ML20058L977
| ML20058L977 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/03/1993 |
| From: | Stoiber C NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-93-250, NUDOCS 9309090434 | |
| Download: ML20058L977 (15) | |
Text
______
l RELEASED TOTHE PDR f"%
c7/.zr/c)3 cf 61e '
ms
.................e.......:
j
/
POLICY ISSUE September 3, 1993 SECY-93-250 4
FOR:
The Commissioners ff0f!:
Carlton R. Stoiber, Director i
Office of International Programs
SUBJECT:
DOE PROPOSED SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT FOR RETRANSFER OF ZIRCALOY TUBES FROM GERMANY TO BRAZIL FOR ANGRA I PURPOSE:
To obtain the Commission's approval of a proposed response to the Department of Energy (D0E).
DISCUSSION:
DOE has requested the NRC's views on a proposed subsequent arrangement for the retransfer of 20,000 zircaloy tubes (9,500 kilograms of U.S.-origir, material),
from Germany's Siemens A.G. facility in Hanau to the safeguarded Industrias Nucleares do Brazil, S.A. facility in Brazil for use in the fabrication of fuel assemblies for the safeguarded Angra I power reactor (Attachment 1).
Zircaloy tubes are an item on the trigger list of the multilateral Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) (INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1), in which the U.S.
participates. Recently the Safeguards section of the NSG guidelines were amended to incorporate a policy of full scope safeguards as a condition of l
supply for the transfer of trigger list items to a non-nuclear weapon State (Brazil). This policy, however, does not apply if it is determined that the 1
proposed export is under an existing agreement or contractual arrangement drawn up prior to April 4,1992.
In regard to the present case, State has secured documentation from the German government showing that the subject retransfer is part of a contractual arrangement between Siemens and Angra's reactor operator that was entered into prior to 1992. On that basis, the German government has concluded that the present case should be grandfathered.
State has informed the staff that it agrees with Germany and plans to concur in the approval of the present request.
Contact:
Karen Henderson, OIP/ESSC NOTE:
TO BE MADE PUBLICLY 504-2337 AVAILABLE WHEN THE 0080 FINAL SRM IS MADE AVAILABL 25"?'% --
h9' 1
~
The Commissioners 2
September 3, 1993 U.S. policy on nuclear exports for Brazil has been affected in a positive way by the steps taken the last two years by Argentina and Brazil toward acceptance of full-scope international safeguards on their auclear programs and toward bringing into force the Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty). However, the staff points out that Brazil continues to lag i
behind Argentina in passing the appropriate legislation to codify the essential Quadripartite safeguards agreement and the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
The staff notes that the question of whether an export or retransfer of an NSG trigger list item is consistent with the recently changed NSG Guidelines regarding full scope safeguards as a caridition of supply will be raised again as more U.S. and foreign exporters of these items seek a rerket in Argentina and Brazil.
In that regard, the Executive Branch presenth has two NRC license applications under consideration for which such determinations are required before approval:
a Westinghouse request to export inconel spacer grids to Brazil for use in the manufacture of fuel assemblies for Angra I, and a Teledyne Wah Chang request to export zircaloy tubes to Argentina for Atucha and Embalse.
The Office of the Executive Director concurs and the Office of the General Counsel has no legal objection.
CONCLUSION:
The staff believes all statutory requirements of the Atoraic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are met. The staff further believes the subject transfer is consistent with U.S. policy and would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the U.S.
Accordingly, the staff finds no basis for NRC to object to the present case.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the Commission approve the proposed response to DOE at Attachment 2.
l
/
Carlton R. Stoiber, Director i
Office of International Programs Attachments:
1.
6/22/93 DOE Memo ETFei to WClements, et al.,
w/ enclosure 2.
Proposed Response to DOE
~
~
The Commissioners 3
Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by COB, Friday, September 17, 1993.
Commission Staff Office comments, if.any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT September 10, 1993, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
DISTRIBUTION:
{
-i i
i I
I i
a a
i J
i i
b
_ ~ -
1
~
s,
~
[
-' ' ~.k Department of Energy RECDVED Washington. DC 20585 1
2
- j
.[
?
O u "
JUN 2 2 1933
'93 Jul 29 A8 :38 L4EMORANDUM T
~
T0:
Mr. William Clements, Director Office of Technolog3 and Policy Analysis Department of Commerce OTPA Room 4069A Washington, D.C.
20230 Defense Nuclear Agency i
Arms Control & Test Limitation Division 6801 Telegraph Rd.
Alexandria, Va.
22310-3398 Attn: Maj. Thomas S. Chivers Mr. Carlton Thorne OES/NEC r
Department of State Washington, D.C.
20520 Mr. Michael D. Rosenthal U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency NWC/INA, Room 4678 Washington, D.C.
20451
.;ir. Ronald D. Hauber Office of International Programs Nuclear Regulatory Commission >
Washington, D.C.
20555
SUBJECT:
Request for Subsequent Arrangements Under the NNPA of 1978 Enclosed for your review is a draft Federal Register notice concerning a proposed subsequent arrangement, as well as and analysis and a copy of the incoming request. We would appreciate your comm5nts within 20 days.
RTD/BR(EU)-7 O
_f-Q
~
//
Edward T. Fei g "
Acting Director Office of Nonproliferation Policy (IS-40)
Office of Arms Control & Nonproliferation
i l
DEPARINENT OF ENERGY Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation PROPOSED SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENT Pursuant to Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2160), notice is hereby given of a proposed " subsequent arrangement" under the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, as amended, and the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy.
The subsequent arrangement to be carried out under the above-mentioned agreements involve approval of the following retransfer:
RTD/BR(EU)-7, for the transfer of 20,000 zircaloy tubes (9,500 kilograms) from the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil for use in fabrication of fuel for the Angra I i
power reactor.
in accordance with Section 131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, it has been determined that this subsequent arrangement will not be inimical to the common defense and security.
s i
r k
~
i This subsequent arrangement will take effect no sooner than fifteen days
[
after.the date of publication of this notice.
l l
.)
Issued in Washington, D.C. on l
l i
Edward T. Fei Acting Director Office of Nonproliferation Policy 4
I s
s
'?
-i i
l 2
.I
..~
i't i
-l l
t f
?
}
1 f
~
-~
i I
ANALYSIS OF RETRANSFER OF ZIRCALOY TUBES Prepared by
. 0ffice of Nonproliferation Policy
[
Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation Office of Intelligence and National Security i
United States Department of Energy i
I Proposed Transferor:
Seimans AG, Hanau, the Federal Republic of Germany i
EURATOM Supply Agency 1
Proposed Transferee:
]
1 Industrias Nucleares do Brazil, S.A., Brazil i
2 Oriain of the zircaloy tubes:
1 Teledyne, Wah Chang, Albany, New York l
r l
3 A
-w-y s+.
L.
~
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.
INTRODUCTION 1
.j II. LYN 0PSIS OF THE PROPOSED RETRANSFER 1
Ill.
POLICY OF THE EXECI)TIVE BRANCH 1
IV.
EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED RETRANSFER 2
l V.
CONCLUSION 3
.]
Annex A:- MB-#10 Request for Approval Annex B: Section 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended Annex C:
Safeguards Implementation l
i 4
?
.I.
INTRODUCTION The Department of Energy has received a request from the EURATOM Supply Agency that the U.S. approve the retransfer of U.S.-origin zircaloy tubes from the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil for use for fuel fabrication for the Angra I power reactor.
The proposed retransfer is a " subsequent arrangement" as defined in section 131a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
As required by section r
131a(1), the proposed retransfer will be analyzed herein to determine whether such an arrangement will be " inimical to the common defense and security,"
It will also be analyzed with regard to other relevant provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
II.
SYNOPSIS OF THE PROPOSED TRANSFER From Seimans A.G., Hanau, the Federal Republic of Germany to Industrias I
Nucleares do Brazil, S.A.,
Brazil, 20,000 zircaloy tubes (9,500 kilograms) for
-fabrication of fuel for the Angra I power reactor.
l III.
POLICY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH The policy of the United States on nonproliferation of nuclear explosives was outlined by President Reagan in his statement of July 16, 1981.
President Reagan mad &ome statements which are pertinent to the consideration of this retransfer.
In particular, he stated that:
i We must re-establish this nation as a predictable and reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards.
This is essential to our non-proliferation goals.
If we are not such a partner, diminish. This will reduce our effectiveness in gaining the support we other countries will tend to go their own ways and our influence will need to deal with proliferation problems.
lo attain this objective, I am:
o Instructing the Executive Branch agencies to undertake immediate efforts to ensure expeditious action on export requests and approval requests under agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation when necessary statutory requirements are met.
I o Requesting that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission act expeditiously j
on these matters.
3 Other factors Approval of this zircaloy tube transfer is consistent with U.S. policy toward Brazil which has permitted exports of nuclear components to Brazil.
I i
iV.
,EVALVA110N OF THE PROPOSED RETRANSFER l
The proposed retransfer has been reviewed to determined whether it satisfies the statutory criteria in Section 127 and 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended and we conclude that the criteria are satisfied.
(See Annex B).
As required by ser. tion 131 of the Atomic Energy Act, with the concurrence of the Department of State (005), and in consultation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the Departments of Commerce (DOC) and Defense (D0D), the Department of Energy has considered whether the proposed retransfer will result in significant increase of the risk of proliferation beyond that which existed at the time that approval was requested, and has considered whether there would be timely warning "of any diversion well in advance of the time at which the non-nuclear-weapon state could transform the diverted material into a nuclear explosive device.
Together with the Department of State, we have concluded that, taking into account the nonproliferation commitments of the countries involved, this approval will not result in a significant increase of the risk of proliferation.
I I
u y w -
MS:11 0-M D ** C k N N umb e r RT.0/BR(Eid ~]
~
AG/2669 APP ROVAI. FOR RETRANSTER OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF UNITED STATES ORIGIN Thc approval of the United States Department of Energy is hereby requested to the t r'a n s f e r from the EURATOM SUPPLY AGiNCY (For Siem ns AC. Hane*11 Germ nvi (Transferor I
to the Government of Brazil (For Industrias Nucleares do Brasil S. A.. Bra 711)
(Trans ie re e) of United States supplied special nuclear material in the quantity and meeting the specificatione described below (h ereinaf ter called "specified ma t e ri al") which the transferor obtained pursuant to its Agreement for Cooperation for Civil Us es wi th the United States Government.
Material was originally obtained by t rans f e re r f r om Taledyne Wah Chang, Albany under Contract or Order Nunber 13259 and Export License No G-NBC, as prematerial for cladding tubes SPECIFIED MATERIAL (Fill in where applicable)
Identification Ma rk iri g,
Total U U-235, U-233 Isetopic Percent Fuel Type No.,
etc.
(In Grans) or Fu (In G r am s ) -
U-235, U-233, or Pu 268-/, 268-8 Zircaloy-4 253-22, 292.-l cladding tubes, 20000 pcs, 9500kg The specified material, which is now located at Siemens AG. Hanau /cermanyw ill upon approval hereby by the United States Department of Energy be transferred on or about 1993 for use at Industrias Nucleares do Brasil.
F.A.
Pecende /pra ppd will be accepted for the f ollowin g s pe cifie d purpose:
Fabrication of Nuclear Fuel for ANGRA-1 Power Plant
'\\
T The transferor, with the concurrence of the transferee, will notify within 30 days af ter the aforesaid date the United States Depart =ent of Energy of the actual'date and quantity of material trans f e rre d.
It is agreed by th e transferor and transferee that as of that date the specified naterial will cease to be subject to :he Agreement for Cooperatien and j
~contract indicated above and will be s ubj ect to the transferee's Agree =ent for Cooperation _for Civ_11 Uses with the United States Government.
EURATOM SUPPLY AC NC f I
(WlF 5" CHTJSTEE FUM J
/% 33,a by rm rtncacn J'^
c nn-ns o,
. 0}uvw Wen
~~~~~~ ( Tiin's'ie r o r )
(Date)
(Transferee)
'/ ( Da t e )
Above requested transfer under Article of transferee's Agreement for Coope r ati on for Civil Uses with the United States Gove rnment approved, i
provided physical transfer is consu= mated by l
l (For the United States Department of Energy)
M Annex B Section 127 of the Atomic Enerov Act of 1954 as amended Section 127(4) provides that the United States may approve a retransfer only if the recipient agrees that the transfer will be subject to the same conditions set forth in that section that would apply to export from the United States in the quoted export criteria. Therefore, the word " export" (or a variation thereof) is equivalent to the word " retransfer" (or a variation thereof).
Brazil has agreed that the material proposed to be retransferred will become subject to the U.S.-Brazil Agreement for Cooperation and therefor for the purpose of the discussion below, the material is treated under the agreement as if it had been transferred from the United States (U.S.).
l Criterion (') - Section 127 (1)
"IAEA safeguards as required by Article 111(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or facilities proposed to be exported, to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof."
The transfer is to be subject to the U.S.-Brazil Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation, the relevant exchange of notes with respect to no nuclear explosive use of exports subject to the Agreement, and the Agreement for the Application of Safeguards between the IAEA, the Government of Brazil and the Government of the U.S. of March 10, 1967.
Therefore, the Executive Branch considers that criterion (1) is met.
Criterion (2) - Section 127 (2)
"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology, will be used for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device."
The Government of Brazil is being asked to confirm in writing that all of the transferred material is intended for use in the safeguarded Angra I nuclear power reactor.
Upon receipt of this confirmation, it is the view of the Executive. Branch that criterion (2) will be met.
Criterion (3) - Section 127 (3)
" Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material or facilities proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
Following the' effective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applicable regulations."
4
.l Zirca,loy tubes are considered to be components pursuant to section 109.b of
)
-the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
Physical protection is not relevant for transfers of zircaloy tubes.
Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is not applicable to this transfer.
Criterion (4) - Section 127 (4)
"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless'the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section."
Article X A of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Brazil states:
j A.
The Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil guarantees that:
(1) Safeguards provided in Article XI shall be maintained.
(2)
No material, including equipment and devices, transferred to the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil or authorized persons under its jurisdiction by purchase or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement or to the superseded 4
Agreement, and no special nuclear material produced through the
[
use of such material, equipment or devices, will be used for atomic weapons, or for research on or development of atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose.
(3) No material, including equipment and devices, tran.sferred to the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the l
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil except as the Commission may agree to such a transfer to the jurisdiction of another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission, the transfer is within the scope of l
an Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the other nation or group of nations.
Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (4) is met.
1 Criterion (5) - Section 127 (5)
I "No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no
{
t i
f
. irradiated fuel elements containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States
.is obtained for such reprocessing or alteration."
t This transfer does not involve reprocessing.
Criterion (5) therefore, is not applicable.
Criterion (6) - Section 127 (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be exported unless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any nuclear material or equipment which is l
produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the_ recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear r
technology."
The proposed retransfer does not involve sensitive nuclear technology.
Criterion (6) therefore is not applicable.
Section 128 of the Atomic Eneroy Act of 1954, as amended Section 128a(1) of the Atomic Energy Act establishes the following additional criterion:
"As a condition of continued United States export of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities,-and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapons states, no such export shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export."
t Section 128 regard 1.,g fullscope safeguards does not apply to transfers of zircaloy tubes.
Nonetheless, Brazil continues to make progress in its negotiations with Argentina and the IAEA toward a full scope safeguards agreement, i
i t
I t
I i
t-t I
--~,,,
w J '
DRAFT l
i Mr. Edward T. Fei Acting Director Office of Nonproliferation Policy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation i
U.S. Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585 i
Dear Mr. Fei:
t B
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has reviewed the proposed subsequent arrangement to retransfer 20,000 zircaloy tubes (9,500 kilograms) from Germany l
to Brazil for use in fabrication of fuel assemblies for the Angra I power reactor.
We understand that the German government has provided documentation to the State Department showing the proposed retransfer would be consistent with the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Guidelines, given a pre-existing German contract with Brazil to provide the first five cores of fuel to Angra I.
While the Commission does not object to the approval of the proposed retransfer, subject to State Department's concurrence, we note that Brazil continues to lag behind Argentina in passing the appropriate legislation to codify the essential Quadripartite safeguards agreement and the amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Sincerely, Ronald D. Hauber, Assistant Director Exports, Security and Safety Cooperation Office of International Programs e
i DRAFT
-