ML20058P162
| ML20058P162 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 10/14/1993 |
| From: | Mcmeekin T DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310220123 | |
| Download: ML20058P162 (6) | |
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Duke Power Company T C Matuns McGwe Nuclear Genemtion Department lice President 12700*Hagen Ferry Rocid (MG01A)
(704)S75-4800
. Huntersnile. AC28078-89M (704)RT5--4809 Fa i
DUKE POWER October 14,1993 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornmission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Sub!oct: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Ncs. 50-369 and 50-370 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-369,370/93-13 l
Violations 50-369/93-13-01 and 50-370/93-13-02 Reply to a Notice of Violation Gentlemen:
Enclosed is the response to the Notice of Vio'ation issued Septembor 14,1993 concerning failure to provide adequate test procedures for the emergency diesel generators and failure to folicw procedures.
Should tnero be any questions concerning this response, contact Randy Cross at (704) 875-4179.
l l-i Very Truly Yours, f@lJ/ L T. C. McMeekin Attachment xc:
(w/ attachment)
Mr. S. D. Ebneter Mr. Georgo Maxwell Regional Administrator, Region 11 NRC Senior Resident inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Station 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. Victor Nerses U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation One White Flint North, Mail Stop 9H3 Washington, D. C. 20555 I
en 9310220123 931014.
PDR ADDCK 05000369 E-G PDR 566 l
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i McGuire Nuclear Station Reply to a Notice of Violation Violation 369/93-13-01 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires written procedures to be developed and implemented for safety-related activities.
Contrary to the above, surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4350/36A and PT/1/A/4350/36B were not revised to incorporate changes to Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.e(8), which resulted in the licensee's use of an inadequate test procedure to conduct the hot restart test for the 1 A diesel generator on May 25,1993 and the 18 diesel generator on April 16,1993. The licensee did not conduct the hot restart tests immediately after the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> run; nor did the licensee conduct the hot restart tests in a manner by which the required data could be obtained for meeting the test acceptance criteria, as was required by the amended Technical '
Specification.
This is Severity Level IV (Supplement 1) violation and applies to Unit 1 only.
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i fleply to Violation 369/93-13-01 1.
Reason for the Violation:
Amendments 135/17 to the McGuire Technical Specifications were approved by the NRC on February 1,1993. McGuire Regulatory Compliance notified Operations and other appropriate station groups of these amendments on February 10,1993 with a request to prepare any required procedure changes. Operations and System Engineering Sections revised the affected procedures except for the change to the hot restart criteria which was overlooked in the review process.
l 2.
Corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
Surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4350/36A and PT/1/A/4350/368 have been revised to incorporate the changes to Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.e(8).
3.
Corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further Violations:
The Station Procedure Adherence Committee will review the procedure review process used to ensure station procedures reflect current Technical Specifications to determine if improvements are necessary. This review will be completed by December 31,1993.
i 4.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
Committee will determine the implementation schedule for any recommended process changes.
Full compliance will be achieved by December 31, 1993. The Station Procedure Adherence
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l McGuire Nuclear Station Reply to a Notice of Violation i
Violation 370/93-13-02 (Example 1)
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be implemented covering the applicable.
procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February,1978. Contrary to the above, plant personnel failed to implement the procedural requirements provided for:
(1)
Fuel reconstruction activities. On July 21,1993, contractor personnel failed to follow procedural requirements for handling fuel rods during reconstitution activities, which resulted in a severely j
bent fuel rod and subsequent challenge to the fuel cladding integrity.
This is a Severity Level IV (Supplement I) violation and applies to Unit 2 only.
R_eply to Violation 370/93-13-02 (Example 1) i 1.
Reason for the Violation:
I During the reconstitution /recaging of fuel assembly V27, fuel rod 1-14 was removed from the damaged assembly and was being placed into the recage assembly. During insertion of rod 1-14 l
as per B&W procedure FS-113, high loads were encountered. As per approved procedure, B&W.
personnel rotated the rod approximately 45 degrees and moved the rod upward slightly to reduce the load to try and continue inserting the rod into the assembly. At this point, the gripping collet i
lost its hold on the rod. The technician tried several times to re-engage the collet on top of the rod but these attempts were unsuccessful. The technician then closed the collet and attempted to push the rod downward through the rod puller rod guides. This action was not addressed in f
the procedure and was outside of the design basis for the tool. Therefore, the root cause of the bent rod was a failure to follow procedure.
i 2.
Corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved:
A team of Duke Power and B&W representatives formulated a plan for the recovery of the bent rod. The following areas were analyzed:
1.
Analysis of rod mechanicalintegrity 2.
Dose assessment of a broken rod 3.
Work process for rod recovery 4.
Rod storage 5.
Grid-cage integrity A pre-job briefing was held to discuss the recovery of the bent fuel rod. This meetmg was:
conducted in accordance with the guidance provided in INPO SOER 91-01. This meeting was attended by personnel from Operations, Reactor Engineering, Nuclear Engineering, Radiation Protection, Fuel Handling and B&W. The following corrective steps were taken:
1.
Vendor personnel were counseled as to the importance of following procedures.
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ReDiv to Violation 370/93-13-02 (Example 1)
Page 2 2.
A new collet design was installed in the rod puller.
3.
Procedure FS-113 was revised to include specific guide !nes on re-engaging the collet.
The use of the collet to push the rod is now explicitly prohibited.
4.
A new rod guide assembly with an improved design was installed in the rod puller.
5.
The bent rod was safely recovered and was stored in a failed fuel rod canister in the spent fuel pool.
3.
Corrective Steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
A post-job meeting involving Duke Power and B&W personnel is scheduled for October 14,1993 to discuss the overall reconstitution /recaging campaign.
4.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
Any further corrective actions identified in the October 14,1993 meeting will be implemented by January 1,1994.
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McGuire Nuclear Station Reply to a Notice of Violation l
Violation 370/93-13-02 (Example 2.)
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be implemented covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February,1978. Contrary to the above, plant personnel failed to implement the procedural requirements provided for:
(2)
Replacement of Unit 2 emergency diesel generator potential transformer fuses. On July 31,1993, licensee personnel failed to follow instructions in an approved work order, which resulted in an inadvertent actuation of the Train B engineered safety features systems.
This is Severity Level IV (Supplement 1) violation which applies to Unit 2 only.
R_eply to Violation 370/93-13-02 (Example 2) 1.
Reason for the Violation:
On July 31,1993 at approximately 1000 hrs., Operations, IAE, and QA personnel were completing a verification on a replacement fuse that had been placed in service without OA observation causing an Engineered Safety Feature Actuation of Train B on Unit 2. This occurred due to the opening of the wrong fuse drawer on the B Safety Bus. This initiated a Black Out Signal and after the time check delay for low voltage, started the Sequencer. The 2B diesel did not start since it was tagged out for post maintenance testing activity. All other equipment activated and operated as designed.
The fuse had been broken initially during reins'allation after the refueling outage maintenance work was completed on July 27,1993. It was then determined that there were no replacement fuses onsite and the Engineering Section approved a substitute fuse to be installed for the diesel break in runs. The temporary fuse was placed in the breaker cubicle early on July 28,1993.
The proper rated fuse was received on site on July 28,1993 and Operations personnel replaced the substitute fuse at approximately 1700 hrs. on July 28,1993 in between diesel runs. Operations personnel routinely remove and replace fuses during the course of their duties. On July 29,1993, an IAE Supervisor questioned the Operations engineer who had replaced the fuse to determine if OA had witnessed the fuse installation. The Operations Engineer replied that the fuse installation had not been witnessed by OA. OA does not witness Operations personnel replacing fuses on a normal basis. It was then agreed that QA would verify the correct fuse had been installed at a convenient time prior to declaring the diesel operable.
On July 31,1993,2B diesel testing was completed and prior to performing the final surveillance test, IAE and Operations personnel decided it was an appropriate time to wrap up the work order on the f use. The IAE Supervisor, an Operations Senior Reactor Operator and a OA Inspector went to the 2 ETB Switchgear Room. Opening the front compartment of cubicle 2ETB-3, they located the fuse drawer labeled " 2ETB BUS PT FUSES " This drawer was opened and this action caused the Blackout signal to be generated. The actual location of the fuse that needed to be verified is
ILepJy 10 Violation 370/93-13-02 (Example 2)
Page 2 located in the back of cubicle 2ETB-3 and is labelled " DG 2B BKR PT FUSES". The work order specified " SOURCE PT FUSE "
2.
Corrective steos that have been taken and the results achieved:
The Senior Reactor Operator at the 2 ETB-3 cubicle closed the fuse drawer and Control Room personnelimplemented AP/2/A/5500/07, Loss of Electrical Power, and returned the B train back to the pre-event status. This action is detailed in the McGuire Licensee Event Report 370/93-05, dated August 30,1993.
3.
Corrective steps that will be taken to avoid future violations:
3 A.
Engineering personnel will revise the One line drawings for Unit 1 and Unit 2,4.16 KV switchgear to clearly indicate the location of all potential transformers and their fuse drawers.
B.
Operations personnel will ensure labels are placed on Unit 1 and Unit 2 4.16 KV switchgear to clearly identify the location of the potential transformer fuses and the possibility of causing train blackout.
C.
Site Communications personnel will communicate this event to station management supervisors to be shared in team meetings on the importance of self verification and the effective communication of work to be performed (written and verbal) will be stressed.
IAE and Operations personnel will define and communicate the roles of each group as it D.-
relates to Operations versus Maintenance and the association of each with the QA program.
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Date when full compliance will be achieved:
t All corrective actions will be completed by January 27,1994.
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