ML20058P238
| ML20058P238 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001201 |
| Issue date: | 06/03/1992 |
| From: | Lester K FRAMATOME COGEMA FUELS (FORMERLY B&W FUEL CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058P237 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-91-001, IEB-91-1, RP-020, RP-20, NUDOCS 9310220174 | |
| Download: ML20058P238 (6) | |
Text
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B&W FUEL COMPANY COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLANT RADIATION PROTECTION PROCEDURE SECTION:
TITLE:
PROCEDURE NO.
REV.
REPORTING LOSS OF HEALTH-SAFETY CRITICALITY CONTROLS RP-020 1-
1.0 APPLICABILITY
All employees.
2.0 PURPOSE
This procedure establishes a uniform method by which situations involving criticality safety or control, procedural, or license deviations can be reported, investigated and documented.
3.0 GENERAL
Criticality safety rules have been established to insure that special nuclear material (SNM) operations are conducted in a safe manner so that an inadvertent criticality will not occur at the CNFP.
A thor-ough criticality safety assessment was conducted that instituted the criticality control parameters that we operate under at the CNFP.
If there is any significant degradation of any of theses controls, there must.be assurance that proper attention is being addressed to the deviations, that they are being promptly reported to management, and as required, reported to the NRC.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 NRC Bulletin 91-01:
Reporting Loss of Criticality Safety Control 4.2 ANSI /ANS-8.1-1983, Rev. 1988, American National Standard.for Nuclear Criticality Safety in Operations with Fissionable Materi-als outside Reactors.
5.0 DEFINITIONS
5.1 Double Continaency Principle - Process designs shall incorporate sufficient factors of safety to require at least two unlikely, independent, and concurrent changes in process conditions before a criticality accident is possible.
DATE: 05/07/92 PAGE: 1 OF 6 9310220174 931013 P4 PDR ADOCK 07001201
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iRP'020:
REPORTING LOSS OF CRITICALITY REV.:
1 CONTROLS 5.2 Controlled Parameter - A parameter that is kept within specified limits.
To prevent criticality accidents, process conditions must be kept within specified parameter limits by controls.
Several controls should be applied to assure that the parameter-does not exceed a specified limit.
All of the controls related to that parameter, taken together, create the " controlled parame-5 i
ter".
Under the double contingency principle defined above there would be two such controlled parameters, both of which must be i
defeated for it to be possible for a criticality to occur.
5 i
6.0 INDEX
The requirements of this procedure are outlined in the following i
i, sections:
Section 7.0 Identification of the Loss of a Controlled Parameter.
Section 8.0 Reporting Instructions 7.0 IDENTIFICATION OF THE LOSS OF A CONTROLLED PARAMETER:
1 l
7.1 Criticality control deficiencies may be identified by any indi-vidual.
[
7.2 The following guidelines have been established to provide crite-ria for internal reporting of criticality control deficiencies.
Report conditions if:
a 7.2.1 The local safety rules cannot be followed verbatim.
i 7.2.2 Following the local safety rules verbatim may result in an unsafe condition.
7.2.3 Local safety rules were not followed and an unsafe condition exists.
s 7.2.4 Measurements or sample results related to criticality j
safety are questionable or outside of approved limits t
specified in procedures.
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7.2.5 Abnormal conditions occur in the process, which are not controlled by the local safety rules.
I l
1 1
DATE: 05/07/92 PAGE: 2 OF 6 i
RP"020:
REPORTING LOSS OF CRITICALITY REV.:
1 CONTROLS 7.2.6 Measurement / sampling equipment required is not func-tioning or is questionable.
7.2.7 Maintenance, calibrations or functional testing, or repair of equipment used for criticality control is not performed within the required time interval.
7.2.8 Criticality safety related equipment / components are discovered which have not been replaced with consistent parts.
7.2.9 Discovery of process or equipment modifications without Nuclear Criticality Engineering review and approval, as required.
7.2.10 Determination that a criticality safety analysis was deficient in evaluating actual plant conditions and necessary controlled parameters were not established.
8.0 REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS:
8.1 Criticality control deficiencies identified must be reported to insure that corrective action can be implemented and proper notifications can be made as required.
8.2 The individual that identifies the criticality control deficien-cies shall report the condition to their respective supervisor.
The supervisor shall then report the incident to the Manager, Safety & Licensing.
The Manager, Safety & Licensing shall contact Nuclear Criticality Engineers to aid in the assessment of the incident.
8.3 If any of the following apply, the Plant Manager and the Nuclear Criticality Engineers shall be notified and the NRC shall also be promptly notified:
8.3.1 Any event in which a control is necessary to prevent a criticality or mitigate the consequences of a critical-ity is disabled or fails to function as designed when needed and results in the loss of the double contingen-cy principle.
8.3.2 Any event or incident where it is expected that media interest is highly likely.
8.3.3 A failure that results in an unanalyzed system which is more critical than the analyzed system.
8.3.4 Loss of a control that results in a significant degra-dation of the system.
PAGE: 3 OF 6 DATE: 05/07/92
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.RP 050:
REPORTING LOSS OF CRITICALITY REV.:
1 CONTROLS 8.3.5 Determination that a criticality safety analysis was deficient in evaluating actual plant conditions and necessary controlled parameters were not established.
8.3.6 An unusual event or condition for which the severity and remedy are not readily determined.
8.4 If any of the conditions specified in 8.3 are applicable the NRC shall be notified as promptly as possible after they have been determined to exist, however, notification should be accomplished within four hours.
8.5 The Plant Manager shall activate the Emergency Response Team as applicable.
8.6 All incidents that require NRC notification shall be thoroughly documented and retained in the Health Safety files.
- END -
DATE: 05/07/92 PAGE: 4 OF 6
. ~.
. RP D20:
REPORTING LOSS OF CRITICALITY' REV.:
1 CONTROLS RECORD OF REVISIONS DATE REVISED /
CHANGE PAGE/
DESCRIPTION REAFFIRMED PARAGRAPH 01-08-92 0
Entire Procedure Initial Issue 05-06-92 1
7.2.10 Added to include discov-ery.of an inadequate evaluation to be included in the internal report-ing.
8.2 Changed the word "may" to "shall".
To mandate criticality engineering to take part in internal reporting events.
8.4 Changed the NRC reporting criteria from 24 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
t DATE: 05/07/92 PAGE: 5 OF 6
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- i NRP-020: '
REPORTING LOSS OF CRITICALITY' REV.2 1
CONTROLS 2
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