designs shall comply with the recommendations of Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4 (i.e.,
that there be diversity 16 the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation).
(2) All plant personnel shall give careful consideration to the definition of enential ar.d nonessential systems, identify each system determined to be essential, identify each system r
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4 determined to be nonessential, describe the basis for selection f
of each essential system, modify their containment isolation designs accordingly, and report the results of the reevaluation to the NRC.
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.(3) All nonessentiel systems shall be automatically isolated by the 1
containment isolation signal.
(4) The design of control systems for automatic containment isolation valves shall be such that resetting the isolation signal wil'. not result in tne automatic reopening of containment isolation valves.
Reopening of containment isolation valves shall require deliberate c
operator actier..
'(5) The containment setpoint pressure that initiates containment isolation for nonessential penetrations must be reduced to the minimum compatable with normal operating conditions.
(6) Centainm6...c purge valves that do not satisfy the operability i
criteria set forth in Branch Technical Position CSB 6-4 or the Staff Interim Position of October 23, 1979 must be sealed closed as defined in SRP 6.2.4, item II.3.f during operational conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 Furthermore, these valves must be verified to be closed at least every 31 days.
(7) Containment purge and vent isolation valves must close on a high radiation signal.
1 In Reference 1, the staff noted that except for Fcsitions 5, 6, and 7 ci Item II.E.4.2, the review of.the remaining outstanding positions of Ite,
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t II.E.4.2 wc::1d be completed by review of containment purge and venting issues (subsequently designated as Multiplant Action B-24).
Referencts1 also indicated that Position 5 was completed for Peach Bottom, Units 2 and i
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With~ respect to Multiplant Action B-24, Referehce 2 provided the status of the staff's review of containment purge and venting issues.
Reference 2
. identified that the following items needed to be addressed to complete the staff's review:
(a)additionalTechnicalSpecification(TS) restrictions
.were needed on purge and vent operations; (b) staff review of plant specific aspects of purge and vent valve operability information was ongoing; (c) additional TS changes were needed with respect to containment isolation valves and purge and vent valves.
In Reference 3 and 4 the staff transmitted evaluations which resolved the containment purge and vent valve operability Item for Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3.
In Reference 5,^the staff issued license amendments and an associated safety evaluation which addressed the remaining two items of TS restrictions on purge and vent operations and TS changes for the containment purge and vent isolation valves.
Reference 5 identified the i
need for the licensee to complete modifications to connect the safety o
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. grade purge 'and vent valve seal air supply system to the Containment e-.
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Atmospheric Dilution System nitrogen storage tank and to request associated TS surveillance change requests.
In Reference 6, the licensee indicated that the moaifications to the safety grade seal air supply system were implemented and submitted proposed changes to TS surveillance requirements. The proposed TS changes will be reviewed by the staff as a separate licensing action.
'The staff t.onsiders that the activities documented in References 3 through 6 provide closure of the open. items identified for Multiplant Action B-24. As indicated above Positions 1, 2, and 3 of Item II.E.4.2 were addressed as part of the closure o,f B-24 since both Item II.E.8.2 and B-24 involve reconnenda-tions of Standard Review Plan Section 6.2.4.
Position 4 of Item I?,I.4.2 was also closed as part of the resolution of B-24 as indicated in tne safety evaluation transmitted in Reference 7 Position 6 required that containment purge and vent isolation valves must either sh:isfy the operability criteria set forth in PNoch Technical Position CSB 6-4 or the Staff Interim Position of October 23, 1979, or they must be sealed closed during operational conditions 1, 2, and 3.
In Reference 2, the staff transmitted a safety evaluation which concluded that the containment purge and vent isolation valves meet the staff's Interim Position and, thus, Iten II.E.4.2 Position 6 was satisfied for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, '
Units 2 and 3 Position 7 required that containment purge and vent isolation valves close on a high radiation signal. By letter dated December 28, 1989, the licensee submitted a Technical Specificatioi change request which reflected the addition of a high radiation isolation signa; for purge and vent valves.
The staff's evaluation of this proposed TS changt follows.
3.0 EVALUATION The licensee submitted a Technical Specifications change request to reflect a modification to the primary containment isolation system for both Units 2 and 3.
The modification added a high-high radiation tri) signal from the main stack radiation monitors to the control circuit of t1e containment vent and purge isolation valves. The modification was implemented to meet the requirement of Item II.E.4.2(7) of NUREG-0737}n"cluded the addition of the main Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." The proposed TS changes stack radiation monitoring trip function to a table of radiation monitoring systems, addition of awociated surveillance requirements, and associated changes to the table of containment isolation valves and TS Bases pages.
The hit high radiation isolation signal from the main stack ladiation q
monitor., is redundant to the isolation signal derived from the reactor vessel low water level and high drywell pressure si.nals. The high-high radiation signal is activated only when valves A0 2506 and 2507 or valves 2511 and 2512 for Unit 2 (or the evrresponding Unit 3 valves) are open and there is flow through the standby gas treatment system. Therefore, isolation will occur on receipt o' a high-high radiation signal during purging operations,'or containment venting during normal operations.
The isolation signal provides 1
for isolation of purge and vent valves on lines larger than two inches in diameter.
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h The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittal and the associated
-l background information. The staff has determined that, in addition to the primary containment isolation signals from low reactor water level and i
~ll high co.cainment pressure conditions, the licensee is providing another means to detect and indicate an abnormal degradation of the reactor cor13t pressure boundary by, sensing the high radiation level in the main
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s'ack. The Circuitry Change to Close the purge and vent Yalves on high radiation provides another level of assurance that the cons,equences of a i
loss-of-coolant accident will be mitigated. The monitors are not considered safety-related, but were provided to assure diverse isolation signals in the event of an accident. The proposed surveillance requirements provide assurance as to equipment operability and g
testability.
The staff has concluded that the proposed license amendments will satisfy the staff requirements stated in Position 7 of NUREG-0737, i
Item !!.E.4.2 on " Containment Isolation Dependability." The staff has l
determined that the balance of the changes in the licensee's proposed l
amendments are editorial in nature and are acceptable.
In a letter to the BWR Owners Group dated May 7,1986 (Reference 8), the staff provided its position that lines of two inches in diameter or smaller need not-be isolated on a radiation signal, provided that the licensee demonstrates on his docket that the BWROG generic evaluation is applicable to his plant. This demonstration should include an evaluation of the ability of the operators to e
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assess and isolate leakages that would not cause other isolation signals.
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BWROG generic evaluation had assumed a 30 Nute operator action time to close the purge and vent valves.
In Referer e licensee provided its s
evaluation on this item. Remote manusi switches for the two inch, and smaller, purge and vent isolation valve operators are located in the control room to assure accessibility to the operator.
Instrumentation available to determine the need for manual closure of the purge and vent lines includes instrumentation which would detect small leaks in:iide the primary containment as well as increases in radioactive effluent. This instrumentation includes the main stack effluent radiation monitors, the vent stack exhaust radiation monitors for each unit, containment high range area radiation monitors, and drywell pressure monitors. These monitors alarm in the conti'o1 room and serve l
to provide the operators with indications that an abnormal condition exists inside the containment. Since the operator will have taken conscious actions to open these valves, receipt of any of these 01 arms will provide indication of the need to isolate these valves.
Furthermore,. operator training and licensee eme ;ei cy operating procedures L
provide for operator actions in situations which may require manual containment isolation.
Based on our review, the staff concludes that the operator has enough time due to available instrumentation, plant procedures and operator training to isolate the two inch and smaller purge and vent valves within 30 minutes of accident initiation in the event that other isolation signals (containment pressure and reactor water level) fail to cause automatic isolation of the valves.
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5 Based on our review of the licensee's submittal, we conclude that tie proposed TS changes to ensure the capability of the main stack radiation mon tor signal i
circuitry to isolate. containment purge and vent valves located on 1 nes that are larger that tw im.hes in diameter, and the' revisions to the aff teted TS pages, are acceptable and meet the requirements of NUREG-0737, Item II.E.4.2(7).
i 4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL. CONSIDERATIONS These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the ar.mnts, and no significant change in the 1
types,.of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is j
no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational ra11ation exposure. The Comission hes previously issued 3 proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration' and there has been no public coment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the elig(ibility criteria for categorical exclusion set i
forthin10CFR51.22(c)9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environn. ental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prep,ared in connection with the issuance of the amer::ments.
a 5.0 CONCLU$f0N The Comission made a proposed determination that the amendments involve i
no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (55 FR 18412) on May 2,1990 and consulted with the Common-
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wealth of Pennsylvania. No public consnents were received and the 1
Comonwealth of Pennsylvania did not have any comments.
The staff i;as concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the ublic will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and p(2) such actiyities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's i
regulations, and the Vssuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: September 7, 1990 Principal Contributor: G. Y. Suh i
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6-REFERENCES 1.
Letter from J. Stolz, NRC, to E. Bauer, Jr, Philadelphia Elec
!!.E.4.2," dated July 7,1982.
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Letter from J. Stolz, NRC, to E. Bauer, Jr.
Philadelphia Electric Company, " Status of the Review of Contatomen,t Purge and Venting (Multiplant Action B-24) and NUREG-0737. Item II.E.4.2 " dated December 12, 1983.
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Letter from J. Stolz, NRC, to E. Bauer, Jr., Philadelphia Electric Company, " Containment Isolation Dependability by Demonstration of Containment Purge and Vent Valve Operability," dated February 20, 1985.
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Letter from J. Stolz, NRC, to E. Cauer, Jr., Philadelphia Electric Company, " Containment Purge and Vent,"_ dated October 24, 1985, Letter from R. Martin, NRC, to G. Hunger, Jr., Philadelphia Electric i
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Company, " Technical Specifications for Containment Purge and Venting," dated May 8, 1989.
Letter from G. Hunger, Jr., Philadelphia Electric Company, to NRC, 6.
" Technical Specifications Change Request," dated November
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22, 1989.
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7.
Letter from J. Stolz, NRC, to E. Bauer, Jr., Philadelphia Electric 21, 1981.
l Company, dated August 8.
Letter from R. Bernero, HRC, to J. Fulton, BWR Owners Group, dated May 7, 1986.
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Letter from J. Gallagher, Philadelphia Electric Company, to W.- Butler, NRC, dated April 28, 1987.
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