ML20059C839
| ML20059C839 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/19/1993 |
| From: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OLA-2-I-MFP-100, NUDOCS 9401060124 | |
| Download: ML20059C839 (20) | |
Text
- .
aws & ~ ^
m;_s w h
If h
b l
E
^
3 g
....., m /
$bI N.
Ml& VGIGK4-f f
~ ~~~
NCR D 0-92-MM-N022 Rev. O DRAFT:
January 4,
1993 s
7'
&f
[.f f h h $ h ? ' I E S
___ i,, u.u s __.
l, i b & S e L -
MANAGEMENT
SUMMARY
Recently, there have been frequent problems identified on various HVAC and related components.
These problems would not be expected to occur if proper maintenance had been performed.
This NCR is to focus on maintenance practices, procedures, and methods associated with key safety-related
)
HVAC components, and whether they are sufficient to assure equipment reliability and function.
This is considered a nonconformance per QAP-15.B, paragraph 2.1.8 (management prerogative).
In addition to the generic issue of HVAC problems, this NCR will specifically address:
(1) QE Q0009874 and ARs i
A0269316/A0266387 regarding damper actuator diaphragm failures, (2) A0268176 regarding damper blade seal degradation on fan M-22A, and (3) QE Q0009677/AR A0264127/AR A0256009 regarding Unit 2 fan S-1 failures to start.
(This NCR is not meant to take the place of root cause investigations and corrective actions for current HVAC ARs/QEs, unless decided upon by the TRG.)
Root cause is to be determined.
Corrective actions to prevent recurrence are to be
%termined.
This draft, dated January 4, 1993, provides the meeting minutes from the 12/22/92 TRG.
Revisions below include the addition of another QE (Q0009677) specifically to be resolved in this NCR, and new investigative and corrective actions determined at the TRG meeting.
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 1
of 20 6C - 2 7 5[4 FF- /oC 3 2 0 -o d - L M82 186EA3s88a?73 T-/
C PDR
. ~.-
.l l
<-l NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 HVAC MAINTENANCE PRACTICES I.
Plant Conditions l
Units 1 and 2 have been in various modes, at various power levels, with the conditions described.
II.
Description of Event A.
Summary:
Recently, there have been frequent problems identified on various HVAC and related components.
These problems would not be expected to occur if
(
proper maintenance had been performed.
This NCR is to
~ cus on maintenance practices, procedures, 3
and methods associated with key safety-related HVAC components, and whether they are sufficient to assure equipment reliability and function.
This is considered a nonconformance per QAP-15.B, paragraph 2.1.8.
B.
Background:
NCR DCO-92-MM-N007/LER 1-91-019 identified problems related to maintenance of containment fan cooler unit (CFCU) back draft dampers.
Additional frequent problems with HVAC equipment in general have been identified and experienced since that time.
The high rate of problem identification indicated a potential lack of attention or emphasis on safety-related HVAC equipment.
As a result, the need for further investigation into HVAC problems in general led to the initiation of this NCR.
l l
A preventive maintenance (PM) program is in place to routinely maintain safety-related HVAC l
equipment.
Previously, maintenance procedures MP l
M-23.4 and MP M-23.6 were utilized to perform the PM activities.
MP M-23.4 has recently been revised to incorporate lessons learned and additional experience related to HVAC equipment maintenance.
MP M-23.6 has been incorporated into M-23.4 and M-23.8 has been revised to specifically address CFCU maintenance.
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 2
of 20
-~. -.
M i
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 I
There are various STPs implementing Tech Spec surveillance requirements on HVAC equipment.
Thsee STPs are generally performed on either a monthly or 18-month frequency.
Administrative Procedure AP C-6S3 provides guidance for determining post-maintenance testing (PMT) requirements for equipment, following corrective and preventive maintenance activities.
The STPs mentioned above are specified for the PMT testing.
C.
Event
Description:
There is no specific event that initiated this NCR.
This NCR has resulted from frequent HVAC equipment problems.
This TRG is not intended to correct all specific HVAC problems and nonconforming conditions.
It is intended to review current maintenance programs, procedures, and practices to assure the reliability of the specific equipment.
The following are examples of typical HVAC problems that will be reviewed to assess the adequacy of current HVAC maintenance procedures, programs, and practices.
l A0252451/Q0009363:
FAN E-1 HAS LOST ALL FAN BELTS A0253867/Q0009424:
MIXED LUBRICANTS IN FANS A0259308/Q0009533:
S-2 FAN FAILS TO RUN A0264485/Q0009692:
FAN S-68, LOW AIR FLOW NCR DCO-92-MM-N007: CONTAuiMENT FAN COOLERS In addition to the generic issue of HVAC problems, this NCR will specifically address:
(1) QE Q0009874 and ARs A0269316/A0266387 regarding damper actuator diaphragm failures, (2) A0268176 regarding damper blade seal degradation on fan M-22A, and (3) QE Q0009677/AR A0264127/AR A0256009 regarding Unit 2 fan S-1 failure to start.
In 1988, a HVAC " task force" coordinated by NOS was initiated due to an increasing number of ARs on HVAC systems.
See Investigative Action #1 and 7/30/92 TRG meeting minutes below.
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 3
of 20 4
~
s NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 D.
Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:
None.
i l
E.
Dates and Approximate Times for Major Occurrences:
1, 1988-1990:
HVAC Task Force, coordinated by NOS 2.
July 9, 1992:
Revision of MP M-23.4 F.
Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:
None.
G.
Method of Discovery:
The potential for improvements to HVAC maintenance practices was determined by utility management personnel.
H.
Operator Actions:
None.
I.
Safety System Responses:
None.
III.
Cause of the Event A.
Immediate Cause:
To be determined.
B.
Determination of Cause:
1.
Human Factors:
a.
Communications:
b.
Procedures:
c.
Training:
e d.
Human Factors:
e.
Management System:
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 4
of 20
4 d
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 2.
Equipment / Material:
Material Degradation:
a.
b.
Design:
c.
Installation:
d.
Manufacturing:
e.
Preventive Maintenance:
f.
Testing:
g.
End-of-life failure:
C.
Root Cause:
To be determined.
D.
Contributory Cause:
To be determined.
IV.
Analysis of the Event A.
Safety Analysis:
In general, this NCR addresses overall mairtenance practices and policies, not specific instances of failed or degraded equipment.
Specific operability and safety questions are addressed in each initiating AR or QE.
However, for those individual items that will be addressed in this NCR, a safety analysis is presented below:
QE Q0009874/AR A0269316/AR A0266387 - DAMPER ACTUATOR DIAPHRAGM FAILURES This QE was written to address the recurring nature of diaphragm failures.
Because the QE is of a programmatic, generic-type nature and the failures discussed have already been identified and evaluated on ARs, no safety analysis is required.
As noted on each AR, the damper (M-22A) was failed in its safeguards position (closed).
Therefore, the damper would have performed its safety 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 5
of 20 f
f 4
._ _-.__.~_. __ _,
. ~ - -
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 function if the Aux. Building Ventilation System had been required to switch to safeguards mode, and the health and safety of the public was not adversely affected by this event.
AR A0268176 - DAMPER BLADE SEAL DEGRADATION Damp
'2A is in series with another damper (M-22B),
their safety-related function is to close to isolate air supply to non-safeguards areas of the Auxiliary Building.
Damper M-22B was closed when the problem with the M-22A seals was identified.
This assured a sealed ventilation path and elimini ad the potential for failure of M-22B when regi to close.
Thus, with M-22B 5
closed and no
.ge verified, the system was maintained in its accident (safeguards only) condit'3n (ref. A0268176, AE03).
The M-22A damper i
and degraded seals have been repaired; therefore, the health and safety of the public is not adversely affected by this event.
QE Q0009677/AR A0264127/AR A0256009 - FHB SUPPLY j
FAN S-1 FAILU' TO START To be determinea.
B.
Reportability:
1.
Reviewed under QAP-15.B and-determined by management to be non-conforming in accordance with Section 2.1.8, as a problem requiring resolution through the nonconformance process.
2.
Reviewed under 10 CPR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 per NUREG 1022 and determined to be not reportable.
3.
This problem will not require a 10 CFR Part 21 report, since (a) it is being evaluated under 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, and (b) it does not involve defects in vendor-supplied services or spare parts in stock.
4 This problem (will, will not) be reported via
)
an INPO Nuclear Network entry.
To be determined.
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 6
of 20
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 i
5.
Reviewed under 10 CFR 50.9 and determined to be not reportable since this event does not have a significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security.
i 6.
Reviewed under the criteria of AP C-29 requiring the issue and approval of an OE and determined that an OE is not required.
V.
Corrective Actions A.
Immediate Corrective Actions:
For each specific problem, immediate corrective actions are documented in the specific AR or QE.
B.
Investigative Actions:
1.
Provide the TRG with a copy of the 1987-88 NOS I
review of System 23 and relevant documentation.
FOLLOW-UP ACTION:
Summarize in the AE the significant events, history, and findings from the 1988 task force.
RESPONSIBILITY:
R. Moy ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
NOEM Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #01 2.
Perform a search of previous QEs and NCRs on System 23.
Review the previous QEs FOLLOW-UP ACTION (1f.
and NCRs to determine if there are any recurring categories of root or contributory causes.
FOLLOW-UP ACTION (2):
Generate RAMIS reports and plot graphs of cause codes, number of System 23 QEs/ total number of QEs, and number of System 23 NCRs/ total number of NCRs, vs.
time.
RESPONSIBILITY:
N. Koellish ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
PQCE Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #02 3.
Review the maintenance procedure for System 23 equipment.
i 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 7
of 20 l
Yeer-a+-
w --
v
-wwvww w-
=
wrw w-e --
e
-+
-+-*4 e
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 RESPONSIBILITY:
C.
Pfau ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
PGMA Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #03 4.
Review the STPs associated with HVAC equipment.
RESPONSIBILITY:
D.
Stermer ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
PTEB Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #04 5.
Interview past HVAC system engineers regarding previous HVAC problems / perspective.
RESPONSIBILITY:
R. Moy ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
NOEM Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #05 i
6.
Interview Mechanical Maintenance engineers and craft regarding previous HVAC problems / perspective.
l RESPONSIBILITY:
C.
Pfau ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
PGMA l
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #06 l
7.
Interview QC personnel regarding previous HVAC problems / perspective.
j RESPONSIBILITY:
N. Koellish ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
PQCE Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #07 8.
Interview 1.C and Plant Engineering personnel regarding previous HVAC problems / perspective.
RESPONSIBILITY:
D.
Stermer ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
PTEB Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #08 9.
Interview Electrical Maintenance personnel regarding previous HVAC problems / perspective.
RESPONSIBILITY:
R.
Moy ECD:
RETURN 3
DEPARTMENT:
NOEM Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #09
- 10. Interview Design Engineering personnel regarding previous HVAC problems / perspective.
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 8
of 20
~
i r
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 i
RESPONSIBILITY:
F.
Ling ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
NCEM Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #10 1
- 11. Discuss with Reliability Engineering the i
feasibility / applicability of performing an 4
NPRDS search for HVAC problems.
FOLLOW-UP ACTION:
Summarize results of NPRDS l
search / comparison with quarterly reviews of I
RESPONSIBILITY:
D.
Helete ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
Reliability Eng.
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #11
- 12. Research the procedures for issuing a work order and determining the required PMT.
Are there potential problems or areas for improvement?
]
RESPONSIBILITY:
C.
Pfau ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
Mechanical Maintenance Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #12
- 13. Review the recent QC concern that identified problems with belt tensioning, and how Mechanical Maintenance responded.
t RESPONSIBILITY:
Pfau/Koellish ECD:
LETURN DEPARTMENT:
Mechanical Mpintenance/QC Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #13
- 14. Perform a component repetitive failure history search for System 23.
RESPONSIBILITY:
D.
Helete ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
Reliability Engineering Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #14
- 15. Investigate the possibility of performing a historical search to determine the number of L
RT work orders performed & what percentage of them are HVAC related, over time.
Investigate also performing the same search for CM and RT
~
work orders combined.
l RESPONSIBILITY:
R. Toomire ECD:
RETURN DEPARTMENT:
Work Planning Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #15 l
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 9
of 20 s
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993
- 16. Electrical Maintenance to review maintenance procedures associated with HVAC equipment to determine if they currently provide adequate guidance.
RESPONSIBILITY:
R. Waltos ECD:
2/15/93 DEPARTMENT: Mechanical Maint.
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #16 4
- 17. I&C to' review maintenance procedures associated with HVAC equipment to determine if they currently provide adequate guidance.
RESPONSIBILITY:
R.
Waltos ECD:
2/15/93 DEPARTMENT:
Mechanical Maint.
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #17
- 18. R /iew the events in QE Q0009677 and begin initial investigations into the causes.
RESPONSIBILITY:
C.
Pfau ECD:
2/15/93 DEPARTMENT:
Mechanical Maint.
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #18
- 19. Generate a summary writeup incorporating the results of the TRG investigative actions and discussions.
RESPONSIBILITY:
R. Waltos ECD:
2/28/93 DEPARTMENT:
Mechanical Maint.
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #19 (If investigations point to recurring problems with certain components or equipment, review the vendor manuals to determine if we are following the vendor's guidance.)
(PROPOSED)
'T RESPONSIBILITY:
ECD:
1 DEPARTMENT:
Tracking AR:
A0 AE #__
C.
Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
Coordinate with NECS to develop a PM program for diaphragms and seals.
(Refer to recent actions for Grinnel diaphragm valves for an example.)
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 10 of 20
, - -, e m se o+
-+e-ww, w---,m w
y
-me-m
~-
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 i
RESPONSIBILITY:
C.
Pfau ECD:
7/31/93 DEPARTMENT:
Mechanical Maint.
Tracking AR:
A0266976, AE #20 Outage Related? No OE Related?
No NRC Commitment? No CMD Commitment? No D.
Prudent Actions (not required for NCR closure)
To be determined.
RESPONSIBILITY:
ECD:
Tracking AR:
A0 VI.
Additional Information A.
Failed Components:
None.
B.
Previous Similar Events:
See " Description of Event" on p.1 above.
i C.
Operating Experience Review:
1.
NPRDS:
See Investigative Action #11 above.
2.
NRC Information Notices, Bulletins, Generic Letters:
A search of the Operating Experience Assessment database under keywords HVAC and PROGRAM revealed the following:
IE Notice 86-76:
This Notice discussed specific problems in the operation of the control room ventilation system.
PG&E's response addressed these specific problems.
The Notice did not identify any wider-scope l
problems regarding HVAC in general.
IE Notice 92-32:
This Notice discussed inadequate maintenance and testing of EOF and TSC 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 11 of 20 l
l
~
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 ventilation systems.
It did not discuss any generic, wide-scope HVAC problems.
3.
A search of the Operating Experience Assessment database under keywords HVAC and PROGRAM did not reveal any items.
D.
Trend Code:
i Responsible department __, and cause code __.
To be determined.
E.
Corrective Action Tracking:
1.
The tracking action request is A0266976.
2.
Are the corrective actions outage related?
To be determined.
F.
Footnotes and Special Comments:
None.
G.
References:
1.
Example Action Requests, Quality Evaluations, and NonConformance Reports:
A0252451 QOOO9363 A0253867 00009424 A0259308 y0009533 A0264485 Q0009692 NCR DCO-92-MM-N007 2.
Specific ARs/QEs to be addressed in this NCR:
- QE Q0009874 DAMPER ACTUATOR DIAPHRAGM FAILURES AR A0269316 (Unit 1)
AR A0266387 (Unit 2) i
- AR A0268176 M-22A DAMPER BLADE SEAL DEGRADATION
- QE Q0009677 FHB FAN S-1 FAILURE TO START i
AR A0264127 AR A0256009256009l
l 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 12 of 20 l
n
,_.v.
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 3.
Background information:
AP C-6S3 POST MAINTENANCE TESTING MP M-23.4 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF PLANT VENTILATION FANS, ASSOCIATED DAMPERS, AND FILTERS MP M-23.6 (Rescinded)
PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF FANS, ASSOCIATED DAMPERS, AND FILTERS MP M-23.8 PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS AND ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS 4.
QC Surveillance QCS 91-0103 H.
TRG Meeting Minutes:
On May 28, 1992, the initial TRG convened and considered the following:
1.
Scope of the NCR:
This NCR will focus on procedures, practices, and methods among all disciplines for maintenance, testing, operation, etc. of safety-related HVAC i
equipment.
The TRG will not take the place of l
root cause investigations and corrective actions for current open QEs, unless decided i
upon by the TRG.
2.
The TRG needs to perform investigations to determine the scope of HVAC problems, and to gauge our current and previous effectiveness in resolving them.
Investigative Actions #1-
- 11 were assigned to revi. sit the '87 '88 MOS review, search previous QEs and NCRs, review the maintenance procedure and STPs, and i
interview personnel.
It was noted that the number of NECS and System Engineering personnel assigned to HVAC has increased since l
1987.
3.
The ECD for investigative actions is 7/15/92.
l This TRG will reconvene in July when the investigative actions are completed.
On July 30, 1992, the TRG reconvened and considered the following:
1.
The TRG reviewed the previous TRG meeting minutes.
The TRG agreed to specifically add 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 13 of 20
]
- -. =..
. - - -.- -=__ -
~
NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 two ARs regarding damper diaphragm and blade seal degradation (see text above) to the scope of the NCR.
2.
The TRG updated the status of investigative actions (IAs):
- 1:
The 1988 HVAC task force was initiated due to an increasing number of HVAC ARs.
An action plan was generated, but efforts slowly trailed off by 1990 due to lack of budget /
manpower / management support for the task force.
A second on-site system engineer was added.
Several corrective action recommendations were informally drafted, and although these recommendations were never formally issued, most of the problems were addressed via other mechanisms (e.g.,
m.intenance issues, design issues, AT-EWRs).
Follow-up action is to summarize this info. on the tracking AE.
- 2:
The TRG discussed the searches that identified a list of several previous QEs and NCRs.
Follow-up action is to review this list and attempt to categorize any recurring root or contributory causes (e.g.,
personnel error, equipment failure, or design).
- 3:
There were two maintenance procedures for fans & dampers - MP M-23.6 and M-23.4, prior to a very recent revision that provided additional details and combined them into M-23.4.
MP M-23.8 was revised te specifically address CFCU components.
Craft personnel may previously have been unsure of the scope of the procedures, but currently the procedures are adequate and there is a heightened awareness / mentality towards identifying i
problems.
- 4:
There are two groups of STPs - monthly (typically to run/ stroke equipment), and 18-month tests.
There was a question as to whether the POV panel logic used by the monthly STPs properly tests individual components.
Improvements regarding such issues as test bases and adequate testing of backdraft dampers are currently being pursued 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 14 of 20
NCR DCO-92-HM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 separately; and overall, there does not appear to be any major programmatic weaknesses.
l A new investigative action was assigned (#12) in response to a concern that there are potential problems in choosing the proper post-maintenance test.
- 11:
For HVAC, NPRDS focuses only on CFCUs and hydrogen purge fans.
Reliability Engineering's quarterly review noted a higher-than-industry failure rate of CFCUs at DCPP in 1989-90 caused by personnel errors (due to lack of training?).
The TRG discussed that Rel. Eng's recent proposals for an integrated plant-wide system for trending failures /cause codes could be useful for searches such as this one.
3.
This TRG will reconvene 8/14/92 AM to continue discussing investigative actions.
ECDs for open investigative AEs will be extended to 8/27/92.
On August 14, 1992, the TRG reconvened and considered the following:
1.
The TRG reviewed the minutes from the last meeting, and clarified that most of the problems noted by the HVAC task force were addressed.
2.
The TRG discussed tne results of Investigative Actions #5-#10:
These investigative actions were to interview several different NPG organizations on five questions related to HVAC.
1)
The first question concerned the perceived importance of safety-related HVAC systems, relative to other safety-related systems.
In general it was felt that TS-related HVAC is important, but sometimes other TS equipment is given a higher priority for allocating funding and resources.
2a) Recurring HVAC problems:
MM and I&C cited damper problems (potentially due to recent i
heightened awareness in that area?).
Design Eng. noted general corrosion and degradation over time, as well as some f
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 15 of 20
~
.~
i NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 design issues (outside the scope of this NCR on maintenance procedures / practices).
OC noted dampers, the use of contractors for work on the CRVS (determined not a problem by the TRG, due to the need for specialized expertise), a weakness in acceptance criteria in PMs for sheaves, and problems with fan belt tensioning.
An investigative action was assigned to review MM's response to the recent QC concerns on belt tensioning.
2b) What could be done to fix these recurring problems?
Suggestions included either 1) increasing PM frequency or 2) improving consistency and quality of maintenance by better attention to detail, better training (including fundamentals of system operation as well as components), or better information sharing among experienced individuals (including the HIT team concept).
Other suggestions included improving access to components for j
inspection / maintenance.
3)
Were HVAC problems addressed commensurate with safety class?
If not, any specific examples?
Some groups felt that procedures and general knowledge have improved from the past.
However, others
=
felt that the damper problems indicate 4
that some problems are still recurring.
4)
General feeling on HVAC - are things a
degrading?
Again, most groups noted the recent improvements, but corrosion and agina are continuing, and the POV panels may no. be completely reliable.
(There is i
an existing commitment from approx. 1988 to replace the panels, eventually.)
5)
Is there adequate guidance for HVAC work?
MM felt that training, tailboards, and foreman involvement could be better.
I&C and Design Eng. noted that the existing drawings are definitely lacking in quality and availability.
3.
Remaining investigative actions and follow-up actions will be discussed at the next reconvene, as will the potential inclusion of additional specific ARs into 'he NCR (e.g.
A0268176).
This TRG will reconvene in approximately three weeks (ECD 9/3/92).
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 16 of 20 l
_.. - _. =.,.. _, _..
9 NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 On September 3, 1992, the TRG reconvened and considered the following:
1.
Investigative Action #12, PMT process:
There are spaces for two types of PMT in PIMS:
Operational Verification Testing (OVT) and Maintenance Verification Testing (MVT).
Currently we are only using OVT.
During planning, WPC determines if any PMT is required.
AP C-6S3 provides some guidelines.
1 If there is a question, the planner consults the test group, or can call Engineering, System Eng., or Maintenance Eng.
- Finally, prior to lifting the clearance, ops also reviews whether an operating test is required.
This test would often be the same OVT already specified by the test group.
Therefore, there are existing barriers to assure appropriate PMT.
However, personnel in the test group felt AP C-6S3 could be enhanced to incorporate guidance provided an EPRI report.
The ECD for this AE will be extended to 9/13/92 to allow inputting all of this information into PIMS.
2.
Investigative Action #13, previous QC concern regarding belt tensioning:
This concern i
documented in QC Surveillance QCS 91-0103 was i
addressed by revising MP M-23.4, which now includes a specific section for infouuation on belt tensioning.
Other issues regarding improper documentation and improper resolution of problems were addressed as part of the corrective actions for NCR DCO-92-MM-N007 (ref. A0258408, AE/17).
i 3.
Reliability Engineering discussed a new PIMS report method that generates an "importance factor" based upon component history.
This importance factor is an indicator of repetitive problems, weighted by impact on operability and QEs.
A new investigative action was assigned to perform this search for components in System 23.
This action will help to begin collecting information for the task force (see next item).
4.
There was a verbal commitment from the CFCU NOV enforcement conference that a task force would review the adequacy of the HVAC 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 17 of 20
4 NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 systems / equipment (ref. DCL-92-161 and 5/28/92 email summary).
It was believed that this TRG was to be that task force; however, this TRG is only of limited scope and will recommend that a larger-scope task force be initiated.
5.
Response to the follow-up action to Investigative Action #1 (listing of major events of previous NOS HVAC Task Force) is now on the AE.
The follow-up action to Investigative Action #2 is also done, with the QE and NCR searches of previous HVAC problems categorized.
As another follow-up, QC will plot graphs of this data to determine any trends over time.
QC will also investigate the generation of plots for total number of QEs and NCRs versus time, and the percentage 2 those related to HVAC equipment / systems.
6.
A new investigative action was assigned to Work Planning to determine whether plots can be generated of the number of CM and RT work orders and the percentage of the total number which are related to HVAC systems / components, vs. time.
L 7.
The TRG discussed adding AR A0268176 to the NCR writeup.
8.
This TRG will reconvene once more before the outage, on September 10, 1992.
on September 10, 1992, the TRG rec 7nvened and considered the following:
1.
Reliability Engineering presented the results of their component repetetive failure history search.
Nine components were identified as having an importance factor (IF) of 5 or greater, forty-four had an IF between 3 and 5, and between two and three hundred had an IF of less than 3.
The report has only been run a few other times, and in those cases ifs between 3 and 5 were targeted for a closer look.
2.
Since 1988, there have been approximately 6900 PM W0s.
Approximately 1600 (23%) were on HVAC components.
There are an estimated 600 CM WOs 92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 18 of 20
m s
l
'o NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 per year (vs. some 340 PMs per year), with a i
total of 2200 HVAC cms since
'88.
The number of cms appears to be trending down, with only about 115 so far tnis year.
However, there does not appear to be a way to summarize the applicable data with the standard PIMS reports.
The ECD for this investigation was revised to 12/15/92 to allow time to create custom PIMS reports.
3.
The data and graphs to determine any trends in QE/NCR cause codes over time are still being compiled.
4.
These remainder of the meeting served as the initial meeting of the new HVAC task force.
A preliminary action plan for the task force was discussed.
4 on December 22, 1992, the TRG reconvened and considered the following:
J 1.
The TRG will complete the investigative actions for this NCR, then will close out the NCR with the HVAC task force continuing on to i
address the larger issues.
2.
Graphs for PMs and cms were reviewed and do not appear to show discernible trends over time.
Data for HVAC QEs indicated that QEs decreased, then increased.
This may show an actual decrease and increase in probicms, or may reflect decreasing problems but an increased sensitivity for QEs.
The total number of QEs has increased, however.
There was not enough data available to graph NCRs.
3.
Although Electrical Maint. and I&C personnel were interviewed as part of the investigative actions, two new actions will be assigned to have them specifically review their procedures for adequacy.
4.
Root cause and corrective actions are needed I
for the specific ARs and QEs that are part of this NCR (see above).
Proposed root cause for i
the first two issues is that the design life of the diaphragms was exceeded, and a corrective action was assigned to develop a PM 4
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 19 of 20 4
~,.
- m...
--n r---.r
~
s' i
s NCR DCO-92-MM-N022 Rev. 00 DRAFT:
January 4, 1993 program to address the problem.
An investigative action was assigned to begin looking at causal factors for QE Q0009677, which will also be specifically included in this NCR.
5.
The TRG chairman will generate a summary writeup, including the results of investigative actions and TRG discussions to date.
This TRG will reconvene by approximately the end of February 1993.
I.
Remarks:
'l None.
J.
Attachment (s):
None.
i j
92NCRWP\\92MMN022.PSN Page 20 of 20
_.