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Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20202F9161998-01-29029 January 1998 Special Rept:On 980128,two of Three Fire Protection Pumps Were Removed from Svc as Result of Sys Configuration Necessary to Support Planned Maintenance.Fire Pumps Were Returned to Svc on 980128 ML20196H0111997-07-11011 July 1997 Special Rept 97-001:on 970620,removed High Range Radioactive Noble Gas Effluent Monitor (Stack Ragems) from Service to Allow Secondary Calibr IAW Master Surveillance Schedule. Completed Calibr on 970628 & Returned Stack Ragems to Svc ML20138F5801997-04-29029 April 1997 Special Rept:On 970402,declared Reactor Bldg Wide Range Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Ruptured Pump Diaphragm. Initiated Work Order,Installed Replacement Pump & Declared Pump Operable ML20137Y2171997-04-15015 April 1997 Special Rept:On 961220,util Rail Car Was Released to Burlington Northern Railroad from Monticello Nuclear Plant. Rail Car Was Delayed in Chicago as Result of Problems W/Bill of Lading on Computer Sys.Rail Car Was Delivered on 970131 ML20129A3401996-10-15015 October 1996 Special Rept 96-001,rev 1:on 960806,stack Ragems High Range Monitor Was Removed from Svc & Not Restored to Svc in Seven Days.Caused by Malfunction of Interlock on Source. Interlock Components Replaced ML20117K5931996-09-0505 September 1996 Special Rept SR 96-001:on 960806,declared Stack Ragems High Range Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Difficulties Requiring Component Replacement.Developed Course of Action for Returning Stack Ragems Instrument ML20101E8321996-03-15015 March 1996 Special Rept:On 960314,two of Three Fire Pumps Removed from Svc for Planned Mod Work.Returned Both Fire Pumps to Svc Same Day ML20094E4371995-10-31031 October 1995 Special Rept:On 951010,sys Engineer & Technicians Reintiated Work on B Channel of Reactor Bldg Vent Radiation Monitor, After Providing Proper Notification to Main Control Room. Caused by Incorrect Channels Removed from Svc ML20082R6601995-04-19019 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950404,discovered That Manual Isolation Valves for 'A' Channel in Closed Position.Cause of Failure to Correctly Position Valves Will Be Assessed.Valves Placed in Required Position & Demonstrated Operability ML20082E5661995-04-0606 April 1995 Special Rept:On 950326,pump Discharge Relief Valve for Electric Screen Wash/Fire Pump Became Inoperable.Valve Had to Be Secured to Permit Installation of an Isolation Device. Pump Returned to Operational Status After Device Installed ML20080G4731995-02-0101 February 1995 Special Rept:On 950119,two of Three Fire Protection Pumps Out of Svc for Period of Approx 15 H.Action Taken for Planned Preventative Maint on Two Check Valves & Drain Valve in Fire Suppression Sys.Roving Fire Watch Established ML20067D1351994-02-23023 February 1994 Special Rept:On 940126,fire Door 105 Declared Inoperable Due to Inability to Close Properly.Caused by Higher than Normal Differential Pressure Between Plant Administration Bldg & Turbine Bldg.Cause of Failure Corrected ML20117A5801992-11-24024 November 1992 Special Rept:On 921020,determined That RHR Sample Supply Loops a & B Excess Flow Check Valves Not Included in ASME Section XI Program.Caused by Lack of Proven Test Procedure. Valves Incorporated Into Third 10-yr ASME Program ML20116B7521992-10-27027 October 1992 Special Rept 92-08:on 920929,Turbine Building High Radiation Noble Gas Monitor Declared Inoperable for Greater than Seven Days.Alternate Testing Performed Throughout Period of Inoperability ML20115G6461992-10-22022 October 1992 Special Rept 92-07:on 921015,determined That Stem & Disc Separated on Discharge Valve V-9-004 for Diesel Fire Pump P-9-102A.On 921021,fire Pumps Isolated.Redundant Fire Pump Secured & Valves Replaced ML20104B6081992-09-10010 September 1992 Special Rept 92-05:on 920727,condenser Bay Sprinkler Sys 2 Removed from Svc After Spurious Actuation of Sprinkler Head. Hourly Fire Watch Established While Sys Out of Svc.Sprinkler Head Replaced & Sys Returned to Svc on 920814 ML20105A5121992-09-10010 September 1992 Special Rept 92-06:on 920807,fire Diesel Pump 1 Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days to Perform Preventive Maint.On 920811,diesel Engine Overheated.Solenoid Valve Replaced & New Cooling Water Strainers Installed ML20114C5191992-08-26026 August 1992 Special Rept 92-03:on 920705,electromatic Relief Valve C Inadvertently Opened While Testing Pressure Switch of Valve A.Caused by Personnel Error.Training Session Will Be Held & Engineering Work Request Submitted Re Switch Terminal Point ML20114A9701992-08-17017 August 1992 Special Rept 92-04:on 920724,fire Diesel Pump 2 Removed from Svc to Replace Battery Cables & Solenoid Valve.Correct 24 Volt Dc Coil Obtained from Mfg & Pump Returned to Svc on 920806 ML20096D4711992-05-0101 May 1992 Special Rept 92-02:on 920327,fire Diesel Pump 1 Out of Svc for More than 7 Days to Replace Pump Due to Marginal Discharge Pressure.Caused by Valve Seating Problem.Pump Replacement Expected to Be Completed by 920504 ML20100R7411992-04-10010 April 1992 Special Rept 92-01:on 920227,CO2 Fire Suppression Sys for 4,160-volt Switchgear Inoperable for More than 14 Days When Leaking Valve Stem Repaired on 920226.Possibly Caused by Moisture Intrusion.Corroded Components Replaced ML20087B8431992-01-0303 January 1992 Special Rept 91-09:on 911115,fire Diesel Pump 1-2 Failed to Meet Required Acceptance Criteria During Functional Test. Caused by Cloth Rag Becoming Lodged Inside Pump.Fire Diesel Pump 1-2 Rebuilt & Reinstalled on 911208 ML20082G9261991-08-15015 August 1991 Special Rept:On 910719,potential for Inoperable Penetration Fire Barrier Identified.Caused by Use of Less Conservative, But Technically Acceptable,Design Alternatives in Plant Const.Vents Will Be Rerouted ML20076E2641991-08-13013 August 1991 Special Rept 91-08:on 910717,coolant Found Leaking from Cap on Heat Exchanger of Engine of Fire Diesel Pump 1-1.Caused by Wearing on HX Neck,Resulting in HX Failing to Hold Normal Pressure.Engine Secured & Work Request Initiated ML20076E3001991-08-12012 August 1991 Special Rept 91-07:on 910709,nonfunctional Fire Barrier Doors Between Fire Zones OB-FA-6 & TZ-FZ-11B Not Restored to Operable Status within 7 Days.Caused by Ventilation Flow Preventing Door from Closing.Fire Patrol Established ML20077K2271991-07-31031 July 1991 Special Rept 91-06 Re Nonfunctional Fire Barrier Door Not Repaired within 7 Days as Required by Tech Spec 3.12.E. Caused by Broken Door Closure Mechanism.Hourly Fire Watch Initiated.Door Mechanism Repaired on 910704 ML20082E1411991-07-23023 July 1991 Special Rept:On 910702,non-functional Fire Barrier Door Not Repaired within Seven Days as Required by Tech Specs. Caused by Faulty Door Closing Mechanisms.Util Evaluating Alternate Door Closing Mechanisms ML20073C9381991-04-18018 April 1991 Special Rept 91-04:on 910309,fire Detection Sys on Elevations 75' & 95' of Reactor Bldg Made Inoperable to Facilitate Maint Activities.Fire Watch Patrol Has Been Established to Compensate for Detection Sys ML20070T5341991-03-28028 March 1991 Special Rept:On 910222,inoperable Fire Hose Station 33 Not Restored to Operable Status within 14 Days as Required by Tech Specs.Caused by Maint to Angle Valve.Valve Reopened on 910312,restoring Hose Station 33 to Operability ML20070M5181991-03-14014 March 1991 Special Rept 91-02:on 901117,discovered That Fire Barrier Door Between 480-volt Switchgear Rooms a & B Nonfunctional Since 901110 & Not Repaired within 7 Days.Caused by Faulty Door Latching Mechanism.Fire Watch Established ML20058A7441990-10-16016 October 1990 Special Rept 90-04:on 900921,nonfunctional Fire Barrier Door Not Repaired within 7 Days.Fire Watch Established ML20244E5941989-06-16016 June 1989 Special Rept:On 890603,two Out of Three Diesel Fire Pumps Were Inoperable for Less than 12 H.Caused by Diesel Fire Pump Day Tank Outlet Valve Being Closed Instead of Fill Valve During Performance Test 1158.Test Revised ML20245E7541989-06-0909 June 1989 Special Rept 89-02:on 890526,declared Fire Pump/Diesels 1-1 & 1-2 Inoperable.Caused by Loss of Fire Suppression Water. Pressure Switch & Associated Recorder for 1-2 Diesel Recalibrated Along W/Pump Discharge Pressure Gauge ML20247J2081989-05-22022 May 1989 Special Rept 89-01:on 890422,nonfunctional Fire Barrier Not Repaired within 7 Days as Required by Tech Spec 3.12.E. Fire Watch Established.Nonfunctional Fire Barrier Seal Plannned to Be Restored to Operable Status by 890523 ML20237C6711987-12-11011 December 1987 Special Rept 87-08:on 871112,fire Diesel Pump 1-2 Not Restored to Functional Status within 7 Days.Caused by Constraints Imposed by Increased outage-related Maint Activities.Fire Diesel Pump Restored to Functional Status ML20236S5201987-11-19019 November 1987 Special Rept 87-07:on 871020,nonfunctional Thermo Lag Fire Barrier Not Restored to Functional Status within 7 Days Per Tech Spec 3.12.E.Caused by Constraints Imposed by Increased Maint Activities.Fire Watch Established ML20236L3711987-10-29029 October 1987 Special Rept 87-06:on 870928-30,fire Barrier Penetration Seals Identified as Not Meeting Acceptance Criteria.Cause Not Stated.Fire Watch Established Immediately.Fire Barrier Seals Will Be Restored to Functional Status by 871030 ML20235B4411987-09-22022 September 1987 Ro:On 870811,spill of Reactor Bldg Closed Cooling Water Occurred.Caused by Failure to Follow Instructions on Switching & Tagging Request Form Re Valve Backseating. Procedures Will Be Revised & Training Provided ML20235G2151987-09-20020 September 1987 Ro:On 870911,w/reactor in Cold Shutdown Mode,Tech Spec Safety Limit 2.1.E Exceeded.Caused by Operator Error. Operators Received Training on Safety Limit,Applicable Procedures & Relevant Control Room Indications ML20214H9801987-05-0707 May 1987 Ro:On 870424,operator Personnel Blocked Open Two Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Valves at Time When Primary Containment Integrity Was Required.Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.Procedures Revised ML20215H3621987-04-0909 April 1987 Special Rept 87-02:on 870214,turbine Trip & Reactor Scram Occurred.Caused by Loose Wire Causing Loss of Feedwater Flow Signal.Following Reduction in Reactor Pressure All Electromatic Relief Valves Reseated Properly ML20206E3931987-04-0101 April 1987 Special Rept 87-01:on 870302,inoperable Fire Suppression Water Deluge Sys Not Restored to Functional Status within 14 Days from Time of Discovery.Caused by Long Lead Time for Procurement of Replacement Parts ML20209H2501987-01-23023 January 1987 Special Rept 86-017:on 861228,nonfunctional Fire Barrier Not Returned to Functional Status within 7 Days from Discovery.Hourly Fire Watch Established.Repairs Completed & Penetration Seal Restored to Functional Status on 870112 ML20207J2981986-12-17017 December 1986 Special Rept 86-16:on 861121,fire Barrier Door Between Monitor & Control Area Stairwell & Hallway Outside Cable Spreading Room Found Nonfunctional.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Established.Door to Be Restored as Functional on 861222 ML20207J2821986-12-16016 December 1986 Special Rept 86-15:on 861110,penetrations Through Floor of 4160 Volt Switchgear 1D Vault & Floor of Motor Generator Set Room Found Degraded.As of 861117,penetrations Not Restored to Functional Condition.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Initiated ML20197B1471986-10-0909 October 1986 Special Rept 86-14:on 860922 & 27,nonfunctional Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Not Restored to Functional Status within 7 Days.Hourly Fire Watch Patrol Established within 1 H. Restoration Expected by 861130 ML20212D6251986-07-10010 July 1986 Special Rept 86-03:on 860616,two Hangers Supporting Ofc Bldg Fire Water Supply Riser Found to Need Repair.Riser Consequently Isolated,Rendering Sprinkler Sys 4 & 12 & Deluge Sys 4 Inoperable.Hangers Repaired & Sys Restored ML20137U7031986-01-20020 January 1986 Fire Protection Special Rept 85-03:on 851216,insp of 14 Fire Dampers Identified Design or Installation Deficiencies Resulting in Dampers Being Determined Inoperable.Caused by Nonconforming as-found Fire Damper Configuration ML20117C7451985-04-25025 April 1985 Special Rept 85-02:on 850225,electromatic Relief Valves NR-108B,NR-108C & NR-108D Failed to Fully Reseat After Initial Actuation,Per Tech Spec 6.9.3.f.Caused by Valve Design Deficiency.Design Change Considered ML20102B8671985-02-21021 February 1985 Special Rept 85-01:on 850207,leakage Observed Around post-indication Valve V-9-13.Fire Suppression Water Sys Isolated on 850211 to Facilitate Valve Repair.Caused by Crack in Valve Body.Valve Replaced 1998-01-29
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K4451999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20217D1261999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20216E7031999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20211P6731999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20210Q0521999-08-0404 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Approving Relief Request 10 to License DPR-22 Per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(i).Inservice Exam for Relief Request 10,Parts A,B,C,D & E Impractical & Reasonable Assurance of Structural Integrity Provided ML20210Q6611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20211A7051999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Station.With ML20209F7901999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20209G0631999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20212H5491999-06-18018 June 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 4 to HI-981983, Licensing Rept for Storage Capacity Expansion of Oyster Creek Spent Fuel Pool ML20195H0351999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generatintg Plant.With ML20195E7961999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20206N1721999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20206N7431999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20205N0861999-04-12012 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Re Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20205P5701999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20205P5401999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20204H4951999-03-18018 March 1999 SER Concluding That Licensee Established Acceptable Program to Verify Periodically design-basis Capability of safety-related MOVs at Monticello.Therefore Staff Concludes Licensee Adequately Addressed Action Required in GL 96-05 ML20205G7391999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20204C8201999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20202F7901999-01-25025 January 1999 1999 Four Year Simulator Certification Rept for MNGP Simulation Facility ML20199E4871999-01-0606 January 1999 SER Accepting Licensee 951116,960214 & 0524 Responses to NRC Bulletin 95-002, Unexpected Clogging of Residual Heat Removal Pump Strainer While Operating in Suppression Pool Cooling Mode ML20205H0561998-12-31031 December 1998 Northern States Power Co 1998 Annual Rept. with ML20195E8321998-12-31031 December 1998 10CFR50.59(b) Rept of Changes to Oyster Creek Sys & Procedures, for Period of June 1997 to Dec 1998.With ML20199F6211998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Mngp.With ML20199E4671998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20198P0691998-12-28028 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That NSP Proposed Alternative to Paragraph III-3411 of App III to 1986 Edition of Section XI of ASME Code Provides Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety.Alternative Authorized ML20198D0751998-12-10010 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting NSP Proposed Change to EOPs to Use 2/3 Core Height as Potential Entry Condition Into Containment Flooding ML20198B2531998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20198D2091998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20195J8591998-11-12012 November 1998 Rev 11 to 1000-PLN-7200.01, Gpu Nuclear Operational QA Plan ML20195E3691998-11-12012 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Licensee USI A-46 Implementation Has Met Purpose & Intent of Criteria in GIP-2 & Staff Sser 2 for Resolution of USI A-46 ML20195C4271998-11-0606 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Proposed Ocnpp Mod to Install Core Support Plate Wedges to Structurally Replace Lateral Resistance Provided by Rim Hold Down Bolts for One Operating Cycle ML20195D2381998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20155J3021998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20198J4451998-10-22022 October 1998 Rev 2 to SIR-97-003, Review of Test Results of Two Surveillance Capsules & Recommendations for Matls Properties & Pressure-Temp Curves to Be Used for Monticello Rpv ML20154R4981998-10-20020 October 1998 Core Spray Sys Insp Program - 17R ML20154L3051998-10-14014 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Request to Defer Insp of 79 Welds from One Fuel Cycle at 17R Outage ML20154Q3371998-09-30030 September 1998 Rev 8 to Oyster Creek Cycle 17,COLR ML20154L5571998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20154L3471998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20153F0511998-09-21021 September 1998 Rev 2 to MNGP Colr,Cycle 19 ML20153E9361998-09-0808 September 1998 Rev 1 to MNGP Colr,Cycle 19 ML20151V6311998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.With ML20237D5691998-08-31031 August 1998 Rev 0 to MPR-1957, Design Submittal for Oyster Creek Core Plate Wedge Modification ML20153B0861998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.With ML20237D5711998-08-18018 August 1998 Rev 0 to SE-000222-002, Core Plate Wedge Installation ML20237B8461998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ML20237B0131998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station ML20236W5041998-07-21021 July 1998 ISI Exam Summary Rept - Refueling Outage 19 1999-09-30
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Jersey Central Power & Light Company i
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M AotSoN AVENUE AT PUNCH soWL Ro AD 9 MoRRISToWN. N.J. o7960 e 539 6114 April 20, 1972 -,
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f) z -- l Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director -_{ . - g- 1' Division of Reactor Licensing IC . t / pl United States Atomic Energy Commission p . ye, .(' )'
Washington, D. C. 20545 N-fg .
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Dear Dr. Morris:
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Subject:
Oyster Creek Station
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Docket No. 50-219 Loss of Secondary Containment Integrity The purpose of this letter is to report to you a violation of a Limiting Condition for Operation in that Secondary Containment ',
Integrity was not maintained as required by Specification 3.5.B.1.
of our Technical Specifications, ,
i i
On April 11, 1972, during performance of a routine weekly surveillance test of isolation of the Reactor Building and initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System due to simulated high radiation levels on the Reactor Building Operating Floor and in the Reactor i Building Ventilation Exhaust ducts, the supply dampers' for the !
Reactor Building Ventilation System failed to close as required. i As a result of this failure, Secondary Containment was not in )
etfect.
Isolation of the Reactor Building Ventilation System supply damper is initiated by "b" contacts from the Reactor Building Ventilation System supply fans SF1-12, SF1-13, and SF1-14 wired in series. However, due to an electrical problem with supply fan 1-13, which resulted in the discovery that the motor was shorted, its supply breaker was racked-out.
Thus, the logic control circuit for the dampers was " opened", the normal situation with the fans in operation. When the remaining fans were '
tripped during the surveillance test conducted at 2:00 a.m. on April 11, 1972, the logic control circuit was still open, the damper control relays remained de-energized, and the dampers did not close, e m.e
$( 4.;)c) .
9102110357 721222 CF ADOCK 05000263 CF g
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l Dr. Peter A. Morris Page II April 20, 1972 l The logic circuit was restored by disconnecting the motor leads from the breaker and racking-in the breaker. At 9:20 a.m.
on April 11, 1972, an operability check of Reactor Building Isolation was conducted and proved to be satisfactory. A caution tag was placed at the fan control switches in the Control Room to notify operators that if a supply fan breaker is racked-out,the Reactor Building supply damper isolation control logic is defeated unless a jumper is installed in the breaker cabinet. A similar caution note is i being stenciled locally on the supply fan breakers.
As noted in the FDSAR, the primary objective of the Secondary J Containment System is to minimize ground level release of airborne radioactive materials and to provide for controlled elevated release l of the building atmosphere under accident conditions. The containment l systems. Primary and Secondary, pro.ide the principle mechanism for j mitigation of accident consequences. The off-site accident consequences, l however, are relatively insensitive to the Reactor Building in-leakage rate as long as the Standby Gas Treatment System can maintain the building at a vacuum. In this particular instance, the supply and exhaust fans tripped, the exhaust dampers closed, and the Standby Gas Treatment System was initiated. With the above situation, the air supply to the building was not only via the various in-leakage paths but also, and no doubt primarily, via the Reactor Building supply dampers.
1 Any accident conditions postulated that require secondary l containment in determining environmental releases would, under these l conditions, have a second path permitting release of the Reactor l Building air at approximately a 60-foot elevation. l In order to prevent a reoccurrence of this incident, a j circuit design change will be implemented that will permit a Reactor i Building supply fan breaker to be racked-out for maintenance without ;
defeating the Reactor Building supply damper isolation logic. Until this design change can be implemented, a standing order will be issued instructing plant personnel in the appropriate practice to be followed to avoid defeating the Reactor Building supply damper isolation logic.
Very truly yours, Ib I Il Ivan R. Finf ock Jr.
Manager, Nuclear Generating Stations IRF/pk Enclosures cc: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly, Director Division of Compliance, Region I
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