ML20058J462
| ML20058J462 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/09/1989 |
| From: | Ponomarevstepn, Taylor J NRC - U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILI |
| To: | NRC - U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVILI |
| References | |
| JCCCNRS-WG-1, JCCCNRS-WG-10, JCCCNRS-WG-2, JCCCNRS-WG-3, JCCCNRS-WG-4, JCCCNRS-WG-6, JCCCNRS-WG-8, NUDOCS 9012020080 | |
| Download: ML20058J462 (92) | |
Text
bbUN Mt Memorandum of the heating of the Workinti Groups i
of the US USSR Joint Coord< nating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor $afety June 8 9,1989 The second meeting of the working groups of the US USSR Joint Coordinatinti Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor safety (JCCCNR$) was held in the Wash'npton, DC area on June 5 to g. 1989, in accordance with the Protocol of tae first meeting of the JCCCNR$ of August 31, 1988 (hereinafter called the Protocol).
The USSR side of the working groups was headed by M. N. Ponomarev stepnot. First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and Co Chairman of the JCCCNRS. The US side of the working groups was headed by James M.. Taylor, Deputy Executive Director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Co Chairman of the JCCCNR$. A list of the members of the working groups and all other US USSR participants is appended.
(Appendix!)
The working groups met at the Pavilion Hotel in Rockville, Maryland,,
' a Washington, D.C., suburb.
The groups discussed seven of the ten areas of civilian nuclear reactor safety cooperation as described in the Protocol. The reports of the seven working groups are appended hereto.
(Appendix 11)
During the course of these meetings the US and USSR Co Chairmen of the JCCCNR$ signed the Procedures to laplement an Inspector Exchange Pursuant to item 1.2 of the Protocol. The first e-thnge is to tab place in July 1989.- The signed Procedures are scoced hereto.
(Appendix 111)
During the course of the activities within the seven Working Groups, the US and US$R Co Chairmen met frequently to discuss matters relating to overall cooperation under the JCCCNR$ and in followup to the Memorandum of the Meeting in Moscow on December 5 5, 1988 grouped under the following appro(M 1). The discussion of these matters is priate headings:
1.
Conclusient and Reneifie Future Activities Within Individual Workina N
treuen Workina Creue 1 I
The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 1 are:
(a) The structure and philosophy of the Soviet nuclear power plant inspection progras, as constituted since 1944, are very similar to the US NRC program.
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e' (b) Because nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union are government owned and operated, the USSR philosophy of nuclear power plant regulation includes a degree of direct responsibility for plant safety.
(c) Working Group 1 discussed the methods and approaches of bott countr< es concerning the regulatory aspects of ensuring nuclear reactor safety: information was exchanged on the evaluation of operating events and inspection practices. The program for cooperat' on in 1990 was discussed.
Proposed future activities of Working Group 1 aret (a) Discuss results of the U$/ USSR inspector exchange program to identify additional future activities associated with the reactor inspection program.
(b) Discuss critoria for and indicators of safe operation, including quantitative perfomance indicators as well as-the more qualitative indicators used in the systematic assessment of licensee performance
($ ALP).
i (c) Discuss how inspectors evaluate overall plant safety on a day-to day basis, including the parameters and indicators reviewed to determine the plant safety status-(d) Discuss how regulations and requirements are changed and have changed as a result of the accumu,lation of experience, research results,.etc. Areas to be discussed include channes to the
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regulations (including the backfit process the 'ncorporation of national standards (e.g., ASME, IEEE, AN5th), the approval of license amendments, and changes to the reactor inspection manual.
(e) Discuss the emergency response function used during a major nuclear facility incident; in particular, the intersctions with other
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government agencias and industry groups.
(f) Discuss in greater detail the function and specific activities of 1
the Scientific Technical Safety Center that is affiliated with the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear power Safety (GAEN).
Workina Creue f The conclusions and rocessendations of Working Sroup 2 are:
(a) Both delegations recognize that the other has auch to offer.in tems of safety concents. A continuing dialog will contribute to the safety enhancement of reactors in both countries.
(b) Both delega'. ions felt that the time available to review the documer.iedon supplied was brief and that further dialog would be needed to better understand each other's design, i
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(c) Both delegations identified issues which need fwther s'aploration.
These issues were discussed briefly but considerably more time will be needed to fully explore them.
Proposed future activities of Working Group I are:.
(a) Mutual understanding of the US and U$5R regulations and guides (b) Participation by regulatory authorities as well as design organisations from both countries would be beneficial y( p Emergency Guidance for Operators / Design Features stat <on Blackout (p) ATWS analysis including the possibility of calculations
( )J Mid leep operation seismic design considerations t.( ) In depth containment study Future activities in the above areas will concentrate on identifying and discussing safety significant differences. Both sides will be prepared for this before scheduling the next meeting of this Working Group.
Preposals for the work plan of this Group will be examined at the October 1989 JCCCNR$ meeting.
WerHne Creue 3 The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 3 are:
(a) The US and USSR agree that radiation embri'.tlement is greater at icw temperatures, and that the flux level can have an important effect on the level of embrittlement. Soth'have develope.d trends for e
embrit.tlement.
(b) The primary variables are agreed to be m.terip.1 composition, flux anc fluence, and temperature. The influNt of neutron spectrum and flua levels is'not clearly delineated, brd further work is necessary. Cooperative efforts on flux level effect:, are enceuraged.
(c) The US has noted a strong effect of cerrte and nickel on attrittleitnt ca their Mo Ni steel nth a secondary effect c,f Phottherev., The U!SR has not
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'*19< ce cf Ph:'.phorous at Copper on their Cn Mo V sto.i and little or no effect of nickel.
Molybdenum has beneficial effect according to USSR research and some US research.
(d)
USSR research reports no gpparegt saturation of radiation t
embrittlement up to Sx10 n/cm.
(e) A large statistical data base is necessary in order to adequately predict safety of nuclear power plants, not just a few tests. The USSR emphasised that tests of decosatssioned reactor satorials are very important.
(f) US has shown good correlation of Drop Weight NDT witn Charpy Shifts in research programs. The correlation to J integral fracture toughness is very good for some compositions but is not yet found to be generally defined. The correlation between Charpy shifts and K shiftsisgenerallygoodbutcurrentuseofCharpyshiftsappears15 be inadequate fnr some cases.-
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I (g) The U$ dosimetry program has developed many tiench marks that permit prediction of flux and fluence to about 1015% accuracy. The US continues to report dJsimetry using an energy criterion of
- greater than 1 MeV,* and sor4 times on DPA (displacement per atos); and the USSR reports their dosimetry using an energy criterion of ' greater
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than 0.5 MeV," ar4 they always include DPA values.
3 (h) The US has described a large effort on embrittlement of reactor vessel supports. It is understood that because of different desigt.
considerations, the USSR does not believe they have an embrittlement problem for supports.
(1) Both the US and U$5R use DPA to help correlate radi: tion embrittlement, but do not use the same procedures. The working g-group proposes te exchange these procedures with a view toward presentations and discussion at a future WG 3 seating.
(j) The major U$ points on radiation damage mechanisms are as follows:
(1(2) Mn Mo steels embrittle due to yield stress increases
) Vield stress increases due to irradiation induced i
precipitation are reasonably consistent with theory e
(3)
Precipitation of Cu Mn Ni ferrite phases is accelerated by radiation enhanced diffusion (4) Copper nickel temperature flux fluence plus other variables interact to mediate embrittlement (5) ' matrix
- defe:y s) are enhanced by nickel but their character is not k%wn (6) Flux effects are important and low flux provides more embrittlement. Possible mechanisms have been identified but not' confirmed, and this leads to different extrapolated predictions (k) The USSR and US have conducted studies of annetHng recovery of embrittlen.ent of VVER-440 and US Pa'R reactor vessels over many years, specifically evaluating the factors of material composition (Cu, P, Ni) time, temperature, fluence, and effect of cyclic irradiation and annealing.
higher annealing temperatures.In general, more recovery is found for Both agree that a reasonably optimum for time is about 150 170 hours0.00197 days <br />0.0472 hours <br />2.810847e-4 weeks <br />6.4685e-5 months <br />.
(1) The US$R has found clear trends for annealing recovery as a function of a p content alone that are more closely tied to Cu and Ni content.the US has found trends for anneal (s) ThegSandU$gRfindthathighannealingtemperatures (460 C or 850 F) are technically feasible for service applications, and can result in recovery of 70 to nearly 2005, depending on the asterial composition.
(n) The USSR has conducted a very extensive program to evaluate factors important to annealing, has verified those factors in demonstration tests, has applied them to actual in place annealing of 5 vessels, and is completing 2 more at)this time. Annealings have been l
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conducted at 420 and 460% for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, with no less thari 705 recovery of properties to ensure normal operation of the plant.
They have verified the effect of the anneal through irradiation and anneal of control (surveillance) samples, and also by direct osasurements of hardness on the annealed vessel wall.
(o) The US$R has demonstrated the feasibility of annealing operating reactor vessels starting with the Novoveroneth 3 in 1987 and has returned all the plants to service, with no evidence of distortion er other degradstion to the plant. These annealings were conducted during normal periodic shutdowns.
(p) The USSR has found that reirradiation after annealing does not increase the rate of radiation embrittlement of reactor vessels
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after annealing. In eeneral angeoment with US findings, the USSR has found that annealing at 346 C does not ensure a lessened level of recovery of embrittlements thus, the wet annealing of reactor vessels cannot be reconnended.
l (q) The U$ has verbally offered an invitation to the USSR to participate, in the International Group on Radiation Damage Mechanisms in Finland in the fall of 1989, and the USSR has indicated a desire to accept.
In addition, the NRC will provide a copy of the charter and other background information on the study group.
o (r) Collaboration on the study of materials from decomissioned reactors was considered to be desirable. To be carefully explored is the possibility for scientists from both countries to participate in the i
studies conducted by the other, and to share the results of those l-collaborative studies.
(s) Using US equipment and instruments, joint programs might be conducted using materials which are directly cut from the reactor vessti of WER 440 (inc1:-'ng Novwon'e251) nuclear r er reactors, and from other irradiated.4terials. Shippingport materials are not being exa ined due to bu't.et limitations. The US will provide infor atten o, testing sia" !als from the Gundreamengen reactor vessel.
(t) The Ussr has offered cooperation and participation in their cooperative program with the German Democratic Republic and i
I Czechoslovakia on neutron dosimetry, using the zero power reactor facility at the Rex, Czechoslovakia Research center.
l (u) It is proposed that Working Group 3 undertake a specific objective to pool their knowledge in order to fors a comon basis for the understanding and conduct of reactor vessel annealing. Discussion of the information available for such a common basis could be a subject of discussion at the nort meeting of the Working Group 3.
Proposed future activities of Working Group 3 ares (a) Guidelines for the reports to be given at seelnar in Moscow in September / October 1990 5
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(1) Summing up of annealing experience for MR 440 reactor vessels I
and the methodology for determining radiation embrittlement of i
vessel metal after annealing.
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(2)
Non destructive including surveillance methods for monitoring metal (characteristics of reac) tor vessels du operation and after annealine.
(3) Tendency toward radiation em6rittlement of MR 1000 asterials (steel alloyed with nickel chromium 15x2NMFAA and its welded (4)- Aasear)ch on MR-440 reactor vessel esterial seams.
operating units.
(5) On the nature of radiation damage to reactor vessel materials and related factors.
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(4) Theoretical and experimental research of the thermodynamics applied to the problem of thermal shock in the reactor vessel.
(7)
Elastic plastic analysis of fracture mechanics of the embrittled reactor vessel with the goal of ensuring its 1
reliable operation.
Results of research of reactor vessel models.
(b) On the conduct of joint research on problems of radiation metallurgy and increasing operational reliability of reactor vessels and supports.
9 (1) Sum up and analyre the scientific and technical results
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obtained in the US and USSR on annealing irradiated materials and vesselst form into practical recommendations which could be used for reactor vessel annealing. -
(2) Using US instruments, carry out joint research programs on materials cut directly from the vessel of a VVER 440 reactor removed from operation.
irradiated mate'lals.
The programs would also examine other (3)
Participate in radiation damage}oint.research of neutron flux density on r of vessel materials and supports, including research conducted within the framework of international programs.
(4) Research on radiation embrittlement of cladding materials
. including chemical composition characteristics and other,
possible factors.
change in mechanical and corrosion characteristics of theInflu materials.
(5) Corrosive mechanical characteristics of base metal and the metal of the welded seam in coolant environment under the effect of ionizing radiation of varying intensity (6). Determination of vessel life time, especially as influanced by more precise elastic plastic fracture evaluations, research on thermal shock, and calculation of uncertainties in determining metal characteristics and the presence of defects, w
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4 tierkine traun 4 The conclusions and recomendation of Working Group 4 are:
(a) Fire safety is a very important part of nuclear power plant safety and therefore aust be an important part of plant design and operation.
(b) There are att11 aspects of nuclear plant fires that are highly oncertain with regard to their impact on safety and deserve further consideration. T%se primarily doal with the primary and secondary effects of fires on plant operation. They deal with system interaction under the effects of fire.
proposed future activitias for Working Group 4 are:
(a) Exchange information and explore opportunities for cooperative research on calculational models (COMP 8RN III) for fire propagation, the effects of water, smoke, and energy transport during fire fighting efforts, where and under what conditions fires start, and fire risk assessment methods.
(b) Exchange inforsation and experiences on backfitting fire prevention measures (i.e., penetration seals) on older nuclear plants.
(c)' Exchange new publications dealing with nuclear power plant fire safety issues and current regulatory documents that pertain to regulatory requirements for fire protection in nuclear power plants.
Concentration should be given to system interactions under the effects'of fire.
N) Determine the feasibility of exchanging information tnd proposing f'.tur6 v.optrativt rnc d on treatunt cf r,eismical'y.ind.... :'
fires; specifically, how fire fighting equipment is designed for seis & events.
(e) Exchange information on fire suppression methods and their effectiveness on energized electrical equipment.
(f) Exchange infonnation on fire brigade numerical strength and fire fighting equipment requirements at nuclear power plants.
(g) To study the possibility of having US and USSR teams inspect nuclear power plants in the area of fire safety in both the US and the USSR.
(h) Exchange information on various combustion phenomena to include experimental and modeline efforts on deflagration, deflagration to detonation transition (DOT)bein performed at the Kurchatov
, and detonation. This exchange is
- 1) USSR work inclusive of (dman and Dorofeev -and the All Union Research Institute (Fri Institute of Fire Protection (K khenko and Shebeko) on the effects of water sprays and aerosol on DDT and detonation, DDT modeling for I
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non uniform conditions and detonations and modeling results of investigations on flame (ac)celeration and DOT,2 US exper t
detonat< ons, and deflagrations. This Working Group will coordinate hydrogen work with Working Group 6.
(1) Consultation to investigate the feasibility of a joint cooperative program to perfore experiments at facilities in the USSR and US to investigate various combustion modes at high temperature, elevated pressure and in a steam environment. This would include the E
development of joint objectives, common data base, data reduction, modeling and the exchange of superts.
(j) Exchange information on development of models for transport and combustion of hydro practical purposes. gen and the application of these models for L
(k) Exchange information on high temperature zirconium oxidation modeling. Consultation to establish the feasibility of joint research, common objectives and data base, modeling and exchange of experts.
Workina Groun j The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 6 are:
(a) Both sides agreed that an important topic for future US USSR cooperation invelves the severe accident related phenomena and processes which determine the challenge and the loads (i.e.,
pressures, temperatures) to light water containments (PWRs/BWRs for theUS;VVERsfortheUSSR),r. The quantification of these loads is also utilized in Level !! r obabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs).
Initially the US USSR cooperative efforts will focus on the most important phenomena which are generic to both the containment types utilized in US and USSR. Ameng these phenomena are hydrogen deflagration / detonation, corium concrete interactions and corium water interactions. To address the above, we have agreed on the followlog program of work for the remainder of 1989 as well as 1990 and beyond:
(1) Interface iss1es between a Level ! and a Level-!! PRA (methods, app' oaches, in,9ertant issues.
Containment Event Trees and how they are utilized in Leve)l II PRAs (Quantifications (how kr,owledge of pha3omena is utilized how phenomena uncertainties sretakenintoaccount);anduseofEventTreestodevelop accident management erocedures). As part of this activity the US will make availabis to the USSR the second draft (to be i
i published in July Ig8g? of NUREG 1150 and the NRC contractor's reports developed for its support. The activity described under this item is proposed for Spring 1990 and is consistent with the intent of Protocol Item 6.ta.
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(t) Corium Concrete Interaction (Protocol Itos 6.tb)
Initial discussions and exchange cf information in the fall of 1989 will focus on the consequences of corium concrete interactions (i.e., how they affect the containment loads and also how they augment the radioactivity in the containment);
other issues to be addressed include corium relocation patterns, the formation of insulating crusts and corium debris bed coolability. This activity will be properly coordinated and integrated with the MACE program and the calculation and evaluation of the SURC-4 experiaant which the Soviets have agreed to take part in order to avoid any duplication. In the next US USSR meeting in which the status of analytical and experimental efforts will be discussed (and the status of current knowledge and understanding) an assessment will be maJe whether further joint US USSR cooperative efforts can be identified'and defined.
(3) Corium Water Interactions Even though a part of this issue (i.e., debris bed coolability) is to be addressed under activity (2 above, it is significant and broad enough to require special a)ttention.
This is proposed for fall 1989.
(4) Generation and Combustion (H, CD) Under Severe Accident 2
Conditions Both corium-concrete interactions and cortus coolant interactions produce C0 and H The issues to be addressed underthisactivitycouldincIu.de: 'overall mixing behavior (dynamic vs. quasi static); condensation processes inside a containment leading to high cc-t.stible concentratiens; deflagration / detonation and DDT limits under a variety of severe accident conditions and how they load a containment.
Tk se issues are listed in some more detail in Apperdix 1 to Working Group 6's Memorandum of Meeting. Assass whether future joint US USSR cooperative efforts (e.g., exchange of information, or some type of joint programs) are warranted and define specific areas (this could be better accomplished after a ' standard' probles has been defined and analyzed). This is proposed for Spring 1990.
(5) Even though issues associated with fission product releases during both design basis and severe accidents were dicitsed 4'.
great detail by both sides during this meeting, it was decided to explore further some specific issues such as the behavior of the various chemical forms of iodine. At a future meeting to be held in fall 1990 between US and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed about the nature and extent of this further exploration. As part of this activity the US will make available to the USSR published information on the behavior of fission products under severe accident conditions.
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(4) Because of the great interest expressed in filtration and venting during severe accidents, it was also decided to exchange information and continue to explore further the proposed bases for such systems as well as possible performance criteria. At a future meeting to be held in Spring 1990 l
between U$ and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed about the nature and extent of this area.
(7) Soth sides also agreed that it would be important to have teneral discussions, on an annual basis, which would cover the otal range of both the US and USSR aupported severe accident programs.
(8)-TheUSandtheUSSRwiliprepareadraftagreementconcerning the precise form and content of bilateral cooperation addresseo utder activities (1) through C7) above. This agreement should be a:scussed at the next Work < ng Group meeting (fall 1989) and l
finalized at the Working Group meeting to be held in the Spring of 1990.
Workine Groun 7 The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 7 are:
(a) The USSR noted that the schedule for meetings of Working Group 7.1 had been set for September 18 22, 1989 in Morcow and of Working Group 7.2 for September 25 28, 1989 in Kiev. The USSR.
provided the US with a listing of, USSR members of these grouss, structure of the work and list of topics. This is appended aereto.
(Appendix IV)
Workina creue a The conclusions and recommendations of Working Group 8 are:
(a) The major conclusion of this operational experience exchange is the need for continuing centralized reporting and review of events, with emphasis on collection of accurate and complete information, rigorous evaluation, and subsequent dissemination of information and lessons learned.
(b) The US and USSR data collection, analysis, and dissemination share many common technical aspects r and concerns, and similar goals.eporting thresholds, safety problems We have much to learn from each other..
(:) Maintain a close, direct contact in exchanging reactor operating experience reported through IRS reports for further understanding of lessons-learned from mutual operating experience.
(d) Share methods to identify safety significance of operating events and accident precursors, and assess approaches by reviewing mutual experience.
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s (e) We should have continuing.tochnical discussion of safety significant events and event classes.
Proposed future activities of Working Group 8 aret (a) plan another information exchange meeting in 1989 to discuss items of autual interest. The topics of interest to include:
(1) indicators of nuclear power plant safety with emphasis on esasures to monitor maintenance.
(!) implications of human factors on nuclear power plant safety.
(3) technical discussion of selected safety significant events or event classes.
(b) Plan a second meeting of the Working Group in 1990 to:
4 (1) discuss in depth. methods for identifying accident precursors.
(2) assess the effectiveness of feedback and dissemination of-operational experience.
(3) technical discussion of selected safety significant events or event classes.
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(c) Plan a third meeting of the Working Group in 1991 to review mttual* operational experience and analyses, g ne Groun 10 Preposed future aWvities of WorHe Group 10 are:
(a) A workshop is proposed to be held in Moscow, May 1990, covering the folio.dng topics:
(1) Improvement in the composition a'nd control of water chemistry in light water nuclear power plants.
(2) Corrosion product release and transport.
(3) Non destructive examination techniques for monitoring degradation of components due to erosion and corrosion.
(4) Study of alternative or new materials.to resist the.effests of erosion and corrosion.
A detailed agenda will be mutua11y' developed at a later date.
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(b) It was egreed that reciprocal visits to institutions, m erimental facilities and nuclear power' plant siter in 3g90 by US and USSR delegations would be beneficial to both sides. The visits could include up to approximately 30 people for two to three weeks.' Each side will submit proposed places to visit along with details of facilities, experiments and data to be seen or obtained. The times i
and dotatied arrangements for these visits should be agreed upon-within the next six sonths t
(c) Finally, it was agreed that there would be a mutual exchange of information, in the fem of published papers, and reports ' n the areas oft (2) Methods for determining degradation of piping due to corrosion tracking i
1 (2) Effects of corrosion on airconium al1oys (3) Methods and systems of control (including automated) of corrosion and erosion of nuclear power p ant components.
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2.
Suneented Tenien for Future Workino Crauen Additional topics were examined for consideration by the JCCCNRS at its next meeting tentatively scheduled for October 1989 in the US. These topics were:
(a) Plant Aging and Life Fxtension The US.noted that this subject was already an area of eghasis by the NRC and by US industry.
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Safety Co'cepts 4r the Next Generation of Nuclear Power Plants.
(b) n The U$ noted tk.at this area encompassed work by US industry, the Department of Energy, and the NRC.
Discussion centered on constraints in this area such as proprietary data.
(c) Methods to Incorporate Effects of Pressure Vessel Embrittlement into Plant Operating and Control Procedures. Both US and USSR agreed this was an area of somewhat narrow scope but would require a separate working group.
3.
Cent sharine Procram en thernoby1 The U$$R Co Chairman noted he was developing a preliminary proposal in this are.. The U$ noted that any US response would await details of this preposal as well as the estimates of cost involved. Were the US to
. agree on any parts of this proposal, cooperation with other international partaers would be treated outside the US USSR Protocol which is a tilateral agreseen't.
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U11R Partteinatian < n Themhydraulie Research hv Joinina the 4.
' nternational fade a ttnetement Procram flCAP)
The USSR expressed interest in participating in ICAP under which the US provides thermal hydraulic codes in return for an assessment of the codes, or infomation in kind from research fres the receiving country.
The U$ will work to obtain necessary approvals for the partic< pation so A
that it can be considered at the next JCCCNR$ meeting in October 1989.
visit of U$ thermal hydraulic experts to the facility at Electrogorsk was The U$ noted that conducting code assessment involves at discussed.
least I engineers full time. This research cooperation will be subject o
to US export requirements due to computer involvement.
111111 During the course of these meetings, several working group participants visited US nuclear power plants. Representatives from Working Group 4 Workinti Group 8 and Working Group 10 visited the North Anna facility in Virgin <a on June 8.
Representatives of Working Group 6 visited the Three j
Mile Island 2 facility in pennsylvania on June 8.
Lastly.
i representatives of Working Group 2 will visit the South Texas facility in l
Texas on June 12. The Co Chairmen feel that these visits add great value l
to these cooperative exchanges among the specialists of both countries.
- 6., Meetina with us industry and Other US Non Governmental Oraanizations i
On Friday, June 9. the JCCCNRS Co Chairmen and Working Group Leaders met with members of the US industry and other non-governmental organizations.
The working groups sumarized their activities, and followup sessions were held by each working firoup to allow members of US industry and other non governmental organizat< ons and the members of the working groups to identify and pursue areas of mutual interest with potential industry participation. A list of US industry and other non governmental organizations who were represented is appenced hereto.
(Appendix V) 7.
%rt Meetira efXCCHS Following the ' Record of the Eighth Meeting of the US/ USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in the peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy" which was signed in the Soviet Union on Nay 26, 1989, the Co Chairmen of the US/US$R JCCCNRS have agreed to prepare both detailed proposals for their 1990 programs and general summaries of program direction for 1991 at the second meeting of the JCCCNR$ which they agree will be in the United States during the sonth of October 1989. Lnformation on any further proposals in this meeting will be exchanged between JCCCNR$ Co-Chalmen in August 1919.
8.
Pavnent Polig Additional 1), that same record of the 8th JCM also addressed the sending side payment policy. Both Co Chairmen adopt the guidance of that policy and they wili consider innovative approaches for financing equitable and 1
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_ __ _.7 balanced assignments in developing their 1990 work programs, summarize associated exceptions to the send'ng side payment policy, and provide t
their findings to the Joint Comittee at the Ninth Meeting in 1990.
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conclusten The US and U$5R Co Chalmen of the JCCCNR$ believe that the exchange of information was both useful and beneficial to both sides. They look forward to the continued efforts of the individual working groups.
Further, they anticipate reviewing progress at the next meeting of the JCCCNRS, which, as previously noted, is scheduled for October 1989 in the US.
June 9, 1989 FOR THE US NUCLEAR REGULATORY FOR THE USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR COMMIS$10N THE UTILIZAT N OF ATOMIC ENERGY i
-_' W h a.- s M. Taylor f'
Nikol Co. Chairman of JCCCNR$
USSR'fi N. Ponomarev.5tepnot Co Chairman of JCCCNRS 0 9. 0 S, $ $
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APPENDIX 1 I
LIST OF MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUPS AND ALL OTHER US USSR PARTICIPANTS
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U.S./U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Cosmittee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS)
June 198g Rockville, Maryland, U.S.A.
U.S. Participants Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chaiman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
JCCCNR$ Co-Chairman James M. Taylor Deputy Executive Director for Nucle e Reactor Regulation,RegIonalOperationsandResearch,NRC,andU.S.Co-Chairman of the JCCCNRS JCCCNR$ Nembers James H. $nferek, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Themis P. Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issues Re.olution Office of l
Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC l
Edward L. Jordan, Director, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Sol Rosen, Director, International Nuclear Program Division, Office of Nuclear Energy, Department of Energy (DOE) l JCCCNR$' Advisors Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Governmental and Public Affairs (GPA) NRC (Senior Advisor to JCCCNRS) l JamesR.Shea, Director,InternationalPrograms,GPA,NRC(U.S. Executive i
Secretary of JCCCNRS)
Theodore Wilkinson, Director Office of Nuclear Enerfly Technology, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scient'fic Affairs, Department of State l
Andrew Reynolds, Peaceful Uses Agreement Executive Secretary. Office r,f International Research and Development Policy, DOE 1
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Other Particioants 4
Edward C. Shomaker, Senior Project Manager U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, International Programs Office of GovernmentalandPublicAffairs(SPA /IP)
James W. Clifford; R ional Coordinator Regional Operations staff Office of the Deputy ecutive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research Stephen N. Salomon, Technical Analyst,PU.S.. Soviet Cooperation on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, SPA /I Sordon Fowler, International Relations Specialist, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety, SPA /IP Ellen Brouns, International Relations Assistant / Typing, International Policy and Reactor Sefety Cooperation, SPA /IP Michael K. Launer, Contract Interpreter, Department of Modern Languages, Florida State University Workino Grouo 1. Safety Acoroaches and Regulatory Practices Co-Leaders:
Charles E. Rossi, Director, Division of Operational Events Assessment. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC el
- Frederick' J. Hebdon, Chief, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis Staff Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, KRC Other
Participants:
Patrick W. Baranowsiry, Events Assessment Branch Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear, Division of Reactor Regulation, NRC Charles J. Haughney, Chief, special Inspections Branch, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC
$ 6 art D. Rubin, Chief. Diagnostic Evaluation and Incident t
invesd;: tion Branch Division of Operational Assessment. Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data NRC James W. Shapaker, Technical Assistant Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office cf Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Milton B. Shyolock, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects, RegionII(Atlanta),NRC 2
e
Eric 1. Weiss, Chief Operations Officer Section, Incident Response Branch, Division of dperational Assessment Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC t
Oleg Volkonsky, Interpreter, Language Ser/ ices, Department of State Narris Coulter, Interpreter, Language Se' vices, Department of State Working Group 2. Analysis of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.S.5.R. and tne U.S.
g Co.Leadert Ashok C. Thadant, Assistant Director for Systems, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Other
Participants:
Marvin W. Hodges, Chief, Reactor Systems 8 ranch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC
=
of Engineering and Systems Technology,ctor Systems Branch, Division Timothy E. Collins, Section Chief Rea Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Jack Kudrick, Section Chief, Plant Systems Branch Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor lation, NRC
~
,ominic Tondi, Section Chief. Electrical Systems Branch, Division of
'ngineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor
,.io tiun, h.,C Mark P. Rubin, Technical Assistant, Assistant Director for Systems, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reauor Regulation, NRC Jose t.. Calvo, Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Operttional Event Assessments, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC George Sege, Senior Task Manager, Reactor and Plant Safety Issues tranch, Division of Safety Issue Resolution Research, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Kenneth A. Raglin, Director, Technical Training Center, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NitC Wayne Lanning, Chief, Events Assessment Branch, Division of Operational Events Assessment. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC 3
\\
l Igor Kozak, Interpreter, Laoguage Services, Department of State l
Joseph Morur, Interpreter, Language Services Department of State l
Workino Grovo 3. Radiation Embrittloment of the Housinn and Succort structure anc annea nno of sne nous'no l
Co-Leaders i-Guy A. Arlotto Director, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC l
Other
Participants:
Ching-Yao Cheng, Chief, Materials Engineering Branch Engineering and Systems Technolosy, Office o' Nuclear, Division of Reactor Regulation NRC
]
Barry J. Elliot, Senior' Materials En ineer, Materials Enhffice of
}
ineerin Branch, Division of Engineering and ystems Technology, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Robert A. Nermann, Section Leader, Materials En Division of Engineering and Systems Technology,gineering Branch, J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Samson S. Lee, Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Michael E. Mayfield, Senior Materials Engineer Naterials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Pryor N. Randall, Senior Materials Engineer, Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Charles Z. Serpan, Chief, Materials Engineering Branch Di Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRd vision of Alfred Taboada, Senior Materials Engineer ' Materials inpineering Researc,h, NRCDivision of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regu atory Branch Keith R. Wichman, Section Leader, Materials Engineering Branch Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nucle,ar Reactor Regulation, NRC Richard D. Cheverton, (Consultant), Program Manager, Pressure Vessel Technology Section, Engineering Technology Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) 4
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Leader, Radiation Shielding and Francis B.K. Kas, (Consultant), Telecommunication division, ORNL Dosimetry Group, Computing and Randy K. Nanstad, (Consultant). Leader, Fracture Mechanics Group, MetalsandCeramicsDivision,dRNL William E. Pennel, (Consultant), Manager, NS$T Program, Engineering' Technology Division, ORNL l
Jan R. Hawthorne (Consultant),MaterialsEngineeringAssociates, Inc., Lanham, Ma land John J. Houstrup.l Mountain Tennessee (Consultant), Professional Eng Consultant, Signa G. Robert Odette,lifornia(Consultant), Professor, University of Californi Santa Barbara, Ca PaulG.Shewmon,(Consultant), Professor,OhioStateUniversity, Colustus, Ohio, Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Paul C.S. Wu, Nuclear safety Technology Division, Office of Safety Approach, Department of Energy Natalie Latter, Interpreter Language Services, Department of State John Glad, Interpreter, Language Services Department of State Workino Group 4. Fire Safety L
Co-Leader l
Brian W. Sheron, Director, Division of Syste:n Research, Of f.ce of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC j
Other
Participants:
Gary R. Burdick, special Assistant, Office of Nuclear Regulatory
-Research, NRC Ivan Catton, Member, Advisory Cosmiittee on Reactor Safeguards, NRC Dennis J. Kubicki, Fire Protection Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Carlyle Michelson, Vice chairman, Advisory Committee on, Reactor Safeguards, NRC David P. Notley, Fire Protection Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC 1
Frank J. Witt, Chemical Engineer, Office of Nuclear Reactor
,, Regulation, NRC 5
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i l
Patricia -R. Worthington, Senior Chemist, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC (Consultant), Member Te Steven P. Nolan,fety Assessment Division,chnical Staff Adverse Environmental Sa Sandia National Laboratory I-Thomas A. Storey, (Consultant) Fire Protection Engineer, Science Applications International Corporation
\\
Vladimir Klimenko, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State Evgeinni Ostrovsky, Interpreter,, Language Services, Department of State Workino Group 6. Severe Accidents i
l Co-Leader:
l Themis P. Speis, Deputy Director for Generic Issues Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Other
Participants:
I Timothy S.'Margulies Risk Applications Branch, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Ralph 0..Meyer, Leader Accident Phenomenology Section, Accident Evaluation Branch, Division of Systems Research, Office of Nuclear j.
Regulatory Research, NRC I
l Denwood F. Ross, Jr., Deputy Director for Research, Office of l-Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC l
Brian W. Sheron Director, Division of Systems Research, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Leonard Soffer Leader..Section A, Severe Accident Issues Branch, Division of Safety Issues Resolution, Office of Nuclear Regulatory l'-
Research, NRC Thomas S. Kress,-(Consultant), Manager, Severe Accident Programs, ORNL l
Dana A. Powers, (Consultant). Supervisor, Severe Accident.
.Phenomenology, Sandia National Laboratories Kyrill Borissow, Interpreter, Language Services Department of State Galina Tunik, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State 6
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V Workino Group 8. Exchance of Operational Experience
)
Group Co-Leader:
Thomas M. Novak',luation of Operational Data, NRC Director Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Eva Other
Participants:
Edward L. Jordan, Director Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Clemens J. Heltames, Jr.l Data NRCDeputy Director Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operationa Earl J. Brown, Reactor Systems Section Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and i
Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC i
Sec' tion Chief, Trends and Patterns Section Trends Robert L. Denniglysis Branch, Division of Safety Programs, OIfice of j
and Patterns Ana Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC Jack R. Rosenthal, Chief, Reactor Operations and Analysis Branch Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC i
Mark H. Williams, Chief, Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch,
~'
Division of Safety Programs, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operat'ional Data, NRC Gary Mays, (Consultant). Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee Vladimir A. Goldgor, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of l
State l
Nicholas Berkoff, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of l
State Workino Group 10. Erosion-Corrosion Destruction of Pipino and Components Co-Leader:
James E. Richardson, Assistant Director for Engineering Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Aeactor Regulation, NRC Other
Participants:
l Conrad E. McCracken, Chief, Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC 7
e Alfred Taboada Materials Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, NRC Frank J. Witt, Chemical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and Systems Technology, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Carl.J. Crajkowski (Consultant) Department of Nuclear Energy, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York PeterGriffith,(Consultant), Professor Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of De>artment of Mechanical Tecinology, Can6 ridge, Massachusetts John P. Houstrup,l Mountain, Tennessee (Consultant), Professional Eng Consultant, signa Wilmington,6e(laware Otakar Jonas Consultant), Professional Engineer, Jonas, Inc.,
William J. Shack, logy Division, Argonne National L$boratory, (Consultant),AssociateDirector Materials and l
Components Techno 1
Argonne, Illinois l
Paul C.S. Wu, Nuclear 3nfety Techrtology Division, Office of Safety Appraisals, Department of Energ>
l Irena Firsow, Interpreter, Langu, age Services, Department of State
- ]
Dimitri Zarachnak, Interpreter, Language Services Department of i
State j
l U.S.S.R. Participants JCCCNRS Co-Chairman Nikolai N. Ponomarev-Stepnoy, First Deputy Director, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy-JCCCNR$ Member
- Alexander T. Gutsalov, Head, Main Scientific and Engineering Department, i
U.S.S.R. State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety Other Particioant Alexander N. Gavrishin, Interpreter, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy i
l 8
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Workinc Group 1. Safety Approacher. and Regulatory Practices o
Co-Leader:
- Alexander T. Gutsalov, Head, Main Scientific and Engineering Department, U.S.S.R. State Connittee for the Supervision of Nuclear PowerSafety(GAEN)
. 0ther
Participants:
Anatoly T. Mazalov, Deputy Head, Main Operations Department, GAEN (June 5-7)
Mikhail !. Miroshnitchenko, Head, Core Physics Division, GAEN (June 5-7)
Working Group 2. Analysis of the~ Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the U.5.5.R. and U.5.
Co-Leader:
- Gleb L. Lunin, Division Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Other
Participants:
- Sergei A. Astakhov, Researcher, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic, e-Energy
- Valentin 6. Fedorov, First Deputy General Designer, Hydropress Design' Bureau
- Nikolay S. Fil, Division end, Hydropress Design Bureau
'Makhail L._Klonitski, Head, Architecture and Design Bureau, AtomenergoprojectInstitute(June 5-7)
- Boris K. Maltsev,InstituteHead Technological Systems Division, Atomenergoproject Igor S. Mino, Head, Thermal and Mechanical Monitoring Division.
Atomenergoproject Institute (June 5-7)
'Gennady A. NovikovInstitute (June 5 Y) Chief Project Engineer, Atomenergop E
- Sergei M. Tax, Chief Project Engineer, Atomenergoproject Institute
- Viatcheslav G. Sadtchikov, Chief Specialist, Fuels and Energy Bureau,'U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers e
9
______________-______-_________.m...
Working Group 3. Radiation Embrittlement of the Housing and Support Itructure ano Annealino of tne Housino Co-Leader:
Amir D. Anaev Head of laboratory, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Other
Participants:
Alexander M. Krukov. Head of Group, Kurchatov' Institute of Atomic Energy (June 5-7)
Sergei K. Morozov, Head of Department, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Vladimir A. Nikolaev, Head of Laboratory. Prometey Machinery Institute Complex (June 5-7)
Workino Group 4. Fire Safety Co-Leader:
AlexanderYa,Koroitchenko,Dep(June 5-7) uty Director, All-Union Research Institute for Fire Protection-0ther
Participants:
a oly K. Mikeev, Head, Main Fire Department, Ministry of
~
Working Group 6. Severe A'ecidents Co-Leader:-
- 01eg Ya. Shah, Deputy Division Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Other
Participants:
- Vladimir A. Payshuk Head of Division, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy
- Evgenyi G. Basansky, Head of Laboratory, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Dperations ry
. Fedulov, Head of Radiation Safety Division,' Scientific a
10
Working Group 8. Exchange of Operational Experience Co-Leader:
- Vladimir M. Vitkov, Division Head, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Other
Participants:
- stanislav A. Lesnoy, Director, Research Center, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear. Power Plant Operations Viktor A. Kotchanov, Head of Laboratory, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations (June 5-7)
Working Group 10. Erosion-Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components Co Leader:
- Ivan A. Stepanov, Division Head, Research and Design, Institute of Power Technology Other
Participants:
- Vladimir G. Kritski, Head of Laboratory, Power Technology Institute (June 5-7)
Bulat I. Nigmatulin, Division JIead, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclea,r Power Plant Operations (June 5-7)
- Alexander A. Tutnov,. Head of Laboratory, Kurchatov 'attitute of Atomic Energy
- Notes:
The eight Soviets marked with.an asterisk (*) visited the South Texas
. Project on Monday, June 12.
The five Soviets marked with a double asterisk (**) visited the 'lorth Anna Nuclear Power Station on Thursday, June 8.
The four Soviets marked with a triple asterisk (***) visited the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station on Thursday, June 8.
e 9
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APPENDIXll 9
MEMORANDA Of tiEETINGS OF THE SEVEN WORKING GROUPS 6.
9 4
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6
MEMORANDUM 0F MEETING WORKING SROUP 1 SAFETY APPROACHES AND REGULATORY PRACTICES The main topics covered by the USSR and US participants included the following:
1.
Operating Events Assessment US participants discussed.the regulations of the US governing the reporting of operating events at nuclear facilities and the role of the regulatory organization in analyzing reported matters. The discussion focused on the short-tern evaluetion of significant events and problems that are reported to Headquarters, with 1a regional perspective on the followup effort provided by region based and onsite inspectors, and on the evaluation of industry reports of defects and noncompliance with NRC regulations.
USSR participants discussed their procedure for responding to events at nuclear power plants which result in a reactor shutdown. The functional relationship of onsite inspection groups, the District and Headquarters organizations of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear power Safety (Gosatomenergonadzor (GAEN)) and the USSR Ministry of Atomic Energy was explained.
2.
Communication of Safoty Concerns to,the Industry US participants discus;ed the NRC's practices for alerting all nuclear facilities of safety concerns steming from an operating event or problem at a facility. Tne genesis and preparation of Information Notices.
80 'rtins and Generic letters were discussed, including licensee mions to inform the NRC of actions taken in response to generic comunications and/or. document actions taken for subsequent verification
" nugn the inspection process.
USSR participants discussed how the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) informs operating reactor facilities-of events or situations having generic applicability through the issuance of two types of information letters. One type of information letter informs, whereas the second type not only informs but broadly defines what action must-be taken by one or more reactor facilities to achieve resolution to a probles.
In-discussing this process, a paper was presented concernin a situation involving a positive temperature coefficient of reactivity n WER-1000 reactors.. The USSR participants also discussed a situation which arose concerning defects in the steam generators of WER-1000 reactors. The USSR side then described the~ actions taken to eliminate these situations.
WG1-1 e
e
y
- 3.
Reactor Inspection Program US participants discussed the str'ucture and philosophy of the NRC's Reactor Inspection Program, including a regional perspective on program implementation. Through direct observation and verification the NRC 1
determines whether a plant is being operated safely, whether plant management is effective, and whether regulatory requirements are being satisfied.
USSR participants broadly described th9 reactor inspection program administered by the USSR State Cosmittee (GAEN). The inspectien program provides for the conduct of planned inspections at periodic intervals (inclucir.g a comprehensive inspection conducted triennially, and the
[
conduct of unscheduled inspections in response to operating) events or i
identified problems.
4.
- Assessment of Facility Management US participants discussed the purpose and use of the NRC's program for the systematic assessment of licensee perfomance (SALP), including a L
regional perspective on the implementation of the SALP program. The application of SALP results in establishing site specific master inspection plans was discussed, and the role of the semi-annual Senior Management Meeting in identifying facilities that warrant closer scrutiny was also addressed.
USSR participants discussed the organizational structure for the management of nuclear power plant operations, and the corresponding supervisory levels engaged in the inspection = and assessment of management performance.,The USSR also discussed the functional aspects of this--
supervision.
"e major conclusions of Working Group 1 are:
m (a) =The structure and philosophy of the USSR nuclear power plant inspection
' progrem - as constituted since 1984,.are very similar to the NRC program.
'(b) Because nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union are state owned and L
operated, the USSR philosophy of nuclear power plant regulation includes a degree of direct responsibility for plant safety.
The major recommendations of Working Group 1 are:
(a) Working Grou31 discussed the methods and approaches of both countries concerning tse regulatory aspects of ensuring nuclear reactor safety; information was exchan inspection practices. ged on the evaluation of operating events and The program for cooperation in 1990 was discussed.
Thc Working Group leaders from both the US and USSR feel that the discussions were useful and informative, and express the hope for further successful cooperation within the Working Group.
WG1-2 h
A'.
Proposed future activities of Working Group 1 are as follows:
(a) Discuss results of the US/ USSR inspector exchange program to identify additional future activities associated with the reactor inspection program.
(b) Discuss criteria for and indicators of safe operation, including Quantitative performance indicators as well as the acre qualitative
' ndicators used in the systematic assessment of licensee performance i
($ ALP).
(c) Discuss how inspectors evaluate overall plant safety on a day to day basis, including the parameters and indicators reviewed to to determine the plant safety status.
(d) Discuss how regulations and requirements are changed and have changed as a result of the accumulation of experience, research results, etc. Areas to be discussed include changes to the regulations (including the backfit process), the incorporation of national standards (e.g., ASME, IEEE, ANS'), the approval of license amendments, and changes to the reactor inspection manual.
(e) Discuss thJ emergency response function used during a major nuclear facility incident; in particular the interactions with other government agen,cies and industry groups.
(f) Discuss in greater. detail the function and specific activities of the Scientific Technical Safety Center that is affiliated with the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN), and how similaractjvitesareaccomplishedintheUS.
WG1-3 E
e
Appendix 1 US Participants in the Second Meeting of Working Groups of the Joint Coordi-nating Comittee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS) f June 5 9,1989 Washington, D.C.
Working Group 1 Safety Acereaches and Raoulaterv Practican Co Le'ader:
Rossi, Charles E.
Director Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear, Reactor Regulation, US Nuclear Regulatory Coenission Hebdon, Frederick J., Chief, Inspection and Licensing Program Branch, Program Management, Policy Development and Analysis staff, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Other
Participants:
US Nuclear Regulatory Comission Baranowsky, Patrick W., Events Assessment Branch, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Naughney, Charles J., Chief, Special Inspections Branch, Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Rubin, Stuart D., Chief, Diagnostic Evaluation and Incident Investigation Brrnch, Division of Operational Assessment, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data Shapaker, Japs W., Technical Assistant, Division of Operational Events Assessment, Difice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Shymiock, Milton B., Section Chief. Division of Reactor Pro.iects, Region II (Atlanta)
Weiss. Eric W., Chief, Operations Officer Section, Incident Response
- Branch, Division of Operational Assessment, gfor Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data WG1-4 I
I' o
e Ap~pendix2 USSR Participants in'the Second Meeting of Working Groups of the Joint Coordinating Committee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety (JCCCNRS).
June 5 9,1989 Washington, D.C.
Working Group 1 Safetv Anereachen and Roaulaterv Practican Co Leader: Gutsalov, Alexander T., Head, Main Scientific and Engineering Department, USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (EAEN)
Other participants:
Mazalov, Anatoly T., Deputy Head, Main Operations Department, USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN)
Miroshnitchenko, Mikhail f., Head, Core Physics Division, USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) e WG1-5 l
l
--.. - - -.. =. -
Appendix 3 Additional documents exchanged during the Working Group I topic discussions
'are noted below.
1.
Documents US participants provided to the Soviets for the first time during the session discussions:
(a) Undated paper entitled 'NRC Review of Operating Events.' This paper describes the NRC's program for evaluating operating events at nuclear power plants and for responding to significant events and issues.
(b) Copy of the report of the Emergency Operational Procedures (EOP)
Inspection performed at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, and forwarded to the licensee by letter dated August 10, 1988.
(c) Copy of the report of the Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) performed at the Cooper Nuclear Station, and forwarded to the licensee by letter dated September 22, 1987.
(d) Copy of the Diagnostic Evaluation Team report for the Fermi Atomic Power Plant, dated November 1988.
2.
Documents USSR participants provided ;o the US for the first time during the session discussions:
(a) ' Decree on the State Committee der the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety,GAEN, Moscow (1988)
(b) " Instructions on the Supervision of Safety During Operation of Nuclear Power Plants," GAEN, Moscow (1986)
(c) " Rules and Standards in Nuclear Power: Guidelines for Investi and Reporting Violations in Operating Nuclear Power Stations," gating Moscow (July 1, 1987)
GAEN,.
(d) State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety, "Infor-nation and Cammentary" (Newsletter), GAEN, Moscow (April 1989)
WGI-6 e
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1
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-WEMOR$DUM0FMEETING WORKING GROUP 2
~
ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY'0F NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN THE USSR AND US The main topics covered by USSR and US participants include:
1.
Safety Philosophy for Nuclear Power Plant Design and Operation. Both the L
USSR and the US summarized the safety philosophy governing design and operation of nuclear power plants. The US presentation addressed defense in depth, accident prevention and mitigation, the licensing process, types of standards applied, the scope of NRC review,- use of Technical Specifications, and NRC safety Evaluation Reports. The USSR presentation addressed safety improvements designed into Rovno, design 1
according to USSR national standards, use of 1/ne ceterministic approach L
in design, desi p criteria,~ design tra.sients and accidents, and ideas l
under consideration for future designs. There were numerous questions l.
from both delegations regarding emergency procedures and operator actions
.during the course of an accident or transient.
Of special. interest is the difference in philosophy, and consequently piant design, for operator response to plant transient conditions.
2.
General. Arrangement of reference plant. The US presented the site location and general site arrangements of the South Texas plant.
Photographs of the site and its surroundings were shown. The USSR presented.the general site arrangement for Rovno and a vertical cross section of the plant. There was a discussion of siting and design 3
considerations such as population density, proximity to hazards, and seismicity; 3.
Safety System Functional, Design and Capabilities. Both delegations i
l presentec.ie ' scope and functional design of :.ajor piant systems. System design criteria'in such areas as design margin, single failure capability, and defense-in-depth were highlighted. Specific topics dis-cussed in considerable detail included: 1) Reactor Protection System;-
- 2) Normal and: Emergency AC/DC power; 3) Containment design and-capabilities; 4). Steam generator; 5) ECCS, and; 6) Emergency Feedwater System. The USSR delegation also presented and discussed the Service
. Water System. Highlights of the discussions included:
- 1) Extensive discussion of station blackout, ATWS, Intersystem LOCA, and Feed and Bleed capability; 2) An indication by the USSR participants that the sensors.used for safety system functions do not have control systems functions.in:the ROVN0 design; 3) The USSR discussed their experiences with primary-to-secondary system leaks in the steam generators, and the US described steam generator tube rupture experience; and 4) Differences in ECCS design were noted although both Countries use nearly identical
~
criteria.
WG2-1 L'
~.
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__ ~
4.-
Reactor Design. Both delegations presented peneral descriptions of the two reactor designs and noted strong similer' ties.
The US design.has additional pressure relief capability (by PORVs); the USSR noted desig" modification in this regard for their plants.
5.
Transient and Accident Assessments. Both delegations provided discussions on safety limits and the scope of transient and accident analysis as used in plant design. Both countries use similar methods and p
criteria to evaluate similar events.
The maior conclusions are:
1.
Both delegations recognize that the other has such to offer in terms of safety concepts. A continuing dialog will contribute to the safety enhancement of reactors in both countries.
t 2.
Both delegations felt that the time available to review the documentation supplied was inadequate and that further dialog would be needed to better L
understand each other's design.
3.
Both delegations identified issues which need further exploration. These issues were discussed briefly but considerably more time will be needed to fully explore them.
Both delegations agreed to consider the following issues for future discussions. Future communication would be.necessary to develop a detailed agenda for the next meeting in the Soviet Union.
1.
1l' 1.
' Mutual understanding of the US and the USSR regulations and guides.
. 2.
- Participation by regulatory authorities as well as design organizatiens from both countries would be beneficial.
3.
Emergency guidance for Operators / Design Features.
. 4.
Station Blackout.
l 5.
ATWS analysis including the possibility of calculations.
1 L
6.
Seismic design considerations.-
- 7.
Mid-loop operation 8.
In-depth containment study 4
WG2-2
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~~ ~"
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Appendix 1 Participants
}l133:
Lunin, Gleb L.
Astakhov, Sergei A. Fedorov, Valentin G. Fil, _ Nikolay S.
Klonitski, Makht l L. Maltsev, Boris K. Mino, Igor S. Novikov,,-
i Gennady A. Tax, Sergei M. Sadtchikov, Viatcheslav G.
All:
Thadani, A.
Hodges W. Collins, T. Kudrick, J. Tondi, D.. Rubin, M. Calvo, J. Sege, G. Ragland,. K. Lanning, W.
m.
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t,-
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Appindix 2 MateriaisExchanged 1)
Viewgraphs of presentations by both delegations 2)
Additional information requests by both delegations 4
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MEMORANDUM 0F MEETING WORKING GROUP 3 RADIATION EMBRITTLEMENT OF THE PRESSURE VESSEL AND i
SUPPORT STRUCTURE AND ANNEALING 0F THE VESSEL E
The main topics covered by USSR and US participants included:
1.
Embrittlement Trends and Variables 2.
Embrittlement in thick sections and application to structures 3.
Embrittlement and radiation damage mechanisms F
4.
Vessel surveillance programs and embrittlement regulations 5.
Annealing, recovery and post annealing reenbrittlement trends 6.
Application and system considerations, and annealing experience L
The major conclusions are:.
3.
The US and USSR agree that radiation embrittlement is greater at low temperatures, and that-the flux level can have an important affect on the level of embrittlement. Both have developed trends for embrittlement.
l'
- 2.. The primary variables are agreed to be material composition, flux and fluence, and temperature. The influence of neutron spectrum and flux levels is not clesrly delineated, and further work is necessary.
Cooperative, efforts on flux level effects are encouraged.
3.
The US has noted a strong ef.fect of. copper.and nickel on embrittlement on their Mn Mo Ni, steel with a secondary effect of Phosphorous. The USSR has noted a~ strong influence of Phosphorous and Copper on their Cn Mo V steel and little or no effect of nickel. Molybdenum has beneficial effect according to USSR ruearch and some US research..
4.
USSR.reseagh'repgrts no apparent saturation of radiation embrittlement
'up to=5x10 n/cm
- 5. - A large statistical data base is necessary in order to adequately predict safety of nuclear power plants, not just a few tests. The USSR emphasized that tests of decomissioned reactor materials ex very important..
6.
US has shown good correlation of Drop Weight NDT with Charpy Shifts in research programs. The correlation to J integral fracture. toughness is very good for some compositions but is not yet found to be generally
- defined. The correlation between Charpy Shifts and K shifts is generally good but current use of Charpy Shifts appeak to be inadequate for some cases.
7.
The US dosimetry program has developed many benchmarks that permit prediction of flux and fluence to about 10-15% accuracy. The US con-
~ tinues to report dosimetry using an energy criterion of ' greater than 1 MeV," and sometimes includes DPA (displacement per atom); and the USSR reports their dosimetry using an energy criterion of " greater than 0.5 MeV," and they always include DPA values.
WG3-1 s.
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8.- The US has described a large effort on embrittlement of reactor vessel supports.
It is understood that'because of different design considerations, the USSR does not believe they have an embrittlement problem for supports.
9.
Both the US and USSR use DPA to help :orrelate radiation embrittlement, but do not use the same procedures. The working group proposes to exchange these procedures, with a view toward presentations and discussion at a future WG 3 seating.
- 10. The major US points on radiation damage mechanisms are as follows:
o 6.7-Mo steels embrittle due to yield stress increases o
Vieid stress increases due to irradiation induced precipitation are reason 0bly consistent with theory o
Precipintion of Cu-Mn Ni-ferrite phases is accelerated by radiation
. enhanced diffusion Copper nickel-temperature flux-fluence plus other variables interact to mediate embrittlement o
'aatrix" defect (s) are enhanced by nickel but their character is not known Flux effects are important and low flux provides more embrittlement.
o Possible mechanisms have been identified but not specified - lead to different extrapolated predictions
- 11. The USSR and US have conducted studies of annealing recovery of embrittlement of VVER-440 and US PWR reactor vessels over many years, specifically evaluating the factors of, material composition (Cu, P, Ni) time, temperature, fluence, and effect of cyclic irradiation and annealing.
In general, more recovery is found for higher annealing temperatures. Both agree that a reasonably optimum for' time is about-150-170 hours.
. 12. The USSR has found clear trends for annealing recovery as a function of a -
P content alone; the US has found trends for annealing recovery that are more closely tied-to Cu and Ni content.-
- 13. The gS and U$gR find that high annealing temperatures (460 C or 850 F) are technically feasible for service applicai. ions, and can result in recovery of 70 to nearly 100%,. depending on the meterial composition.
- 14. The USSR has conducted a very extensive program to evaluate factors important to annealing, has verified those factors in demonstration tests, has applied them to actual in-place annealing of 8 vessels, and is completgng2moreatthistime. Annealings have been conducted at 420 and 460 C for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, with no less than 70% recovery of properties to.
ensure normal operation of the plant. They have verified tie effect of the annell through irradiation and anneal of control (surveillance) samples, and also by dir9ct osasurements of hardness on the annealed vessel wall.
- 15. The ussr has demonstr,ted the feasibility of annealing operating reactor vessels starting wits the Novovoronezh -3 in 1987 and has returned all WG3 2
jL the plants to service, with no' evidence of distortion or other degradation to the plant. These annealings were conducted during normal periodic' shutdowns.
(
- 16. The USSR has found that reirradiation after annealing does not increase the rate of radiation embrittlement of reactor vessels after annealing.
L IngengralagreementwithUSfindings,theUSSRhasfoundthatannealing at 340 C does not ensure a lessened level of recovery of embrittlement; thus, the wet annealing of t sector vessels cannot be recomended.
L The major recomendations are:
1.
The US has verbally offered an invitation to the USSR to participate in l
the International Group on Radiation Damage Mechanisms, and the US5R has indicated a desire to accept. In addition, the NRC will provide a copy of the charter and other background information on the study group.
2.
Collaboration on. the study of materials from decomissioned reactors was considered to be desirable. To be carefully explored is the possibility for scientists from both countries to participate in the studies L
conducted by the other, and to share t1e results of those collaborative studies.
'3.
Using US equipment-and instruments, joint programs might be conducted l-u' 4 materials which are dire 11y cut fro ~ the reacto" vessel e i
.uR 440 nuclear pwer reactors (including Jovovoronezh), and fru... ;ther irradiated materials. Shippingport' materials are not being examined due to budget limitations. The US will provide-information from testing j:
materials from the Gundremingen reactor vessel, h
4..
The USSR has offered cooperation and participation in their cooperative program with the Gem Democratic.Repubik ud CzechHovakia on acutron dosimetry, using the zero power reactor facility at ti
- Rez, Czechesicvakia Research Center.
5.-
It is proposed that Working Group 3 undertaki a specific objective to-pool their knowledge in order to form a comm basis for the understand-ing and conduct of reactor sessel annealing. Discussion of the infor-u mation available for such a common basis could be a subject of discussion I
at the next meeting of the Working Group 3.
Proposed future activities of the Working Group are as follows:-
Suggestions for the Joint USSR-US Cooordinating Committee on Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety - Topic #3 for 1990.
1.
Guidelines for the reports to be given at the seminar in Moscow in Sept /Oct. 1990 1.1 Suming up of annealing experience for WER-440 reactor vessels and the methodology for determining radiation embrittlement of vessel metal after annealing.
WG3-3 c
Y 1.2 Non destructive (including surveillance) methods for monitoring metal characteristics of reactor vessels during operation and after annealing.
1.3 Tendency toward radiation embrittlement of VVER 1000 saterials (steel alloyed with nickel-chromium 35x2NMFAA and its welded seams).
1.4 Research on VVER-440 reactor vessel materials removed from operating units.
1.5-On the nature of radiation damage to reactor vessel materials and related factors.
1.6 Theoretical and experimental-research of the thermodynamics applied to the problem of thermal shock in the reactor vessel.
1.7 Elastic plastic analysis of fracture mechanics of the embrittled reactor vessel with the goal of ensuring its reliable operation.
Results of research of reactor vessel PAels.
2.
On the conduct of joint research on proMess of radiation metallurgy and increasing operational reliability of reactor vessels and supports.
2.1 Sum up and analyze the. scientific and technical results obtained in the US and USSR on annea'ing irradiated materials and vessels; form into practical recommen9ations which could be used for reactor vessel annealing.
2.2 Using US instruments, carry out joint research programs on materials cut directly from the vessel of a VVER-440 reactor removed from operation, The pr> grams would also examine other irradiated materials..s 2.3 Participate in joint,research.of neutron flux density on radiation damage of vessel materials and supports, including research con-2.4 - ducted within the framework of iriternational programs..
Research.on radiation embrittlement of cladding materials, including chemical cosiposition characteristics and other possible factors.
~
Influence of post-irradiation annealing on change.in mechanical and
- corrosion characteristics of the materials.
2.5~ Corrosive mechanical characteristics of base metal and the metal of
- the welded seam in coolant environment W.dct the effect of ionizing
-radiation of _ varying intensity.
2.6 Determination of vessel life time, especially as influenced by more precise elastic-plastic fracture evaluations, research on thermal shock, and calculation of uncertainties in detersing metal char-acteristics and the presence of defects.
c3. Long-term prospects.-
3.1' Examine proposals for joint testing of reactor vessels of power stations which have been shut down.
3.2 ? Internships of USSR specialists on radiation metallurgy in US laboratories
- 3.3 Examine proposals for irradiating US-LWR reactor vessel mat'erials in~
USSR power stations, followed by research conducted within the framework of joint programs.
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Appendix 1 List of Participants AllEG Guy A. Arlotto, Director, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) C. Z. Serpan, Jr., Chief, Materials Engineering i
Branch, RES A. Taboada, St nior Materials Engineer, RES P. N.'Randall, Senier Materials Engineer, RES M. E. Mayfield, Sentir Materials Engineer, RES
' K. Wichman, Secticn Ltador, Materials Engineering Branch, Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulatisn(NRR)
B. Elliot, Senior Engi1eer, NRR, S. Lee, NRR-R. Herman, Section Leader, NRR.
C. Y. Cheng, Materials Engineering Branch, NRR Dak'RidaeNationaiLaboratory. Tennessee
.R. D. Cheverton
'R Nanstad-F. B. Kam W. Pennell Materials Engineeri..g Associates, Lanham, MD J. R. Hawthorne,'ofessor, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA C. R. Odette, Pr l
J. Houstrup, Consultant, Connecticut P. G. Shewman, ACRS Professor, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH P. Wu, DOE 1111B Amir D. Amaev, Head of Laboratory, Kurchatov Institute-of Atomic Energy, Moscow Alexander M. Kruykov, Head of Group, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, o
l Moscow:
Sergei K. Morozov,' Head of Department, All-Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations Vladimir' A. Nikolaev. Head of Laboratory, Prometey Machinery Institute Complex p
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Appendix 2 List of Materials Exchanged WG 3.1 through 3.7 are USSR papers already transmitted and translated.
WG 3.8 Series of new papers in Russian WG 3.9 EmbrittismentTrendsandVariables,J.R. Hawthorne, MEA (handout)
WG 3.10: Dese Rate Embrittlement of Support $tructures, R.D. Cheverton, ORNL (hand out)
WG-3.11 Irradiation Effects in Heavy Section Steels and Applications to ReactorVessels,R.K.Nanstad,ORNL(handout)
WG 3.12 A Review of Fundamental Mechanisms and Models of Irradiation Embrittlement of Pressure Vessel Steels, G. R. Odette, UCSB (hand out)
WG 3.13 Neutron Dosimetry and Pressure Vessel Fluence Spectra Analysis, F. B. Kam, ORNL (hand out)
WG 3.14 Surveillance and Vessel Probability of Failure, P. N. Randall and e
H. W. Woods (hand out)
WG 3.15
- Probability of Vessel fail'ure froin PTS Events, H. W. Woods (hand out)
Plus: 4-o NUREG/CR 4183 Vol. I and Vol. 2, ORNL/TM9567/V1 PTS Evaluation of H. B. Robinson Unit 2 NPP NUREG/CR 4267, PNL-5469, Vessel Integrity Simulation Analysis o
(VlSA) Code Sensitivity Study o 6 50.61 Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protectior. Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events Reg. Guide 1.154 Format and Content of Plant-Specific '/ressurized o
Thermal Shock Safety Analysis Reports for Pressurizer, Water Reactors ORNL/NRC/LTR-85/32 Comparison of Plant-Specific Analyses of o
Pressurized Thermal Shock (Based on Oconee Calvert Cliffs, and H. B. Robinson), D. L. Selby, ORNL, Oct. 15, 1985 WG 3.16 Annealing of the Housing - USA Overview, C. 2. Serpan, Jr. (hand out)
WG-3.17 Annealing Recovery and Reenbrittlement, J. R. Hawthorne, MEA (hand out)
WG-3.18 Annealing Applications and Experience, A. Taboada (hand out)
WG3-6
MEMORANDUM 0F MEETING WORKING GROUP 4 FIRE SAFETY The main topics discussed by the USSR and US participants included:
1.
Fire safety design criteria, practices, and methods in both the US and USSR. Discussion focused on a variety of important issues, such as smoke control, effects of water as a fire suppressant, determination of fire o
l 2ones, penetration seals, effectiveness of protective coatings and other protective measures, risk assessment methods, and fire safety systems in nuclear plants.
2.
Regulatory practices. In particular, the discussions focused'on the l
different regulatory organizational structures used in the USSR and the US, and how regulatory authority was carried out in both countries using their respective regulatory structures. Backfitting of older plants was discussed.
3.
Operational experience. In particular, the USSR participants presented information in statistical form on the various causes of nuclear plant fires in the USSR, and gave a detailed presentation on a large fire at a fast reactor in the USSR in 1978.
Risk assessments. The US gave a presentation on the results of the re-cent fire risk scoping study,' showing the contribution of fires to core melt probability for several US plants. Other areas discussed included treatment of seismically induced fires, seismic effects-on fire-fighting equipment, and risks associated with computers utilized in nuclear power p' nt s.
Um of Halnn as a fire suppressant e t M e,issad in light of current environmental concerns with the etfeu, of nalon on the ozone layer.
5.
Hydrogen transport and' combustion. US discussions focused on an overview Lof current work,-and a more detailed discussion on flame acceleration and 4
transition from deflagration. The U55R discussed hydrogen mixing experi-ments and-the results of the effect of sprays on mixing and on the poten-Qualitative re-tial for deflagration.to detonation transition (DDT)ing both soft (spark suits were presented on the minimum cloud-for 00T us plug, hot wire) and strong (high explosives) ignition sources.
The major conclusions of the meeting are:
1.
Fire safety is a very important part of nudear power plant safety and therefore must be an important part of plant design and operat~ ion.
1+
2.
There are still aspects of nuclear pla'nt fires that are highly uncertain with regard to their impact on safety and deserve further consideration.
l These primarily deal with the primary and secondary effects of fires on l
WG4-1 i
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plant operation. They deal with system interactions under the effects of fires.
The Fire safety Working' Group has concluded that future interactions of the working group would be beneficial, and future areas of cooperation between the USSR and the US in the area of fire safety, including hydrogen behavior, are proposed as follows:
Future Arman for Exchance for 1990-1991 2.
Exchange information and' explore opportunities for cooperative research on calculational models (COMPBRN !!!) during fire fighting efforts, where-for fire propagation, the effects of water, smoke.-and energy transport and under what conditions fires start, and fire risk assessment methods.
2.
Exchange information and experiences on backfitting fire prevention mea-sures (i.e., penetration seals) on older nuclear plants.
3.
Exchange new publications dealing with nuclear power plant fire safety issues and current regulatory documents that pertain to regulatory re-quirements for fire arotection in nuclear power plants. Concentration.
should be given to tie effects of system interactions caused by fires.
4.- Determine the feasibility of exchanging information and proposing future cooperative research on treatment of seismically-induced fires; specifi-cally, how fire fighting equip:nent is designed for seismic events.
5.
Exchange information on. fire suppression methods and their effectiveness on energized electrical equipment.
6.-; Exchange information on fire brigade numerical strength _and fire-fighting equipment requirements at nuclear power plants.
7.- To study the' possibility of having US and USSR teams inspect nuclear power plants in the area of fire safety in both the US and the USSR.
' Exchange infomation on various combustion phenomena to include experi-8.
- mental and modeling efforts on deflagration, deflagration to detonation
- transition (DDT), and detonation. This exchange is inclusive of (! USSR workbeingperformedattheKurchatovInstitute(FridmanandDorofee)v) and the All Union Research Institute of Fire Protection (Korokhenko and
-Shebeko) on the effects of water sprays and aerosol on DDT and detona-tion, DDT modeling for nonuniform conditions and detonations and (2) US experimental and modeling-results of investigations on flame acceleration and DDT, detonations, and deflagrations. The working group will coordinate H work with Working Group 6.
2 4
9.
Consultation to investigate the feasibility of a joint cooperative pro-gram to perform experiments at facilities in the USSR and US to investi-flate various combustion modes at high temperature, elevated pressure and
'n a steam environment. This would include the development of joint WG4-2 1
-.. _... _..... = _ _...
.=
+
~
objectives, cannon data base, data reduction, modeling and the exchange of experts.
- 10. Exchange information on development of models for transport and combus-tion of hydrogen and the application of these models for practical pur-poses.
- 31. Exchange information on high temperature zirconium oxidation modeling.
Consultation to establish the feasibility of joint research, common ob-'
jectives and data base, modeling and exchange of experts.-
9 e
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Appendix 1 Participants Brian W. Sheron, Director, Division of Sytoms Research, RES, USNRC US Group Leader Alexandra Kovoltchenko, Deputy Director, All-Union Research Institute for Fire Protection USSR Sroup Leader-Anatoly Mikeev, Head, Main Fire Department, Ministry of the Interior Dennis Kubicki, Fire Protection Engineer, NRR, USNRC David Notley, Fire Protection Engineer, NRR, USNRC Steven Nolan, Sandia National Laboratory Tom Story, Science Applications International Corporation Patricia Worthington, Senior Research Engineer, RES, USNRC Carlyle Michelson, Member, Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards
- Ivan Catton, Member Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Igor Korobowsky, Interpreter Vladimir Klimenko,. Interpreter
~
- Part time o
4 WG4 4
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l Appendix 2 Materials Exchanged Vugraphs of Presentations Chernob,1 Implications Report (2 volumes) NUREG 1251 l
Hydrogen Reports provided to the US by USSR (3 copies) 1.
htonation Onset Conditions in Spatially Nonuniform Combustible Mixtures, S. B. Dorofeev, A. 5. Kochurko, B. B. Chaivanov, IAE-4871/13. I. V.
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.
2.
Experimental Study of Detonation Initiation in Motor Fuels Sprayed in Air, V. I. Alekseev, S. B. Dorofeev, V. P. Sidorov, B. B. Chaivanov, IAE-4871/13,1. V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy.
Hydrogen Reports provided to the USSR by US (3 copies) 1.
PLAME Facility, The Effects of Obstacles and Transverse Venting on Flame Acceleration and Transition to Detonation for Hydrogen-Air Mixtures at Large Scale Prepared by M. P. Sherman, S. R. Tieszen, W. B. Benedick, NUREG/CR 5275, SAN 085 1254, Sandia National Laberatories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 1989, 2.
Modeling for Large Scale Flame Acceleration Expe'riment, K. D. Mary, NUREG/CR-4855, SANDS 7 8203, Sandia National Laborttartre, Albuquerque, Ne< 9exico, July 1987.
WG4-5
3 j
5 MEMORANDUM 0F MEETING WORKING GROUP 6 SEVERE ACCIDENTS The sain topics covered by USSR and US participants included discussions on protocol items 6.la, 6.lb, and 6.lc, which had eve'ved out of discussions of the meeting of the JCCCNRS in August 1988.
There were four US presentations on item 6.',a.
These concerned fission product releases to the fuel clad gap during reactor operation, fission product releases during severe core damag9 accidents prior to reactor pressure vessel failure, severe accident phenomen91ogy and releases after reactor pressure vessel failure, and aerosol and fission product transport within the primary coolant system and containment.
In the discussion that followed, the -
' USSR expressed interest in information regarding the variation of the gap thermal conductivity with fission product activity and in obtaining or developing fission product transport calculations for specific accident sequences of interest. There was also discussion on the experimental validation of the VICTORIA, CORCON and VANESA codes.
There.<ere three USSR presentations on item 6.la. The first described an analytic method particularly suitable for describing releases of fission products in the early phases of an accident. The next described pulsed power testing of VVER 1000 type fuel elements in two research reactors during the per M I E 19SB.
td propos:1s for fu ure testing. Tbc third prest
't"'
descr ueo a sever accicut co.mputer crde,which is capabe of analyzing. f.R scenarios.
In the discussion, the USSR suggested that the data from the proposed Soviet tests be shared with that from the US PBF tests. -It was also noted that questions on CORCON and VANESA had been directed to the US, via the-IAEA. The US responded that these questions had not yet been received, but would be answered.
Item 6.lb was then taken up.- A presentation by the US discussed the chemical
' - if 1 " e released from the fuel,-the stability of : mum iodido (Cst),
'.ethe importance of aqueous iodine chemistry in the containment.
A USSR-presentation then discussed two experiments planned for 1989 and 1990 to study surface adsorption of iodine and the transfer of iodine from steam to water upon. condensation. -There was considerable discussion on the presence and-importance of organic iodine. as well as remarks on the regulatory aspects of iodine in the US, the revision of Standard Review plan section 6.5.2, and the
. potential implications of iodine chemistry with regard to filtration systems.
Item 6.le-was begun with a US presentation which discussed severe accident ~
. containment challenges and failure modes amenable to venting, filtration materials, filtered venting applications outside the US, and US efforts. ~ Two USSR presentations then discussed (1) a potential filtered venting system for VVER-1000 tyn reactors, including a proposed testing of an experimental-sock up of tiis system at Hanford, Washington, within the context of the international ACE program, and (2) recent USSR criteria on severe accident releases and an examination of potential filtration-systems. There was 1
WG6-1 e
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j considerable discussion on US efforts in this area as well as US practices with regard to containment leak rate, exclusion area size and iodine chemical form. There was also interest expressed in the potential use of granulated titanium dioxide (TiO ) as a filtration material.
2 A brief presentation by the US also covered the NRC severe fuel damage l
partners program. This is an international consortium covering a broad area of severe accident research topics.
The major conclusions are that both sides agreed that the information exchanged was useful and beneficial. The exchanges on the question of iodine cheaistry clarified how each side was pursuing this issue. The discussions on filtered venting were also useful and informative.
The major recomunendations were as follows:
Both sides agreed that an important topic for future US USSR interactions involves the severe accident related phenomena and processes which determine the challenge and the loads (i.e., pressures, temperatures) to light water containments (PWRs/BWRs for the US; VVERs for the USSR). The quantification of these loads is also utilized in Level-II Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs).
Initially the US USSR cooperative efforts will focus on the most important phenomena which are generic to both the US and USSR containment types. Among these phenomena are hydrogen deflagration / detonation, corium. concrete interactions and corium water interactions. To address the above, we have agreed on the following pr^qram of work for the remainder of 1989 as well as 1990 and beyond:
A.
Discuss the interface issues between h vel-! and Level-II PRA (methods, approaches, important issues). Discurt Containment Event Trees and how they are utilized in Level II PRAs (Quantifications (how knowledge of phenomena is utilized; how phenomena uncertainties are taken into account); and use of event trees to develop accident management procedures]. As part of this activity the US will make available to the Soviets the second draft (to be published in July 1989] of NUREG-1150 and the NRC contractor's reports developed for its support. The activity described under this item is proposed for spring 1990 and is consistent with the intent of Protocol Item 6.2a.
8.
Corium Concrete Interaction (Protocol Item 6.2b)
Initial discussions and exchange of infomation in the fall of 198g will focus on the consequences of corium concrete interactions (i.e., how they affect the containment loads and also how they augment the radioactivity in the containment); other issues to be addressed include corium relocation patterns, the formation of insulating crusts and corium debris bed coolability. This activity will be properly coordinated and integrated with the MACE program and the calculation and evaluation of l
the $URC-4 experiment which the Soviets have agreed to take part in order to avoid any duplication. In the next us-USSR meeting in which the status of analytical-and experimental efforts will be discussed (and the status of current knowledge and understanding) an assessment will be made WG6-2 u.
1
I l
- - T..
.e whether further. joint US-USSR coeperative efforts can be identified and L
defined..
C.
Corium Debris 8ed Coolability Even though a part of this issue (i.e., debris bed coolability) is to be addressed under activity 8. above, it is significant and broad enough to require special attsntion. This is proposed for fall 1989.
D.
Generation of Combustibles (H, CO) Under severe Accident Conditions 2
Both corium-concrete interactions and corium coolant interactions produce C0 and H. The issues to be addressed under this activity could include:
overall dixing behavior (dynamic vs. quasi-static); condensation i.
processes leading to high concentrations; deflagration / detonation limits under a variety of severe accident conditions and how they load a containment. These issues are listed in some more detail in Appendix 1.
Assess whether. future joint US-USSR cooperative efforts (e.g., exchange of information, or some type of joint programs) are warranted and define i
specific areas (this could be better accomplished after a ' standard" problem has-been defined and analyzed).
This is proposed for spring i
work with Working Group 4.
1990. The working group will coordinate H2 L
E.
Even though issues associated with fission product releases during both design basis and severe accidents were discussed in great detail by both sides during this meeting, it was decided t-71ere further some specif-ic isstes such P' the behav!or of t.ie variour. chemical form cf iodine.
At a feure mer( ) to be hcid in fall 1989 between US and USSR specialuts a ;..gosal will be develciped abcu,, the nature and extent of this further exploration. As part of this activity, the US will make available to the USSR published information on the behavior of fission J
l products under severe accident conditions.
b F.
Escause of the great interest expressed in filtration and ver. ting during 1
l severe accidents,- it was also decided to exchange infomation and q
continue to cxploro fur W r the prorosed h ses i sah r;;' a.r as well as possible performance criteria. At a future meeting to be held in spring 1990 between US and USSR specialists a proposal will be developed about.the nature and extent of this area.
G.
Both sides also agreed that it would be important to have general discus-sions, on an annual basis, which would cover th~e total range of both the US and USSR. supported severe accident programs.
The US and USSR will prepare a draft agreement concerning the precise form and
.l content of bilateral c.oo >eration addressed under the activities A. through G.
above. This agreement ssould be discussed at the next Working Group meeting (fall 1989)-and finalized at the Working Group meeting to be held in the spring of 1990.
-l 1
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Appendix 1 Hydrogen Safety Proposals for Cooperation 3.
Investigation of detonation Interchange of information. properties of hydrogen /afr/ steam mixtures.
Possible joint experiments.
~1.1 Determination of minimum initiation enerpy and detonation cell size as a fun: tion of tho' composition, initia temperature and pressure.
1.2 Experimental study and numerical modeling of heterogeneous systems detonation properties. The effect of droplet size and concentration on detonation properties.
I 2.
Investigation of detonation onset conditions. Interchange of information I
andjointexperiments.
2.1 The effect of scale, obstacles and steam on the possibility of
. deflagration to detonation transition (DDT).
2.2-Experimental study and numerical modeling of detonation in nonuniform combustible mixtures (self in'tiation of detonation).
Self initiation conditions in the-presence of radioactive components, ionizing radiation, temperature and concentration gradients, and pressure perturbations. Minimum detonation formation distances.
2.3 Experimental and numerical modaling of potential mitigation systems.
3.
Development of new combustion and detonation models and incorporation into generic containment codes.
3.1 DDT simulation.
3.2 Modeling of detonation self initiation in nonunifore eixtures.
~
3.3 Development of numerical models for heterogeneous mixtures.
4 40 i
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l Appendix!
Participants US Co Leader:
Theats P. Speis Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, USNRC soviet Co Leader Oleg Ya. Shah, Deputy Division Head, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy US Working Group:
D. F. Ross, Deputy Diro. tor, RES, USNRC B. 5 heron, Director, DSR, RES, USNRC R. Meyer, section Leader, AEB DSR, RES, USNRC L. Soffer,SectionLeader.SAIB,0$1R,RES,USNRC T. Margulies, PRAB, NRR, 3NRC D. Powers, Sandia National Laboratory T. Kress, Oak Ridge National Laboratory Soviet Working Group:
Vladimir A. Payshuk, Head of Division, Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy Evgenyi G. Basansky, Head of Laboratory, All Union Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Oper.
ations Valeryi F. Fedulov, Head of Radiation safety Division, Scientific teater USSR St...
Cec ittee for the. Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety (GAEN) m 5
WG6 5
,,.4-..
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 8 EXCNANGE OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 1.
THE SUBJECTS OF DISCUS $10N The following main topics 'were covered by USSR and US participants:
, 3.
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR REACTOR OPERATING EXPERIENCE US participants presented the current requirements for event reporting. The significance of the types of events being reported.
was emphasized by specific examples. A summary was presented of the types of events reported by U$ plants.
The USSR speaker described their event reporting system and described new rules developed and implemented stnce the Chernobyl accident. Event investigation by special comissions with participation by designer / manufacturer / supplier, the State Atomic Energy Administration, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy was addressed.
2.
NATIONAL DATABASE 3 - INFORMATION STOPAGE AND RETRIEVAL LL
,ars de:ct the da'.dases ma4 3ainec y AC (h rw..,.
Coding and Search Synem) as well as these maintained by liiPO (Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System) and various vendors.
Details of coding of event and component failure information and retrie'al were addressed by NRC.
v USSR participants discussed their national databases for operational events and t.on.gwient f aii.zes. Detailed cocriptions of treir W..
'tructure and retrieval enabilities were provided. Relative merits
.of the two uts of syst a mere noted.
3.
USE OF DATABASES IN ANALYS!$ AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL EXFERIENCE U$ speakers discussed the use of stored information to identify classes of events that warrant investigation. Following a brief discussion of the Accident Sequence Precursor Program, a specific example was used to illustrate the approach for risk quantification of operating events. In addition, the results of two studies - one related to component failures and the other related to a specific system failure - were presented. The causes and corrective actions were discussed.
The USSR speaker discussed the evaluation and feedback of operational data for Soviet plants which experienced non scheduled uutages and shutdowns in the past two years. Copy of an additional paper on ' Survey of Observations of Violation in Work at Soviet 440 NRs during 1987 1988' was provided.
WG8 1
\\
e l
!!. CONCLU$10N$
\\
The major conclusion of this operational experience exchange is the need for continuing centralized reporting and review of events, with emphasis and subsequent dissemination of infomation and lessons lea The U$ and USSR data collection, analysis, and dissemination share many common technical aspects, reporting thresholds, safety problems and concerns, and stellar goals. We have auch to learn from each other.
!!!. REC 0pt"NDATIONS The major recommendations are:
1.
Maintain a close, direct contact in exchanging reactor operating experience reported through IR$ reports for further understanding of lessons lea *ned from autual operating experience.
2.
Share methods to identif and accident precursors,y safety significance of operating events and assess approaches by reviewing. mutual experience.
3.
We should have continuing technical discussions of safety significant events and event classes IV. PROPOSED FUTURE ACTIVITIES Proposed future activities of this Working Group are as follows:
1.
Plan another information exchange meeting in 1989 to discuss items of mutual interest.
The topics of interest to include:
indicators of nuclear power plant safety with emphasis on a.
measures to monitor maintenance b.
implications of human factors on nuclear power plant safety.
- c..
technical discussion of selected safety significant events or event classes.
2.
Plan a second meeting of the Working Group in 1990 to:
discuss in-depth methods for identifying accident precursors a.
b.
assess the effectiveness of feedback and dissemination of operational experience techrical discu c.
event classes. ssion of selected safety significant events or WG8 2
(
3.
Plan a third meeting of the Working Group in 1991 to review mutual operational experience and analyses 4
l
}
WG8 3
i Appendix 1 Participants E
Eli T. Novak, Group Co Leader V. Vitkov, Group Co Leader I
Director, Division of safety Programs Division Need, All Union Office for Analysis and Evaluation Research Institute for i
of Operational Data. NRC Nuclear Power Plant Operations
- f. Brown, Senior Mechanical Engineer S.A. Lesnoi, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation Research Center, All Union cf Operational Data NRC Research Institute for Nuclear Power Plant Operations R. Dennig, Chief Trends and PatternsSection V.A. Kotchanov, Head of Laboratory Office for Analysis and Evaluation All Union Research Institute of Operational Data, NRC for Nuclear Power Plant Operations C. Heltemes, Deputy Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation t
of Operational Data, NRC E. Jo 1an, Director l
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC i
G. Mays (Contractor)
Cak Ridge National Laboratory L
J. Rosenthal, Chief Reactor Operations Analysis Branch L
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, NRC M. Williams, Chief L
Trends and Patterns Analysis Branch Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data. NRC WG8 4
,--,e nn, -, w
.a
-~
i i
Appendix !
l ADDITIONAL DoctMENTS
'$vney of Obsenations of Violation in Work at Soviet 440 PWRs During 1987 1988,' 3.A. Lest.oi, et al.
f e
e O
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e WG8 5
MEMORANDUM OF MEETING WORKING GROUP 10 ER0$10N/ CORR 05!0N DESTRUCTION OF P! PING AND COMPONENTS A workshop on Topic No. 10, ' Erosion Corrosion Destruction of Piping and Components' was held on June 5 7, 1989. Theoretical and engineering aspects of corrosion and erosion degradation of nuclear power plant piping were discussed. A list of participants is shown in Appendix 1.
There was a mutual exchange of information on the basis of reports Dy U$ and USSR scerialists on the design, standards and practical use of materials, water thei..stry, in service experience, and identification (NDE), control and prevention of the erosion and corrosion of piping. Phenomenological aspects of erosion and corrosion were discussed, as well as models for forecasting corrosion erosion degradation, and the mechanism of erosion corrosion processes. A list of papers presented is shown in Appendix 2.
The following proposed topics for a workshop to be held in Moscow, May 1990, were discussed:
1.
Impro, cant in the composition and control of water chemistry in light auclear,:ower plants.
t-
, 2.
Corrosion product release and transport.
3.
Non dero
.tive examin6 tion techr. buts fu menitorir.; degrad.
n of componen'.. due to erosion and corrosion.
4.
Study of alternative or new materials te resist the effects of erosion and corrosion.
A detailed agenda will be mutually developed at a later date.
It was agreed that reciprocal visits to institutions, experimental facilities atd nuclear power plant sites in 1990 by US and USSR delegations would be beneficial to both sides. The visits could include up to approximately 10 people for two to three weeks. Each side will submit proposed places to visit along with details of facilities, experiments and data to be seen or obtained.
The times and detailed arrangements for these visits should be agreed upon within the next six months.
Finally, it was agreed that there would be a mutual exchange of infomation, in the form of published papers, and reports in the areas of:
1.
Methods for determining degradation of piping due to corrosion cracking 2.
Effects of corrosion on airconium alloys 3.
Methods and systems of control (including automated) of corrosion and erosion of nuclear power plant components.
WG10-1 O
Appendix !
l Participants g
i 1
- 1. Stepanov, Institute of Power Technology (Group Co Leader)
A. Tutnov, Kurchatov Institute l
V. Kritski, Institute of Power Technology B. Nignatulin, All Union Research Institute of NPP M1 J. Richardson, NRC (Group Co Leader)
C. McCracken NRC
( -
' A. Taboada, NRC F. Witt NRC l
P. Wu, DOE J. Houstrup,-ASME P. Griffith, NIT C. Czajkowski, Brookhaven National Laboratory W. Shack Argonne National Laboratory D. Jonas, Consultant l
l l
l l
WG10 2 i
l
Appendix 2 List of Papers Presented ElR
' Quantitative and probabalistic analysis of the risk of destruction of 1.
structural elements of nuclear reactors as a means of evaluating the service life of these elements under conditions of incomplete and indeteminate initial data about the state of the facility.' (Russian) 2.
'The influence of the concentration of dissolved oxygen on the behavior of corrosien ptMucts dispersed in the :oolant of a boiling water reactor."
(Russian) 3.
' Release of corrosion products from the surface of steel in the coolant water of an atomic power piant.' (Russian) 4.
'The basic dependence of corrosion and erosion of carbor steels in power l
plant water loops on equilibrium thermodynamic factors.
(Russian) water at eleu,tod temperatures. generation medium in atomic power pl
' Magnetite solubility in the re 5.
(Russian) 6.
' Solubility of steel corrosion products under conditions simulating various water cHistry protesw. a ;wcr niants.'
U.ssian) 7.
'fehavior of copper corrosior} produc,ts in the sater wups of power plants."
(Russian) 8.
' Experimental research on the influence of hydrodynamics and physical and chemical properties of water media with high parameters on the process of appearance and development erosion and corrosion destruction."
(Russian) 9.
' Criteria for detemining permissable size of defects in pipes."
(Russian)
- 10. ' Magnetite solubility in boiling water power plant coolant." (Russian) 11.
'A thermodynamic model of cobalt corrosion product behavior in boiling water reactor channels." (Russian)
- 12. *8asic tasks and ways of providine, is11able and safe atomic power plant operation.' (Russian)
- 13. ' Electrochemical Methods for Corrosion Studies at Nuclear Power plants.'
(Viewgraphs in English and Russian)
- 14. 'On the Principal Relationship Between Power plant Stainless Steel Loop Erosion Corrosion and Thermodynamic Equilibrium Factors.' (English) l WG10 3
--._--.______L___._*:_,_-
- 25. ' Corrosion Products Release Fronisteel surface Into 8WR Water Coolant."
(English) i E
- Sanchez Caldera, LE, Griffith, P. Rabinowict: 'The Mechanism of Corrosion-l Erosion in Steam Extraction Lines of Power Stations " Trans. ASME Jn1 of Engineering for tas Turbines and Power Vol. 110. April 1988' DeFreitas, Germano: ' Dissolution Rates in the Wake of a Welding Backup Ring,'
Engineer's Thesis in ME, MIT, February 1986 Keck, R.G. and Griffith, P: "Models and Equations for the Prediction of Erosion Corrosion Wear in steam Extraction Piping,' ASME Paper No. 97-JPGC PWR 35 Taboada, A.:
'Past Experiences With Pipe Wall Thinning in Nuclear Power Plants" (Viewgraphs)
Czajkowski,C.J.: ' Erosion Corrosion at Nuclear Power Stations' Houstrup, J.P.: 'The Design of Nuclear Piping' Houstrup, J.P.:
'ASME Evaluation Methods for Erosion Corrosion Damage in Nuclear Piping" Shacks, W.J.: Phen'omenology of Erosion Corrosion
- i Shacks W.J.: 'Phenomenological Models for Erosion Corrosion" l
Shacks, W.J.:
" Methods for Preventing Erosion Corrosion: Materials Water Chemistry, and Design" Witt, F.: " Zinc Injection in the BWRs for Radiation Buildup Control' (Viewgraph) 1 WG10 4 l
c
4 APPENDIX 111 1
PROCEDURES TO IMPLEMENT AN INSPECTOR EXCHANGE PURSUANT TO ITEM 1.2 0F THE PROTOCOL OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL.IAN NsCL",?. REACTOR !.'JETY e
9 4
Procedures to laplement an Inspector Exchange Pursuant to Item 1.2 of the Protocol of the First Meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Coordinating Coenittee for Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety Item 1.2 of the Protocol of the First Meeting of the Joint Coordinating Cesmittee for Civilian Nuclear React or Safety (JCCCNR$) proposed that the U.S.
 the U.S.S.R. (held pursuant to the authority set forth in the Memorandum of Cooperac. ion in the Field of Civilian Nuclear Reactor Safety of April 26, 1988)establishesameansforeachsIdetodevelopanunderstandingofthe other's methods used to ensure adhertnce to design and operational
' requirements and specifications through an exchange of inspectors.
The goal of the U.S..U.S.S.R. inspector exchange program is to develop knowledge of the safety culture of the host country through an understanding of licensee / operator and regulator / inspector methods for ensuring adherence to design and operational requirements and specificaticts.
It is expected that the participating inspectors will return with a basic understanding of regulatory and ins'>ection procedures, and inspector and operator safety
. approaches of the sost country. The goal is for the participating inspectors to cr *.ain this undersw. q to
... N nt gsn.ry 1. acco op descrier the program to their peers upon uwir return.
In order to.successfully implement Item 1.2 cf the Protocol, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission and the U.S.S.R. State Comittee on Supervision of Nuclear Power Safety adopt the procedures below:
- 1) N -ber er oW % nits in tio EN;1 Each countt.till send a single group consisting of two inspectors and one interpreter (further referred N as a ' group").
- 2) Leneth of trehanee. The grous will be in the host' country for a term of approximately seven weeks. The Excsange will begin during the month of July 1989. The host country is to be informed about the exact data no later than one month before the departure date of the group.
- 3) titen nt Which the trehaneen Wir occur. The Soviet group will visit the Catawba nue' ear facility near Rock Hill, South Carolina, which is operated by the Duke Power Company. The U.S. group will visit the Zaporezhye nuclear facility, which is located in the Ukraine about 200 miles southeast of Kiev on the Dnieper River.
4)- Loaintien Arraneaments. The sending country will provide for transportation of its group to the vicinity of the capital of the host country and for their return. The group will visit the headquarters of the national and on their way back (two regulatory body on their way to the site (one day)d a few days in the regional days), and during the Exchange the group will spen office of the host regulatory body. The group will work at the designated 9
l
,2 -
site for the rest of the term of the exchange. The group will remain within a twenty five mile radius of the site unless accompanied by a host country official.
The host country will arrange a mid visit break for the visiting group for four or five days at an appropriate location.
The host country will be responsible for arranging and paying for all living expenses of the sending country's group within the host country. This includes transportation, acconsnodations, and food.
Identifientieg ef Greue Meeers. The sending country will provide the hos)t country at hast thirty five days before the group's arrival in the the ccuntry with the following information concerning each group member:
-name, surname;
-profession;
-length of service in the nuclear power industry; length of service in the regulatory body; post occupied at present;
-date of birth and place of birth; passport number.
be allo)wed to bring cameras, tape recorders, personal costmetry eq 6
Eeuiement that May be Breucht into the Hest countev, The group will (e.g., dosimeters, radiation measuring equipment), and porta 61e personal computers.
The cameras and tape recorders will not be taken onto the reactor site without the specific permission of the appropriate host country authorities.
7 Access to peneter Site Documents. The sending country group will have ac) cess to all documents available to the host country's inspect except as restricted by the applicable laws and regulations of the host country.
Inspection or reactor plant related documents will not be taken offsite without the permission of the approp:iate host country authorities.
The host side, however, will provide assistance to the visiting group in obtaining necessary information concerning the supervision practices at t'.e site.
- 8) t w unication To and From the Creue. The host country will provide access to and provide assistance in placing telephone calls to the sending country's embassy or consulate.
T.5e host country will assist the sending country (as necessary) in contecting its personnel.
serious) illness of a group,s. fig. In the event of an emergency (e.g., the 9
%ereenev Trantee u mber) the host country will provide transportation for as many group inembers as the group leader considers necessary as quickly as possible to a location from which the sending c'ountry can provide additional travel asdstance.
- 10) Medical care in the Hest countev.
necessary) appropriate medical care for the U.S. group.The U.S.S.R. will provide (as the Soviet group with medical insurance coverage.
The U.S. will provide
--.,-,.,,,..,....,~-~,.r
3
- 11) site and Reaeter plant Access. The sending country's group will be escorted by an official representative of the host government whenever they are on the reactor site and will follow all health, safety, and security rules prescribed by the host country or the reactor operating organization. A briefing will be provided by the host country or reacter operating organization covering site specific health, safety, and security rules.
32 Nott Country Coordinater. The host coun.ry will identify a person at the rea)ctor site who has the authority and responsibility to resolve any problems or issues that develop while the group is in the host country, including any problems or issues not addressed it this implementing procedure.
The host country coordinator will also be the cormunication point of contact for both routine and emergency situations.
These implementing procedures a1 ply only to a single exchange of inspectors and interpreters. Any su> sequent exchanges pursuant to Item 1.2 of the Protocol will be addressed through separate implementing procedures.
FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
' FOR THE U.S.S.R. STATE COMMITTEE.FOR C0KdlS$10N THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY N
I
.. m,JM,< b
//
/
James M. Taylor
//
Nik Ol i N. Ponomarev 5tepnoi
,U.S. Co Chairman W JCCCNRS U.S.5.R. Co Chairman of JCCCNRS
\\
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case V
Date[,'
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APPENDIX 'ly PROPOSALOF,THESOVIETSIDE ON THE REALIZAT10N OF COOPERATION IN THEME 7 0F THE PE,07000L OF THE FIRST MEETING OF THE USSR US JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR 31 AUGusi 1958 (RUSSIAN) i 1
t i
~.
~___;7-
,J.
Translation PROPOSALS OF THE $0VIET $1DE ON IMPLEMENTATION OF COOPERATION WITHIN THEME 7 0F THE PROTOCOL OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE OF THE J0!NT USSR-USA COORDINATING ColmITTEE ON CIVIL NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY 31 AUGUST 1988 1.
Within the framework of subdivision 7.1. of the Protocol there is to be designated an independent subfiroup that will unify the full subject matter of the dosimetric and rad'oecological areas. The general name of the subject matter of the subgroup is ' Principles of formation of individual and collective dosages of external and internal irradiation from various sources."
2.
Fromaprop,saloftheAmericanside(seeU.S. Correspondence 89-7) this group of subjects includes the following subpoints: 7.1.A(4,5,6, 7,8.9):7.1.C(1,2,3);7.1.0,(1B,2C);7.1.E(2,3).
}.
L 3.
In accordanca with point 2, the following outline is proposed:
l-7.1.
Trar r of radionuclides.. the en. :onment r.nl irrac Lt 9n doses of human beings (Directoh Asst. Director of Scientific Production Association [ SPA NPO: Nauchno-proirvodstvennaya ob'yedineniye) 'Tayfun" BorzilovV.A.).
t 7.1.1.
Transfer of radionuclides in the environment (Director:
Ass'.. L ectes of SFA 'Teyf on" Borzi;ov V. A.).
7.1.1.A.
Models of short and medium-term prediction 1.
Descri) tion of the radioactive release source.
2.
Atmospseric transfer of gas-aerosol radioactivity, its concentn tion in the air.
3.
Fallout onto tae earth's surface.
- 4. ~
Local exposure dosage from radioactive trail.
5.
Modeling of radioactive contamination of an aqueous medium at the early stage of a nuclear reactor accident.
6.
Transport of radionuclides through ground food chains.
7.
Transport of radionuclides through water food chains.
8.
Modeling the radioecological situation in an aqueous sodium during the initial and medium-tem period following a nuclear reactor accident.
7.1.1.8.
Obtaining rapid information on radioactive contamination of objects in the environment.
1
- 8
8 Peehe gg e g,q geget pg.p g,. q qge n, e
,4*
g 4* 4
-Mgys-e
- Me 6 4 e
.,g 3
-,.m._,,,.,_.,,.,.m..
..... ~ ~
...._._,,..,.,.~.-,..,--,m.
m m.
l 1.
Principles of data gathering.
2.
Measurements tf concentration of radioactive 1
particles in the air and spectral measurements of ground contamination occurring from the air.
3.
Aerial gamma-spectrometric measurements of the degree of external game-radiation and deposition density of local conf. amination by radionuclides.
4 Ground field gamma-spectrometry and interpretation of data.
5.
Methods of utilizing serial means (serial gama. photography)toevaluateextentofradioactive contamination.
6.
System of rapid monitoring of radioactive contamination of bodies of water during the ihitial period following a nuclear reactor accident.
7.
Jse of a fixed radiation monitoring network to evaluate the extent of radioactive contamination.
7.1.1.C.
Models of Tong-term prediction and data pathering system.
1.
Vertical transfer of radionuclides <n the soil.
I 2.
Time of presence of radionuclides in the soil (periods of natural self-purification).
3.
Radioactive contamination of the urban environment.
- 4.. Time of presence of radionuclides in an aqueous i
medium.
5.
Repeated radio-aerosol contamination of the air.
6.
Estimation of uncertainties.
- 1 7.1.1.D.
Methods for substantiating and verifying models.
1 i
1.
Models of atmospheric transfer.
2.
Models of soil transfer.
3.
Models of water transfer.
L The names of participants on the Soviet side with respect to pt. 7.1.1.
will be provided later.
~7.1.2.
Dosesofirradiationofhumanbeings(Director-l-
Likhtarev !.A., Director of Division of Dosimetry and Radiation Hygiene l.
of All-Union Scientific Center for Radiological Medicine of USSR Acadesy ofMedicalSciences[AUSCRMUSSRAMS])
I 7.1.2.A.
Dosimetric models for early prediction.
1.
External irradiation from a cloud.
2.
Internal inhalation irradiation.
3.
External irradiation fron local fallout.
4 Transfer of radionuclides through terrestrial food chains.
5.
Transfer of radionuclides through mater food chains.
L-6.
Coefficients of dose conversion for peroral intake of radionuclides.
7.
Estimation of uncer:ainties.
2
7.1.2.B.
Dosimetric models of prediction for " intermediate periods in the development of the radiation situation."
1.
External irradiation and dosages.
2.
Doses of int 6rnal irradiation due to terrestrial food chains.
3.
Doses of internal irradiation dae to water food chains.
term prediction.
Dosimetric models of long<fa e distributed sources.
7.1.2.C.
1.
External irradiation 2.
Internal irradiation due +4 terrestrial food chains.
3.
Internal irradiation due t6 water food chains.
4 Synthesis of empirical data.
5.
Estimation of uncertainties.
7.1.2.0.
Methods for substantiating and verifying models.
1.
External irradiation.
2.
Internal irradiation from alimentary uptake of i
radionuclides.
3.
Internal irradiation from inhalation uptake.
4 Stability, replicability of models, temporal drif t of parameters.
f Within the framework of subsection 7.1.2. the following will participate l
on the Sov9* er from All Union Scit ntific Center of Radiological Mcsicine of USSR Acadecy ofMedicalSciences[AUSCRMUSSRAMS: VNTsRM; Vsesoyuznyy nauchnyy tsentr radioaktivnoy meditsiny) - Likhtarev 1.A. (Director), Los' !.P.,
Repin V.S., Shanda'la N.K., Kovgan L.N., Bondarenko 0.I., Chumak V.V.
from the In d tute of Biophysics [18), U$to Ministry of M 11c Health
'IBFHZS$$R]-KnizhnikovV.A.,BarnudarovR.M.,SayKinel.I.,
baylovskiy 0.A.
from Lenin rad Scientific Research Institute of Radioactive Hygiene of i
the USSR M.nistry of Public Health [LenN!!RG MZ RSFSRg Leningradskiy Nauchnoissledovatel'skiy institut radioaktivnoy gigfyeny) - Balonov M.I.,
Konstantinov Yu.A.
from I.V. Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (IAEl Institut atomnoy energiy1]-MurzinN.Y.
l 4
Per section 7.2:
- thematically the fundamental positions of the section proposed by the American side are acceptable;
- it is advisable to desifinate as the head clanitation on the l
Soviet side with respect to thts section AUSCRM USSR AMS, and l
Prof. Likhtarev I.A. its directort 3
l
~
s l
- it is proposed that the following directors of subsections on the Soviet side be designated:
- on clinical effects of [0LB--a Russian abbreviation)--Prof. Bebeshko V.G.;
l
- on epidemiological aspects (long-term effects) and systems of registers--Prof. Buzunov V.A.;
- on dosimetric aspects--Prof. Likhtarev I.A.;
- on the section rgarding improvement of methodolop of risk assessment (stochastic effects)--senior scientific researcher Domin V.F.;
- on genetic effects of radioactive irradiation--Pilinskaya M.A.;
For' work within section 7.2 it is advisable to draw upon the following specialists:
i from AUSCRM USSR AMS: Prisyazhnyuk A.Ye., Chabak A.K., Ledoshchuk B.A.,
Shklyar G.I., Preverskiy B.P., Tsvetkova 0.M.;
from 1.V. Kurchatov IAE: By kov A. A. ;
from IB of USSR Ministry of Public Health: Barabanova A.V.
5.
It is proposed that 11' yin L.A. and Romanenko A.E. be designated directors of tie entire area 7.
6.
Time and place of meetings:
- p. 7.1.
18-22 September 1989, Obninsk near Moscow.
- p. 7.2.
25-29 September 1989, Kiev.
l l
l 1
[The U.S. Side has attached hereto for reference the text of U.S.
Correspondence 89-7 which is entioned in paragraph number 2., above.)
4
ATTACHMENT Oraft Aflenda for Protocol Item So, 7. Health Effects and Environmental ProtectSon Considerations, as presented in U.S. Correspondence 89-7 to the U.S.S.R. dated March 28, 1989 JCCCNR$ WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA Name of Working Group:
Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations.
U. S. Working Group Leader:
Murray Schulman, US DOE.
Designee for Leader of Item 7.1 Environmental Transport:
Lynn Anspaugh.
U. S. Working Group
Participants:
M. H. Dickerson, P. Gudiksen, LLNL, F. D. Hoffman, ORNL, W. L. Templeton, PNL, F. W. Whicker, Colorado State University, A. Bouville, NCI, H. L. Beck, EML, Lynn R. Anspaugh, LLNL, E. M. Romney, UCLA, K. Eckeman, ORNL, TBD, EG and G, H. T. Peterson, Jr., NRC, F. Congel, NRC.
Additional U.S.
Participants:
E. Shomaker, NRC, A. Reynolds, DOE, C. Eberhard, 005.
Date/Timt.f Meetine.-
July 17. July 21,.-389.
Location of Meeting:
Moscow, USSR.
Objective:
Development of an ongoing program of research cooperation and information exchange to verify models which can rapidly forecast radionuclide plume distribution, deposition and potential committed doses from severe reactor accidents.
TOPICS FOR DISCUS $10N 7.1 A.
Models for Use at Very Early Times 1.
Source ters (P. Gudiksen) 2.
Air concentration M. Dickerson) 3.
Ground deposition P. Gudiksen) 4.
External exposure romimmersion(K.Eckerman)
Inhalation 5.
External exp(K. Eckerman)osurefromgrounddeposition(H. Beck) 6.
7.
Terrestrial food chain transport W. Whicker) 8.-
Aquatic food chain transport (W. empleton 9.
Dose conversion factors for ingestion (K.
ekeman) 10.
Uncertainty (O. Hoffman) 1 4
=.
i 7.1 B.
Acquisition of Data at Early Times 1.
Criteria for data to be-collected (L. Anspaugh Measurements of air concentration and spectral) 2.
measurements of ground deposition from an aerial platform (EG and G) 3.
Conversion of airborne spectral measurements of ground deposition to external gasra exposure rate and radionuclide deposition density (EG and G) 4.
Ground based field spectrometry and interpretation (H. Beck) 7.1 C.
Modols for Use at Intermediate Times (Following Data Collection) 1.
External exposure and dose Dosefromingestionofterre(L.Anspaugh) 2.
strial foods (A. Bouville) 3.
Dose from ingestion of aquatic foods (W. Templeton) 7.1 D.
ModelsforUseatLaterTimes(FollowingLengthyData Collection) 1.
External exposure and dose 0.
Vertical movement of radionuclides in soil (E. Romney) b.
Exposure afwi dose from distributed sources (H. Beck) c.
Fate of radionuclides in urban environments (L. Anspaugh) 2.
Dose from ingestion a.
Long ters availability of radionuclides in soil (E. Romney) b.
Long term availability of radionuclides in the aquatic food web (W. Templeton Synthesis of empirical). data (A. Bouville) )
c.
3.
Dose from secondary aerosols (L. Anspaugh 4.
Uncertainty (0, Hoffman)
-7.1 E.
Methods of Model Validation 1.
Atmospheric transport (M. Dickerson) 2.
External dose (H. Beck) 3.
Dose from. ingestion Casa studies (W. Whicker)l Validation Study a.
b.
(810MOVS) Biospheric Mode
- 0. Hoffman Body burdens measured following Chernobyl (A(. Bouville))
c.
JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA l
Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations Topic 7.1:
Environmental Transport l
Team Leader:-
[
U. S.: Dr. Lynn Anspaugh, Lawrence Liverinore National Laboratory U. S. S. R.: Oleg A. Pavlowski, Institute of Biophysics, MPH 2
P
l 7.1 A.16odels for use at Early Times At the moment of occurrence of a sajor accident, we expect t' hat the available data will be quite sparse. There will be an
.immediate need to forecast the direction of the cloud and the ossible doses that cipht result, meteorological data would ikely be all that w3u d be available. To deal with this situation, a standby 'most likely' source tem would have to be developed for the front and of a complex model. This model would ideally forecash air concentrations and ground depositions (both from dry and wet processes and the dose from the significant pathways of external) gamma exposure and ingestion of
. radionuclides with food. Also to be included would be the less important pathways of inhalation and external exposure from immersion.. To be included in this discussion are the generic topics of dose factors (Sv/8q inhaled or ingested), uncertainty, and radiation physics as it pertains to external exposure. The goal is to exchange infomation and to develop a bilateral position on how best to achieve this objective. A detailed discussion of the Soviet experience following the Chernobyl accident will greatly add to the evolution of this topic.
7.1 B.
Acquisition of Data at Early Times Following an initial period of calculation and protective actions, it is necessary to acquire rapidly empirical data so that more accurate asses e nts may be made.
At early times, thi" is cost done C :.h arourne platforms capaole of collecting and c.dasuring air - ncca: iions and of :ca:uri u the sp ctr:1 composition of the deposited material on the soil surface.
From
-these data, the surface external exposure rate and the de>osition density of individual radionuclides can be inferred.
Otier, less expensive methods can be used to infer the same data at 1ccations of lesser contamination and where more time is availtble to preparc fu such trn:uretW.:.
. goal of this topic is to exchange information on techniques of accomplishing the objective and to prepare a position statement on how such w asurements can best be made and interpreted.
7.1 C.
Models for Use at Inter.Mdiate Times (F111owing Data Collectiori)
After the deposition densitles and/or external exposum rates have been esasured and the radionuclide composition of thE source has been determined, atu ntion can turn to t:ie calculation of doses over longer time periode to populations that have not been evacuated. This requires a more comprehensive knowledge of the local geography, demography and agriculture. The key issue is to project the one-year dose from external exposure and from the ingestion of terrestrial and aquatic food stuffs. The goal is to exchange information on this topic and to develop a joint statement on the preferred methods of accomplishing this goal. As a great deal of the dose commitment via ingestion will be accumulated during this l
t 4
ene year 3eriod, auch of the discussion of the generic features of food ciain transport should take place during consideration of this topic.. Food chains (e.g., mushrooms, tea, fresh fish) found to be of special interest following the Chernobyl accident would be a valuable part of this discussion.
7.1 D.
Models for use at Later Times A key issue in assessing accidents is the projection of dose far into the future, leportant considerations are the long term vertical migration of radionuclides in terrestrial and aquatic environments.
The experience in studying fallout from weapons tests will be of great value here. The goal of this discussion is to exchange information and develop nothods of making such forecasts.
7.1 E.
Methods of Model Validat. ion The validation of all levels of models is a most important aspect. The goal of this topic is to provide a general discussion of techniques of model validation and of past efforts in model validation. The goal would include development of a general protocol for model validation.
As this topic is very complicated, maximum advantage should be made of the efforts by others in BIOMOVS and the IALA.
JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA Name of Working Group:
Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations U.S. Co-Chairman of JCCCNRS:
JamesTaylor(Participating)
U.S.' Working Group Leader:
Murray Schulman Designee for Leader of Item 7.2 Health Effects:
M. Goldman, UC Davis
.U.S. Working Group
Participants:
C. Lushbaugh.-ORAU, R. Jensen, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory W. J. Schull, Univ of Texas, S. Fry, ORAU, G. Beebe, NCI, E. Gilbert, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, R. Catlin, R. C.
Associates L. Anspaugh, LLNL, F. Congel, NRC, S. Yaniv, NRC
'i Additional U.S.
Participants:
E. Shonaker, NRC, A. Reynolds, DOE, C. Eberhard, DOS 1
Date/ Time of Meeting: July 24 - July 28,1989 Location of Meeting: Kiev, USSR
~4 I
l
Objective:
Development of an ongoing program of research cooperation and inforsation exchange for documenting, analyzing and assessing term health consequences of radiation exposure from the long le nuclear reactor accidents.
large sca Topics for Discussion:
A.
Acute Effects of High Doses 1.
Lessons Learned Regarding Diagnosis, Treatment and Recovery of Heavily Irradiated People (C.Lushbaugh) 2.
Dose Prevention Reduction and Mitigation (R.Catlin) i 8.
Delayed Health Effects from Chernoby1 Accident Exposures 1.
Protocol Design and Infrastructure Requirements for implementing an Epidemiological Analysis of AppropriateSovietCosorts(G.Seebe) 2.
Internal / External Dose Assessment:
Personnel Dosimetry (L. Anspaugh) l Dosimetry (R. Jensen)
Application of Biologica 3.
4.
Biological Consequences
- Statistical Methodology for EstimatingCancerRisk(E. Gilbert) o.
Genetics and Prenatal Effects (W. J. Schull) d 5.
Registry Development, Data Base Management an 6.
An.alysis (S. Fry)
C.
Improving Health Risk Estimates From Individual or Pcpulation Exposure to High or low Radiation Doses and Rates l
1.
Models and Data Needs (H. Goldman) - Stochastic 2.
Models and Data Needs (S. Yaniv) - Non Stochastic l
1 JCCCNRS WORKING GROUP DRAFT AGENDA Health Effects and Environmental Protection Considerations Topic 7.7.: HEALTH EFFECTS Team Leader:
Professor Marvin Goldman, University of California-Davis, California 7.2A Acute Effects of High Doses.
l:
l Improve understanding of and lesson: learned from the diagnosis, treatment and recovery of heavily irradiated people.
US--C. Lushbaugh USSR A.E. Baranov/A.K. Guskova/ Participants from All-Union-I Center of Rad. Med., Kiev l:
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Dosimetry...For each person.roceiving high radiation doses data are needed on the amount and quality of radiation exposure,.
The internal dose estimate from deposited radionuclides in the body, as well as the external dose from local environmental exposures should be developed for each patient of concern. The time course of exposure (dose rate and duration) is also needed for these patients. Where the doses are estimated, the means used for estimation should be made available. Any estimate of error on these individual doses should also be available.
Clinical... Clinical signs and symptoms for acute radiation exposure diagnosis should be available for each exposed person.
Time of appearance of specific symptoms and degree of deMation from the nomal values are needed. The $pulatie not values used for each parameter / measurement are needed for the specific exposed populations. The method used to score and grade each patient with regard to estimated ' radiation dose' on the basis of clinical / bio ogical measurements is of particular importance and interest. The speed (i.e. the time necessary to wait), with which such ' triage" determinations are made is of interest. The accuracy and correlation with physical dosimetry is also'an area i
to be discussed.
Treatment... Modification of ' radiation dose effect" by combined injuries (whole body with radiation induced local injury, radiation plus trauma including thermal burns) and its impi.ication for medical management of affected patients should be reviewed and discussed.
Recovery... Comparative recovery rates in patients with roughly sinilar ' doses", but. differing treatment protoccis should be discussed and reviewed. Secondary and late manifesting conditions in patients after the acute phase should be reviewed. Follow-up examination protocols and needs for specific measurenants should be discussed.
Psychological management of heavily irradiated patients and the follow-up of their status is of interest and should be discussed, i
Dose Reduction Efficacy (US-R. Catlin: USSR ??)ial Individual dose reduction through use of s>ec procedures, such as KI to reduce radiciodine uptace, should be reviewed.. Side reactions, allergies or other negative effects should be discussed. The amount used for specific population classes, and the timing and duration of administration should be l
discussed to better understand level of dose reduction that may l
be optimal. The role of such therapy in risk reduction is of great importance.
REAC/TS... Sharing of views and experiences regarding the value and organization of a Radiation Emergency Assistance Center and Training Site (REAC/TS) for improving follow up i
medical care of radiation accident victims and training for emergency response.
6-
l 7.2B Delayed Heal %h Effects from Chernoby1 Accident Exposures.
1.
Epidemiology...(US Gl Seebe U$5R ??)
Develop a plan and an'opidemiological protocol to study specific cohorts of irradiated populations.
Included should be a separ&te study of the Pripyat population, the
'in close' popult, tion of some 24,000, estimated to have received about 0.4 0.5 6', the ca. 100,000 evacueos who say have received an average deso of about 0.05 Gy.
In addition, it is of primary importance to determine the pssible range and magnitude of doses received @ ell workers icvolved in the Chernobyl recovery operation. These may number about 200,000 and the range of doses may be up to totals of about t Gy in the first year. The infrastructure of the study p,otocol should be related to the lessons learned in the Hiroshima / Nagasaki study. The criteria for choice of ' control' cohorts should also be discussed. The type of measurements to be made on the living persons, the frequency and the possible relation to morbidity and mortality should be discussed.
2.
Dose Assessment..(US L. Anspaugh, USSR 0.
Pavlovski??)
Individual doses are available for many of the exposed persons. Local / area monitoring as well as personnel dosimeters used to estimate / determine personnel doses are of interest for discussion and review of the entire data base.
External expetone and dc
- c:pontat sho '
. sparately cetermined fr:n tho : ternal at ;,.ad, and.onnn
. doses. The absolute magnitude and ratio of internal to aternal' dose are needed.
Tiie thyroid dose and whole body dose should be reviewed. The relation between early and future committed dose should be reviewed with the aim of developing an empirical predictive model for dose is of interest for further cooperation.
3.
Biological Dosimetry...(US-R. Jensen, USSR ??)
The calibration of new and established methods of biological dosimetry.should be reviewed and updated. Modern means of flow cytometry and molecular and cellular biology which record latent radiation exgosurr. is of interest. Models for persistence of. biological radiation markers' and their calibration' are of interest. The calibration, determination of errors and artifacts should also be included. An intercomparison of existing methods should be undertaken. Cross calibration in appropriate animal models is desirable.
4.
Biological Consequences: Statistical' Methodology for Estimating Cancer Risk (US-E. Gilbert, USSR L. IL'in??)
Estimates of latent cancer risk is needed. Morbidity and mortality in appropriate age and exposure categories and 7
_.__-____A_.____________
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--I
cohorts is needed. Particular evidence for childhood diseases
~
is of major interest.
In addition -the unique exposures of i
i thyroid need major attention regarding risk related to dose rate, sex and age should be addressed in detail, l
5.
Genetic and Prenatal Effects (US W. Schull, USSR ??)
Estimates of abortion frequencies in the ' exposed" population should be available.
It is thought that there may have been many voluntary abortions performed from fear of radiation, rather than from overexposure. Are there data on this point and how complete is it? The study of children who were exposed during gestation is a most im>ortant cal. Choice of a proper comparison cohort is needed. 1sychole ical and mental testing should be correlated to possible devi tions or alterations in circumference. physical measurements, such as head Study protocols si.ould be developed to determine if radiation induced genetic or cytogenetic lesions can be detected.
6.
Anal Fry, USSR ??) ysis, Database Development and Management (US S.
Interactive registries and database development and security methods should be reviewed. Development of registries for subpopulations of interest for future studies also should be considered.
Bilateral cooperation in setting up computer methodology for the data management should be discussed.
Information is needed on existing systems available for tracking individuals over the long term and retrieving morbidity and/or cause of death data for arge populations. A means to have access to data *and still protect individual privacy, should be discussed and reviewed.
Protcols should be developed for exchange / sharing of data among project investigators.
7.2C Improving Health Risk Estimates 1.
StochasticModelsandDataNeeds(USM.Goldman, I
USSR-L.IL'in) organ specific risk models should be developed to provide a total body ' summed site" model. The use of absolute or relative specific organ risk models in a population age adjusted model should be studied to assist in providing an individual probabilistic estimate of expectation risk. The models should address the influence of dose and dose rate on the calculation. The problem of non uniform exposure of individuals should also be addressed. A series of measures of metrics of detriment, in addition to cancer death rate increments should be-developed. The relation to non radiation stochastic risks should be addressed.
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NonstochasticModelsandDataNeeds(USS.Yaniv,
- USSR??)
- Injury to skin, kidney and lung from internal. and/or external radiation needs to be reviewed. Possible effects on
' organ function such as thyroid should be discussed. Role of 4 -
therapy-in injured organ interactions should be evaluated.
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- 1. SeptmuanbwWA nopewac paamowyunuaos a newse.
-2. Spema npe6wsawan paauowyxnnaos a newse 1
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- 5. Biopuwwoe paaucamposenhuse sarpmewswne sesaymuoA i
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- 2. Homehm newsewnero nepowoca.
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a pyxo'scauvenk ovaena Acammetpun se.paamaunowMcA rurmenw BHuPM AMH
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of met M3 ' CCCP.- Kunawm uss B. A.,
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l no rewersiweenuM stsentaM paanauuouworo c5nywowum nanawccan M; A..
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- Ana paEcTw a paMxax paraena 7.2. uenocompaswo npusnewh enemyuanx l
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APPENDIX V t
4 WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, JUNE 9, 1989 U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES (asof0VNE8,1989) 9
\\
l.
L l
l l:
1 b-I
WORKING GROUP MEETINGS, JUNE 9, 1989 U.S./U.S.S.R. JOINT COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES (as of JUNE 8,1989) 2.
Charles Negin Grove Engineering 15215 Shady Grove Road Rockville}27 MD 20850 301/258-2 Areas of interest:
life extension, abnormal waste disposal, data management with waste.
First contact: 3/15/89 2.
Byron Lee, Jr., President Nuclear Management and Resources Council 1776 Eye St., N. W.
Suite 30
'Washir-ton, D. C.
20036-2495 202/87b12D Areas of interest:
all First contact:
3/27/89 o
?
3.
' Harold B. Finger, President and Chief Executive Officer U. S. Council for Energy Awareness
- Suite 400 1776 Eye St.
Washin-ton 6.N.'W.
C.
20036 2495 I
L 202/295-0770 Areas of interest: all First contact: 3/29/89 4
Stanley J. Anderson, Vice President International and Supplier Division (INPO) s or George I. Hutcherson, Manager WorldAssociationofNuclearOperators(WANO)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Suite 15 Atlanta, GA 30339 404/95.1-7602 Areas of interest: operations first contact: 4/12/89 1
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Industry Participants (continued)-
5.-
Milton Levenson-Consultant to Bechtel 21 Politzer Drive Menlo Park CA 94025 415/322-1035 Areas of interest: unspecified First contact: 5/8/89 6.
Howard Larson, Senior Vice President Nuclear Energy Services Danbuh5220 CT 203/79 Areas of interest: decoenissioning and in-service inspection First contact: -5/8/89 7.
Laurence M. Strassner President Nuclear Support Servic,es, Inc..
r Post Office Box 3120 Hershey, PA 17033-717/838-8125 Areas of interest:
valves and operations, diagnostics and testing First contact: 5/9/89 8.
Robert Horne Vice President InternationalOperations Henze Movats Inc..
200 Chastain, Center Boulevard Suite 250-Kennesaw GA 30144 404/424-E343 Areas of interest: valves First contact: 5/9/89 S.
Thomas S. Baer U. S. Ecology,1e Road Inc.
9200 Shelbyv11 Suite 526 Louisville, KY 40222
-Area of interest: plant operations for waste prevention First contact: 5/10/89
- 20. Alexander Zucker, Associate Director i
. Nuclear Systems-and Engineering Martin Marietta Systems Oak Ridge National Laboratory Post Office Box 2008 Oak Ridge TN 37831-6248 615/574-9520' Area of interest:. all First contact: 5/11/89 2
IndustryParticipants(Continued)
- 11. Gail de Plangue
- Preside.it American Nuclear, Society 555 North Kensington Avenue la Gran 312/352ge Park, JL 60525 6611 Area of interest: all plus dosimetry First contact: 5/11/89
- 12. Lawrence E. Newhart President and CEO Operatina Plant Serv, ices, Floor Inc.
1818 MarEet Street, 22nd Philadelphia 19103 215/299-2434,PA Area of Interest:
First contact: 5/16/89
- 13. Robert Harstern Gro IndustrialServIcesupVice' President.
L and and-t
- 14. Scott Lebsack, Vice President L
Projects U. 5. Testing Co.
1415Hoboken}8X214.
NJ 07030 (800) 777-83 e
Areas of interest: quality assurance, outage succort and erosion / corrosion L
First contact:5/12/89 l
15.
Paul North Mana er Nuclear Rea,ctor kesearch and Technology EG&G Idaho Inc.
l MailStopE057-0 208/529-9833 P. D. Box-1625 Idaho-Falls ID-83415 Areas of interest: all First contact: 5/15/89
- 16. Mike Silvers, President i
h Pullman Power Products Pittsburgh, PA 412/562-7507 Areas of interest: all-First. contact: 5/16/89 L
- 17. Song T. Huang, Senior Section Manager Ralph M. Parsons Co.
100 W. Walnut Street Pasadena CA 91124-818/440-3342 Areas of interest: nuclear safety, architect / engineering, and waste i,
management First contact: 5/16/89 3
L
t Industry Particip, ants (Continued) 18.- Thomas W. Jenkins, Director Soviet Programs j
- 22. John E. Cormier, Director Simulation Systems Vadim Zinger, Business Manager, Eastern Euro-Anthoriy J. Tvarkunas, Program Mant.ger, WER ject Ashok Arora Singer Link-Miles Simulation Corporation 8895 McGaw Road Colimbia MD 21045 301/290$773 Area of interest: control roo's simulators.
Letter: 5/16/89
- 23. James H. Taylor, Manager Licens',ng Services Sabcock and Wilcox P.O. hox 10935 Lynchsurg, VA 24506-0935 804/335-2817 Areas of interest:
broad First contact: 5/18/89 t
s24. Herschel Specter New York State Power Authority 1
123 Main Street White Plains, NY 10601 914/681-6994 Areas of interest:
emergency planning and preparedness First contact: 5/18/89 25.
Ian B. Wall Soviet /EPRI Coordinator, Nuclear Power Division Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Post Office Box 10412 Palo Alto, CA 94303
~415/855-2954 1
Areas of interest:
severe accidents, fire protection, and embrittlement and annealing First contact: 5/18/89 i
- 26. Robert Mucica Rockwell International Rocket Dyne Division i
6663 Canoga Ave.
Mail Stop HA02 l
Cano CA 91303 818/ga Park 718-335$
l Areas of interest: PAA and reifability assessment First contact: 5/19/89 l
4 l'
1
'?
Industy Partic'ipants (Continued)
- 27. Amos Holt. Vice President or David Rosow, Director South West Research Institute San Antonio TX 78284 512/522-2075 Areas of interest: nuclear saSty and in-service inspection First contact:. 5/19/89 2L Edward A. Warsari, Senior ransulting Engineer Stone and Webster 245 Summer St.
5oston$ MA 02107 617/58 6510 or $89-1499 Areas of interest:- comparative analyses and severe accidents.
First contact: 5/22/C9
- 29. Don Leone Assistant Manager MechanicalDepartment l
Sargent and '. undy 55 East Monroe St.
Chicago,3886 IL '60603 312/269-Areas of interest: not specified First contact: 5/22/89 3..
Richard Broots Engineer and Manager Newport News Industrial Corporation
~,
700 Thimble Shoals Boulevard Suite 113 Newport News. VA 23606. 80d/380-7271 Areas of interest: embrittlement, service to nuclear industry and valve repair First contact: 5/24/89 31.- Robert Liner, Division Manager Science Application International Corporation 1710 Goodrich Drive McLean, VA 22102 703/821-4514
' Area of interest: reactor safe?.y Note: someone else may come First contact: 5/30/8a
' 32. David Rosow Southwest Research Institute 6220 Culebra Road P.O. Drawer 28510 San Antonio, TX-78284 512/522-2495-Area of interest: in-serv' ice inspection First contact: 5/30/89 5
.~.s
4 Industry Participants (Continueo) 33.- Edward Siegel and
- 34. Charles Brinkman Plant Structural Services Division Cosbustion Engineering 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 Rockville' MD 20852 301/881-7640and 203/285-4188 Area of interest: erosion / corrosion and radiation embrittlement First contact: 5/30/39 35.- Alex Zarechnak and
- 36. Douglas Chapin MPR Associates 1050 Connecticut Avenue N. W.
on, D. C.
2003E Washin$;2320 202/65 Areas of intere'st: analyses of plants and operational experience J
First contact: 5/31/89
- 37. Steven Stamm Plant Services Division Stone and Webster P. 0.. Box 2325 Boston, MA 02107 t
615/365-1245 617/589 7499 Areas of interest:. operational reporting. service water, and erosion / corrosion First contact:
5/31/89
.38.-
James Gleason, Director Nuclear Engineering and and
. 39. Sherwin Hyten, Director Utilit Services Wyle L boratories P.O. Box 077777 Huntsville, AL 35807-7777 205/837-4411 Areas of interest:
aging (environmental analysis),4saparative analysis, severe accidents D
First contact:
6/2/89
- 40. Jay James Principal JamesEngIneeri:g 6329 Fairmont Avenue El Cerrito Ca 94530 Areas of in,terest: safety and risk assessment First contact: 6/2/89 6
N
- ,. r..l t.,
..e Industry Participants (Continued)'
- 41. Norman Mulvenon, Export Manager EG&G-ORTEC 100 Midland Road Oak Ridge, TN 37831 615/483-2174 6/5/89, instruments for detection Areas of interest:
all First contact:
- 42. Chris Hamilton Manager PowerReactordevelopment General Atomics P. O. Box 85608 San Diego CA 52138 619/455-3364 Area of interest:
severe accidents First contact: 6/5/89
- 43. Noel Grimm, Principal Engineer Nuclear Advanced Technical Division Westinghouse Electric P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh PA 15230-0355
~412074-51Y9 Arc.. e est:. re: tor vessel annealing First contact:- 6/5/89
- 44. Michael A. Schoppaan Washington Nuclesr Representative Florida Power anc Light 3 Metn Center,.'iuite 610 Etr.u a, MS 301/652-2500 Area of inte est. operating events assessment First contact: 6n/89
- 45. Darrell Eisenhut, Senior Vice President Consulting Services Group NUS Corporation 910 Clopper Road Gaithersburg, MD 20877-0962 Areas of interest:
First contact:
6/7/89 Note: For additional infomation, contact:
Stephen Salomon, Technical Analyst International Programs 0ffice of Governmental and Public Affairs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 301/492-0368 l
1