ML20058H281

Forwards Listing of Tests,Changes & Experiments Completed During Oct 1990.Summary of SE in Compliance w/10CFR50.59 & 10CFR50.71(e)

ML20058H281
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	11/01/1990
From:	Robey R COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9011150107
Download: ML20058H281 (12)

Text

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Commonwealth Edison ound Cites Nuc6 ear Power Station e

'o 22710 206 Avenue t4 orth ootcava. Ilknois 61242 9740 b

Telephone 309t654-2241 RAR-90-78 November 1, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.

20555 4

SUBJECT:

Quad Cities Nucle 6r Station Units 1 and 2 Changes, Tests, and Experiments Completed NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265 Enclosed please find a listing of those changes, tests, and experiments

-completed during the month of October, 1990, for Quad-Cities Station Units 1 and 2 DPR-29 and DPR-30. A summary of the safety evaluations are being reported in compliance with 10CFR50.59 and 10CFR50.71(e).

Respectfully, COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION 0

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R. A. Rob Technicaly uperintendent RAR/LFD/vmk Enclosure cc:

A.B. Davis, Regional Administrator T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector 002711 ootti o107 9o1101 T_6 4-7 ADOCK0500y,"y4 L.: e; OR m

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Safety Evaluation #90-625 l

Core Monitoring Code (CMC) Upgrade From PANAC07 to PANAC08 i

l Description l

This is a reyhton of the Core Monitoring Code being installed to upgrade

. t.he' 3-D diff usion tode, PANACEA, from revision PANAC07 to revision PANAC08.

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Evaluation f

1.

The_ probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, f

-or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because this installation involves a computer program which has no control over any_ equipment, and therefore can not increase the-probability of-an hl occurrence or cause any equipment to malfunction. Also, the code U

revision docs-not affect the thermal limits calculated, and-therefore the consequence of an' accident remains the same as reported in the FSAR.

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l D-2.- The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final-Safety Analysis Report is not created because.the program is utilized for safety related calculations concerning-thermal limits. These limits are not changed j

by the-new revision of_ PANACEA. _Since the limits do not change. the assumed-basis for cccidents and malfunctions in the FSAR remains the.

4 same. Therefores there is no possibility of a different type of j

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-accident or malfunction than those described in the FSAR.

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The margin of safety, as defined.in'the. basis for.any-Technical Speci--

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.fication is'not reduced because thu revision of PANACEA from PANAC07

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to PANAC08 doeslnot affect the.resulting_ thermal limits as calculated' l

by: CMC for the various fuel types. Therefore, the margin of safety-

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remains the same.

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' Safety Evaluation #90-750 l

ED-6 Option 2 (C-Model ODCS) Calculation l

Description j

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!A constant of 472 was omitted from the calculation of true release rate.

The C-Model program will be changed to perform the-c.alculations as per the p.

' procedure.

i Evaluation ~

1..The probability of an occurrence or.the consequence of an accident.

or malfunction of equipment.important to safety as previously evaluated

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in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because accident assessment will, improve as a result of correcting errors in the existing 1..

-code.:

f 2; -The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type 4

than any?previouslyl evaluated in.the Finni Safety Analysis Repore u*.

' is.not, created because correcting an error in coding will; improve

. assessment and provide more accurate information to TSC environs

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13.,JThe margin of safety, as defined in the.bseis for any Technical Speci-n efication.iis not reduced'because no setpoints or-. trips-use this informa-a-

l tion.- 1The. actual procedures are not' changed.: only 'the computer model -

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Safety Evaluation #90-663 Minor Design Change 4-2-90-137 Diesel Generator Fuse Holder Replacement Description This minor design change replaced the fuse holders for fuses F23 and F24 in the local control panel for the Unit Two Emergency Diesel Generator. The old fuse holders nad worn and no longer held the fuses tightly.

The new fuse holders are of a bakelite material, replacing the old ceramic material fuse holders, which are no longer available.

1 Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the probabiltty of the Unit Two Emergency Diesel Generator not functioning properly has not increased. The probability of an occurrence of an accident or malfunction is not increased (FSAR Sect. 8.3.1).

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report was not created because the change is limited to the fuse holders internal to the Unit Two Emergency Diesel Generator, which has been previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Function of Diesel Generator Control Circuitry remains unchanged.

3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-fication, is not reduced because the new fuse holders are of similar quality as the originals, and are being dedicated to safety-related.

The dedication process will assure the reliability of the new fuse holders.

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7 Minor Design Change 4-0-90-106-M Yard Potable ^iater and Sewer Lines c,

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' Description s,

Rerouted' yard potable water and sewer 110es to allow construction of the g'

-new service building addition.

E, Evaluation-e e

.1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident.

M or malfunction of; equipment important to safety as previously evaluated.

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function of the piping involved in this change is not affected by in the Final' Safety Analysis' Report is not increased because the design 4

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changing its-location.-

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'2. FThe possibility.for an accident or malfunction of a different type

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-is not created because the-piping involved in this change is non-safety.

u p > y;s related and its relocation will_not change its design function.or 1

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<the design function of'any safety-related components.

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,3.

The marginLof, safety..as. defined in the basis for'any Technical Spec-

[p l, s ificationh isinot_ reduced because;the piping involved in this change 1

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.h Minor Design Change 4-2-90-29 f

RilR lin 1003A Discharge Flow Recorder l

L Description i

. Replaced existing CE/MAC recorder with Johnson Yokogawa recorder utilizing new' flush mounting detail.

Due to proximity to this recorder, replaced recorder l

2-1602-7 also.

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' Evaluation p

l.. The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident i

or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously' evaluated f,

' recorder performs the same function as the existing recorder it replaces.

in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because the-new l

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No new functions added or changed.

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'2.' ' The possibility for'an accident or malfunction of a difference type than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety' Analysis Report l

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- isinot-created because replacement recorder meets seismic criteria t

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whereas existing did not meet that criteria.

Possibility" is reduced..

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~3.

The margin of safety,'as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-

• .s fication, is'not reduced-because actual margin of safety during a postulated seismic event is increased due to new-criteria ~ incorporated a

1 Lin. modifications.

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. Special Test #1-149 s,

. Safety Evaluation #90-639 and #90-728 RHR Heat Exchanger

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Description f'

.... lSpecial Test.No. 1-149 was completed October 30, 1990. The purpose of h

this special testiverified the effectiveness of the Unit One A RHR' Heat Exchanger heat. transfer.t ST Evaluation m-

$ '..,11t;was determined.that noj-10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation was required for'

'this special test.

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Safety Evaluation #90-252 L

Turbine Torsional Telemetry Instrumentation Installation Procedure Description o

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, Turbine Torsional Telemetry Instrumentation was insta11od on the Unit L

Two Low. Pressure rotors at bearing locations #4, #6, and #8.

This involved I

attaching two strain gauges on the Low Pressure shafts at each of the-three L

locations'using epoxies.

A specially machined torque collar was then installed

_at each location and will rotate with the turbine shaft. A stationary radio-L pickup antenna was also installed;at each location. This antenna was held

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in place by fabricated brackets which are bolted to existing holes in the bearings.

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.This Telemetry Instrumentation has been used by General Electric and ABB several times before.to perform this test.

This test was attempted on September'28, L

but was aborted before data was taken, and therefore the test was never completed.

Evaluation -

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The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction _of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated

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in the: Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because in Section 11

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of.the'FSAR,'the-postulated accident associated with the Turbine-Generator System is that caused by the rotors breaking apart and pro-i ducing missiles which could damage safety-related equipment. The 4

r FSAR states that even'if missiles were generated, the plant could t'

still be. shutdown safety since redundant safety-related equipment j

.o would be unaffected.

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the low pressure rotor shafts will not change or affect the operation of-the Turbine-Generator System. The malfunction or failure of this

' telemetry instrumentation would.in no way increase the probability.

V for an accident or malfunction as previously evaluated in the FSAR.

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2. ! - The possibility for~an accident or malfunctis i of-a different type p

than any previously_ evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report F:

is not created because Section 11 of the FSAR covers the worst case F

.scenerio adavciated with the Turbine-Generator System. The installa-tion of this instrumentation will not introduce _any new failure mode to the Turbine-Generator System which has not already been evaluated

'a in Section 11 of'the FSAR.

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E The torque' collars and strain gauges are the only parts of the Tele-metry Instrumentation that will be rotating with the turbine shaft.

The torque collara are small and compact and are machined precisely for each shaft location.

The strain gauges along with the torque 1

collars will have a negligibic effect on the balance of the Turbine-i Generator System.

.3.

The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any. Technical Speci-

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fication, is not reduced because the Turbine-Generator System's reliability does not form the basia for any Technical Specification, therefore, the

margin of-safety is not reduced.

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Special Test #2-95 Partial B Safety Evaluation #90-601 Turbine Torsional Response Test Description Special Test No. 2-95 Partial B was attempted October 27, 1990.

The purpose of this test was to provide the steps necessary to determine the precise location of the Unit Two Turbine-Generator Rotor System torsional resonant frequencien.

This test was to ensure adequate separation between possible resonant frequencies occurring near 120 llz and dynamic torques also occurring at 120 llz to prevent excessive torsional response of the rotor system.

This test was aborted on October 27 before data was taken, therefore the test was never completed.

Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident, or malfunction of equipment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased because in Section 11 of the FSAR, the postulated accident associated with the Turbine-Generator system is that caused by the rotors breaking apart and producing missiles which could damage safety-related equipment. The FSAR states that even if missiles were generated, the plant could still be shutdown safely since redundant safety-related equipment would be unaffected.

During this test, turbine speed will be held lower than that encountered during performance of the annual turbine backup overspeed test.

The torsional load produced during this test will be much lower than the torque produced during normal operation.

Normal operating torque is a function of generator load.

Since the voltage and current induced in the generator stator will be limited to a small fraction of the machine rating, the torque produced during performance of this test will also be much lower than normal.

Therefore, the performance of this special test procedure will not increase the probability of an occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of. equipment as previously evaluated in the FSAR.

2.

The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any prevf.ously evaluated in the Fiani Safety Analysis Report is not creat?J because execution of this procedure will disable the turbine mechanical overspeed trip mechanism. Turbine overspeed protection will still be provided by the-electrical overspeed protection circuitry which is set at approximately 107 percent of rated speed (1934 RPM).

This trip will not be (Msabled by any portion of this test procedure.

Execution of this test procedure calls for a maximum turbine speed

.of approximately 1900 RPM.

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Section 11 of the FSAR covers the worst case scenario associated with J

the Turbine-Cenerator System.

The postulated accident is that caused f!(

-by the. turbine rotors breaking apart and producing missiles which could damage safety-related equipment.

The FSAR states that even 3 ;.

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if. missiles were generated, the plant could still be shutdown safely L

since; re:lundant safety-related equipment would be unaf fected.

Due to' t'rn.aiow acceleration rate used during this test, the turbine

, s control valve (TCV) output to the turbine bypass valves may influence N

- and/or aggravate turbine speed. Therefore it will be necessary to F

electronically decouple the bypass valves from the TCVs. This will allow the. bypass valves to control reactor pressure and.the TCVs to-b

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control turbine speed. This alteration does not introduce any new-a failure modes to the EHC; system. All the scrams required.for the.

' STARTUP mode will be functional during the performance'of this test.

3..Thelmargin-of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-l fication,:-is' not' reduced because all scrams required for the STARTUP mode as listed in Technical-Specification. Table 3.1-2 will be. functional-J bl.

during the performance of this test.- Therefore,'the margin-of. safety.

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as defined in the basis for any Technical l Specification, will'not ibe reduced during performance of this test.

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p' Special Test #2-97

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Diesel Generator Auto Start Logic

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. Description-t f.1,Special Test No.'2-97 was completed.on October 17.11990.

This test. recorded L.'

the time required for.' Auto Start _ Relays and Fast Start Relays to close and E

seal-in'upon' receiving a sumulated Unit Two Diesel Generator auto-start signal, j

from ACB 152-2403-(MainLFeed ACB to Bus 24).

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' it wasLdetermined-that'no: 10CFR50.59 Safety Evaluation was required for' l

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Procedure Change QIS 6-1, Revision $

High Drywell Pressure Scram Calibration and Functional Test W-Description LAdded prerequisite to inform Shift Engineer of anticipated 1/2 Group II and}1/2 scram'by performance of this procedure. Added procedural NOTE to ensure

<that~a full Group 11 isolation may/will occur if there is a 1/2 Group 11 signal already in'th'e circuit. Provided clarification of pressure setpoints.

f4 Evaluation 1.

The probability of an occurrence o.

the consequence of an accident, g

y or malfunction of-equipment.important to safety as previously evaluated 2

in the Final Safety Analysis Report is not increased.because the intent-and performance.of this procedure is not altered by this revision,

[ga' thun the accidents / malfunctions evaluated in th6 FSAR are not affected.

pc 2.

The' possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type t

fh than any previously evaluated in the Final Safety A0alysis Report p4 is-not created because this revision provided clarification of expected:

E, results and ensures awareness of intent of this procedure only, the intent of~ procedure and the principal performance steps have not'been

' altered, thust an accident / malfunction of a different type.has not

-been created.

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.The: margin of safety, as. defined in the basis for any Technical Speci-m fication, is not reduced.because this revision does not alter drywell pressure trip setpoints,.nor does.this procedure alter performance-steps '

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