ML20059E197

Emergency Preparedness Exercise, Final Rept Per Insp Repts 50-454/90-16 & 50-455/90-15

ML20059E197
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	08/24/1990
From:	Eva Hickey, Jamison J Battelle Memorial Institute, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATION
To:	Khadijah West Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-FIN-B-2311 NUDOCS 9009100085
Download: ML20059E197 (7)

Text

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" OBaHeHe l'acific Northwest Laboratories Battelle Boulevard P.O. Box 999

' Richland, Washington 99352 Telephone (509) 375-3782 August 24, 1990 Mr. K. S. West Planning, Program, and Management Support Branch ,

Office of Nuclear' Reactor Regulation-  :

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Washington, DC 20555

Dear Steve:

FIN B2311 - BYRON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE - AUGUST 15, 1990 (Inspection Report #50-~454/90016; 50-455/90015)

Enclosed is the final report of the Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL) 7 observation during the subject exercise. Only minor changes have been made to the draft provided to the NRC team leader at-the site, f If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on (509)375-3782.

Sincerely, ccvyw / L J. D. amison, roject Manager Eva Eckert Hickey Operational Health Physics Operational Health Physics Occupational & Environmental Occupational & Environmental.

Health Protection Section Health Protection Section HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT HEALTH PHYSICS DEPARTMENT JDJ:EEH:jw In triplicate

= Enclosure-cc: .RA Erickson, w/ enclosure TJ Ploski, w/ enclosure 1

9009100005 900824 PDR ADOCK 05 g4 ,

Twenty-Rve ysus of sdence kw DOE and the Northwest 0'OM 1 635 sp  ;.

. .( ,

i BYRON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE (Inspection Report #50- G /90016; 50-455/90015)

August 15,.1990 A. Name: 'Eva Eckert Hickey B. Assignment: Emergency Operations facility (EOF) .

C. Site Personnel Contacted: B. Saunders, Safety and. Security. Manager; _

K.' Leech; B. Querio, Manager of Emergency Operations (MEO)

D. Positive Findings

• The EOF was ' activated in a. timely manner after a Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared by the' Technical Support Center (TSC).

The facility was not prestaged, and actual activation,' including the  !

arrival of Security and deactivating the alarm, was demonstrated.

Frequent updates e the ME0 and other EOF directors were given to

-E0F staff.

• The E0F technical staff interacted and performed well as a team.

Even though information did.not appear to come promptly from the TSC, the E0F staff were able to obtain most of the data-they needed.

E. Negative Findings There were numerous computer failures in the EOF. The reasons for the failures need to be identified and corrected. Most activities were handled using other calculational methods; however, there does not appear to be a means for trending-data in the E0F without the computers.

Communication of technical data between the TSC.and EOF appears to be poor at times. The safety relief valves (SRY) were closed and the release ended, but it was at least 10 mirutes and possibly 1

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longer, before the EOF knew. The source and ::hain of information flow was not clear between the TSC and E0F. Questions were often asked, "Where did this information come from?"

• Status boards were not adequately maintained to track and update  ;

information. At 2037 the plant status board indicated that wind ,

direction was 218 , when it was actually 330 . This information.was not corrected until:2144. The source of the wrong information was not determined luring the ex Use. This information would go to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Another status board had General Emergency (GE)'as the classification for about 20 minutes.

The status boards were not updated every 30 minutes as stated in objective 3C. Apparently this was due to lack of available staff in the E0F. One status board was in orange ink and could not be read from most parts of the E0F, It is recommended that the licensee perform a thorough evaluation of the use of status boards (i.e.,

their purpose and who is responsible for maintaining them).

F. Chronology Time Observation 1758 Security arrives to open and activate EOF using procedure for Access Con + 31 Coordinator, EPIP NST-E0F-12, E0F unlocked, alarm deactivated, and security personnel briefed.

1810 The plant is still in an Alert; therefore, the facility is not currently being staffed.

1833 Only activity at E0F is security.

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4 Time' Observation 2004- Site. assembly initiated.

'2014' ' EOF staff beginning to arrive and sign in on board.-  ;

4 Safeguards Specialist is briefing ME0.

2018 Technical Support Director telling staff to sign in on a board ,

and get out procedures and start thro.gh checklists.

2021 ME0 giving E0F staff a status of' the plant..

2027 Tech Support Director gives plant status update.

-67% power, shutting down.

Service line leak identified. Isolated, ~ maired but line is not pressurized.

Two separate alerts 1) Leak is >50 gpm, 2); river f a.. iow and-deep well pump inoperable.

Becauseoftwoalerts,SAEwasdeclaredat1955(Activationof.

EOF,EAL9.1).

RM-11 is inoperable.

2030 ME0 would like to plan taking over command and control in 15 i minutes.

2033 ME0 conferring with staff. Looking at procedures check-off.

2037 Plant stetus board being filled out. It indicates that wind direction is 218 . (It is actually 330 scenario.) The i Nuclear Accident' Reporting System (NARS) form for the same '

time states 322 .

2040 ME0-giving update. TSC still in command.

Steam Generator tube leak is 1B (earlier said 10),

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Time Observation -:

Trying to determine if there is a plant release and make Offsite Protective Action-Recommendations (PAR).

lA SI Accumulator is low.  ;

Ramp rate for' controlled shutdown is not known.

2045 EOF-taking over command and control.

Affected sectors are G,- F, & H based on wind direction of

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2046 j 316'.-

2050 Discussion of what PAR should be.

Note: The Sequence of Events Board is hard to read. It is in ,

orange. ink.

f 2053 There is a shelter recommendation for all the sectors (G, F, 4

& H).

2055 Wind direction ~is changing-from 310*-to 330 .

2103 Manual trip at the plant at 2100.

There are some problems with the computers. They are.not able-to log on and get plant data. The exercise data is-not accessible, nor_ is_ the actual plant data; therefore, the i controllers are not giving the data.  !

2112 An " unnamed" status board is being filled out. It indicates )

the classification is GE, but everything else still states SAE.

2117 MEO giving plant statur.

Power loss at TSC. Phones operate, but do not ring-in.the TSC.

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...y Time- _

Observation

'1B Main steam isolation valves (MSIV) would not c' lose after trip. Release is unisolable.

Site Evacuation has been completed.: PAR is for sheltering.

TSC can call E0F, but the TSC phones are not ringing. Can call to TSC on blue phones.

The state update on. status has been given.

-2123 Power has been restored to the TSC.

2126 Updating plant status. Did not correct' wind dir'ection mistake. This board.is the one that would be transmitted to NRC.

2130 Corrected classification on other status board. t 2144 Corrected status board and wind direction. l 2145 Status update.

SAE - Multiple Alert Lcoking at possibility of chang:ng EAL, but -this would not affect classification.

Deprassurizing RCS - 695 psi.

2151 The E0F is unaware that'the Safety Valves have closed '

(according to scenario) and the re ease has ended. :Not sure whether there is a change in scenario er if -information.has not'gotten to E0F.

2157 EOF staff finally questioned the wrong wind direction data.

2200 Protective Measures Director knows that the Safety Valves _are I closed. Still. thinks there is a release, or at least suspects l a release. I 1

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Time- Observation 2143 . Plant Stetus Sheet'says wind direction.218'F.

2205 Play in Control Room (CR) and Operational Support Center (OSC)~  ;

has been suspended.

2207 E0F is looking at how to. handle shift change.

2211 ME0 confirming that SRVs are closed. Looking for other-potential releases.

2220 Plant status - ME0 Safety Valves closed, therefore release terminated.

Confirming that from site surveys.

2223 Putting names together for a shift change. ' Planning on two hour shifts. ,

Need trending capabilities. Obviously need to be able'to a

handle more with loss of computers.

2249 Status update. Looking at going into recovery.

Cooling down and depressurizing.

2300 Starting to look at priorities for entering recovery.

Need to get to cold shutdown.

j Can't go to residual heat removal.(RHR) until cooling is accomplished.

L 2300 Exercise terminated.

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