ML20058J764
| ML20058J764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/01/1990 |
| From: | Abagyan A, Novak T NRC - U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILI |
| To: | NRC - U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILI |
| References | |
| JCCCNRS-WG-1, JCCCNRS-WG-8, NUDOCS 9012020175 | |
| Download: ML20058J764 (17) | |
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MEMCRANDUM OF MEETING CF. WORKJNO GROUPS M-5 0F THE US-Ussr 2OINT COCRDINATING COMMITTEE ON C2V2LIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAF27Y i
April E3-27. 1990 The fifth meeting of working groups of the US-USSR Joint Coordinating. Committee on Civilian 'Nuelear Roseter Safety.
(JCCCNRS) was held in Meseew at the All Union Research Eastitute for Nuclear Power Planta CJeration (VM22AES) on April-83-E7.
1990.
In addition the working groups,had a very useful visit to the Zaporothe Atomic Power Station. Two of the ten working aroups had discussions. The workins groups were as follows:
WCRKING GROUP at BAFETY APPROACMES AND RESULATORY PRACT2CES
.(
WORK 2NG GROUP 8: EXCMANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPER2ENCE a
The US side of the working groups was headed by Thomas M.
Novak.
Director.
Division of# Safety Prosrams.
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The USSR side was headed by. ' Armen A.
Abagyan. General Director of All Union Research 2nstitute for'NPP Operation (VNIZAES).
The reports of the two workins groups are provided in Appendix 2.
A list of' participants in the working stoop sessions, as well as observers.
The lists of documents exchanged is provided in Appendix 22.
Appendix 222.
for each session are provided in This Memorandum of proposed future actions.
Meetins reports the recommendations and 1
WORK 2NG GROUP at SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES RECCP.MENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES Both sides agreed to proposed topics for.the next Workins Group 1
Information Exchange meeting and areas of empharts for the next ine e ter excharco.The int'.rraticn exchance tentatively meetins is proposed for fall / winter 1990/91..but both sides reccanine that this proposal for the timing of the next meeting eay be affected by the timing of the currently postponed inspector exchansas.
The US will consider specific Soviet proposals.
i Soth sides agree that tho following, topics should be included
+
during the upcoming information exchange meeting and inspector exchanget
\\ (O 1.
Allocation of inspection resources to refleet the l
differing safety performance of NPPs.
l' b 2. Inspection operator-licensing examiners.of licensee training programs and activ! ties of l
A 3.The role of the headquarters organisation and regional offices in assessing the efficiency reactor inspection program.
and effectiveness of the REh lR
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)( gj Programs for' development
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'l of emergency preparedness ' drills i..
with emphasis en the-partteapation of local governments'and j
public relations croups.
Soth sides agree that participation j
durins an emergency preparedness drill as part of the next
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inspector exchange would be. beneficial.
S
- 5. Resulatory Pequirements for PeViewing. The adequacy of-l reactor core thermal ~ and physics entracteristics of newly
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installed cores. inc3'ading comparison of associated US and USSR i
regulatory documents.
<s 6
How and when changes 'are made to the inspection program to 1
inc porate lessons learned er information gathered from analysis of'eperational events.
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/
i 7., Accident manasement for beyond design basis accidents.
1 i-L (8.Early in' the inspector exchange, exchangees will be britfed on the -host. country's system fer nuclear power H
procuction, f ocusing on the ' current roles of Soviet ministers or US government agencies. and industry organisations in design.
construction, operations and regulation
-(including the i
relationships and responsibi.'.ittes of GPAN' and the NRC relative the other sovernment ministries / agencies). Information will be exchansed about the philosophy and practices of supervision /resulation of the nuclear industry-in the USSR /US.-
(=
9.
US and V,SSR practices regarding the supervision or regulation of design processes and methods for assuring that US i
and UCCR design' standards are met.
In addition.
both sides will consider appropriate tours of nuclear facilities for members of the workins aroup.,
WORMING GROUP 8: EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE April 27. 1990
)
Topie 1: Nuclear Power Plant Performance ~ Indicators RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVIT250s-Performance Indicators should be further' discussed in the.
1990 fall meetins. specifie subsects would include further development and benefits.Posulting from the i
L indicators.
The U.S.
should' coordinate a discussion of plant use of the.
i maintenance management systems and.possibly a presentation by a
U.S.
utility.
Topic 2 Human Factors Affects on NPP Safety P.ECOMENDATIONS FOR TUTURE AC'TIV2 TIES:
It was agreed that future work was warranted to human factors of recent examine the operational events-and share results frem that work. Actual examples of operetor performance during abnormal operational events should be further discussed in the next meetins.
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Topie 3: Technitues.to Identify Severn Ace 1 dent Precursors i
RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURF AC72V272ES:
The delegations screed. that further results should be i
exchanged at the next meeting.
In the 1:.terisi additional J
information en the ASP eede may be provided to the U.S.S.R.
delegation.
Topic 4: Assessment of Feedback Effeettveness RECOMMENDATIONS FOR' FUTURE AC72V272ES Future meet *nss of the workins troup should include reports feedback projects, new ease studies.:and the analysis of en new i
recent safety sist.ificant events, specifte toples beinst i
1, 1.
V5t Studies addressing common-sause' failure potential.
2.
USt Programs and stisdies assoelated with conditions and event's occurins during plallt shutdowns.
- 3. USSR.and US: Interp} ant feedback of operating experience to stimulate improved plant performanee.
Topic 5:
Discussion et selected safety events root cause RECOMENDA720N FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES USSR and U5: Discussion of recent including root cause analysis.. lessons learne$ operational expertence.
and feedback of operatins, experience.
i FOR THE USSR STATE COKMITTEE FOR THE UTILICATION OF ATOMIC ENERG*t FOR THE U P"c t.V.*.?. 'rHE REGULATORY COMMISSION Armen A.
Aba'syan [
{T Thomas M.
Novak q_y'o- ')
1 maw. 1990.-
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l APPENDIX I' l
MEMORANDA OF MEETIWGS OF THE Two WORKING OROUPS i
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Attached are the memoranda of the two working group meetings in Moscow. April 23-27, 2990.
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i MEMORANDUM OF MEET 1NG FOR. WORK 1NG GROUP at 1
SAFETY.APPROAC'NES'AND RSOULATORY PRACTICES
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- 1. WORKING GROUP SCOPE AND CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS i
The main topics discussed by the USSR and the US participants were as_follows:
- 1. The US and USSR representatives made' presentations on 4
I their experien'ces and observations during the 1989 inspector exchanse program. with emphasis on differenees in. US and USSR approaches in the followins' areas of interests _
The roles and relationships.aaens the various severnmental J
organisations involved with nuclear poter senerations The relationship between inspectors and the plant stafft
[
The allocation of inspection resources and inspection l
Plannanst The.. enforcement authority of. inspectors and personal vs ersanisation responsibility for vio35cion'st The reactive vs proactive role 6/ inspectorst The roles of resident vs region-based inspectors and offsite.
^
support prov3ded to the resident inspectorst.
Design' philosophy is evidenced by design and. safety' featu' es
.j currently in place in each counter's reactor plantet The scope and depth of operating and emeravncy procedsrest The scope and depth of inspection procedurest The desree of plant manasement oversisht of safety-related activities The characteristics.of maintenance, surveillance, and desian change programs The training and qualification of operators and inspectors and the depth of inspector plant-specific. knowledge and ensincerins expertiset Regulatory body systems for providing feedback on operating experience.
eperating events ar.d design troblems for use in r.ccification of the insrection program.
i
- 2. The sides also cascussed resident inspectorievaluation of I
cvorail plant safety on a, day-to-dky
- basis, includins the parameters and indicatorr, reviewed by the.inspectorp to determine the plant safety status. Topics included:
The philosophy underlying the resident inspector's approach to monitoring the activities of the operating organisation t,
A typical weekly schedule of-resident inspector activities as divided between scheduled and non-scheduled activitiest A
detailed breakdown-of regularly eeheduled daily, weekly.
biwcekly.. etc.
inspector tours. observations and verificational e
Non-routine, unscheduled (reactive)
Posident' inspector i
activities such as event or senerie. safety issue followup.
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Planning was purs'ued fer the nexT inspector exchanse.and resulatery body eversight of design preessses Was discussed.
A.
The USSR side described the organisation and nuclear.
regulatory activities of 40SPROMATOMNAD20R (GPAN), a new State i
Committee havins responsibility for the safety of all industries.
includins the civilian.nuelear power industry. The Soviets also outlined the nuclear' safety policy of this new ersanisation, and-the role of GPAN.,the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety, which' As now a subset of this larger organisation. The extent
't o which
'GPAN's authority. in' directinS and implementins nuclear safety po11ey-has been
. enhanced by this restructurina -was also covered.. Finally, the i
USSR side described the funettons and specific activities of the Scientific Technical Safety Center. which. As affiliated with GPAN.
The following aspects were discussed:
The current and projected activities.of the Center The organizational structure of the Centers
~
The decision process'for selectins research activitiest How the scientifie and engineerins expertise of the Centar staff is adgusted to satisfy diverse research needs The process by which research results are folded 'back into the regulatory program for implementatient The circumstances leading to the undertaking of research activities (e.g..-whether a proactive or reactive undertakinst whether prompted by operating expertene..
d.stan/anasysis practices.
construction practices.
performance capability i
considerations)
Acccmplishments of the Centers Relationship of Center efforts to GPAN regulatory program activitiest Impact of Center activities on the deslan/ construction /
I creration of nuclear power' plants. manufacturing facilities, and
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regulatory activities.
3 l
AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
- 1. Both sides reviewed and discussed in detail the results of the very valuable 1989 inspector exchanse program.
The US and USSR representatives made presentations en their experiences and observations during this exchange, with emphasis
~
on differences in the two sides'
. approaches in a number of areas such as the scope and depth of-inspection procedurest-the relationship between inspectors and the plant stafft the enforcement authority of inspectoret the roles of resident va region-based inspectors and the training and qualification of operators and inspectors.
The following significant similarities and differences in the approaches of the two sides were notedt.
a..The US Nuclear Regulatory' Commission (NRC) and the USSR Gosprematonnadsor have common ob$ectives to regulating the safe utilization of nuclear
- enersy, but differ in organizational structure and regulatory procedures / approaches.
b.
Both sides consider it important to analyze the causes of operational occurrences at nuclear power plants and to undertake implementation of regulatory approaches that encourage an 3'ttit1de of concern and-self-criticism on the part of plant managers &nd operatins personnel toward their work, aimed at safe e
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It is noted that periodie'somprehensive team inspections-of i
all aspects 'of safety. eenducted by specialists in the restons l
and from the headtuarters. provide an important suppassent to tha NPP inspection program.
Seth sides attach arest importanee to developing operating procedures.
and believe that an optimal relationship should be
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maintained betwo,p'een situations (takins 'into aesount the level of n procedural detail and operator flexibility. to respend to unfom operator training and proficioney).
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- 2. The.two sides also discussed resident inspector evaluation 2
of everall plant safety on a daily basis. includins parameters -
and indientors reviewed-to determine plant safety status.
Conclusions reached were as followst i
4 4.
Both sides believe,that the inspection program eenducted by regions to evaluate NPP safety. in addition to werk done by the. site inspectors. is an.important factor that contributes to I
The ability to effectively allocate regulatory resources.
- b. Both sides are committed to a
high quality of plant maintenance. particularly, at units operating for.a lens period of 1
time.
Both sides agree that there is a need to enhance eur regulatory approaches to maintenance.
3.
The US side discussed the NRC oversight of design i
activities from pre-licensing to license renewal / life extension.
The Soviet side discussed their regulatory approach to design review including the use of operational experience as an input design and modification activities.
to A.
The USSR side described the organization.and. nuclear L
regulatcry activities of GOSPROMATOMNADZOR (GPAN).
a new State Committee having responsibility for tne safety'of all industries.
including the civ111sn nuclear power industry. The Soviets also
)
outlined the nuclear safety policy of this new: organization.
the role of UPAN.
and the USSR State Committee for Supervision of Nucles" ?ower Safety, which is now a
subset of.this larger orsar '..ation. The extent to which GPAN's.
authority in directing and implementing nuclohr safety policy has been enhanced by this restructuring was also covered.
Finally. the Ussr side described the functions and specific activities of the i
Scientifie Technical Safety Center, which it. affiliated with GPAN.
I At the meeting the Soviet side Toported a change in tho' structure and functions-of'the USSR 00SPROMATOMNAD20R. Regulatory an'd eversight functions in the genormi field'of safe utilisation i
of nuclear energy are now beins headed by Chairman A.5elyaev. He'is the first deputy Chairmancarried out by a com
.GCSPROMATOMNAD2OR.
This commission is charged with additional.
of regulatory responsibilities in the area of radiation
- safety, safety in radioactive. Weste handlins.
fuel technology.
and others.
5.The Us side discussed the coordinatins role ot. the Us Nuclear Regulatory Commission in scfety.research and development 7
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and how regulatory no.ds influence safety research.
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. Callan.
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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING,FOR WORX:NG GROUP 8 EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WoPX2NG GPOUP.8 EXCNANCE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE i
ECOPE AND CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS:
i The various topics of discussior, focussed on the evaluation cf operating experience, primarily power reactor events. and thq l
methods employed. in the U.S.
and the U.S.C.R.
to determine the relative significance of events and omerging safety issues.
It i
was noted that the U.S.S.R..had ir.itiated new work based upon the 1989 Working., Group ~8 meeting and they discussed the results of '.'
This work. During this meeting. it was also nc:ed that The accFe I
of Yne interchange was becomming better defined and of mere e
interest to both participants..
Topic it Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicaters i
t The participants presentec papers discussing methods to trend and further analyze the events-at power reactors to detect safety issuto art:ing from oculpment or program deficiencies.
The U.S.
and the
.U.S.S.R.
presented their respective programs of plant performance indicators..These indicators included reactor trips.
safety system t siliare.
significant events, unplanned-or forced power plant outages, and other ' accepted indicaters of overall I
plani performance. Each country presented its approach to further l
devolep maintenance indicators. The U.S: presented its equipment i
failure based indicator and the
'U.S.S.R.
presented its i
development retsrding maintenance indicatcre based on the reliability of plant e q u i p m e n t.'
t AG?.EIMEN7S AND CONCLt*S10NO:
It was agreec that i t. e potential benefits for further discussions warrant that a meeting be held in the U.S.-
in the l
tall of 1990.
Both delegations agreed.that the subject of monitoring nuclear plant performance was a priority issue-and must be further develcred.
1 Both delesitions agreed that indicators provide valuable information and, if possible. should cover all ma$or areas of plant performance. The U.S.S.R.
noted that certain indicators used by 2AEA or WANO. such as the Safety System Performance Indicator (SSP 1).
may warrant.
further discussion.
The
[
U.S.
agreed with the technical basis for this proposal.
Both delegat Ans recognised. based upon their ' analysis of operating experAence.,that plant maintenance was a primary issue i
to ensure safe operations. It was observed that the'U.S. and-the U.E.C.R.
had a
commen understanding of the definition of
" main t e n an c e". This perspective-defined maintenance as all functions needed to maintain the reliability'of the plant equ'iment and the function of~each train as well as the bal ar.c e -cf-pl ant system..One obsective of the U.S.S.W.
program is basec on optimising the frequency of preventive maintenanca -of equipment te avoid unnecessary maintenance activities.;The U.S.
noted that this activity was simalsr.
to reliability-centered r
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maintenance activities in the U.S. The.U.S.S.R.
expressed an l
interest in discussing plant maintenance management systems.
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The U.S.S.R.
discussed the potential for developing 5
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an overall safety indicator based upon. The individual indicators.
The U.S. explained their expertenee on that 4
l sub#eet. The U.S.*emphasised its.positten' that guidance As i
necessary to easure that performance indicators are not aisused'.
The delegations agreed that deterministie. indiestors l
and reliability-based (probabilistic) indicators are I
desirable.
Deterministie indicators are sharacterised.
by.
simplicity and
- accuracy, but. reliability (probabilistie);
Andicators have the potential to provide additional quantitative perspective-en equipment performance and would represent.a step in the development of risk based indleaters. The'delesations believed that the probabilistic approach aan suppiament j
deterministic assessments.
RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES:
verformance Indicators should be further discussed in the 4
i 1990 fall meetina. Specifie sub$ects would include further development and benefits resulting from-the use of the indicators.
The U.S.
should coordinate a discussion of plant maintenance management systems and possibly a presentation by a
U.S.
utility.
Topic 2: Human Factors Affects on.Npp Safety U.S.S.R.
and U.S.
presentations focussed on their analyses of t
the human factors involved in the causes and response to operating reactor events. In addition to systematic, analyses of the patterne.
of personnel reisted causes for these events.
Insishts were provided on the operator behavior durins. such The USSR presented an analysis of operator actions curing events.
abnormal events involving eculpment failure. The U.S.
presented information regarding steam senerator tube rupture (SGTR) events where the operators responded differently in performins reenvery actions.
i AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS The delegations agreed that the performance of operators durins operational events should be further studied.
Understanding the influences on the operators was of first importlince.
The U.S.
delesation agreed to provide ~ lessons learned from their program The U.S.
agreed to forward to the U.S.S.R.,
for their potential use, a protocol for operator interviews following such events and a
-specifie evaluation of one event.
The U.S.S.R.
delesation noted that future discussions might approach the topic of causes for human errors.'
RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES:
It was agreed that future work was warranted t, examine the human factors of recent operational events and hare'results from that work. Actual examples of -operator perrormance during abnormal operational events should be further discussed in the 4
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Topic 3 Techniques to 2dentify Severe Ateident Pretursors This topte focussed en the actual review of uperating events
-1 to detect those that could be precursers of more serious events.
The U.S.S.R.
presented potential modeling techniques we' utilise operational data to evaluate and trend the overall ar?q,7 -level of a
plant.
Thess. involved the use - et Markevian ' e6 pig'ees to formulate methode - to prediet; the possibility of the. t..iures. of equipment and systems with the eensequences ef a more severe accident. The U.S. discussed their Aseident: Sequence Precursor (ASP) program.
using event tree methods, te screen operattenal event
- and select precursors for further analysis and evaluation.
The r.. dor assumptions included in the models were discussed.
The Markovian method'may address the.eeneern of analysis uncertainty and may lend itself to provide
's probability value for event reoccurrence, while the ASP involved' a
best estimate analysis that could be.used for feedback to plant' management.
Additionally, a paper was also presented involving analyses of noble saa release whichaeould be:needed to sussest a basis for-restricting plant operations to within ' acceptable safety limits.
AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
l The delegations agreed that quantTtative tools for events analysts had been shown to provide safety benefit.
Specific benefits from past analyses were presented as examples of how the technique could be used to enhance safety. One such was the quantification of sequential events at. ene plant with the resultant effect r.E increasing that plant's vulnerability to a serious accident. Recognition of this condition and communteation s
with the plant operators can improve their awareness of potentially unsafe plant conditions..The delesstions agreed d e ve lo pme r.t activities should continue to obtain quantitative that methods to. evaluate actual operational events. Stratestes be developed to should Markovian models areassess the uncertainty in an analveis. ASP ar.d two initial approaches to this area.
The l
delegaticne agreed that there was a
potential for misinterpratation of the results from such' quantitative tools and that the development activities should address the proper and improper use of such tools based potential effects.
upon the17 limitations and l
RECOMENDATIONS FOR PUTURE ' ACTIVITIES.
The delegations.asreed that further results should be-exchanged at.the next meeting.
In the interim.
additional information on the Asp code may be provided to the U.S.S.R.
delegation.
r Topic 4: Assessment of Feedback Sffectiveness Seth sides presented examples which tilustrated the effectiveness of their processes for the feedback of operatias experience.
dif ferences between' each country's programs.It is recognized that there ar however, the avstems of both countries do have some similarities. Each country provided examples to include that each As workina i
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succotatuliv. Tho 20un'iriots, hov3 0033 And 01a11Cr. Cperating i
experience. with simi?;c. corrective actions, by way..ef their in plan feedback processes.
The U.S.S.R. Colegation presented information on nuclear power plant equipment relistility data. The US delegation expressed i
interest in this activity and.provided Anaights sained from similar US activities.
AGREEMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS I
t We agree that continued' evaluation and feedback'of operational.
f data ic an important tool to inhance reactor safety. Each caontay's program is effective and appears to be achieving successful results.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES Future meetings of tho'workins group should include _ reports en new feedback projects. new caso studies, and the analysis of recent cafety significant events, specific topics beinst
- 1. US: studies addressins conumen-cause failure potential.
- 2. US.Pecarams and' studies associated with conditions and events cecurina during plant shutdewns.
- 3. U3SR and US: Interplant feedback cf operatins experience to stimulate improved plant performance.
Topic 5:
Discussion of selected safety events root cause analysis. lessons learned t
foth sides presented information about recent events.
The precentatiens included discussions of the analysis techniques and each country's event clacsification guidelines.
AGREEMENTS AND CCNCL*JS:ONS We agree that the discussions of recent operational events are important to our feedback programs to enhance reactor safety.
We agree that future meetinsa should include similar discussions of recent events.
RECOMENDATION FOR TUTURE ACT VITIES USSR and V5 Discussion of recent operational experience.
including root cause analysis. lessons learned and feedback of operatins experience.
U.E.S.R. WG 8 Co
- ader U.S. WG S Co-Leader Vi t: tov, Vladirdir M.
Novak. Thomas. M.
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4PPENDIX:228-i LIST OF PART1.2 PANTS AND OSSERVERS
.i US PART,tCIPANTS 2N WORKING GROUP 1:
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SAFETY APPROACMES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES:
1 Co-Leader:
l
-i Callan.. Leonard J..
Director.' Division of Rosetor Safety.
Reston IV. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission other
Participants:
Whitney. Leon E..
Inspection and Licensing Program Sranch i
office of Nuelear Reactor Regulatten tis Muelear Regulatory commission observert ij Fowler. Gordon.-International Programs. Office of Governmental and Public Affaire us Nuclear Regulatory Commission s
USSR Participants in Working Group is Safety Approaches and Regulatory Practices Co-Leader l
Masalov. Anatolvi T... Head of-GPAN Main Department l
I Other
Participants:
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Mordduk. Alexander G..
Yuzhoukrainsky Tesion GPAN Deputy Head Steveun. Viktor V..
Yuzhoncukrafticky' region GPAN Inspector Moltunov, Viktor P..
Zaporothy. NPP GPAN 2nspector Mead Serebryakov. Alexander V..
Yuzhnoukrainskaya NPP GPAN Inr;tetor HOLO t
Miroshnichenko, Michael 2..-
Mead of GPAN Nuclear Safety-Section Slepnev. Lev N..
Deputy Head of GPAN Second Department Sukrinskyi. Anatoly1'M.. Department Mead Scientifie Research Centre Gorbunov. Viktor P..
Scientifie Seeretary Scientifie Research Centre Slutsker.
Valeryi P.
Senior Scientist Scientifie Research Centre Khazanov. Adolf-L.,
Laboratory Sead.
Scientific Research Centre k
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.o US Participants in Workins Group 88 l
Exchange of Operational Experiences 1
Co-Leaders I
Novak. Thomas M.. Director. Division of Safety Presrams US f
i Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1
j Other
Participants:
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Williams. Mark M.. Chief.-Trends and Patterns Analysis l
Branch US Nuclear Resuistory-Commission l
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Ornstein. Marold L..
Rosetor Systems Section for l
l Westinshouse and-Babooek-and Wileex Roseters US Nuolear-i Regulatory Commission 1
Cbservers l-f Fowler Gordon, 2nternational Programs Office of Governmental and Public Affairs US Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Interpreters Melly. Xevin. US Department of State USS4 Participants in Workins Group 8:
Exchange of Operational Experiences Co-Leaders Vitkov.
V.. Divisten Mesd. All-Union Research. Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations (VN22AES)
Other
Participants:
ALL UNION RESEARCH, INSTITUTE FOR NPP OPERATION Taratunin, Valery1 M.
I Shuk. Yuryl K.
Altshooler. Michael A.
Mikhailov. Valentin D.
I Conchukov. Viktor V.
Podkoisina. Larisa V.
Doroshenko.-Georsvi G.
Ourinovich. Valery1 D.
Plyusin. Scris S.
Borovkov. Anatolyi 2.
Ananyev. Oritoryi A.
Zhukavina. Svetlana M.
Belosertsev. Michael A.
Popov, Aleksei M.
Lesnoi. Stanislav A.
Ph111montsev..Yuryi N.
Sorokin. Vyatcheslav V.
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1 GCEPROMATOMNAD20R Mazalov, Anatolyi 7.
- Mamenev.'Yupiter A.
P.h a t a n o v, Adolf L.
Sukrinskyi. Anton M.
Grosovskyi. Ger.nadyt 2.
Stryukova. Nataly F.
Gorbanko, Andrew L.-
GYDROPRESS Melchanov.-Vladimir L.
'D:hangobesov, Viktor V.
l I.V.Kurchatov Atomic Energy 2nstitute Osma,chkin. Vladimir S.
USSR MINISTRY CP NUCLEAR POWER & INDUSTRY Artyushin.
Viktor P.
2akharenkov. Sergey N.
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4 S
L 6
Se i d'
=
i
q APPENDIX 232 Documents Exchanged by Workins Group it i
]
by US:
l t
2nspection Proeedure 7170~.
December it. 1989
" Operational safety verification."
(
l g
s Memorandra from L.J. Callan. Direeter. Division of Rosetor i
safety.
ton tv and P.O. arachman. senior Resident 2nspector.
Resion 21.. to James M. Taylor. Acting Executive Director fse l
operations. " Trip Report on Inspector Exchange with the tssR.
l l
July 8 - August t
- 27. 1989." dated November 14.'1989.
NURE0/3R-0053 (rev. a), "U S
?
j Resulations mandbook." December 1989..' Nuclear Resulatory Commission.
i NUREG-1319. "A Priorittaation of.Research-Activities." December 2988.
l l
Memorandum from Iric s. 3eek$ord to multiple-addressees, transmittins RE8 office Letter No. 1. Revision 1. " Procedure for Identification.
Generie Issues." March 22,Prioritization and Tracking of the Resolution of 1989 "Research Procedures Mandbook for Centrol'of Rulemakins." prepared by the Resulation Development Branch.
of Nuclear Regulatory Research. Division of;Resulatory Applications. Office Stello. Jr..'to multiple addressees.May 1988. Memorandum from Victor transmitting the revised charter for the Committee to Review Generic Requirements. April
- 23. 1987.
by USSR
)
to be provided i
Documen*s Exchanged by Workins Group 8:
by US:
Performance 2ndicators for Operatins Commercial Nucleme Power Reactors - Data throush. December 1989'(a volumes)
NUREG-1272 Vol. 3. June 1989. "AEOD Annual Report for 1980" Accident sequence Precursor Program Event Analysie NUREo-1275. Vol. 5.
dated.
"operatine Experience Peedback l
Report-Proscess in scram Reduction."
NUREG/CR-4991 dated " Evaluation and, Proposed Improvements to Effectiveness of U.S.
Nuclear -Regulatory Commission Generic Commur eations."
by USSha F
Altshooler. M. MPP Performance Indicators.
//
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Ana]Fev.O. NPP Operational Safety Performance indicatorr,. Use Taratunin. V. Maintenance optimization Based On Reliability
[
2ndicators Using Probabilistic Techniques.
i Gurinovich. V.
NPP. Equipment Maintenance And Aepair Indicators.
't Sorevkov. A. Operatins : Personnel Effect On NPP Safety an 1989 Compared 'to 1988. Examples Of Events Where Personnel Aetions Mad An Effect On NPP Safety.
Artemchuk.
V..
Sonchukov, V.,
Podkolaina. L. Analysis Of
. s Serial VVER-1000 Plant Operatins Personnel Errora And Their
[
Causes.
- Panov, A., Taratunin.
V. Use Of Markevian Prosesses For Se9ere
' i I
Accident Probabilistic Prediction.
i l
Kamenev. Yu. Basic' Guidelines For The Development of An Expert System For severe'Aceident Prevention. A Way To 2dentify The Current NPP Safety Le, vel.
i Doroshenko.
G. Technological Approach To The Reguistion Of NPP Noble Oas Discharges To Determine Permissible Deviations And Prohibit NPP Operation With Rosard.To Plant Peculiarities.
i
- Khatanov, A.
Analysis Of NPP Event Data And Evaluation Of Plant Operational Safety Level.
- Vitkov, V. Operational Experience Dissemination And Examples Of Feedback.From Plant Events.
Mikha11ev.
V. Use of NPP Equipment Reliability Data-in 2ndustry (Factories. Research 2nstitutes. Designers).
- Matalov, A. Experience With ISI-NAD20R Information Systemt Feedbacks Contacts With Industry.
e 4
Ehukavina.
8..
Pryaklin.
V. Khmelnitsky NPP Unit 1 Scram On 23.04.89 After 70 Load Reduction And Subsequent Surse Due To Spurious Actuation of Automatie Protections.
i V
Novak V...et all. Preitsinary Assessment of he aber Events At VVER-1000. Plants Throughout Lifetime.
l t
-Solosertsev. M. 2ndependent Pa11ures of Two trains of Emergency Power Supply System Of Safety System And Water Discharse From SS Through ADV Durins Kalinin NPP Unit 1 Cooldown on 06.01 90.
Plyusin.
S. Failure Of Control Valve In The Service Water Subsystem Of Safety System Train 3 on 27.08.49 NPP Unit 4.
At Esperothye Zhuk. Yu.. Sorovkov A.
Tunnel At Chernobyl NPP Unit-E onPressuritation Of Refueling Machine 22.06.89.
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