ML20059D353
| ML20059D353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1993 |
| From: | Stetka T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20059D331 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-93-33, NUDOCS 9311020220 | |
| Download: ML20059D353 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1993033
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-382/93-33
License:
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
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P.O. Box B
Killona, Louisiana
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Facility Name:
Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3
Inspection At:
Killona, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: September 14 through October 7, 1993
Inspectors:
L. J. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector
E. J. Ford, Senior Resident Inspector
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Jennifer Dixon-Herrity, Resident Inspector
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Approved:
/
Tid
/o/8/93
u,
Thomas F. Stetka, Chief, Project Section D
Date
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Inspection Summary
Areas Inspected: This special inspection was performed to evaluate the
corrective action, operability, and reportability determinations related to
the failure of containment spray Valve CS-125A to open on September 13, 1993.
The related testing, requests for enforcement discretion, and subsequent
request for an exigent Technical Specification change were also reviewed.
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Results:
Two apparent violations were identified:
(1)
The first apparent violation involved the failure to satisfy the
requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.2.1.
On September 25,
Train A of the containment spray system was determined to have
been inoperable.
This inoperability was significantly in excess
of the allowed outage time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Section 1.8).
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(2)
The second apparent violation involved the failure to promptly
identify-and correct the inoperability of the containment spray
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system as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
The appropriate level of management attention was not directed at
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resolving this problem until 11 days after unexplained system
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9311020220 931026
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anomalies were identified (Section 1.8).
In addition, Valve CS-
125A maintenance history indicated some degradation. Based on
test results, the degradation would probably not have prevented
the valve from opening against expected differential pressures.
However, the degradation would have prevented the valve from
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opening against design differential pressures. This degradation
was not properly identified and is considered to be a second
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example of this apparent violation (Section 2.3).
Valve CS-125A and, therefore, Train A of the containment spray
system was probably inoperable since the end of Refueling Outage
RF5 (November 1992) and may have been inoperable before that time
(Section 4.2).
Because of pressures significantly in excess of the nominal design
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pressures, Train B of containment spray was degraded to the extent that
detailed evaluations were required to determine its operability
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(Section 3.2).
Licensee efforts to determine the operability of Valve CS-125A were
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effective after September 24, 1993, when Site Directive W4.101,
"Nonconformance/Indeterminance Analysis Process," was invoked
(Section 1.8).
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Pressures significantly in excess of the nominal design pressures were
found to exist on both trains of containment spray during conduct of
special tests (Section 1.6).
Summary of Inspection Findings:
Inspectim' rollowup Item 382/9333-01 was opened (Section 1.6).
Apparent Violation 382/9333-02 was opened (Sections 1.8 and 2.3).
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Apparent Violation 382/9333-03 was opened (Section 1.8).
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Attachments:
Attachment A - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
Attachment B - Simplified Diagram of Containment Spray System
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DETAILS
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1 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
1.1 Failure of Valve CS-125A to Open Followina Surveillance Testing
On feptember 13, 1993, the valve.and pump portion of Surveillance
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Procedure OP-903-094, "ESFAS Subgroup Relay Test - Operating," for Containment
Spray System Train A was performed. Following the testing, an attempt was
made to fill the containment spray riser by opening air operated containment
spray Header A isolation Valve CS-125A. This valve, a 10 inch WGN solid wedge
gate valve, which uses air to open and a spring to close, failed to open.
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As the result of this failure, the shift supervisor declared containment spray
Train "A" inoperable at 1:39 a.m. on September 13 and entered Technical Specification 3.6.2.1.
The shift supervisor contacted the maintenance
superintendent who was the duty plant manager. The maintenance superintendent
suggested the problem might be related to a hydraulic lock due to pressure
buildup occurring in the pipe header between Valves CS-117A and CS-125A (see
Attachment B). The licensee believed that the pressure occurred as the result
of the conduct of the engineered safety featu e actuation system (ESFAS) relay-
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test, OP-903-094, which started and ran the containment spray pump against a
shutoff head.
The header was subsequently vented, the valve stroked satisfactorily, and the
Technical Specification action statement was exited at 2:50 a.m.
1.2 Condition Identification (CI) and Reportina
On September 13 CI 287289 was initiated to document that the valve would not
The CI indicated that Valve CS-125A had a 300 psid pressure across it.
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open.
This 300 psid pressure was the result of a 370 psig pressure upstream of the
valve and an approximately 70 psig pressure downstream of the valve caused by
a 180-foot containment spray riser header that was maintained in a full
condition.
Engineering was asked to evaluate this condition to determine why
the valve would not open with a 300 psid pressure across it. The condition
was given a resolution priority of T4, which meant that the item was Technical
Specification related with an urgency such that it should oe completed within
7 days. The bulk of the engineering effort during the period of September 13-
17, 1993, was focused on determining how the valve worked and attempting to-
identify the cause of the apparent degradation.
On September 17 the inspector questioned licensee personnel about short-term
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corrective actions to ensure Train B would not unknowingly be similarly
effected by elevated differential pressures induced during testing.
The
licensee-speculated that the high differential pressures always may-have been
present; however, it probably was not a problem because the upstream check
valves (CS-Il7A/B) leaked sufficiently, thus allowing the built-up pressure to
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decay rapidly. However, recent check valve maintenance apparently slowed the
pressure decay in the line and allowed the line pressure to remain high.
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As the result of discussions with the inspector, on September 17, the system
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engineer wrote a letter to the operations superintendent recommending that the
containment spray header be vented after each run of the respective
containment spray pump.
Following receipt of the letter, the operations
department initiated Standing Instruction 93-07, which provided guidance to
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operations personnel directing them to vent the headers following pump runs.
The system engineer wrote Condition Report (CR)93-156 later the same day to
identify the fact that Valve CS-125A would not open with a 300 psid pressure
across it, which was in conflict with it's design and procurement
specification which stated that the valve would open under emergency
conditions with a 300 psid pressure across it. The failure of Valve CS-125A
to open was not understood at the time.
Since Valves CS-125A and CS-125B were
identical valves (one in each train), the potential existed that both valves
could be affected by the hydraulic lock phenomenon.
The inability to open
either of these two valves could have prevented the fulfillment of the
containment spray safety function. The condition was determined to be
reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) on September 17 at
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4:45 p.m.
On September 22 the licensee also determined that this event should
be reported as a licensee event report in accordance with
1.3 Initial Containment Spray System Evaluations
On September 22 during a conference call with NRC personnel, the licensee
stated that the containment spray pump shutoff head was 620 feet or
approximately 275 psig. Chart Recorder CS-IPR-0303X- records the pressure on
the inlet of Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger A, which is upstream of stop
check Valve C5-117A. This recorder indicated a peak pressure of 370 psig for
this event with a decay to 314 psig after approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.
Further, the licensee stated that, during November 1992 the same chart
recorder had recorded pressures as high as 500 psig. Operation at 500 psig
was later determined by the licensee to have occurred when shutdown cooling
was placed in service at the end of Refueling Outage RF5 and, therefore, not
related to this event.
The licensee also stated that the pump would start
from 1-1/2 to 2-1/2 seconds following the signal- to open the valve during
emergency conditions. They also stated that it was expected that, during loss
of offsite power, the pump start would lag the valve opening by 11-1/2 to 12-
1/2 seconds and, therefore, they did not consider that the hydraulic lock
condition would occur during an actual containment spray system demand.
NRC
personnel requested the licensee to assure that there were no other potential
operating configurations that would allow the pump to start prior to the valve
opening.
On September 23, following additional reviews in response to the NRC
questions, the licensee concluded that, in an accident situation, both the
containment spray pumps and the containment spray isolation valves (CS-125A/B)
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"would actuate at about the same time and that, therefore, they could not
conclusively state that the valve would open prior to pump start.
1.4 Initial Evaluation of Valve CS-125A Degradation
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Preliminary evidence of valve degradation became evident on July 13, 1993, on
the basis of diagnostic data taken for another purpose (see Section 2.2).
Some disagreement existed within the licensee's technical staff as to what was '
the appropriate estimate of the degradation. On September 24 at 5 p.m. the
licensee considered the condition of containment spray Valve CS-125A as
indeterminate in accordance with Site Directive W4.101, "Nonconformance/
Indeterminate Analysis Process." This was 11 days after it was identified
that containment spray Valve CS-125A would not stroke with a 300 psi
differential pressure across it.
1.5 Special Testing of Valve CS-125A
On September 25, Revision 0, of Special Test 01113735, " Test of Containment
Spray Header," was performed for Train A.
The test was written to determine
the length of time each containment spray header stays pressurized after
securing the respective containment spray pump and to identify the source of
indicated pressure above the pump shut-off head in the piping. During
testing, pump discharge pressure measured 260 psig.
Pressure at the inlet to
the shutdown cooling heat exchanger measured 308 psig. The pressure just
upstream of Valve CS-125A was measured at 469 psig. This pressure stabilized
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at 450 psig.
Fluid transient effects were observed as containment spray pump
discharge check Valve CS-111A, slammed shut. Based upon these test results,
Containment Spray Valve CS-125A was considered to be inoperable for the
containment spray function.
Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 was entered at
3:05 p.m., September 25.
1.6 Unexpected Pressure Suroes due to Air Entrainment
On September 27 Nonconforming Condition Identification (NCI) 287461 was
written to document the unexpected pressure surge and fluid transient in
Containment Spray Train A.
The design rating of the line was 300 psig and the
licensee conservatively hypothesized that pressures as high as 570 psig may
have previously existed in the line. The licensee performed engineering
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evaluations that demonstrated the structural integrity of the containment
spray system and conducted system walkdowns to ensure that no damage had
occurred. Air entrainment, coupled with an impulse wave phenomenon, was the.
suspected cause of the unexpected pressure surge and fluid transient.
The licensee evaluated the piping configuration for both trains of containment
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spray. Train A was determined to have twice as much pipe as Train B.
Further, approximately 18 feet of high point piping upstream of Valve CS-125A
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was identified without a high point vent. NCI 287462 was written to address
the air entrainment. A high point 1-inch vent valve was installed on
September 27. The licensee completed a series of sweeping and venting
operations, repeated special testing in accordance with Special Test 01113735,
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" Test of Containment Spray Header," and performed ultrasonic testing. As the
result of this testing, a second air bubble was identified.
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On September 28 the licensee believed that significant air accumulation did
not exist on Train B.
The licensee requested a time extension of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for
Techanical Specification 3.6.2.1.
NRC granted enforcement discretion so that
the licensee could install a second vent on Train A.
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A second vent was installed on September 29 using NCI 287462, Revision 1, as
the authorizing document. NCI 287492 was also approved to add a second
solenoid valve to the actuator of Valve CS-125A for the purpose of decreasing
the stroke titre. The system was filled, vented, and retested in accordance
with Special Test 01113735, " Test of Containment Spray Header.". The peak
pressure testing was repeated several times, with similar results. The
shutdown cooling heat exchanger inlet pressure peaked at approximately
320 psig and leveled off at 270 psig in less than 4 seconds.
Local peak
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pressure upstream of Valve CS-125A was now approximately 337 psig.
The licensee planned to evaluate their nominal design pressure rating and
corresponding hydrostatic test specifications in light of the recent special
test results. Their evaluation will be tracked as Inspection Followup
Item 382/9333-01 and reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
1.7 Significant Degradation Measured for Valve CS-125A
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On September 29 and 30 the peak pressure test was repeated and Valve CS-125A
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was tested against the differential pressure determined to exist one second
after the peak, i.e., 320 psig upstream of the valve with a riser level of
170 feet. The valve did not open at 320 psig or at 310 psig. The valve
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successfully stroked twice at 300 psig and then failed to operate two times
during subsequent consecutive strokes.
Pressure was lowered to 290 psig and
the valve stroked successfully. During subsequent testing, a 15-minute
interval was instituted beween valve strokes. When this interval was
implemented, the valve successfully stroked at both 290 psig and 300 psig.
The licensee theorized that valve heating due to multiple stroking operations
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was a factor in the previous failures at 300 psig. The licensee evaluated
this data and determined that they were unable to demonstrate operability of
Valve CS-125A.
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On September 30 the licensee submitted Emergency Technical Specification
Change Request NPF-38-143. The proposed change was approved by the NRC to
allow containment spray isolation Valves CS-125A and/or -B to be maintained in
the open position. The licensee opened Valve CS-125A and declared Train A to
be operable.-
1.8 Conclusions
Valve CS-125A was apparently inoperable at least since September 13, 1993, and
continued to be inoperable even after system venting. This was an apparent
violation of the Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 because the allowed outage
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time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> was exceeded without taking action to restore the containment
spray system to operable status or to shut down the plant (382/9333-02).
The appropriate level of. management attenticq was not directed at resolving
this problem until 11 days after unexplained system anomalies were identified.
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As a result, the inoperability of containment spray system Train A was not
corrected promptly. This was an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, criterion XVI wnich states, in part, that conditions adverse to
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quality, such as failures and malfunctions, are promptly identified and
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corrected (382/9333-03).
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Licensee efforts to determine the operability of Valve CS-125A were effective
after September 24, 1993, when Site Directive W4.101,
"Nonconformance/Indeterminance Analysis Process," was invoked.
2 PRIOR MAINTENANCE HISTORY - VALVE CS-125A
2.1 Valve Maintenance
On May 16, 1991, the licensee completed Work Authorization 01056121. The work
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authorization was initiated because Valve CS-125A leaked by the valve seat
under normal system pressure. A new stem was fabricated by the licensee and
installed with new seats for the valve. The root cause was determined to be
galling on the seat and gate.
On March 10, 1993, Work Authorization 01106349 was completed. The work
authorization was initiated because the valve did not stroke smoothly while
opening to fill the containment spray riser. The licensee ap)1ied neolube
through a port opening and on the. exposed shaft.
Following tie lubrication,
licensee personnel stroked the valve six times and concluded that the valve
operator was working satisfactorily. The root cause was determined to be
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inadequate lubrication on the piston stem.
During Refueling Outage RFS, the containment spray header was drained and
refilled for work on another valve.
The clearance for the valve maintenance
work was removed on October 8, 1992.
The maintenance superintendent stated he was investigating a report from the
mechanics that they were called during November of 1992 regarding problems
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with Valve CS-125A following ESFAS testing. The nature of-the problem or the
mechanics response has not been determined.
The licensee will be interviewing
personnel and reviewing records in this area.
2.2 Riser level Anomalies
The licensee stated that riser level instruments on both containment spray
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headers were drifting out of calibration. On May 25, 1993, the as-found value
of the riser level on containment spray Header B was below the Technical
Specification required level. CR 93-059 was written and the licensee replaced
the Train B level indicator.
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On July 13, 1993, as a part of the investigation for CR 93-059, instrument
technicians performed valve performance testing on Valve CS-125A. The
technicians were attempting to determine if valve performance had some impact
on riser level instrument calibration problems. The licensee believed that
rapid pressure changes, following the opening of Valve CS-125A or CS-1258,
caused the needle to move rapidly and knocked it out of calibration. The test
results indicated some sluggish valve operation during the first stroke. The
valve appeared to travel smoothly on the second stroke.
However, the licensee '
stated that it was not possible to determine a valve factor from the graphs
because the tests were not performed with a differential pressure across the
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valve. The licensee also stated that the test equipment was new and the test
results were not reviewed by engineers assigned responsibility for valve
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performance data collection at that time.
2.3 Conclusions
The degradation of Valve CS-125A was evident in the maintenance history, and
precursors of this degradation occurred on March 10 and July 13, 1993. On the
basis of the test results, it appeared that the degradation would probably not
have prevented the valve from opening against expected differential pressures;
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however, the degradation would have prevented its opening against design
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differential pressures. This degradation was not properly identified and is
considered to be a part of the apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI (382/9333-03).
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3 TEST AND EVALUATION OF CONTAINMENT SPRAY TRAIN B
3.1 Peak Pressure Test and Valve CS-125B Stroke Test
On October 2, 1993, Special Test Procedure STP-01113917, " Test of B
Containment Spray Header," was initiated. The peak pressure of 409 psig,
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measured upstream of Valve CS-125B following a containment spray pump. start,
exceeded licensee expectations. The test pressure rig was not capable of
testing at that pressure so the valve stroke test was performed with an
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initial pressure of 365.6 psig, i.e., the maximum capability of the test rig.
The valve stroked satisfactorily during this test.
Following the test, the licensee placed Valve CS-125B in the open position
pending evaluation of the test results and development of a retest. On
October 5 the engineering evaluation of the test results was completed. The
licensee determined analytically that the valve was capable of operating at
pressures exceeding the 409 psig line pressure witnessed during the
performance test.
Further testing was performed on October 6.
During that test Valve CS-125B
opened against a 412 psig pressure measured upstream of the valve with a
corresponding riser level of 172 feet. These results empirically confirmed
the analytical results.
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3.2 Conclusions
Because of pressures significantly in excess of the nominal design pressures,
Train B of containment spray was degraded to the extent that detailed
evaluations were required to determine its operability.
4 PRIOR OPERATING HISTORY
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4.1 Train A Shutdown Coolina Heat Exchanger Inlet Pressure
The inspector reviewed copies of the charts from Chart Recorder CS-IPR-0303X
provided by the licensee for periods before and after Refueling Outage RF5.
The licensee stated that the charts indicated that the pressure transient
problem was worse after the refueling outage. The event that occurred on
September 13, 1993, was the most significant in terms of peak pressure and
time to decay. Other periods of elevated pressure with slow pressure decay
were evident, both before and after Refueling Outage RF5.
4.2 Conclusions
The Train A containment spray piping design made it probable that air bubbles
of some magnitude were in the piping since construction. Variations in
venting methods may have changed the amount of air trapped in the system.
The
potential existed that Valve CS-125A and, therefore, Train A of containment
spray was probably inoperable since the end of Refueling Outage 5 (November
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1992) and may have been inoperable before that time.
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ATTACHMENT A
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1 PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee Personnel-
R. Azzarello, Design Engineering Director
R. Barkhurst, Waterford 3 Vice President, Operations
0. Bulich, Mechanical Design Supervisor
R. Burski, Nuclear Safety Director
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J. Houghtaling, Technical Support Manager
L. Laughlin, Licensing Manager
D. Packer, Plant Operations General Manager
W. Pendergrass, Licensing Shift Superviscr
R. Peters, Electronic Maintenance Supervisor
D. Vinci, Operations Superintendent
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The personnel listed'above attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the
personnel listed above, the NRC inspectors contacted other personnel during
'this inspection period.
2 EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on October 8, 1993. During this meeting, the
NRC inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee
had no comments or questions regarding the inspection findings. A followup
exit was conducted via telephone with the Plant Operations General Manager on
October 15, 1993, to discuss the licensee's plans to evaluate the containment-
spray system hydrostatic test requirements as a result of the recent pressure-
test results.
Proprietary valve internal drawings were reviewed by the NRC
inspector and are'not included in this report.
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ATTACHMENT B
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FIG.
01
CONTAINMENT
SPRAY
SYSTEM
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STANDBY MODE
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(REF. LCU-1564-G-163)
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ENCLOSURE 2
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30762
Federal Register / Vol. 57. No.133 / Friday. July 10. 1992 / Notices
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aaaar*=re Sendmmments to: The
Secretary of the Comminaion. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory e---en.
Two-Yene Trial Program for
Washmgton. DC 20555. ATTN:
%m
Docketmg and Sernce Branch.
Conferences; Poucy Statement
Hand deliver comments to: Ons White
AGesect: Nuclear Regulatory
Flint North.11555 Rockville Pike.
Commission.
Rockville. MD between 7:45 a.m. to 4:15
Acnom: Policy statement.
p.m Federal workdays.
,
Copies of comments may be exammed
stnessARY:The Nuclear Regulatory
at the NRC Public Document Room. 21::0
Commissmn (NRC) is issums this policy
L Street. NW. (Lower 14 vel).
statement on the implamentat2on of a
Washmgton. DC
two-year tnal program to allow selected
a y m ,,,,.Ana cow n
.
enforcement conferences to be open to
James Ueberman. Director. Office of
attendar.ce by all members of the
Enforcement. U.S. Nucler.r Regulatory
general public.This policy statement
Commission. Washmgton. DC 20555
destnbes the two-year tnal program
(3014-2741b
and informs the public of how to get
informacon on upcommg open
suPPtasstTARY INFOfIssATION:
enforcement conferences.
Background
cavat This trial program is effective on
g g.,
,
July 10.1992. while comments on the
enforcement conferences is addressed in
pmgram am kung meerd Submit
Secuan V of the latest revision to the
comments on or before the completion
of the tnal program scheduled for July
., General Statement of Policy and
Procedure for Enforcement Actions."
n.1992. Comments received after this
date will be considered if it is practical
(Enforcement Policy)10 CR part 2.
to do so, but the Commission is able to
appendix C that was pubhshed on
aasure consideration only for comments
February 18.1992 (57 FR 5791).The
received on or before this date.
Enforcement Pohey states that.
" enforcement conferences will not
nonnally be open to the public"
'
However, the Comnussion has decided
to implement a trial program to
determme whether to matntain the
current policy with regard to
enforcement conferences or to adopt a
new policy that would allow most '
enforcement conferences to be open to
attendance by all members of the public.
Policy Statement
Position
The NRC is implementing a two-year
trial program to allow public
observation of se'octed enforcement
conferences. The NRC will monitor the -
program and determine whether to
establish a permanent policy for
conductmg open enforcement
conferences based on an assessment of
the following cnteria:
(1) Whether the fact that the
conference was open impacted the
NRC's ability to conduct a meanmgful
conference and/or implement the NRC's
enforcement program:
(2) Whether the open conference -
impacted the licensee's participation m
the conference:
(3) Whether the NRC expended a -
sigmficant amount of resources m
-akme the conference public: and
(4)The extent of public interest in
........s...r........
~.
.~
.
.
.
Federal Regater / Vol 57, No.133 / Friday, July 10, 1992 / Nodcas
gjg3
!. Criteria For Selocams Open
three categones oflimnaees wdl be
subject to peroommel screensag, that
signs, baamers,poesmen.etc netlarger
Erdoecament Codesences
commernal operaung reactora.
.
Enforcement conferences will not be
hospitals, and omer h== wasch
man W be W e 6 at
open to the public if the enforcement
mu cessat at the renammg types d
esmtm pareams may be mueved,
licensees.
Each regnemal alba wel === a.n=== to
acnon bem matem%,
cmdact the enfeecamentsamfammes
(1) Would be takan asamat an
Conferences % Ope t Enforemment procee&nes a
mth mammal
II. A
individmaL or d the acuan, thougn not
pmcude enfansment emismom
taken agamst anindividual. turns on
As soon as it is determmed that an
wdl contmee tobe a messung between
whether an mdindualhas can:ntued
enforcement conference ml! be open to
the NRC and the hcenese.While the
wmn@"""
public observanon, the NRC wd1 orally
edorcemesa canieressea
for<
(2 Invoi
a
notify the licansee that the enforr* ment
public observacon.it is not open for
g
c aferen e wdl be open to public
public perucipanas.
that the mdividualfs) involved be
observation as part of the agency,a tria,
Persona atteamns open enforcement
'
param aWeM b Ucensa a copy d mnfennces am naamded that(1) the
Isb
onth
ncs of an NRC
this Federal Respster notice that outhnea apparent violanone A=====d at open
O
v
uo
a
the program.1.fcensees mil be asked to
edorcemmt codenmcas am subect to
y y
Privacy Act inintmanon. or other
[t[b
"
ot enf
t
r nee
ge
o y
ung
informanon which could be consuiered
so that the NRC can scheoule an
enforcement acnon and (2) the
propnetary.
appropnately stzed conference room.
statements of views or exps===uma of
Enforcement conferences involving
The NRC wdl also nonfy appropnata
opinion made by NRC employees at
medical misarimetrations or
State liaison officers that an
open enforcement conferences or the
overexposures will be open assnmmg
enforcement conference has been
lack thereof, are notintended to
' ' "l'd and that it is open w pu' iic
represent final detunnmanons or beliefs.
n
tho
a amg
p d
au
"""*"
Individual's name. In addition.
The NRC intends to announce open
ea
8n pgnun in acm&ce
enforcement etmierences mil not be
enforcement conferences to the puolic
"""
- E*"
open to the puolic tf the conference mi! normaily at least 10 working days m
auendq open enbcament hs
be conducted by telephone or the
advance of the enforcement conference
m epm e an ppatunitym
conference mil be conoucted at a
through the followmg mecsansma,
subst wnnen connetits anmymo, y
relatively small!1censee's facility-
(1) Notices posted in the public
- ~""~"*
Finally, with the approval of the
Document Roosn:
mH suWumW be knMed to the
Executive Director for Operations.
(2) Toll-free teleobone messeees: and
e
o e
ca Enfa n - atim
enforcement conferences wdl not be
(3) Toll-free eiectrome bulletta coaro
open to the ouolic in special cases
messanes.
where good cause has been shown after
Penomg establishment of the toll-free
Dated at Roctride MD. ttas 7th day alluly
balancmg the bensfit of public
messaee systems. the puolic may call
1991
observanon agammi the potannalimpact (301) 497a73: to obtain a recormng of
For the Nucinar Reguaneory h==ma.
on the agency a enforcement acuca m a upcoming open enforcement
Samuni 1. Chilk.
particular case.
conferences. The NRC wdl isroe another Secremryof the Co- -
The NRC will stnve to conduct open
Federal Reester notice after the toll-free [FR Doc. E-16233 Flied 7-0-94 eas a.m4
enforcement conferences dunna the
messene systems are established.
sause cooe me.c.m
two. year tnal program m accornance
To assist the NRC In maxmg
mth the followmg three gosta:
appmpnate arrangemems to support
(1) Approximately 25 percent ci all
public observauon of enforcement
ehgible ensorcement conferences
conferenas,inamduais interesten m
concucted by tne NRC wdl be open for
attenmng a parucular enforcement
public observaoon:
conference should confy the momdual
(2) At least one open enforcement
identifiedin the meermg nonce
cocierence will be conducted m each of announcma the open enforcement
the reinonal offices: and
conference no later tnan tive busmess
(3) Open enforcement coniczences
days pnor to the enforcement
wul be conoucted with a venety of the
conference.
o av
poi ual bias in the
III. Conduct of Open Enforcement
Coolerences
seleenon process and to attempt to meet
the tnree roais stated above,everv
in accordance mth current crecuce.
fourta chinoie enforcement conference
enforcement centerences mil contmue
involymg one of three catesones of
to normally be held at theNRC remonal
licensees wn! normady be open to me
offices. Members of the puolic wul be
puolic danns the tnel prouram,
allowed access to the NRC remonas
However, in cases wnere there is an
offices to artend open enforament
ongomg aciudicatory pwmi mth
conferences m accoroance wrta the
one or more sterrenors. enforcemmt
" Standard Operstma F
a For
conferences mvorymg tasues related to
Pnmdma Secunty Stroport fer NRC
the subiect mauer of the ocoruna
Heanngs And Meetmas ' published
adjudicanon may also be openea.For
Novemoer 1.195r1158 m 562511. nasa
the purposes of thisinniprogram,the
proceoures provide that visitors may be
,