ML20059E436
| ML20059E436 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1994 |
| From: | Flack E NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Winslow T GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| References | |
| TAC-L21618, NUDOCS 9401110165 | |
| Download: ML20059E436 (15) | |
Text
i D'ocket 70-1113 J/@95 Ofijc4 License.SNM-1097 Mr. T. Preston Winslow, Manager Emergency Preparedness, Security and Material Control Accountability GE Nuclear Energy General Electric Company Nuclear Energy Production j
P.O. Box 780 Wilmington, NC 28402 i
Dear Mr. Winslow:
SUBJECT:
REVISED RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLAN (TAC NO. L21618)
We have completed our review of the revised Radiological Contingency and Emergancy Plan dated April 29, 1993 (transmitted by a May 3, 1993, letter),
and conclude that additional information is needed before final action can be taken.
Our comments are enclosed.
Please submit the requested information as page changes to the revised plan or as a complete resubmittal which replaces the April 29, 1993, submittal.
Indicate changes with vertical bars in the page margins.
The requested information should be submitted within 45 days of the date of this letter.
Please reference the above Tac No. in future correspondence related to this request.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Kevin Ramsey at (301) 504-2534 or me at (301) 504-240S.
Sincerely, Originals! ped by T(?ox O Edwin D. Flack Senior Health Physicist Licensing Section 1 Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
Enclosure:
As stated DISTRIBUTION: (Control No. 320S)
Docket 70-1113 PDR NRC File Center Region II NMSS r/f FCSS r/f FCLB r/f FCLSI r/f GTroup RII HZibul sky
[EDFlack-A:\\ REVISED]
- See previous concurrence OFC FCLB E
IM0B E
FLLB E
FCLB 6
NAME EFlack*
KRamsey*
DAHoadley*
meigh DATE 12/30/93 12/30/93 1/03/94 1/5/94 C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 3
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, DOCKET 70-1113 j
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION COMMENTS ON THE RADIOLOGICAL CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLAN, REVISION 0, DATED APRIL 29, 1993.
1.
The list of effective pages on page i should list every page of the appendices.
l 2.
Section 1.2 should direct the reader to the large site map in Appendix E.
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3.
There is conflicting labeling on some of the figures.
Page 1.7 is labeled as Figure 1.1 along the top and Figure 2 in the lower right corner.
Page 2.12 is labeled as Figure 2.1 in the lower right corner and Figure 3-7 in the upper right corner.
The licensee should verify that the labeling on all of the figures is accurate.
4.
The legends or Figures 1.6 and 2.1 are difficult to read.
The licensee should enlarge or retype the information to make it legible.
In addition, the information about hazardous chemical storage tanks appears i
to be conflicting.
Figure 1.6 shows a caustic tank and a carbon dioxide tank in the FM0/FM0X building.
However, Figure 2.1 shows a waste oil / coolant tank and propane tanks in approximately the same locations.
Complete'and accurate information about hazardous chemical tanks should be consolidated in one section of the plan.
5.
" Property" is misspelled on Page 1.30 at the end of the second line.
6.
Section 2.1.4 should identify the locations where criticality. accidents could occur and specify the location and cause of the worst case criticality accident described in the plan.
7.
Chapter 3 defines the emergency classifications as Alert and Site Emergency.
The second classification should be Site Area Emergency pursuant to 10 CFR 70.22(i)(3)(iii).
8.
An Unusual Event classification is not required by 10 CFR Part 70, but it is not prohibited either. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 only list Alert and Site Area Emergency even though Section 3.1.1 appears to define Unusual
?
Event as part of the classification scheme.
The licensee may wish to include the Unusual Event classification in its tables and procedures for clarity.
9.
The terms used to discuss the types of accidents are inconsistent. All l
of the terms needed to discuss different types of accidents should be clearly defined in Chapter 2.
These should be the only terms used in Enclosure m-.-
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the rest of the plan. The licensee should revise the plan to use I
consistent accident type terms in every chapter. An example of the inconsistent terminology is listed below:
Accident Types Accident Types Accident Types l
in Chapter 2 in Chapter 3 in Chapter 5 Radiological Bomb Threat Criticality Fire / Explosion Chemical / Toxic Fire / Explosion UF Release Fire Radiological 4
Criticality Explosion Environmental Non-radiological Criticality Bomb Threat Severe Weather Severe Weather Radiological Civil Disorder Security 10.
Section 3.2 should specify the minimum frequency of updates to each of the offsite response organizations notified.
11.
On page 3.12, paragraph before Section 3,3, the reference to Section 5.4 should be more specific. We recommend using "Section 5.4.1.1."
12.
Some of the references to the appendices are not accurate.
Section 4.2.1 refers to Appendix B for a list of implementing procedures but this list is in Appendix C.
In addition, Section 4.2.1 refers to Appendix C for the Emergency Director delegation letter but the letter is in Appendix A.
The licensee should ensure that all references to the appendices are accurate.
- 13. Although the response to NRC. comment 20 states that correlations were made between potential accidents and mitigating strategies in Chapter 5, the overall strategy for mitigating'each type of accident is still not clear. Section 5.3 should clearly address each type of accident defined i
in the plan and describe the overall strategy for mitigating the consequences of each accident. The description should include the criteria for partial and complete shutdown of the facility and the time required for shutdown.
14.
The response to NRC comment 22 does not address the deficiency identified. Table 5.3 (formerly Table 5.2) still states that professional rescue personnel " volunteer" for emergency exposures by their choice of employment. This is unacceptable. ~ Simply being a fireman or other rescue professional does not guarantee that an individual understands the increased health risk associated with an emergency radiation exposure. The plan should require verification of informed consent consistent with the 1991 revision of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Manual of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). See Section 2.5 of the PAG Manual attached ~
- 15. Tables 5.1 and 5.3 should be revised to reflect the 1991 revision of the PAG Manual.
In addition, protective action criteria for exposure to a UF release should be established. The criteria should address the toxic 6
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3 chemical hazards in terms of soluble uranium intake and exposure to hydrofluoric acid vapors.
16.
Page 5.2 has a Table 5.1, page 5.17 has a Table 5.1, and page 5.31 has a Table 5.1.
Please correct.
l 17.
Page 5.23, paragraph before Section 5.3.14.2, states Table 6.1 lists instruments typically employed at GE. No Table 6.1 was found.
18.
Section 5.4.2 should provide a detailed description of the initial protective action recommendations (PARS) which have been prepared in advance for the first notification of a Site Area Emergency to offsite officials. The PARS should specify the offsite areas where the licensee recommends implementing protective actions (i.e., shelter all residents within 0.5 miles of the plant, etc.).
PARS addressing the toxic chemical hazards associated with a UF release should be provided in addition to 6
PARS addressing radiation hazards.
19.
Section 5 6 states Letters of Agreement are contained in Appendix A.
Appendix A does not contain Letters of Agreement.
Section 7.7 does correctly indicate that Letters of Agreement are maintained at the site.
P 20.
Section 5.7 states typical instrumentation provided to New Hanover Regional Medical Center found in Table 2.2.
No Table 2.2 is found.
21.
Section 6.1 should specify exactly where the local Civil Preparedness Agency and the County E0C are located and their distance from the plant.
22.
Section 7.3 should require that exercise scenarios be kept confidential and unknown to most exercise participants.
23.
Section 7.3.1 declares that exercises will be biennial.
In Table 7.1 under the category of "Offsite Support" is the statement that
- Retraining will include an annual exercise or response to actual emergencies."
Please clarify.
i 24.
Figure 8.1 discusses classifying incidents as Class I, II, or III. The text does not discuss Class I, II, or III incidents.
Attachment:
Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protection Actions for Nuclear Incidents
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MANUAL OF PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES ANo i
PROTECTIVE ACTIONS l
FOR NUCLEAR INCIDENTS i
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i Office of Radiation Programs United States Environmental Protection Agency Washington, DC 20460 Revised 1991 i
Second printing, May 1992 1
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usually not practicable, at the time of could be significant, generally it will be I
an incident, to project these long-term less important than that from f
doses and because different protective radioactive material taken into the I
actions may be appropriate, these doses body through inhalation.
This is I
are not included in the dose specified especially true if early protective in the PAGs for the early phase. Such actions include washing exposed skin doses are addressed by the PAGs for and changing clothing.
Inhaled the intermediate phase (see Chapters 3 radioactive particulate materials, and 4).
depending on their solubility in body fluids, may remain in the lungs or The first exposure pathway from move via the bloodstream to other an accidental airborne release of organs, prior to elimination from the radioactive material will often be dii ect body. Some radionuclides, once in the exposure to an overhead plume of bloodstream, are concentrated in a radioactive material carried by winds.
single body organ, with only small The detailed content of such a plume amounts going to other organs. For will depend on the source involved and example, if radioiodines are inhaled, a conditions of the incident.
For significant fraction moves rapidly example,in the case of an incident at a through the bloodstream to the thyroid nuclear power reactor, it would most gland.
commonly contain radioactive noble
- gases, but may also contain As the passage of a radioactive radiciodines and radioactive particulate plume containing particulate material materials. Many of the these materials and/or radioiodine progresses, some of emit gamma radiation which can these materials will deposit onto the expose people nearby, as the plume ground and other surfaces and create a passes. In the case of some other types third exposure pathway.
People of incidents, particularly those present after the phime has passed will involving releases of alpha emitting receive exposure from gamma and beta particulate materials, direct exposure radiation emitted from these deposited to gamma radiation is not likely to be materials.
If large quantities of the most important pathway.
radiciodines or gamma-emitting particulate materials are contained in A second exposure pathway occurs a release, this exposure pathway, over when people are directly immersed in a a long period, can be more significant radioactive plume, in which case than direct exposure to gamma radioactive materialis inhaled (and the radiation from the passing plume.
skin and clothes may also become contaminated), e.g., when particulate materials or radiciodines are present.
2.3 The Protective Action Guides When this occurs, internal body organs as well as the skin may be exposed.
The PAGs for response during the Although exposure from materials early phase of" an incident are deposited on the skin and clothing summarized in Table 2-1. The PAG for 2-4 l
evacuation (or, as an alternative in from evacuation itself. However, EPA certain cases, sheltering) is expressed recognizes the uncertainties associated in terms of the projected sum of the with quantifying risks associated with effective dose equivalent from external these levels of radiation exposure, as radiation and the committed effective well as the variability of risks dose equlvalent incurred from associated with evacuation under inhalation of radioactive materials from differing conditions.
exposure and intake during the early phase. (Further references to dose to Some judgment will be necessary members of the public in this Chapter when considering the types of refer to this definition, unless protective actions to be implemented otherwise specified.)
Supplementary and at what levels in an emergency guides are specified in terms of situation.
Although the PAG is committed dose equivalent to the expressed as a range of 1-5 rem, it is thyroid and dose equivaleat to the skin.
emphasized
- that, under normal The PAG for the admir.istration of conditions, evacuation of members cf stable iodine is specified in terms of the the general population should te committed dose equivalent to the initiated for most incidents at a thyroid from radioiodine. Tbis more projected dose of I rem. (It should be complete guidance updater and recognized that doses to some replaces previous values, expreswd in individuals may exceed 1 rem, even if terms of whole-body dose equis 41ent protective actions are initiated within from external gamma exposure ancl this guidance.) It is also possible that thyroid dose equivalent from inholation conditions may exist at specific facilities which warrant consideration of radioactive iodines, that were recommended in the 1980 edition of of values other than those recom-this document.
mended for general use here.
Sheltering may be preferable to 2.3.1 Evacuation and Sheltering evacuation as a protective action in some situations. Because of the higher The basis for the PAGs is given in risk associated with evacuation of some Appendix C. In summary, this analysis special groups in the population (e.g.
indicates that evacuation of the public those who are not readily mobile),
will usually be justified when the sheltering may be the preferred projected dose to an individual is one alternative for such groups as a rem. This conclusion is based prim-arily on EPA's judgment concerning acceptable levels of risk of effects on
' EPA, in accordance with its responsibilities under the regulations governing radiological public health from radiation exposure emergmy planning (47FR10758; March 11, in an emergency situation.
The 1982) and under the Federal Radiological analysis also shows that, at tlu.s Emergency Response Plan, will consult with radiation dose, the risk avcided is Federal agencies and the states, as requested, usually much greater than the risk in such cases.
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PAGs for the Early Phase of a Nuclear Incident i
Table 2-1 1
i Protective PAG Comments Action (projected dose)
Evacuation (or, for some b
Evacuation 1-5 rem situations, sheltering")
(or sheltering")
should normally be initiated at I rem.
Further guidance is provided in Section 2.3.1 Administration of 25 rem' Requires approval of State medical officials.
stable iodine
' Sheltering may be the preferred protective action when it will provide protection equal to or greater than evacuation, based on consideration of factors such as source term characteristic temporal or other site-specific conditions (see Section 2.3.1).
- The sum of the effective dose equivalent resulting from expasure to external sources ar.d the committed efTective dose equivalent incurred from all significant inhalation pathways during the early phase. Committed dose equivalents to the thyroid and to the skin may be 5 and 50 times larger, respectively.
' Committed dose equivalent to the thyroid from radiciodine.
conditions.
Illustrative examples of protective action at projected doses up to 5 rem. In addition, under unusually situations or groups for which hazardous environmental conditions evacu ^ ion may not be appropriate at I use of sheltering at projected doses up rem include: a) the presence of severe to 5 rem to the general population (and weather, b) competing disasters, c) up to 10 rem to special groups) may institutionalized persons who are not become justified. Sheltering may also readily mobile, and d) local physical factors which impede evacuation.
provide protection equal to or greater Examples of situations or groups for than evacuation due to the nature of the source term and/orin the presence which evacuation at I rem normally of temporal or other site-specific would be appropriate include: a) an 2-6 i
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incident which occurs at night, b) an buildings can be highly effective at incident which occurs when children reducing dose, may provide adequate are in school, and c) institutionalized protection, and may be more effective persons who are readily mobile.
than evacuation when evacuation Evacuation seldom will be justified at cannot be completed before plume less than 1 rem.
The examples arrival (DO-90). However, reliance on described above regarding selection of large dose reduction factors for the most appropriate protective action sheltering should be accompanied by are intended to be illustrative and not cautious examination of possible failure exhaustive.
In general, sheltering mechanisms, and, except in very should be preferred to evacuation unusual circumstances, should never be whenever it provides equal or greater relied upon at projected doses greater protection.
than 10 rem. Such analyses should be based on realistic or "best estimate" No specific minimum level is dose models and include unavoidable established fbr initiation of sheltering.
dose during evacuation. Sheltering and Sheltering in place is a low-cost, evacuation are discussed in more detail low-risk protective action that can in Section 5.5.
provide protection with an efficiency ranging from zero to almost 100 percent, depending on the circum-2.3.2 Thyroid and Skin Protection stances.
It can also be particuhirly useful to assure that a population is Since the thyroid is at positioned so that, if the need arises, disproportionately high risk for communication with the population can induction of nonfatal cancer and be carried out expeditiously. For the nodules, compared to other internal above reasons, planners and decision organs, additional guidance is provided makers should consider implementing to limit the risk of these effects (see sheltering at projected doses below 1 footnote to Table 2-1).
In addition, rem; however, implementing protective effective dose, the quantity used to actions for projected doses at very low express the PAG, encompasses only the levels would not be reasonable (e.g.
risk of fatal cancer from irradiation of below 0.1 rem). (This guidance should organs within the body, and does not not be construed as establishing an include dose to skin. Guidance is also additional lower level PAG for provided, therefore, to protect against sheltering.) Sheltering should always the risk of skin cancer (see Table 2-1, be implemented in cases when footnote b).
evacuation is not carried out at projected doses of 1 rem or more.
The use of stable iodine to protect against uptake of inhaled radiciodine Analyses for some hypothesized by the thyroid is recognized as an accidents, such as short-term releases effective alternative to evacuation for of transuranic materials, show that situations involving radioiodine sheltering in residences and other releases when evacuation cannot be 2-7 I
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facility is operating outside its design i
implemented or exposure occurs during basis, or an incident is imminent but evacuation.
Stable iodine is most e ffe etiv e when administered has not yet occurred, data adequate to directly estimate the projected dose immediately prior to exposure to radiciodine.
However, significant may not be available. For such cases, blockage of the thyroid dose can be provision should be made during the provided by administration within one planning stage for decisions to be made based on specific conditions at the or two hours after uptake of radio-source of a possible release that are iodine. If the administration of stable of anticipated relatable to ranges iodine is included in an emergency response
- plan, its use may be offsite consequences.
Emergency considered for exposure situations in response plans for facilities should make use of Emergency Action Levels which the committed dose equivalent to (EALs)', based on in-plant conditions, the thyroid can be 25 rem or greater trigger notification of and to (see 47 FR 28158; June 29,1982).
recommendations to offsite ofHeials to Washing and changing of clothing implement prompt evacuation or is recommended primarily to provide sheltering in specified areas in the absence of information on actual protection from beta radiation from environmenta1 re1 eases or radiciodines and particulate materials measurements. Later, when these data deposited on the skin or clothing.
become available, dose projections Calculations indicate that dose to skin based on measurements may be used, should seldom,if ever, be a controlling in addition to plant conditions, as the pathway. However, itis good radiation basis for implementing further protection practice to recommend these
- actions, even for alpha-emitting protective actions. (Exceptions may occur at sites with large exclusion radioactive materials, as soon as practical for persons significantly areas where some field and source data exposed to a contaminating plume (i.e.,
may be available in sufEcient time for when the projected dose from inhala-protective action decisions to be based tion would have justified evacuation of on environmental measurements.) In the case of transportation accidents or the public under normal conditions).
other incidents that are not related to a facility, it will often not be practicable to establish EALs.
2.4 Dose Projection The calculation of projected doses The PAGs are expressed in terms of projected dose.
However, in the should be based on realistic dose early phase of an incident (either at a i
nuclear facility or other accident site),
' Emergency Action Levels relat(d to plant parameters other than projected dose conditions at commercial nuclear power plants may frequently provide a
more are discussed in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654 appropriate basis for decisions to (NR-80).
Implement protecta.ve actions. When a i
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models, to the extent practicable.
to individuals, themselves, from Doses incurred prior to initiation of a exposure to radiation, and the risks protective action should not normally and costs associated with a specific be included.
Similarly, doses that protective action. On the other hand, might be received following the early workers may receive exposure under a phase should not be included for variety of circumstances in order to f
decisions on whether or not to evacuate assure protection of others and of or shelter.
Such doses, which may valuable property.
These exposures occur from food and water, long-term will be justiSed if the maximum risks radiation exposure to deposited permitted to workers are acceptably radioactive materials, or long-term low, and the risks or costs to others inhalation of resuspended materials, that are avoided by their actions are chronic exposures for which neither outweigh the risks to which workers emergency evacuation nor sheltering are subjected.
are appropriate protective actions.
Separate PAGs relate the appropriate Workers who may incur increased protective action decisions to those levels of exposure under emergency exposure pathways (Chapter 4).
As conditions may include those employed noted earlier, the projection of doses in in law enforcement, fire fighting, the early phase need include only those radiation protection, civil defense, exposure pathways that contribute a traffic
- control, health
- services, significant fraction (e.g., more than environmental monitoring, transpor-about 10 percent) of the dose to an tation services, and animal care. In individual.
- addition, selected workers at institutional, utility, and industrial In practical applications, dose facilities, and at farms and other projection will usually begin at the agribusiness may be required to protect time of the anticipated (or actual) others, or to protect valuable property initiation of a release.
For those during an emergency. The above are not designations of situations where significant dose has example.4 already occurred prior to implementing workers that may be exposed to protective action, the projected dose for radiation under emergency conditions.
comparison to a PAG should not include this prior dose.
Guidance on dose limits for workers performing emergency services is summarized in Table 2-2.
Th(se 2.5 Guidance for Controlling Doses to limits apply to doses incurred over the Workers Under Emergency Conditions duration of an emergency. That is, in contrast to the PAGs, where only the The PAGs for protection of the future dose that can be avoided by a general population and dose limits for specific protective action is considered, workers performing emergency services all doses received during an emergency are derived under differen t are included in the limit. Further, the assumptions. PAGs consider the risks dose to workers performing emergency I
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i Table 2-2 Guidance on Dose Limits for Workers Performing Emergency Services 3
Condition Dose limit' Activity (rem) 5 all 10 protecting valuable lower dose not practicable property lower dose not practicable i
25 life saving or protection oflarge populations
>25 lifesaving or only on a voluntary basis protection oflarge to persons fully aware of the risks involved (See populations Tables 2-3 and 2-4)
- Sum ofexternal effective dose equivalent and committed effective dose equivalent to nonpregnant adults from exposure and intake during an emergency situ tion. Workers performing services d emergencies should limit dose to the lens of the eye to three times the listed value and doses other organ (including skin and body extremities) to ten times the listed value. These limits a all doses from an incident, except those received in unrestricted areas as members of the publ the intermediate phase of the incident (see Chapters 3 and 4),
services may be treated as a once-in-a-of five rem per year for adults and one lifetime exposur" and not added to tenth this value for minors and the occupational c posure accumulated unborn (EP-87). We recommend use of under nonemergency conditions for the this same value here for the case of To purpose of ascertaining conformance to exposures during an emergency.
normal occupational limits, if this is assure adequate protection of minors However, any radiation and the unborn during emergencies, necessary.
exposure of workers that is associated the performance of emergency services with an incident, but accrued during should be limited to nonpregnant nonemergency operations, should be adults.
As in the case of normal limited in accordance with relevant occupational exposure, doses received occupational limits for normal under emergency conditions should also situations.
Federal Radiation be maintained as low as reasonably Protection Guidance for occupational achievable (e.g., use of stable iodine, exposure recommends an upper bound where appropriate, as a prophylaxis to 1
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'F reduce thyroid dose from inhalation of at which acute effects of radiation will radiciodines and use of rotation of be incurred and numerical estimates of workers).
the risk of delayed effects.
Doses to all workers during Tables 2-3 and 2-4 provide some emergencies should, to the extent generalinformation that may be useful practicable, be limited to 5 rem. There in advising emergency workers of risks are some emergency situations, of acute and delayed health effects I
however, for which higher exposure associated with large doses of radia-limits may be justified. Justification of tion.
Table 2-3 presents estimated any such exposure must include the risks of early fatalities and moderately presence of conditions that prevent the severe prodromal (forewarning) effects rotation of workers or other that are likely to occur shortly after commonly-used dose reduction exposure to a wide range of whole body methods. Except as noted bAow, the radiation doses.
Estimated average dose resulting from such emergency cancer mortality risks for emergency exposure should be limited to 10 rem workers corresponding to a whole-body l
for protecting valuable property, and to dose equivalent of 25 rem are given in 25 rem for life saving activities and the Table 2-4, as a function of age at the protection oflarge populations. In the time of exposure. To estimate average context of this guidance, exposure of cancer mortality for moderately higher workers that is incurred for the doses the results in Table 2-4 may be protection oflarge populations may be increased linearly. These values were considered justified for situations in calculated using a life table analysis which the collective dose avoided by that assumes the period of risk the emergency operation is signif-continues for the duration of the icantly larger than that incurred by the worker's lifetime. Somewhat smaller workers involved.
risks of serious genetic effects (if gonadal tissue is exposed) and of Situations may also rarely occur in nonfatal cancer would also be incurred..
which a dose in excess of 25 rem for An expanded discussion of health emergency exposure would be effects from radiation dose is provided unavoidable in order to carry out a in Appendix B.
lifesaving operation or to avoid extensive exposure oflarge populations.
Some workers performing It is not possible to prejudge the risk emergency services will have little or that one should be allowed to take to no health physics training, so dose save the lives of others.
- However, minimization through use of protective persons undertaking any emergency equipment cannot always be assumed.
operation in which the dose will exceed
- However, the use of respiratory 25 rem to the whole body should do so protective equipment can reduce dose only on a voluntary basis and with full from inhalation, and clothing can awareness of the risks involved, reduce beta dose. Stable iodine is also including the numericallevels of dose recommended for blocking thyroid 2-11
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Table 2-3 Health Effects Associated with Whole-Body Absorbed Doses Received Within a Few Hours"(see Appendix B)
Whole Body Early Whole Body Prodromal Effects
- Absorbed dose Fatalities' Absorbed dose (percent affected)
(rad)
(percent)
(rad) 140 5
50 2
200 15 100 15 300 50 150 50 400 85 200 85 460 95 250 98
' Risks will be lower for protracted exposure periods.
' Supportive medical treatment may increase the dose at which these frequencies occur by approximately 50 percent.
' Forewarning symptoms of more serious health efTects associated with large doses of radiation.
Approximate Cancer Risk to Average Individuals from 25 Rem Effective Table 2-4 Dose Equivalent Delivered Promptly (see Appendix C)
Appropriate risk Average years of Age at of premature death life lost if premature (deaths per 1,000 death occurs exposure (years) persons exposed)
(years) 24 9.1 20 to 30 19 7.2 30 to 40 15 40 to 50 5.3 11 50 to 60 3.5 2-12 i
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uptake' of radiciodine in personnel References involved in emergency actions where atmospheric releases include radiciodine.
The decision to issue DO-90 U.S.
Department of Energy.
stable iodine should include Effectiveness of Shelterin, Buildings and Vehicles for Plutonium, D EH-0159, U.S.
consideration of established State Depanment of Energy, % aNnoon (19901 medical procedures, and planning is required to ensure its availability and EP-87 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal proper use.
Agencies for Occupational Exposure. Federal Rerrister. 52, 2822; January 27,1987.
NR-80 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
NUREG-0654, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, (1980).
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