ML20059D909

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Special Rept:On 900531,noncompliances Identified Re Fire Protection Plan & 10CFR50,App R.Caused by Design Deficiencies in Original Wall Design.Walls Will Be Modified, Per Requirements of License Condition
ML20059D909
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/28/1990
From: Wallace E
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9009070224
Download: ML20059D909 (4)


Text

,-.._4-TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORh i CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 SN 157B Lookout Place AU6 281990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ATTN: Document Control Desk-Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of

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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority

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50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1 AND 2=- DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 -

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-77 AND 79 - SPECIAL REPORT 90-11, REVISION 1 -

FIRE PROTECTION PLAN AND 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX R The enclosed revised special report provides corrective actions related to three noncompliances with the requirements of License Condition 2.C.13.a of-the Unit 2 Facility Operating License and one noncompliance with Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.c.

These corrective actions and associated implementation schedule were determined following an evaluation by. Nuclear Engineering as committed-to by TVA in the special report' dated June 13, 1990.

One nonconformanep (Item 4 on the enclosure) was inadvertently omitted f rom previous reporting because of a miscommunication;' documentation concerning this item was initially inferred to portray a breeched condition rather than a design nonconformance. The changes from TVA's original response are designated by revision bars.

If you have any questions concerning this' submittal, please telephone I

M. A. Cooper at (615) 843-6422.

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Very truly yours.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

' cs E. G. Wallace, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosure

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cc: See page 2 O g n,; <a, mos l

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9009070224 900828 7

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.PDR ADOCK 05000327.-

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An Equal Opportunity Employer;

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosure):

Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director-Project Directorate II-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. J. N. Donohew, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint,~ North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cotmission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia. 30323

ENCLOSURE 14-Day Follow-Up Report Special Report 90-11 i

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Description of Condition I

i This special report addresses the requirements of License Conditions 2.C.13.a i

and 2.C.13.c of the Unit 2 Facility Operating License regarding the SQN fire i

protection plan and 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.

Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.13.a requires TVA to maintain and implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan which, in part,-commits to walls of specified fire-rated i

durations in certain plant locations.

Unit 2 License Condition 2.0.13.c i

requires SQN to comply with certain sections of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, that stipulate requirements for fire barriers between certain cables and equipment.

On May 31, 1990, during performance of extensive reviews conducted'as a result i

of corrective actions for a previously identified fire protection plan noncompliance (Special Report 90-06 lated April 24, 1990), three l

noncompliances with Unit 2 License Cone.4. tion 2.0.13.a and one noncompliance i

with Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.10-c were identified.

1.

A wall panel above tire Door C53 located on control building, Elevation 732 (reference Final Safety Analysis Report {FSAR),

FI ure 1.2.3-3) has a welded frame that does not have an acceptable F

relieving mechanism for thermal expansion that could occur during a fire.

The wall support frame is restrained so that thermal expansion during a fire could result in deflection, which could degrade the wall as a fire barrier. Additionally, the wall contains an exposed steel plate supporting two electrical boxes.

2.

An Appendix R wall with a 1-hour fire rating located at Column Lines A8 between Column Lines Q and R of auxiliary building, Elevation 714 1

(reference FSAR, F!gure 1.2.3-4), is restrained and does not allow for thermal expansion. As was the case with the preceding wall, thermal expansion during a fire could result in the wall being degraded as a fire

barrier, s

3.

Two walls surrounding Fire Doors C57 and C63 located on control building, Elevation 732 (reference FSAR, Figure 1.2.3-3), are constructed of wood fiber and gypsta sand mixture. No fire-tested configuration corresponding to this design could be identified.

Therefore, the fire rating of the walls is indeterminate. The walls provide fire separation between the conference room and NRC office in the Technical Support Center and the adjoining relay room.

4.

A wall panel above Fire Door C23 (connecting the computer room and corridor on control building, Eleva* ion'685) has exposed structural framing above the corridor ceiling.

it.: wall gypsum board does not cover the ends of channel studs above the doorframs.

1 The affected areas are included ~in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrol.s.

A condition adverse to quality report was also initiated to document the problem and its corrective action. Telephone notification to NRC and subsequent confirmation by facsimile were made in accordance with Unit 2 License Condition 2.H.

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  • Cause of Condition The root cause of noncompliance Itams i and 2 above has been attributed to a design deficiency in the original wall design in that an adequate allowance was not made for thermal expansion faring a fire.

The root cause of noncompliance Item 3 above has been attributed to a design deficiency in the original wall design in that the design as specified did not correspond to a fire-tested configuration. The root cause of noncompliance Item 4 above has been attributed to an inadequate initial design.

Analysis of_ Condition 7

There are no plant systems or components considered inoperabic or incapable of performing their design functions as a result of the condition describet in this report. The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hodrly, roving fire watch patrols. The roving fire watch-patrols, coupled with the existing fire detection and suppression systems in these arcse, provide assurance that a fire in these areas would be identified so that appropriate response actions could be initiated.

Corrective Action The affected areas are included in the surveillance of hourly, roving fire watch patrols. As a result of evaluation by Nuclear Engineering, corrective l

actions have been developed to modiff the subject walls to bring them into compliance with the requirements of Unit 2 License condition 2.C.13.

Those correts1vr actions include (1) modifying the steel f raming in the pancl above e

Fire Door C53 to allow for thermal growth..(2) modifying the steel framing in the wall located at Column Lines A8 between Column Lines Q and R of auxiliary building, Elevation 7141(which' contains Door A210) to allow thermal growth, (3) replacing walls at Fire Doors C57 and C63 and ceilings in the NRC of fice and conference room in the Technical Support Center with Undrewriters Laboratory approved material, and (4) in *alling additional Type K gypsum board to cover exposed structural f raming above the corridor ceiling in the panel above Door C23. These fire barrier modifications wifi be completed by June 1, 1991.

Commitment These fire barrier' modifications will be completed by June 1, 1991.

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