ML20058L051

Proposed Rule 10CFR73, Protection Against Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants. Rule Would Modify Design Basis Threat for Radiological Sabotage to Include Use of Land Vehicle by Adversaries for Transporting Personnel

ML20058L051
Person / Time
Issue date:	10/29/1993
From:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058L043	List: ML20058L042 ML20058L051
References
FRN-58FR58804, RULE-PR-73 CCS, PR-931029, NUDOCS 9312160121
Download: ML20058L051 (18)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 73 RIN 3150-AE81 Protection Against Malevolent Use of hicles at Nuclear Power Plants _

AGENCY:

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION:

Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its physical protection regulations for operating nuclear power reactors.

The proposed amendment would modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to incluce use of a land vehicle by adversaries for transporting personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives. The Ccamission believes this action is prudent based on en evaluation of an intrusion incident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station and the bombing at the World Trade Center.

The objective of the proposed rule is to enhance reactor safety by precluding the malevolent use of a vehicle to gain unauthorized proximity to a vital area barrier.

Further, the proposed rule would enhance reactor safety by protecting vital equipment from damage by detonation of an explosive charge at the point of vehicle denial.

i CATE: Comment period expires (insert 60 days after publication in the Federal Register).

Comments received after this date will be considered if it is

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for comments received on or 5 fore this date.

ADDRESSES: Mail written comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention:

Docketing and Services' Branch.

Deliver comments to:

11555 Rockville Pike,- Rockville, Maryland, between j

7:45 am and 4:15 pm Federal workdays.

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A proposed environmental assessment and finding of no-'significant-. impact on

- l which the determination is based, proposed regulatory analysis, proposed backfit analysis, and proposed regulatory guide' are available for' inspection-at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L' Street'NW.. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental asussment_ and finding of no significant impact are available from Corrie Brown, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

- i Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2382.

Single copies of.

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the regulatory and backfit analyses are available' from Robert J. Dube, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.

Single copies of the regulatory guide are available from Ann Beranek, U.S.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,' DC 20555, telephone (301).492-3519.

FOR FURTtiER INFORMATION CONTACT: Priscilla A. Dwyer, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2478.-

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

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In the development of its physical protection programs, NRC uses the concept of a design basis threat to assure adequate protection. The design basis threat is a hypothetical threat that is not intended to represent a real threat. The design basis threat serves three purposes:-

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(1) It provides a standard with which to measure changes in the real threat environment, (2) It is used to develop regulatory requirements, and i

i (3) It provides a standard for evaluation of implemented safeguards programs.

f The intent of the design basis threat for power reactors is to provide a physical protection system that protects against radiological sabotage.

To assure adequacy of the design basis threat, NRC continually monitors ar,d evaluates the threat environment worldwide. The Commission is also briefed periodically by agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep abreast of domestic and foreign intelligence concerning threat. The bombing at the World Trade Center,

4 demonstrated that a large explosive device could be assembled, delivered to a public area, and detonated in the United States without advance intelligence.

The unauthorized intrusion at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station demonstrated that a vehicle could be used to gain quick access to the protected area at a nuclear power plant.

In light of these incidents, NRC held a public meeting on May 10, 1993, to obtain additional information from the public, affected licensees, and other interested parties concerning the need for any changes to the design basis threat for radiological sabotage.

Discussion Findings. NRC has concluded that there is no indication of an actual vehicle threat against the domestic commercial nuclear industry. However, based on recent events, NRC believes that a vehicle intrusion or bomb threat to a nuclear power plant could develop without warning in the future. To maintain a prudent margin between the current threat estimate (low) and the design basis threat (higher) NRC is proposing to amend 10 CFR Part 73 to modify the design basis threat for radiological sabotage to include protection against the malevolent use of vehicles at nuclear power plants.

Description of proposed Amendments. NRC proposes to amend 10 CFR 73.1 to explicitly include use of a four-wheel drive land vehicle by adversaries for the transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives.

Proposed criteria specifying vehicle and explosive characteristics are exempted from public disclosure as Safeguards Information and have been

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pre ' isly provided to personnel of affected licensees authorized access to-l Saft :ards Information pursuant.to 10 CFR 73.21 on a need-to-know basis.

Four.

provisions would be added to amend 10 CFR 73.55. The' first provision,10 CFR 73.55(c)(7), would include new regulatory requirements to establish measures to protect a reactor from use of a land vehicle to gain proximity to vital l

1 areas. The vital areas contain equipment, systems, devices, or material the-

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l failure or destruction or release of which could directly_ or indirectly I

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. l endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

l provision,10 CFR 73.55(c)(8),- would propose a process for licensees to ab..;s i

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whether the protective measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(7) protect ag.th.st a vehicle bomb consistent with design goals and.

criteria specified by the Commission.

Licensees whose vehicle denial measures l

do not fully satisfy the cesign goals.for protection.against a' vehicle bomb-would have the option to establish additional measures to meet the design goals or propose other additional measures that give substantial. protection against a 1and vehicle bomb. The third provision, 10 CFR 73.55(c)(9),

describes proposed implementation schedules and' information that would be required to be submitted to the Commission.

In order to protect.;certain l

documents, required by amendments to 10 CFR 73.55, as Safeguards Information,

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10 CFR 73.21 would also be amended. The fourth provision, '10 CFR l

73.55(c)(10), treats applicants for a license to operate a nuclear power l

i reactor.

Regulatory Acoroach. The NRC proposes that licensees. establish measures to j

i protect vital equipment within power reactor vital areas from:

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1) access by persons transported by a land vehicle and

2) damage from the detonation of a ' vehicle bomb in~.the vicinity of the.

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vital area.

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The NRC would emphasize the protection 'of vital equipment by requiring j

licensees to establish measures to protect against the use of a land vehicle l

to gain proximity to vital areas of. a facility. ' The NRC would require each licensee to establish a barrier system to prevent' land vehicle proximity to vital areas of the plant.

The NRC would allow for-use of natural features.

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such as cliff and ' natural waterways or artificial' features such as buildings

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and canals to be included as part of the barrier system.

In establishing a

.t system of physical barriers to protect against access of a land vehicle'to l

t vital areas, the licensee would also protect the facility against a vehicle a

transporting a bomb which could detonate at or near the. point.of the vehicle.

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The licensee would be required to determine if' measures ' established to protect against vehicle proximity' to vital areas of the facility also protect against the threat of a land vehicle bomb as -defined'by' the design goals and criteria set by the Commission.

Essentially, the licensee would need to I

protect vital or alternative equipment needed to shut down the reactor and maintain the reactor in a shutdown' condition.

In evalua' ting the protection of vital equipment, the licensee could consider protection provided. by structures '

near the equipment, assigning credit for alternative equipment not damaged.by

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the assumed explosion, and damage control. measures.

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l Most sites would likely meet the Commission's design goals for protection against a vehicle bomb by establishing protective measures against vehicle l

intrusion in the vicinity of existing protected area boundaries. The licensee l

would have two options if its evaluation shows that these protective measures 1

do not fully meet the design goals and criteria for protecting against a land l

vehicle bomb.

It may implement additional measures that would fully meet the l

design goals and criteria such as moving vehicle barriers further away from vital areas or equipment, installing blast shields, or todifying plant systems and equipment. Alternatively, the licensee may propose to the Commission additional measures other than ones needeel to fully meet the design goals and criteria, provided this approach provides substantial protection against a vehicle bomb and that it can be demonstrated that the costs of measures to fully meet the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

Guj dance. The staff prepared a regulatory guide containing preliminary information for licensees in initial assessments of protective measures against vehicle intrusions and approaches to assess whether the Commission's design goals and criteria are met by measures taken to.proteci against vehicle intrusion. The regulatory guide is titled DG-5006, " Protection Against Malevolent use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants."

Additional guidance is available in NUREG/CR-5246, "A Methodology to Assist in Contingency Planning i

for Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Land Vehicle Bombs." NRC has also arranged for the United States Army Corps of Engineers to write a NUREG-series report that would be available to the licensees through the Commission in time for publication of the final rule.

This NUREG report would include i

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l simple methods for the licensee to select barriers and perform an analysis _of:

l existing structures and equipment to demonstrate their ability 'to withstand l

t the effects of an explosive blast, j

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Public Comment.

The Commission is issuing this proposed rule with a 30-day.

public comment period. The Commission notes that some of the issues associated

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j with a design basis threat modification have been previously discussed in a :

l public meeting.

Interested parties who' previously submitted comments at the time of the public meeting need not' resubmit their-comments.

Previously.

submitted comments will be addressed during the review of the comments t

submitted on this proposed rule.

f The Commission wishes to receive comments cn the need to revise the design basis threat and on the proposed implementation schedul'e for the rule, particularly on the availability of active vehicle denial systems for j

purchase.

Implementation. The proposed rule would likely be implemented through 10 CFR 50.54(p) (no decrease in effectiveness of security plan), or 10 CFR 50.54(p) coupled with 10 CFR 50.59 (no change to the technical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety issue) changes.

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licensee would be required to submit to.the NRC within 90 days from the J

effective date of the rule a summary description of the proposed vehicle-intrusion control measures and the results of its evaluation comparing the measures to protect against vehicle intrusion with the design goals and criteria for protecting against a land vehicle bomb. A licensee proposing

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measures, as alternatives to those needed to fully meet the Commission's i

criteria for protecting against a vehicle bomb, would be required to submit i

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details of their analyses, including justification that. substantial protection ~

l was provided and that the cost of measures needed to fully meet the design j

goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection. that would be j

i provided.

Proposals by licensees to use alternative measures would be handled as 10 CFR 50.90 amendments.

Licensees would be required to implement their j

measures within 360 days of the rule effective date.

i Once implemented, the control measures required J meet these regulations j

supersede contingency requirements initiated in response to Generic Letter l

89-07, " Power Reactor Safeguards Contingency Planning for Surface Vehicle l

1 Bombs," dated April 28,.1989. However, licensees whose vehicle centrol measures do not fully meet the NRC's design goals and measures may choose to-maintain vehicle bomb contingency planning as one element of proposed -

I alternative measures.

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Safeauards Information. The Commission cautions licensees not to submit ~

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any data that is protected as Safeguards Information as part of their comments cn the proposed rule.

l Enforcement.

Violation of these proposed rules, if codified, may subject a.

person to the criminal penalties in section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of I

1954, as amended.

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Decommissionina Reactors.

The rule would apply to licensees wno are either in the process of decommissioning or. plan to decommission in the near future and do not have a possession-only license.

Those licensees would need to be evaluated individually to determine if full or partial exemption from the new rule is appropriate.

Electronic Submittals.

Comments.may be submitted, in addition to the original paper copy, by copy of the letter in electronic format on IBM personal computer MS-DOS compatible 3.5-or 5.25-inch double-side, double density (DS/DD) or high density (HD). diskettes. Data files should be submitted in Wordperfect 5.0 or 5.1, unformatted ASCII code, or if formatted text is required, IBM Revisable-Form-Text Document Context Architecture (RFT/DCA) format.

Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. The proposed rule involves installation of vehicle barriers at operating power reactor sites and an evaluation of these barriers by the licensee to determine whether they provide adequate protection against a land vehicle bomb under design goals and criteria established by the Commission.

Implementation of these' amendments would not involve release of or exposure to radioactivity from the site. The

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I environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact on which this determination is based are available for inspection at the Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the environmental assessment and the finding of no significant impact are available from Carrie Brown, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2382.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) This rule has been submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the information collection requirements.

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 497 hours0.00575 days <br />0.138 hours <br />8.217593e-4 weeks <br />1.891085e-4 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Information and Records Management Branch (MNBB-7714), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20b55-0001; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NE08-3019, (3150-0002), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

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Regulatory Analysis F

The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analysis on this proposed regulation.

The analysis examines the cost and benefits of the alternatives considered by the Commission. The draft analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC. Single copies of the draft analysis may be obtained from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, telephone (301) 504-2912.

The Commission requests public comment on the draft regulatory analysis.

Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading.

Regulatory Flexibility Certification Based on the information available at this stage of the rulemaking proceeding and in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.

605(b), the Commission certifies that, if promulgated, this rule will not have a significant economic impact upon a substantial number of small entitics, The proposed rule affects only licensees authorized to operate a nucleer p4 dst reactor. The utilities that operate these nuclear power. reactors do not fall within the scope of the definition of "small entitias" as given in the Regulatory Flexibility Act or the Small Business Size Standards promulgated in-regulations issued by the Small Business Administration (13 CFR Part 121). ;

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Backfit Analysis As required by 10 CFR 50.109, the Commission has completed a backfit l

l analysis for the proposed rule. The Commission has determined, based on this analysis, that backfitting to comply with the requirements of this proposed rule will provide a substantial increase in protection to public health and safety or the common defense and security at a cost which is justified by the substantial increase. The backfit analysis on which this determination is based is available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC.

Single copies of the backfit analysis are available from Robert J. Dube, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, telephone (301) 504-2912. It should be noted that the conclusions reached are based on best available data. The proposed rule contains a provision for affected licensees to conduct site-specific analyses if they so choose.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 73 Criminal penalties, Hazardous materials transportation, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power plants and reactors, P.eporting and recordkeeping requirements, Security measures.

i For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to Part 73. =

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I PART 73 -- PHYSICAL PROTECTION 0F PLANTS' AND MATERIALS l

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1. The authority ci.tation for Part 73 continues to read 'as follows:

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'I AUTHORITY:

Secs. 53,161, 65 Stat.. 930,- 948,.. as' amended, sec. 147, 94;

!y Stat. 780 (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2167, 2201); sec. 201'. as: amended,: 204, 88 Stat.

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1242, as amended, 1245 (42 U.S.C. 5841', 5844)..

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Section 73.1 also issued under secs.. 135,141, Pub. L.97-425, 96 Stat.

2232, 2241, (42 U.S.C.10155, ~10161). ' Section.73.37(f) also issued under sec..

i 301, Pub. L.96-295, 94 Stat. 789 ~ (42 U.S.C. 5841 note).. - Se'etion173.21 is '

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issued under sec. 606 Pub. L.'99-399,100 Stat. 876 (42 U.S.C.. 2169).-

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2. In 673.1, the. introductory text of paragraph (a) ~1s revise'd and a new -

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paragraph (a)(1)(i)(E) 'is added to read as--follows:'

673.1 Purpose and scope.

r (a) Purpose.

This part. prescribes requirements for the est'ab'lishment and i

maintenance of a physical protection system which will have'capabilitiesi for :

the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in' transitcandi

.j in plants in which special nuclear material is used. The following design-i basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections'of this part, shall-be -

used to design-safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological 1 i

sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material. : Licensees- -

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4 subject to the provisions of 673.20, 673.50, or 673.60 are exempt from

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673.1(a) (1) (i) (E).

(1) ***

(i) ***

(E) A four-wheel drive land vehicle used for the transport of personnel, hand-carried equipment, and/or explosives, and

3. In 673.21, a new paragraph (b)(1)(xiii) is added to read as follows:

673.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

(b) ***

(1) ***

(xiii) Information required by the Commission pursuant'to 10 CFR 73.55 (c)(8) (9), and (10).

4. In 673.55, new paragraphs (c)(7), (8), (9), and (10) are added to read as follow:

673.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. i

(c) ***

(7) Vehicle control measures, including vehicle barrier systems, must be established to protect against use of a land vehicle, as specified by the Commission, as a means of transportation to gain unauthorized proximity to vital areas.

(8) Each licensee shall compare the vehicle control measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) to the Commission's design goals and criteria for protection against a land vehicle bomb.

Each licensee shall either:

(i) Confirm to the Commission that the vehicle control measures meet the design goals and criteria specified; or (ii) Propose alternative measures, in addition to the measures established in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7), describe the level of protection that these measures would provide against a land vehicle bomb, and compare the costs of the alternative measures with the costs of measures necessary to fully meet the design goals and criteria. The Commission will approve the proposed alternative measures if they provide substantial protection against a land vehicle bomb and it is determined by an analysis, using the essential elements of 10 CFR 50.109, that the costs of fully meeting. i l

l the design goals and criteria are not justified by the added protection that would be provided.

(9) Each licensee authorized to operate a nuclear power reactor shall:

(i) By (insert 90 days from effective date of rule) sabmit to the Commission a summary description of'the proposed vehicle control measures as required by 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and the results of the vehicle bomb comparison as required by 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8). For licensees who choose to propose alternative measures as provided for in 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8), the submittal must include the analysis and justification for the proposed alternatives; (ii) By (insert 360 days from final rule effective date), fully implement the required vehicle control measures, including site-specific alternative measures as approved by the Commission; (iii) Protect as Safeguards Information, information required by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c)(8) and (9); and (iv) Retain, in accordance with 10 CFR 73.70, all comparisons and analyses -

prepared pursuant to 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8).

(10) Each applicant for a license to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21(b) or 10 CFR 50.22 of this chapter, whose application was submitted prior to (insert effective date of rule), shall incorporate the

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i required vehicle control program into the site Physical Security Plan'and j

I implement it by the date of receipt of the operating' license.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this N day of 3W 1993.

the Nucle / Regulatory Commission.

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T' N(

Eamuel J. Chi 1(,

Secretary of the Commission.

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CONGRESSIONRL CCRRESPONDENCE SYSTEN DOCUMENT PREPARATION CEECKLIST This checklist is

- be submitted with each document (or group of Qs/As) seat for e ing into the CCS.

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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT (S) l' /'l lll IA[2'dA

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TYPE 0F' N Corrompendeaem Isariages (GS/ ADS 4 3.

DOCUMENT CONTMcL Sensitive (NRC Caly),

Non-Semaitive 4.

CoNGRESSIONRL COMMITTEE and SURCOMNITTEES (if applicable)

Congressional Committee Subcommittee 5.

SUBJECT CODES r

(a)

(b)

(c) 6.

SOURCE OF DOCUMEETS I

(a) s 5520 (document name (b)

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(c)

Atlashmaste (d)

Rakey (e)

Other 7.

SYSTER LOS DATES (a)

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Date OCA seat.desument to CCS i

(b)

Date CCS.receivesedocument (a) i Date returned to CCA for additional information j

(d)

Data resubmitted by-0CA to CCS

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(e) 1 Date entered into CCS by g

(f)

Date OCA notified that document is in CCS li s.-

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