ML20058K017
| ML20058K017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1990 |
| From: | Keeton J, Pellet J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058K015 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-382-OL-90-01, 50-382-OL-90-1, NUDOCS 9012060265 | |
| Download: ML20058K017 (5) | |
Text
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AFTENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0!PISSION REGION IV Operator Licensing Examination Report:
50-382/0L 90-01 l
Operating License: NPF-38 Docket: 50-382 Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box B Killona, Louisiana 70066 facility Name: Waterford-3 Steam Electric Station (W-3)
Examination at:
W-3, Taft Louisiana 9/7 I
NMe/Jo l
Chief Examiner:
/J. N. Keeton~,' Chief Examiner Date Operator Licensing Secti n Division of Reg or Sa ty A
c-1.e
// 24 yd Approved by: h y. F(llet,fection Chief Date l
Optratoe Lice 6 sing Section Division of Reactor Safety i
Sununary
)
NRC Administered Examinations Conducted During the Week of jggmber 10, 1990 (NRC Feport 50-382/0L 90 01)
Examinations were administered to ten senior reactor operator (SRO) applicants.
Eight of the applicants passed all sections of the examination and have been issued the appropriate licenses. Two of the applicants failed the Integrated Plant Operations section of the examination.
l The examinations were conducted in accordance with flVREG-1021. Revision 6, as a pilot for the new methodology that uses facility developed examination material.
Difficu'.hy was encountered in using the examination-material provided, because the examination bank material had not been updated since the previous requalification examinations conducted in September, 1989. The effort of the training staff assigned to assist in pre-examination development is noted and was helpful.
l 9012060265 90112/.
l POR ADOCK 05000382 l-V PDC.
o 2
DETAILS i
1.
PERSONS EXAMINED R0 SRO Total Licensee Examinations:
Pass -
0 8
8 Fail -
0 2
2 i
2.
EXAi41NERS J. M. Keeton, Chief Examiner i
J. E. Whittemore G. D. Weale
- 1. Kingsley 3.
EXAM 1 HAT 10N REPORT Performance results for individual candidates are not included in this report because examination reports are placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Individual performance results are not subject to public disclosure.
3.1 Examination Review Comment / Resolution In general, editorial comments or changes made as a result of facility reviews i
prior to the examination, during the examination, or subsequent grading reviews are not addressed by this resolution section. All facility licensee pre-examination comments were incorporated into the examination.
No post-examination i
comments were made by the facility licensee.
3.2 Site Visit Summary 1
The facility licensee was provided a copy of the examination and answer key for the purpose of commenting on the examination content validity. The facility licensee had no comments on the written examination.
i An exit meeting was held September 15, 1990, with the following persons in attendance:
NRC FACILITY J. Keeton R. Barkhurst B. Loetzerich J..Whittemore J. McGaha C. Fugate
- 1. Kingsley F. Drummond D. Paker G. Weale C. Toth J. Culliton J. O'Hearn
o
) DRC expressed appreciation for the cooperation and professionalism ey.hibited by the operations and training staffs during all portions of the eyamination, especially the individuals from the training staff who were responsible for assisting the examincrs during the pre-examination and examinatior activities.
The focus of the exit meeting was on the examination process using the methodology of the examiner's standard, NUtEG-1021, Revision 6.
This examination was developed material (i.e., examination question bank, job a pilot using f acility(JPMs). and simulator scenarios).
performance measures Specific feedback was provided to the facility licensee during the exit rtgarding problem areas is r+1fied during examination development that will reouire licensee attention r to the next examination. Because feedback on the status of examination
..K development can be beneficial to the facility Wenset, the licensee was
.informed that the facility developed materiel supplied fur this examination would not have supported development of a recua11fscation examination nor would it have been of suf ficient quality to support futart replacement examinations using the Revision 6 methocology. The erob'. ems encountered included out-of-date material on all sections of the eFamination, p9er Construction of Written questions and JPMs, lack of verification and validation on all sections, and simulator scenarios that did not challenge tne operators in use of the emergency operating procedures and the emergency plan.
3.3 General Consnents Performance on both the written and operating examinations was satisfactory, fail of the operating section of the exemination by two applicants cannot be attr
.ted to specific training weaknesses; howcVer, the facility licensee is encouraged to continue evaluating training effectiveness and operator performance using the JPM methodology.
3.3.1 Comments on Exam Preparation f
The written examination bank provided was essentially unusable for development of this examination. This negated the potential benefit that could be realized by the licensee if the majority of the examination questions had been taken l
directly from the facility written examination questions. Future replacement examinations will be 100 percent objective and can be taken entirely fro 1 the l
facility bank; however, NRC is restricted to using no more than 10 percent et those questions that are in the objective format. Therefore, if the licensee has only a limited number of questions in the objective format, the licensee's bank will not be a primary source for the examination.
Problems encountered with the written examination bank included:
- Ouestions at a low cognitive level, i.e., memorization and recall
- Questions that do not elicit stated response
- Qtestions that cued the answer (multiple choice questions)
- Fultiple choice distractors that were not credible
- Double jeopardy questions
4 The reference material provided to support the development of the written examination was marginal. The lesson plans required referencing the system descriptions, which contained out-of-date, erroneous. or incompletc information.
A set of logic diagrams that could have been used tr ensure accuracy of NPC developed questions was reauested but was not rece hed.
The JPMs provided for examination development had not been updated or validated since September 1989. Of the 20 JPMs selected for this examination, only two had questions that idertified the knowledge and abilities category being tested.
At least one of the JNis selected te be performed dynamically on the simulator could not be used because the simulator was not modeled to support the task performance. All JPhs selected required roodification to identified critical steps, and the ma.%rity required revision because of procedure or plant changes.
The simulator malfunction book did not meet the criteria of NUREG-1021, Revision 6 ES-201, Attschment 1, 17b.
Cause and effect information was sparse with no range of results information for variable malfunctions. Expected annunciators were not listed, nor were expected operator actions.
(A similar comment was nde on the previous examination report, 50-382/0L89-01.)
The scenarios provided by the facility licensee did not teet the requirements of ES-301 3.a.
The scenarios lacked both scope and depth end could not be used, as received, for this examination. The scenarios contained insufficient events to satisfy the minimum operator performance requirements and did not challenge the examinees in emergency procedures or emergency plan usage.
The problems identified above resulted in an intensive effort by the facility licensee and NRC examiners during examination preparation and administration.
3.3.2 Observations During Examination Administration During performance of the JPM simulating paralleling the control-element-drive-mechanismmotorgenerators(MGs),theproceduredidnotcallfordeenergizing the synchroscope. Also, the A and B MG sets were not clearly labeled on their r.ontrol panels.
During performance of the JPM simulating local operation of the atmospheric dump valve, the procedure called for turning the preumatic pern.issive valves counter-clockwise. The valves must be turned clockwise. This is a potential safety problem. The facility licensee noted the discrepancy and agreed to change the procedure and to label the valves correctly to identify the proper direction of operation.
During the dynamic simulator examinations, it was observed that the operators appeared to lack confidence in labeling on control board valves. Many of the valves only require momentary positioning of the control switch to open or close for the valve to stroke to the fully opened or closed position. Others require the control switch to be held until full stroke is completed. The operators tended to hold every control switch to the desired position until desired indication was received.
During the dynamic simulator examinations, it was observed that the simulator electric hydraulic control governor valves responded differently than those in the pler t.
Although, the operators were aware of this difference, it could result in negative training.
During the dynamic sirolator examinations, two scenarios were run that involved a bomb threat within the plent. The examiners and facility training staff agreed that this warranted an " alert" classification, in both cases a ceneral emergency was declared. Although this classification was conservative, it was unwerranted because of the impact it would have had outside the plant bouncary.
The operators appeared to have difficulty differentiating between " imminent loss of physical plant control" and "1 css of physical control."
Two cases of incor sistency were identified. Tc:hnical Specification.
Section 3.3.3.1, " Action Statement 27," stated that upon failure of efflutnt accident monitors one should " initiate areplanned alternate monitoring method."
None of the examinees questioned knew w1ere to locate the plan or if it actually existed. The exar.:iners were unable to determine if the plan existed. Also, Section 3.3.3.11, Table 3.3-13, contained a footnote stating that the iodine i
sampler and particulate alarms require "incediate" sample exhaust diversion to the main stack. During the dynamic sinolator scenarios, the operators performed this action each time it was appropriate; however, there was nothing in the
. procedures that identified this action as being required. The facility licensee agreed to address these inconsistencies.
3.4 Master Examination and Answer Key A master copy of the W-3 license examination and answer key is attached. The facility licensee did not consent on the written exemination.
3.5 Simulator Fidelity Report No problems were encountered in using the simulator beyond those pre-identified by the facility licensee. The list of deficiencies is attached.
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