ML20059G245
| ML20059G245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/02/1993 |
| From: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Reid D VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| EA-93-243, NUDOCS 9311080045 | |
| Download: ML20059G245 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000271/1993081
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 1
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475 ALLENDALE ROAD
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KING OF PRUS$1A, PENNSYLVANIA 1940M415
License No. DPR-28
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Docket No. 50-271
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.Mr. Donald Reid
Vice President, Operations
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
RD 5, Box 169
Ferry Road
Brattleboro, Vermont 05301
Dear Mr. Reid:
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-271/93-81, AUGMENTED INSPECTION
TEAM (AIT) FINDINGS RELATIVE TO THE SEPTEMBER 3 AND 9,1993
FUEL HANDLING EVENTS
The subject NRC inspection report was previously provided to you in our letter' dated
October 14, 1993. The report identified several findings that we considered as " Contributing
Causal Factors." Relative to those findings, we are particularly concerned with the significant
weakness in management oversight of fuel handling activities that had allowed many of the
measures intended to prevent a fuel handling accident to become degraded. Procedures were
not used and were not adhered to, and supervisors did not ensure that procedures were followed.
Appropriate training was not provided for fuel handling equipment modifications. Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation management did not communicate expectations and provide
aggressive oversight of fuel handling activities.
On September 21,1993, a public exit meeting was held with you and other members of your
organization to discuss the preliminary findings of the AIT and the findings of your own event
investigation. In that meeting your staff presented the team's evaluation and analysis of the
September 3 and 9,1993 fuel handling events, including preliminary corrective measures taken
or planned. We have also reviewed your corrective action plan submitted to the NRC by letter
dated September 22,1993. We have considered the information and the corrective measures,'
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and we have determined that several apparent violations occurred as described in the. enclosed
summary, which should be considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with "The
General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement
Policy),10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C. Proposed enforcement action is pending the completion
of NRC review of this matter. Accordingly, no Notice of Violation is presently being issued
for these inspection findings. The number and characterization of the apparent violations as
described in the inspection report and the enclosure to this letter may change as a result of
further NRC review.
050010
93110B0045 931102
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ADOCK 05000271
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2 1993
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Mr. Donald Reid
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This matter was discussed with you in a telephone conversation with Mr. James Linville of my
staff on November 2.1993, and an e iforcement conference to examine these apparent violations
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has been scheduled in NRC Regio I on November 23, 1993. The decision to hold an
enforcement conference does not mean > hat a violation has occurred or that enforcement action
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will be taken. The purposes of this conference are to discuss the apparent violation, including
the cause and safety significance; to provide you with an opportunity to point out errors in our
inspection report, and identify corrective actions, taken or planned; and to discuss any other
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information that will help us determine the appropriate enforcement action in accordance with
the Enforcement Policy. In addition, this is an opportunity for you to provide any information
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concerning your perspectives on (1) the severity of the violation (s), and (2) the application of
the factors that the NRC considers when it determines the amount of a civil penalty that may be
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assessed in accordance with Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. No response regarding
these apparent violations is required at this time.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice", a copy of this letter and
its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Thank you for your
cooperation.
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Sincerely,
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Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator
Enclosure: As Stated
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2 1993
Mr. Donald Reid
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cc w/ encl:
R. Wanczyk, Plant Manager
J. Thayer, Vice President, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
L. Tremblay, Senior Licensing Engineer, Yankee Atomic Electric Company
J. Gilroy, Director, Vermont Public Interest Research Group, Inc.
D. Tefft, Administrator, Bureso of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire
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Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
R. Gad, Esquire
G. Bisbee, Esquire
R. Sedano, Vermont Department of Public Service
T. Rapone, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety
Public Document Room (PDR)
local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
K. Abraham, PAO (2 copies)
NRC Resident Inspector
State of New Hampshire, SLO Designee
State of Vermont, SLO Designee
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SLO Designee
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2 1993
Mr. Donald Reid
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bec w/ enc 1:
Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
E. Kelly, DRP
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J. Shedlosky, DRP
D. Holody, ES
J. Durr, DRS
J. Beall, OE
H. Eichenholz, SRI - Vermont Yankee
M. Oprendek, DRP
bec w/enci (VIA E-MAIL):
V. McCree, OEDO
D. Dorman, NRR
W. Butler, NRR
bec w/ encl (AIT REPORTS ONLY):
The Chairman
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Commissioner Rogers
Commissioner Remick
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Commissioner de Planque
J. Taylor, EDO
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T. Murley, NRR
DCD (OWFN PI-37) (Dist. Code #IE10)
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A. Chaffee, NRR/ DORS /EAB
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E. Jordan, AEOD
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P. Bochnert, Chairman, ACRS
K. Raglin, AEOD
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ENCLOSURE
SUM 31ARY OF NRC INSPECTION FINDINGS
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(AIT REPORT 50-271/93-81)
CONSIDERED FOR ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTION
During fuel handling activities associated with Vermont Yankee Refueling Outage XVII, events
occurred on September 3 and 9,1993 that were caused by significant weaknesses in management
oversight. Clear management expectations did not exist for the required level of use of refuel
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procedures. The AIT found a general lack of knowledge of, and widespread instances of failure
to adhere to procedure OP 1101 by operators, engineers, and supervisors. 10 CFR Part 50, -
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Appendix B, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Actions," requires, in part, that conditions adverse to
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quality are promptly identified and corrected. Plant administrative procedure AP 0007, Revision
1, " Corrective Action Reports," requires, in part, that root cause determinations be performed
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to identify the fundamental reason (s) for a problem which when corrected, will minimize the
probability of recurrence.
Vermont Yankee Technical Specification 6.5 requires that procedures involving safety shall be
adhered to. Plant operations procedure OP 1101 (Revisions 21-23), " Management of Refueling
Activities and Fuel Assembly Movement," is written pursuant to Technical Specification 6.5.
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Procedure OP 1101 requires, in part, that during fuel handling (a) the Reactor Engineer (RE)
and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall visually verify fuel grapple closure; (b) the Refuel
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Platform Operator shall attempt to rotate the control console one way and then the other to
verify that the fuel assembly is grappled; and, (c) the SRO shall halt any activity in the event
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of an unusual or abnormal occurrence.
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Also 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,"
requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by instructions of a type
appropriate to the circumstances. Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 13.9.3, requires, in
part, that instructional briefings be held with members of the refueling staff prior to executing
refueling procedures.
On September 3,1993, the RE and SRO assigned to the refuel platform did not verify that the
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grapple was closed and the Refuel Platform Operator did not rotate the console to verify proper
grappling. That console rotation was apparently not performed for other previous fuel moves.
Also, prior to September 3,1993, briefings for refueling operations were not conducted. The
failure to perform these actions contributed to conditions resulting in the dropping of a fuel
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assembly on September 3. In addition, on September 9, the Senior Reac'or Operator did not
halt refueling activities following indications that a fuel assembly had been inadvertently lowered
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onto core internals; a condition classified as " abnormal," per procedure OP 1101.
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