ML20058E209
| ML20058E209 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/20/1982 |
| From: | Vincent R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-06-04, TASK-6-4, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8207280096 | |
| Download: ML20058E209 (66) | |
Text
.
O Consumers Power Company General Offices: 1945 West Parnati Road, Jackson, MI 49201 e (517) 788 0550 July 20, 1982 Dennis M Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 5 Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-155 - LICENSE DPR BIG ROCK POINT PLANT - RESPONSE TO j
DRAFT SER ON SEP TOPIC VI-4, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM By letter dated June 11, 1982 the NRC submitted a draft safety evaluation report (SER) of SEP Topic VI-4, " Containment Isolation System".
This letter requested Consumers Power Company responses to four (4) outstanding items which identify staff concerns about the adequacy of isolation provisions on selected piping penetrations.
In summary, the outstanding items are as follows:
1.
Adequacy of isolation provisions in test, vent and drain lines; 2.
Adequacy of isolation or leak detection provisions on ECCS subsystems; 3.
Adequacy of isolation provisions on instrument lines; and 4.
Adequacy of isolation provisions on closed systems.
In addition to the above concerns, the SER indicates that in the case of item 1 there is a lack of administrative controls.
/ 035' A review of valve check-off sheets has shown that those test, vent and drain f
line valves identified in the SER (VFW-138, VFW-171 and VPI-101) are included on valve checklists and thus are administrative 1y controlled. A breach in a ih test, vent or drain line leading to a failure of containment isolation would necessarily involve a passive failure such as a pipe break. Analyses per-formed in conjunction with the Big Rock Point PRA have indicated that passive failures are a negligible contributor to the overall containment isolation failure probability.
Those valves identified under item 2 as being part of ECCS subsystems and maintained in a locked open position are kept in such a position to assure availability of the ECCS system if called upon to function. As is the case ocC782-0014bl42 8207200096
I D M Crutchfield, Chief 2
Big Rock Point Plant SEP Topic VI-4 July 20, 1982 with the test, vent and drain line valves, the ECCS system would be required to experience a passive failure in order for containment isolation to be lost.
Items 3 and 4 involve the isolation of instrument lines and systems designated as closed inside containment. As with cases 1 aad 2 described above, a loss of containment isolation would have to be the result of a passive failure.
Reference is made in the draft SER to analyses performed as part of the Big Rock Point PRA to determine the probability of containment isolation failure.
Because of the small source term applicable to Big Rock Point, a very conservative approach was used in the original PRA which resulted in a failure probability of.25/ demand.
Because this value was somewhat high, a reanalysis was undertaken to more realistically assess the issue. The reanalysis concluded that the failure probability was actually about.06/ demand.
It is believed this reanalysis.is still conservative in that only valves subject to periodic leak testing are considered suitable for containment isolation purposes. The magnitude of this containment failure probability is dominated by active failures such as the failure of a valve to close when called upon to do so.
The reanalysis, which is to be incorporated into the Big Rock Point PRA report, is included as an attachment to this letter. Those parts of the PRA report to be revised by the attached material include Appendix IV,Section IV.3, Probability of Failure to Isolate Containment, and Appendix V, Table V.5-4, Summary of Important Accident Sequences for Big Rock Point.
This revision will be formally transmitted to holders of controlled copies of the PRA under separate cover.
The Consumers Power Company review of the technical details in the draft SER is currently in progress.
Based on the review to date,.however, it is clear that comments will be extensive and that numerous corrections to the SER will be required. These comments will be transmitted to the NRC upon completion of our review.
G-tr L42~
Robert A Vincent Staff Licensing Engineer CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC NRC Resident Inspector-Big Rock Point 2 pages oc0782-0014bl42
BIG ROCK POINT PLANT PRA REVISED SECTION IV.3 APPENDICES IV & V
& TABLE V.5-4 l
l I
1 ic0782-0014a142 l
IV-11 Fo.r the 1% power case, the average heat flux is 6
2 o = (7.5 x 10 Btu /h) + (84 assembly x 115 rods x 0.686 ft / rod) 6 Q = (7.5 x 10 ) + (6624 ft2) 2
$ = 1132 Btu /h-ft Thereisalsoa31peakingfactorsothat the maximum heat flux is 2378 Bru/h-ft However, since the maximum flux will probably not occur at the point of maximum coolant temperature (ie, at~the exit), we will use the average heat flux for the calculation.
As previously noted, the equilibrium flow rate for the 1% power case without considering the pump resistance was 7.3 x 103 lb/h and the corresponding exit coolant temperature was 2355 F.
The cladding temperature is therefore given by Tclad = 2355 + 4/h 2
where o = 1132 Btu /h-ft h = 1.4 x 10-3.8 = 1.725 Btu /h-ft2_op 9
We therefore have Tclad = 2355 + 1132/1.725 > 3000 F Therefore, even without considering the pump resistance, the cladding temperature reaches unacceptable values.
Oxidation will occur which will result in an exothermic reaction, thereby increasing te'mperatures even higher.
The oxide film will also increase the thermal resistance of the cladding, thereby raising the temperature of the fuel.
IV.
2.3 CONCLUSION
S Based upon this simplified model, it is concluded that it would not be possible to remove 1/2 to 1% power from the BRP by natural losses alone.
In order to achieve an equilibrium steam flow rate, the coolant temperature rise needed to support a buoyant driving force would raise the cladding temperature above 3000 F even if losses through critical items such as the pump are not considered.
If such losses are considered, the resulting temper-atures are well above the clad melting point.
IV.3 PROBABILITI OF FAILURE TO ISOLATE CONTAINMENT An analysis was undertaken to analyze the probability that the BRP containment will fail to provide isolation.
The specific systems examined were determined based upon work previously done as part of The Big Rock Point Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
The i
I ma0481-1509a-72-158
IV-12 8
following systems were considered those in which containment isolction failures were most likely to occur:
1.
Locks 6.
Demin Water 2.
Vent Valves 7.
Treated Waste 3.
Steamline 8.
Fuel Pit Drain 4.
Feedwater 9.
Resin Sluice 5.
Sumps Each system was analyzed by first developing a fault tree in which the paths to containment isolation failure were identified.
Containment isolation was found to fail as the result of 1 of 2 mechanisms:
1.
Leakage through a valve, or 2.
Failure of a valve to close.
The leakage history of containment isolation valves was obtained by reviewing leak test reports. " Valve failure to close probabil-ities were determined from reliability data presented in Appendix III of the PRA report.
The leakage and failure to close proba-bilitics were then incorporated into the fault trees to obtain the probability that a particular system would fail to provide containment isolation.
IV.3.1 RESULTS OF ANALYSIS The overall probability of failure to isolate containment was calculated to be 6.1 x 10'2 Table IV.4 indicates each system's contribution to this failure probability.
Primary contributors to containment isolation failure are flow through the vent valves, steamline and feedwater lines.
For this analysis, the probability that the main steamline would l
not provide containment isolation was taken to be equal to the probability that the MSIV (MO-7050) would fail to close with no
(
credit being taken for valves located downstream of the MSIV.
A l
leak test program being developed for main steamline valves (CV-4014, CV-4104, CV-4106, ST-01 and SVD-101) could reduce the likelihood of containment isolation failure.
Check valves in the feedwater line (VFW 9 and 304) have failed all recent leak tests making the current probability of contain-ment isolation failure due to flow through the feedwater lines equal to ~1.0.
New check valves are being installed in the feedwater line however, replacing valves VFW-300 and 301.
The containment failure analysis was performed assuming the new check valves were in place and that generic failure data was applicable.
An important point to note concerning the leakage failure mode probability is that only one contributor, the vent valves, ma0481-1509a-72-158 l
IV-13 results in a flowpath directly to the environment.
and fuel pit penetrations drain into radwaste tanks. Both the sump The steam drum /feedwater containment penetrations lead back into the fced-water or condensate system inside the turbine building.
Because of the rather tortuous routes involved and the number of barriers which must be breached outside of containment before any radio-active releases through these penetrations can ultimately reach the environment, the source terms associated with these contain-ment penetrations (except for possibly the noble gases) are expected to be much less valves.
than those associated with the vent The anal however,ysis presented here has considered only active failures.
for completeness, it was necessary to examine passive failures of containment systems and structures.
Accidents such as an ATWS.with unsuccessful poison injection could result in containment overpressurization and failure.
mechanistic passive failures have been addressed on a sequence ch Su by-sequence basis as part of Appen' dix V, "Radionuclide Release and Consequence Analysis."
Failure mechanisms were not identi-fied for containment penetrations such as those through which electrical cable and instrumentation piping pass.
These penetra-tions were therefore not considered susceptible to a passive failure.
Passive failure of containment structures such as the service water system due to high-energy line breaks is possible.
The likelihood of such a line break causing rupture of contain-ment or piping structures depends on the accessibility of the high-energy lines to those components and the probability that these sections of high-energy lines will rupture.
It is felt that the contribution of this mechanism to the containment failure probability to be negligible when compared to the magnitude of the failure rate of active components.
l l
l l
t l
l l
l l
l ma0481-1509a-72-121
IV-16 TABLE IV.4 Probability of Failure to Isolate Containment Locks 1.95 x'10-4 Vents 1.142 x 10-2 Steamline 3.84 x 10-2 Feedwater 1.34 x 10-2 (a)
Sumps 3.15 x 10-4 Demin Water 1.142 x 10-7 Treated Waste 5.75 x 10-5 Fuel Pit Drain 1.1 x 10-4 Resin Sluice 3.455x10-0 6.42 x 10-2
- The feedwater failure to isolate probability was determined by
~
assuming that Valves VFW6 and VFW2 are made motor operated and generic failure data is applicable.
l ma0481-1509a-72-158 m
cv
1 APPENDIX IV.4.2 Failure to Isolate Containment. Fault. Trees, Component Leakage Data and Calculation of Failure to Isolate Containment Probabilitics 1.
Locks:
l'ailure Personnel, Equipment To and Escapc*
Isolate I
Flow Flow Thru Thru Outr,ide Inside of Lock of Lock y
I I
I I
Door Leakage Door I.cakage Open Thru Open Door i
I I
Leakage **
Check Valve Thru Leakage Door l
l
- Escape lock does not contain a check valve.
- Leahage thru door includes leakage thru door and Icakage thru equalizing value (leakage thru the equalizing valve was not. independently determined).
ma0582-0143b-72-123
2 TAllLE IV.4.2.1.a_
Personnel Lock Testing Slope i
Testing Leak Rate Interval Lb/24 lle)
Date Lb/24 IIr (Days)
Day 8/21/64 10.14 2/ 9/64 23.78 172
.0793 8/24/65
.7997 196
.1172 2/ 5/66 2.3 165
.00);
8/13/66 1.34 189
.0051 2/21/67 17.55 192
.0844 8/18/67 7.9 178
.0542 3/ 4/68 0.0 199
.0397 9/ 9/68 34.2 183
.181 i
4/ 2/69 7.73 205
.1291 10/14/69 6.75 195
.005 4/14/70 6.08 182
.0037 10/11/70 1.44 180
.0258 4/14/71 6.95 185
.0298
-10/15/71 0.0 184
.0376 3/ 7/72 3.38 143
.0236 11/ 6/72 4.95 213
.0074 4/25/73 8.5 170
.0209 10/ 8/73 4.83 166
.0221 3/22/74 4.84 165
.00006 9/30/74 6.7 192
.0097 3/15/75 52.07 166
.2733 3/15/75 17.42 (Retest) 8/23/75 17.42
- 161, 0.0 9/22/75 4.9 30
.4173 4/21/76 1.7 211
.0152
- 7/20/76 1.7 90 0.0 11/23/76 0..)
126
.0135 5/31/77
.26 189
.0014 1/11/78 5.i2 225
.0216 9/ 4/78 2.12 257
.0117 ma05.82-0143b-72-121
3 Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval (I,b/24 Hr)
Date Lb/24 Ifr (Days)
Day 1/20/79 19.54 138
.1262 8/28/79 10.048 220
.0431 4/29/80 3.125 245
.0283 10/26/80
.0018 (TS Fraction) 150
.0154 Total Time Avg Slope =.0043 Period = 5910 Assume Leakage Limit
= 225 lb/24 hr (~1/2 Tech Spec Limit)
Time to Failure =
225
.0043
= 52517.763 Days
- Test Periods =
52517.763 182.5 Day
287.76856 Leakage Probabil-ity
288-287.76856 _
~
288
~
8.036 x 10 ma0582-0143b-72-121
4 TABLE IV.4.2.1.b Personnel Lock Check Valve Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval (Lb/24 lir) i Date Lb/24 Mr (Days)
Day 9/22/75
.01 4/21/76
.00099 211
.000043 7/20/76
.00099 90 0.0 11/23/76
.0059 126
.000038 5/31/77 0.0 189
.000031 3/14/78
.0078 287
.000027 1/23/79
.0005 315
- 000023 8/29/79
.068 218
.00031 4/15/80
.0108 230
.00025 10/12/80 0.0 180
.00006 Total Time AvgSlope_g Period = 1848 7.81 x 10 I
Leakage Limit
~ 225 lb/24 hr Time to Failure =
225
.0000781
= 2,880,921.9 Days I
- Test Periods =
2880921.9 182.5
= 15785.873 ma0582-0143b-72-121
S Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval (Lb/24 lir)
Date Lb/24 Hr (llays) _.
Day Leakage Probabil-ity =
15786-15785.873 15786 8.02 x 10 ~
ma0582-01435-72-121
6 TABLE IV.4.2.1.c Eqtilpment Lock Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval Lbf_24ff -)
Date 2
3 Lb/24 IIr
_(Days)
Day 8/21/64 16.58 2/ 9/65 12.8 172
.022 8/24/65 87.467 196
.381 2/ 5/66 0.0 165
.5301 S/13/66 16.0 189
.0847 2/21/67 48.55 192
.1695 8/18/67 0.0 178
.2728 3/ 4/68 0.0 199 0.0 9/ 9/68 0.0 189 0.0 4/ 2/69 32.3 205
.1576 10/14/69 61.6 195
.1503 4/14/70 1.44 182
.3305 10/11/70 70.865 180
.3857 4/14/71 121.99 185
.2764 10/15/71 133.11 184
.0604 3/ 7/72 42.52 143
.6335 11/ 6/72 26.40 213
'.0757 4/25/73 32.9 170
.0382 10/ 8/73 27.66 166
.0316 3/22/74 18.84 165
.0535 9/30/74 13.9 192
.0257 3/15/75 31.74 166
.1075 3/15/75 8.69 (RETEST) 4/27/75 8.74 43
.0012 S/23/75 8.74 118 0.0 9/22/75 20.55 30
.3937 4/21/76 12.63 211
.0375
?7/20/76 12.63 90 0.0 11/23/76 1.3 126
.0899 ma0582.0143h-72-121
7 1
1 Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval
_ Days)
(Lb/24 lir)
Date Lb/24 Hr
(
Day 5/31/77 2.83 189
.0081 3/14/78 30.1 287
.095 1/27/79 2.506 319
.0865 8/29/79 2.762 214
.0012 l
4/29/80 35.65 244
.1348 10/26/80
.0018 (TS Fraction) 180
.1936 Total Time Avg Slope <0.0 Period =
5910 Days Assume Equip Lock Leakage Probabil-ity = Personnel Lock Probability 4=
8.036 x 10 I
l I
ma05S2.0143b-72-121-
8 TA!!LE IV.4.2.1.d 1
Eqisipment Lock Clicek Valve Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval (Lb/24 Hr)
Date Lb/24 Hr (Days)
Day 9/22/75
.15 4/21/76
.0242 211
.0000596 7/20/76
.0242 90 0.0 11/23/76
.0079 126
.00013 5/31/77
.01 189
.0000111 3/14/78
.0052 287
.0000167 1/30/79
.0031 322
.0000065 8/30/79
.024' 212
.0000986 4/15/80
.0229 229
.0000048 10/12/80 0.0 180
.0000127 Total Time Avg Slope <0.0 Period =
1848 Assume Leakage Probability ~ 0.0 l
in:iO582-0143b 121
9-TAT!!J. I V. 4. 2.1. r-Escape I,oci:
Testing Testing Leak Rate Slope Date Interval
__ Days)
Tb/24 lir)
Lb/24 lir
(
Day 8/21/64 20.07 2/ 9/65 7.2 S/24/65 172 7.852
.0748 2/ 5/66 196 0.0
.0033 165 8/13/66 7.91
.0476 2/21/67 1,89
._0419 4/87 192 8/18/67 "0.0
-/0158 3/ 4/68 178 f
0.0
.0274 7
f 9/ 9/(8 199 1.83 0.0 4/ 2/69 189
)
17.1
.0099 10/14/69 205 e'
.0742 22.6
.195 4/14/70 57.6
.0283 182 10/11/70 15.585
.1923 4/14/70 180 57.6
.2334 10/11/70 182
.1923 15.585
/
180 4/14/70 0.0
.2334 10/15/71 185
'.0842 0.0
,, ~
184 3/ 7/72 0.0 0.0 11/ 6/72 143 17.7
. 0.0
~~
4/25/73 213 9.9
.0831 10/ 8/73 170 f
0.0
.0459 d
8/23/75 166 0.0
.0596 684 9/22/75 6.61 0.0
- 4/21/76 30 10.15'
.2203 211 11/23/76 12J3E
.0168 5/31/77 216
.0102 7.19 3/15/78
.235
.0273
/;
189 10/ 7/78 288 f j
.53
.0241
'f 207 1/23//9 1.6281
.0014 Y
108 d-
.0102 e
,/
/
e ma0;' S2.01633 l121 l
a ta f,
_7 10 s
p r
r Testing
' Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval
(~Lb/24 IIr Date Lh/24Ifr (Days)
~ Day S/20/79 2.954 219
.0061 4/30/80 0.0 244
.012 10/26/80
O.0 179 0.0 Total Time Avg Slope <0.0 Period =
5910 Days Assume Escape Lock Leakage Probabil-ity = Personnel Lock Leakage Probabil:4 ity = 8.036 x 10
- Prior to 11/76 the volumes assigned to the personnel, equipment, and escape locks were approximately four times greater than their actual volumes. Therefore leak rates determined prior to this time are over estimated by a factor of four.
ma0582-0143b-72-121
11 LOCKS A.
Personnel Leahage probability through door (assume 1eakage through inner and outer doors are equal):
~0 Leakage through check valve = 8.02 x 10 6 8.036 x 10 Assume inner door open 10%
outer door open 10%
both doors closed 80%
Leakage through inside:
(Leakage thrgugh door) + (chgek valve leakagg)
(8.036 x 10 ) + (8.02 x 10 ) = 8.116 x 10 1.
Inside Door Open:
Flow through inside = 1.0 Flow through outsjde = (leakage through outside) + (outside door open) = 8.036 x 10-4 +
0.0 = 8.036 x 10 Failure to isolate = (flow through inside)(flow through outside) = (1.0)(8.036 x 10 ) = 8.036 x 10'
~
2.
Outside Door Open:
Flow through outside = 1.0 Flow through,jnside = (leakage through inside) + (inside door open) = (8.116 x 10 4) + 0.0
= 8.116 x 10 Failure to isolate = (1.0)(8.116 x 10 ) = 8.116 x 10 ~0
~
3.
Both Doors Closed:
Flou through inside = Icakage through inside = 8.116 x 10-4 Flow through outside = leakage through outside = 8.036 x 10,4 Failure to igolate = (leakage through inside)(leakage through outside) = (8.116 x 10~0)(8.036 x 10~0)
= 6.522 x 10 Total personpel lock failure to isolate =.1(8.116 x 10-4) 1.1(8.036 x 10 ) +.8(6.522 x 10 )
~
~
~
= 1.62 x 10 "
ma0582-0143h-72-121
i 12 B.
Equipment 1.cakage probabilities assumed same as for Personnel I.ock (except check valve Icakage probability ~0.0)
I.ssume inner and outer door open ~ 1 week / year.
1.
Inside Door Open:
(Same as Personnel Lock)
Failure to isolate = 8.036 x 10,4 2.
Outside Door Open:
(Flow throuRh inside)(flow through outside) = (1.0)(8.036 x 10,4)
Failure to isolate = 3.036 x 10 3.
Both Doors Closed:
(Flow through inside)(flow through outside) = (8.036 x 10_f,) 2 Failure to isolate = 6.458 x 10' Totalequipment1ockfailuretoisogate=
.02(8.036 x 10 4) +.02(8.036 x 10
) +.96(6.458 x 10-7) = 3.28 x 10-5 C.
Escape Lock I.cakage probabilities assumed same as for equipment lock inner door tested once/ day, assume inner door cpen
~.1%
1.
Inside Door Open:
Failure to isolate = (8.036 x 10' )(1.0) = 8.036 x 10
~
2.
Outside Door Open:
Fai. lure to isolate = (8.036 x 10~0)(1.0) = 8.036 x 10~4 3.
1:oth Doors Closed:
Failure to ir.olate = (8.036 x 10-4)(8.036 x 10~0) = 6.458 x 10' Total er:rapg lock failure to isolate =.001 (C.036 x 10-4) 1 0.0 (8.036 x 10-4) +.999 (6.458 x 10-7) =
1.449 x 10 outer door open ~01 ma05f;2-0143h-72-121
13 Locks total failure to isolate =
(Personnel lock failure to isolate) +
(Equipment lock failure to isolate) +
(Escape locg) failure to isojate) =
(1.61 x 10
+ (3.28 x 10 ) + 1.449 x 10
= 1.95 x 10
-6
-4 ma0582-0143b-72-121
p 2.
Vent Valves:
Failure to jisolatej
?
js I
I Exhaust Supply Valves Valves
}TC FTC
[
l I
I I
i CV 4094 CV 4095 CV 4096 CV 4097 I
I?oes Not Does Not Does Not Does Not Close Close L Close Close r
m m
r i
I I
I I
I I
I Solenoid CV 4094 Solenoid CV 4095 Solenoid 3CV 4096 Solenoid CV 4097 Valves FTC or Valves
}TC or Valves
,FTC or Valves FT,C or Fail Leaks Fail Leaks Fail Leaks Fail Leaks a
\\
f
'T r
m m
I
. __l.
I L
I -
I I
Solenoid 1:olenoid Solenoid _l Solenoid I Solenoid l Solenoid Solenoid Solenoid Valve Valve Valve Valve f
Valve Valve Valve Valve Fails to Stuck Fails to Stuck Fails to l Stuck l
Fails to Stuck i
, De-E J e_rg ige _
Open De-Energize,
Open De-Energize _
]
Open l
De-Energize Open i
L.
Y
/
ma0582-0143h-72-121
15 SV l
SV Fails to 3 h,'De-Energize Fails to
/
De-Energize
(\\
0 m
7 l
l t
SV 9153 SV 9154 SV 9151 SV 9152 1
Fails to Fails to Fails to Fails to
_De-Energize
_De-Energize De-Energize De-F ergize SV SV Stuck 2\\
- Stuck Aen
,/
Open
(
0 gs sp I
i l
Stuck '
SV 9151 SV 9152 Stuck Stuck Stuck i
_Open l
Open Open Open ma0582-0143b-72-121
15 TABI.E IV.4.2.2.a Exhaust Vent. Valves Testing Slope Test.ing Leak Rate Interval
- 1) ate I.b/24 Hr (Days)
(Lb/24 IIr)
Day 8/21/64 6.61 2/ 9/65 2.33 172
.0249 8/24/65 8.512 196
.0315 2/ 5/66 28.679 188
.1073 8/13/66 96.0 189
.3562 2/21/67 3.09 192
.4839 8/18/67 15.8 179
.0710 3/ 4/68 26.278 199
.0527 9/ 9/68 34.8 189
.0451 4/ 2/69 47.3 205
.061 10/14/69 33.2 195
.0723 4/14/70 36.84 182
.02 10/11/70 17.291 180
.1086 4/14/71 33.22 185
.0861 10/11/71 19,83 180
.0744 3/ 7/72 25.45 148
.038 11/ 6/72 15.15 244
.0422 4/25/73 15.5 170
.0021 10/ 8/73 21.12 166
.034 3/22/74 29.12 165
.0485 9/30/74 16.0 192
.0683 3/15/75 90.37 166
.4480 4/27/75 77.06 43
.3095 8/23/75 77.06 118 0.0 9/22/75 90.90 30
.4613 4/21/76 101.23 212
.0487 7/20/76 101.23 90 0.0 11/23/76 31.89 126
.5503 5/31/77 31.89 189 0.0 ma0582-0143h-72-121
17 Testing Testing Leak Rate Slope Date Interval J1ays)_
(Lb/24 lir)
Lb/24 11r nay__
7/ 3/77 22.58 33
.2821 Total Time Avg Slope =.0034 lb/24 hr Period =
day 4699 Days Assume Leakage Limit = 200 lb/24 lir Time to Failure =
200
.0034
= 58847.761 Days i
fi Testing Periods =
58,847.761, 182.5
322.45348 Probability of Leakage
323-322.45348,
~
323
-3 1.692 x 10 This leakage proha-bility is asnigue:I to the exhatist but-terfly (CV 4095),
exhaunt check (CV 4094) and supply check (CV 4096) v.ilven, ma0532-0143b-72-121
1 ?,
TAliLE IV.4.2.2.b Sujy!y Vent Valve (Ilutterfly Valve CV 4097)
Slope Testing Leak Rate Leak Rate Limit Lb/24 Ifr)
Valve Leakage Date Lb/24 lir (1/2 TS Limit)
Day Time (Days) 8/20/64 11/ 6/72 77.8 No Excess Leakage Leakage Time =
4/25/73 225.0 205
.8608 17.425 9/30/74 S.69 (Testing Interval)-(Time to Leakage)
No Excess Leakage 3/31/75 1428.5 230 7.8012 153.631 Time to Leakage =
4/27/75 76.83 No Excess Leakage Leak Rate Limit-Leakage (t )
5/26/75 825.3 211.85 25.8083 23.768 Slope i
9/22/75
.97 No Excess Leakage 4/21/76 7454.4 208.565 35.1577 206.095 5/19/76 84.997 No Excess Leakage 6/19/76 381.69 208.93 9.5707 18.0508 9/16/77 No Excess Leakage 1/23/78 Failed to lloid 129 Pressure 7/11/78 No Excess Leakage 9/ 4/78 Failed to Ifold 55 Pressure 10/. 5/78 No Excess Leakage 2/ 5/79 Failed to Ifold 122 Pressure Total Leakage Time = 724.97 Days Total Time (8/20/64-5/16/81) = 6109 Days 724.97 Lc. I: age l'robability =
6109
.1187 ma 0582- 01431.- 72-121 l
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(
19 VElff VALVES 4
Supply Butterfly Valve (CV 4097)
.11873 Supply Check Valve (CV 4096) - 1.7 x 10 I.cakage Exhaust Butterfly Valve (CV 4095) - 1.7 x 10 '3 Probatsi1Ry 3
Exhaust Check Valve (CV 4094) - 1.7 x 10 CV 4094, CV 4095, CV 4096, CV 4097 FTC
.001 (Table III-5, App III)
Solenoid Valve FTC - 4 @.001 =.004 Flow through CV 4094:
.0017 + (.001).9 =.0026 Flow through CV 4095:
.0017 + (.001).9 = :0026 Flow through CV 4096:
.0017 + (.001).9 =.0026 Flow through CV 4097:
.1187 + (.001).9 =.1196 Flow through exhaust valves (CV 4094 and CV 4095) :
(.0026)(.0026) + (1 x 10-4) = 1.068 x 10'#'
Flow through supply valves (CV 4096 and CV 4097):
(.0026)(.1196) + 1 x IO~
= 4.11 x 10
~
Failure to Isolate =
l'robability of flow through exhaust valves +
Probability of flow through supply valves +
Probability of solenoid valves failure to close +
Probability g)f assorted relay)or bus failurgs =
(1.068 x 10
+ (4.11 x 10
+ (4.0 x 10 ) + (6.9 x 10-3) = 1.142 x 10-2 ma0582-0143h-72-121
20 3.
Steamline:
Failure to
__ Isolate m
I i
Failure to Failure to Isolate Isolate HO-7065 HO-7050 Line Line O
O
~
l l
I I
I I
CV 4107 HD 7065 Valve Down-MO 7050 Does Not Fails to stream of Does Not close Remain Ho 7050 does close l
Closed Not Close
'Close 1
sm i
I I
I 1
Spurious Air CV 4107 CV 4107 l H0 7050 MO 7050 L
Signal to Open FTC Leaks i
From SV 4917 Electrical Mechanical Failure Failure
- i. -
q SV 4917 l SV 4917 MO 7050 H0 7050 1' ails to Stuck
[D E
FTC Leaks t nqrgize i Open _
ma0582-0143b-72-121
21 Valve Down-l Stream of
,f NO 7050 Does Not Close w
'STs Do SVDs IPR CV 4104 CV 4106 CV 4200 H0 7067 Not Close Do Not Bellows Does Not Does Not Does Not Line Not Close Leak Close Close Close Isolated; I
c.
\\
'l 5
.6
/
I I
1 STs Do
!!Ts Solenoid CV 4200 CV 4200 7
Not Does Not FTC Leaks Close Operate i
i ST-01 ST-02 SVDs Open Open Do Not Close p
7 i.
ST-02 Open SVD-101i SVD-102 Leaks (Operator Leaks (Operator Open Open Error) i Error) l q
T' l
I l-1 SVD-101 SVD-102 SVD- 01 Open SVD-102 Open
' Leaks (Opera tor Leaks (Operator!
8 E r ro_r)
Error) ma0582-0143h-72-121
2.1 Steamline
CV 4104 CV 4106 D es Not
/_ _s/
- )oes Not Close 5
Close N
-w I
I i
I Spurious Air CV 4104 CV 4104 Spurious Air CV 4106 CV 4106 Signal to Open FTC Leaks Signal to Open FTC Leaks From SV 4899 Frun SV 4916 f
.m
.p l_
~j__
~
I i
SV 4899 SV 4899 SV 4916 SV 4916 Fails to Stuck Fails to Stuck De-Energize _
l Open De-Energize J en l
I l
ma0582-0143i-72-121
i 23
+
MO 7067 Line Not b
Isolated (D
I MO 7067 CV 4014 j
Does Not Re-Does Not.Re-Main Closed Main Closed m
m I
I l
'I I
I l
MO 7067 CV 4014 Hydraulic Cylinder MO 7067 MO 7067 HD 7067 Electrical Fails Oil Pump Energized FTRC FTC Leaks Failure Open Loss of Valve Opens Function n'
i I
-~
i i
i Mechanical CV 4014 ICV 4014 Failure FTOP 3
FTC Leaks PS 635 PS 678 Closed l
ma0582-0143h-72-121
I A'4 1
S~lTAMLINE Assume probability of leakage of valves downstream of HSIV j
(HO 7050) = 1.0
-2 Ho 7050 FTC of 3.84 x 10 domjnates tree, therefore, failure to isolate steamline = 3.84 x 10 j
l i
i j
i I
l i
4 i
d i
f 4
1 ma0582.0143b-72-121
~
25 4.
Feedwater:
4 Failure to Isolate e
m I
I Valves Fail Failure to Iso-Valves Fail in Containment late Due to in Containment with IIP Heater FW Pump Without ilP Heater Tube Rupture Start Up Tube Rupture i
b
.J.
VFW 9 VFW 304 IIP litr VFW 9 VFW 304 CVs Failure in FO F0 Tube F0 FO FO Line 1 or Pupture i
Line 2 6
l1
,b bh, 1
2
/1 VFW 9 VFW 304 F0 2
F0 u_
a.
VFW 9 l VFW 9 l VIV 304 l VFW 9 l FTC LeaksJ FTC iLeaksj ma0582-0143h-72-121
26 cVs 3
ro m
I Flow Flow Thru Thru CV 4012 CV 4000 r%
sm I
I I
I CV 4012 l
CV 4000 CV 4000 CV 4012 F0 (Controller CV 4012 Loses Air Stuck CV 4000 Open Fails)
Leaks Supply Wile Open Leaks Open O
I l
CV 4012 CV 4012 Open During FO Operation naa0582-01431s-72-121
27 Flow Thru Line 1 or
/
Line 2 3
e iT I
Flow q
Flow Thru Thru Line 1l Line 2 O
l I
1 I
l' F1ow Flow Flow l Flow Thru Thru Thru
! Thru Loop 1i VFW6l l Loop 2 lVFW2 6
m m
I I
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m Flow Thru Flow VFW 6 VFW 6 VFW 2 VW A' I
I VFW 300 Thru Remains Leaks Remains Leaks VFW 7 Open l
Open
-r... --.
v
' vfl! 300 l "VFW 300 VFW 7 VFW 7 Stuck Leaks Remains Leaks Open
_Op en_
ma0582-0143b-77-121
?5 Flow Thru S
Loop 2
{
r I
1 Flow Thru Flow
]
VFW 301 Thru VFW 3
'i i
T I
I I_
i VFW 301 VFW 301 VFW 3 VFW 3 Stuck Leaks Remains Leaks Open
[
Leaks Open
_ Leaks m
l t
I 1
i ma0582-0143b-72-121
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Clean l Failure to isolate i
I i
1 CV 4031 CV 4102 FO F0 j
-w
.r%
i i
l SV 4869 CV 4031 CV 4031
' SV 4S95 '
I CV4102lI lCV4102 I
FO FTC Lea!:s FO FTC Y.caks (O
up
.p i
1 l
l I
~
Fails to SV 4869 Fails to SV 4895 Receive 1TC Receive FTC Signal i
Signal rn.,0582-01431> 121
- 51 11.
SUMP:
Dirty Failure!
to Isolate
- - - -lw l Leakage Lealiage Thru Thru EC CV 4103
'r i
I I
I I
CV 4025 VEC 301 CV 4025 CV 4103 l
1 i
je m i
I I
l VEC 301 VEC 301 SV 4896 CV 4103 CV 4103l FTC Leaks FO FTC Leaks !
r I
Receivc FTC
_ SlSni'l._.
t__
t j
ma0582"01431>-72-121
?
52 s 0k I
4 ae VL C
5 5
2 2
0 0C 4o 4T r,
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/ {-
v V
i C
1 I
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F VS
'l!
1 9
84O 1
F VS o
1 t el 9
va 8 sin i
4l eg i ci VaeS SFR 1
2 1
2 7
h S
4 1
0 28 50 a
m
'I ;
TAI:1.E IV.4.2.5.a Clean Sump Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval (I.b/24 lir)
___Date Lb/24 Hr
(
_ Days)
~ Day S/ 2/77 0.0 10/ 4/78 2.35 428
.0055 2/25/79 0.0 144
.0163 10/15/79 1.1162 232
.0048 12/ 2/80
.447 414
.0016 Total Time Avg Slope =.000367 Period =
1218 Days Assume Leakage 1.imit = 1/2 TS 1.imit = 223.5 th/24 lir Time to Failure =
223.5
.000367
= 608991.83
- Testing Periods =,
608991.83 365
1668.4708 I.cakage Proba-liility
1669-1668.4708 _~
1669 3.171 x 10'0 ma0582-0143:n-72-121
34 Tant.E IV.4.2.5.b Dirty Sump, Testing Tes t.i ng Leak Rate Interval Slope Date
_ Days,)
JI L24 lir)
Lh/24 lir
(
Day 8/ 2/77
.28 10/ 4/78 11.8 428
.0269 2/25/79 3.52 144
.0575 10/15/79 1.3425 232
.0094 11/25/80 3.0 407
.0041 Total Time Avg Slope =.00225 Period =
1211 Days Assume Leakage Limit = 1/2 TS Limit. = 223.5 Lb/24 hr Time to Failure =
(223.5.28)
.00225 a
= 99208.8C9 Days s
- Testing Periods =
99208.889 365
271.805 Leakage Proba-bility
(272-271.805) _
272 i
l
~'
7.163 x 10 i
niaosnz-oitab-72-i z i
'B S!!!!PS Clean Stimp:
CV 4031 - 3.171 x 10 Leakage CV 4102 - 3.171 x 10 Probability CV 4031
.001 FTC CV 4102
.001 (App III of PRA Report)
SV 4869
.001 (App III of PRA Report)
Flow through CV 4031: 3.171 x 10-4 +.9(1.0 x 10-3) + 1 x 10-3
-3
= 2.217 x 10 Flow through CV 4102: 3.171 x 10'N +.9(1.0 x 10-3) + 1.0 x 10~3
-3
= 2.217 x 10 Failure to isolate = (flow througg)CV 403i)(flow ghrough CV 4102)
= (2.217 x 10, 2
+.1(1 x 10 )
f
= 1.049 x 10 Dirty Suir.p:
CV 4025, CV 4103, VEC 301 - 7.163 x 10~
Leakage Probability CV 4025, CV 4103 - 1.0 x 10 FTC (App III, PRA Report)
~0 VEC 301 - 5 x 10
Flor through emergency condensor =
(Flou throing}'i VEC 301)(Floy')through CV 4025) =
(7.163 x 10
+.9(5 x 10
)(.9(1 x 10 ") 4 (1 x 10_3) 1 (7.163 x 10_4)) +.1(1 x 10_3) = 1.031 x 10_4 Flow throirnh CV 4103 =
(Flow.hri>in;gh CV 4025)(T1ow throingh CV,4103) =
f
(. 9 ( 1 : 10 ' ) + 1 x 10 1 7.163 x 10 ) (. 9 (1 x 10 '3) + 1 x 10 '3 + 7.163 x 10_4) 4.1(1 x 10 '3) = 1.068 x 10
_ f, ma0'>S2-0143b-72-121
3 G.-
Failure to Isolate:
(Flow tiirougg) emergency cos:degser) + (flow p'hrough CV 4103) =
(1.031 x 10
+ (1.068 x 10 ) = 2.1 x 10-Failure to isolate (clean and dirty sump)'=
(1.049 x 10-0) + (2.1 x 10~4) = 3.15 x 10-4
/
/
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l nea0582-01431. 121
)-
.i '"
y l
r
e t
1 II.
DF.!!IN WATER SUPPLY:
_Fa iltire to y,
_ Isolate f/
(
T i
Il Fleu Flow Th rougli Th rotigit CV 4101 CK Valve (VtIU) 1 m
m l
l j
l
'CV 4105 CV 4105 VMU VIIU Open Leaks Sttick Leaks Open I
l Open CV 4'105 During FO
@peration li- -
qs I
1.
I CV 4105
!!cmin I,SV 4S97 CV410Pl lOpenDuring Tap Fails FTC i_ 07 ration Open ina05S2-0143b-72-121
3::
7.
Treated Waste:
Fa iliirt7 to isolate fD i
Flow Flow
(
Thru Tliru I
CV 4049 VRW 313 i
P IP I
I I
l CV 4049 CV 4049 VRW 313 VRW 313 Leaks Open Stuck Leaks Open i
r--
CV5049 CV 4049 Open During F0
_ Ope ra tion qw
]~
, y s, i
-1 SV 4892 Fails SV 4892 to Receive Stuck Signal to Open U".lgjprgize ina0582-0143h-72-121
35 TADI.E IV.4.2.6.a,
.+
Demin t!ater Supply Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval (Lb/24IIr)
Date Lb/24 IIr (Days)
Day 8/14/77 2.52 3/ 5/79 1.001 568
.0027 11/27/80 2.07 633
.0017 l
1 l
Total Time Avg Slope <0.0 l
Period =
l 1201 Days Assume Leakage Probability 20.0 l
ma0582-014313-72-121 l
_. -_ _ _ ~
4%
TABI.E IV.4.2.7.a L
Treated Waste (CV 4049]
Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval Date Lb/24 Hr (Days)
(Lh/24 11r)
Day 8/11/77
.001 10/26/78 0.0 441
-0.0 3/ 1/79 0.0 126 0.0 3/ 1/80
.72 366
.00197 Total Time Avg Slope =.000772 Period =
933 Days Leakage Limit per th Tech Specs 2447 24 Ilr Time to Failure =
447
.000772
= 579240.64 Days
- Testing Periods =
579240.64 365
= 1586.9607 ma0582-0143b-72-121 i
4:
Testing Slope Testing Leak Rate Interval
__D_ ate Lb/24 Ifr (Days)
ILb/24 !!r)
Day -
1.cakage l'robabil-ity =
1587-1586.9607 1587
= 2.48 x 10~
Check Valve (VRW 313) failed leak test 11/27/80. Assume valve had leaked for the entire period between tests (3/1/80-11/27/80).
Leakage Time Leakage Probability (VRW 313) = Total Time
= 271 Days 8
1204 Days
-I
= 2.25 x IO t
nia0582-0143b-72-121
42 DM11N WATE11 SUPPI.Y CV 4105 Leakate Probability 20.0 Check Valve Ig al: age Pre!; ability 01.0 CV 4105 FTC = 1.0 x 10,3 (T bl Table 3.5, App III)
SV 4fi97 FTC = 1.0 x 10 (a e 3.4, App III)
Demiri tap open during operation = 15 x 1 yr for 2 min each
=.5 hr/24 133 (365)
= 5.71 x 10 CV 4105 open eluring operation = 1.0 CV 4105 Open:
[CV 4105 open duripg oper)(demin tap open during oper)]-[(SV 4897 FTC) '+ (CV 4105 FTC))
= (1.0)(5.71_y 10
)-l(1.0 x 10 3) + (1.0 x 10 )]
= 1.142 x 10 Flow through CV 4105:
(CV 4105 Operj)) + (CV 4105 Leaks)
(1.142 x 10
+ (~0.0) = 1.142 x 10_7 Failure to isolate:
(1.142 x 10 ;) (1.0) = 1.142 x 10(Flow t.hrougt CV 4105)(flow thronglj check valve)
'l;l!EATED WASTE CV 4049 Leakage Probability - 2.48 x 10,"
VIN 313 Lealcage ProbabiJity - 2.25 x 10 CV 4049 FTC - 1.0 x 1Q ' (Table III.5, App III)
VlW 313 FTC - 5 x 10
-3 (Table III-4a) Table III-4a, App III)
(
CV 4049 opt o eloring operation - open 6 wks/ year = 42 <!ays/365 days
=.115 CP 4049 fails opeu:
(f.V439hfails)4 (CV.4040 FTC)
(1 x 10 ') + (1 x 10 ' ) - 2 x 10-3 ma0582-01435-12-121
~
43 CV 4049 open:
(CV 4049 open during orq)(CV 4049 fails open)
(.115)(.002) = 2.3 x 10 Flow through CV 4049:
(CV4049Lpaks)+(CV4g49open)
_ f, 2.48 x 10
+ 2.3 x 10
= 2.548 x 10 Plow t hrough VRh' 313:
(VRW 313 1 aks) + (Vl { FrC) 7 + 5 x 10j
= 2.255 x 10 )
2.25 x 10 Failure to isolate:
(Flow througg)CV 4049)(floy)through VRW 3g3)
(2.548 x 10 (2.255 x 10
= 5.75 x 10 e
4 4
ll 7
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t aD p 0y V ne 2 enn u
o C
e 9R gE l ol 4
i-i t h '(l O
a oS c Vt F
)
I S
7 7
2 s 2
0k 0C i 4 a 4T i
e I
VL V
C C
]
7 7
Il 6
2 2
i 8 c n 7k wu0 0
or4 40 l h 4 u e I
F t p FTV V
VSO C
C S
7 6
2 7 s p"
0 n 8l i 4 e I
i4i p
a VO VF 7/'
C S
I g
_s nn c
l 2 r i.
7i o i eox avt i.
0 ut Fi y
r_6 -
l r
I4D a a
r c a e-V ne e i n.
/
n C ep
_S R gF 1
i pO
_A i -
2 O
r
_V t ic 1
oS a
l D
_. S 72 e{I t
i h.
P 4
l 1
e 0
u F
2 f
50 C
an i
i'
45 TA!!I.E IV. 4.2.8.a Fuel Pi t. Drain Testing Testing Leak Rate Slope Date Interval (Days)
(Lb/24 IIr)
Lb/24 Ilr 8/21/77 Day 11.77 3/ 3/79 10.923 9/19/79 568 0.0
.00149 11/26/80 200 17.1
.0546 431
.0397 Total Time Avg Slope =.00445 Interval =
1199 Days Leak Limit. ~
447 lb/24 hr- ('IS Limit )
Time to Failure =
_447-11.7
.00445
= 97905.7 Days
- Testing Periods =
97905]
365
268.2348 1.cakage Probabil-ity
269-268.2348 269
= 2.8446 x 10~
ma0582-0143b-72-121
~.
1 46 FUF.I. PIT DRATH CV 4027, CV 4117 - 2.8446 x 10~3 Leakage Probability CV 4027, CV 4117 - 1.0 x 10'
CV 4027, CV 4117 open during operation ~ 6 wk/yr = 42 days /365 days = 1.15 x 10'I SV 4876, SV 4922 - 1.0 x 10-3 FTC (App III, PRA lleport)
Probability of CV 4027 failing open:
(SV 4876 FTC) + (CV 4027 FTC) = 1.10-3 + 3 (1.0 x 10-3)
,9
= 1.9 x 10 Probability of CV 4117 failing open:
(SV 4922 FTC) + (CV 4117 FTC) = 1 x 10-3_g.9(1 x 10-3)
= 1.9 x 10 Probability of CV 4027 being open:
(CV 4027 open during operation)(CV 4027 FO) =.115 [(1.9 g 10-3)]
= 2.185 x 10, Probability of CV 4117 being open:
(CV 4117 open iluring operation)(CV 4117 FO) =.115 (1.9 x 10 '3) 4
= 2.185 x 10 Flow through CV 4027:
(CV 4077 open) 4 (CV 4027 Icaks) = 2.185 x 10 _43+ 2.8 W x 10
_3
= 3.0631 x 10 Fha through CV 4117:
(CV 4117 op.n) + (CV 4117 leats) = 2.185 x 10- t'
-3
+ 2 J. m x 10
,3
= 3.0631 x 10 Fa i l o r.3 to ::.olate:
(F:ow throu :b CV 4027)(flow through CV 4117) = (3.0631 x g )2 +.1(1 x 10 #)
= 1.094 x 10 ma0582-0143h-72-121
41 9.
Reain Sluice:
Failure to Isolate r
i
-I Flow Flow Thru i
Thru Path 1 Path 2 1
l 1
1 I
1 Flow Flow Flow Flow liin u Thru Thru Thru CV 4092
__CV 4091 CV 4093 CV 4091 1
/
il qm
/
i I
I 1
I i
CV 4092 CV 4092 CV 4093 I CV 4093
._ Lea ks J en
_ l.caks !
Open O
i 1
I 7
I 1
CV 4092 CV 4092 CV 4093 CV 4093 Open Diiring FO Open During FO
_ Oycration Ope ra tion j
bw q~ ~
I t
l I
CV 4092 SV 4879
~ 9~4093 I
(SV4879}
ma0582-0143b-72-121
A
+
4 M
N t/J
-.00 m
< *M (C
> &a t,t3 O
l O
F
< O e
N U
~
m O
,O
,O U Eg g
> O U
U C
0 C.
C O cc o C ',"
.i m
ew J
O L q O
O 3 6 3CC qg c c s. <
a FE.
k O
- b-U i
Nm M
o v)
O.E c
O
> A U
'~
M N
N t~
I O
i Ncc 6".
O
- =
E
- t. g TAlil.E IV. 4.2.9.a Itesin Sluice (CV 4091),
Testing Testing Leak Rate Slope Interval Date 16/24 Hr p ys)
(I.b/24 I!r)
Day S/12/77 1.42 3/ S/79 1.11 573
.000541 10/19/79 1.5358 225
.00189 11/26/80
.45 404
.00269 Total Time Avg Slope = <0.0 Period =
1202 Days Assume Leakage Probability 0 0.0 CV 4092, 4093 8/12/77-3/ S/79 Leaked 3/ 8/79-10/19/79 No Leakage 10/19/79-11/23/80 Leaked Leakage Time 974 Total Time 1199
=.812 1.cakage Prchability =.812 ma05ft2-0143b-72-121
50 1:ESIN SLUICE CV 4091 Leak Probability 2.0 0
CV 4092, 4093 CV 4091, 4092, 4093 FTC = 8.37 x 10 Leakage Probability =_p (12 8
App III)
CV 4091, 4092, 4093 open during operation = 3.425 x 10_4 SV 4879 FTC %1.0 Flow through CV 4091:
(CV 4091 Jeaks) +4)(CV 4091 open during_p,peration)(CV I.091 FO)
~0 + (3.425 x 10
(~1.0) = 3.425 x 10 Flow tierough CV 4092:
(CV 4092 leaks) + (CV 4092 open during operation)(CV 4092 FO) 21.0 Flow through CV 4093:
(CV 4093 Icaks) + (CV 4093 open during opdration)(CV 4093 FO) 21.0 Failure to isolate:
(Flov through CV_/ D92 or CV 4093){ flow through CV,4091)
(1.0)(3.425 x 10 g) = 3.425 x 10 p
ma 0582-O ll.:;b 121
V-110 NOTE (a):
For sequences in which the MSIV has closed as part of the sequence, the probability that the sequence will lead to re-Icases is equal to the sum of the failure to isolate probabil-ities listed in the accompanying table excluding the probability that the steam line fails to isolate.
NOTE (b):
the seiiGence because it has not been called upon to close,For se rather than as a result of inability to close caused by mechanical prob-lems, the probability that the sequence will lead to releases is equal to the sum of the failure to isolate probabilities listed in the accompanying table.
NOTE (c):
b~ffore core damage occurs,For LOSP sequences in which offsite power is restored and instrument air lines are assumed notinstrument air is assumed ava to be a leakage path.
The failure to isolate containment probability was determined as described in footnote (a).
NOTE (d):
EIis'ite power is restored butFor LOSP sequences in which core damage occurs befo the diesel generator is working, it is assumcd that the operator fails to restore instrument air IC%
of the time making instrument and service air lines a leakage path (Ft=.10).
This leakage probability was added to the value o f the railure to isolate probability determined in footnote (a).
NOTE (e):
For LOSP sequences in which core damage occurs before EY'fsite power is restored and the diesel generator fails, it is assumed the standby diesel is not put in service 10% of the time and given that it is, the air compressors are not restored 10% of the time (f
.1 +.9 (.1) =.19).
added to thb v=alue of the failure to isolate probability deter-This leakag mined in footnote (a).
NOTE (f):
For sequences in which the MSlV fails to close on de-uand as part of the sequence, the probability that the sequence will lead to release is equal to the probability that the backup isolation valves fail to close on demand (Probability = 1.0).
NOTE (g):
For BRP as presently designed, all accident sequences which fead to RDS actuation are also expected to produce signifi-cant core damage and containment failure.
The primary factor in this expectation is that following RDS actuation, no assurance can be provided that the liquid poison will mix with the core spray water even if it is injected prior to RDS actuation.
Esti-mates of the radio-nuclide releases from containment have been l
made by assigning ATWS sequences to Release Category 3, for which crre damage and early containment failure are key a
characteristics.
1 i
l FOTE (h):
As described in Section Ill, 5.2.12, Appendix Ill of tee PRA Report, the probability that the instrument air system is not repaired in a timely manner is.01.
This probability was v.a 0 5 8 1.1 5 1 0 a - 7 2 - 1 2.1
V-lll added to the value of the failure to isolate probability as deccrained in footnote (b).
NOTE (i):
For sequences involving fires in the cable penetration crea inside containment which are severe enough to cause cable doua.ge Icading to core melt, it is judged that the probability the fire will also cause contcinment isolation failure is 1.0.
This failure could occur either by combustion or melting of the epoxy which seals the cables to the containment penetration, or by fire-caused failure of the MSIV to'close.
For sequences involving fires in the cable spreading room outside containment which are severe enough to cause cable damage leading to core melt, it is judged that the probability of containment isolation failure is 1.0.
Despite the different density of cables in the vicinity of the penetrations, a fire in the cable spreading room would'also very likely disable the MSIV open.
Given the base case assumption that the backup isolation valves do not close completely, open f,ailure of the MSIV is equivalent to containment isolation failure.
For sequct.cos involving fires in the station power room, the operator is instructed to shut down and close the MSIV.
Because of sc...e a:abiguities in the procedures, it is not obvious that these actions would be implemented immediately for the Plant as presently operated.
For this reason, station power room fires of sufficient severity to cause cable failures and eventual core melt are judged to cause failure of the operators ability to close the MSIV in advance of his taking this action one time in three.
HowcVer, because instrument air lines are assumed to be a leakage path for this sequence F
- 1.0.
g NOTE _(j):
As described in Section III, 5.2.12, Appendix III of tne Pita Report, the probability that the instrument air system is
~
not repaired in a timely manner is.01.. This probability was added to the value of the failure to isolate probability as de-termined in footnote (a).
i i
i i
i ma0581-1510a-72-121
V-112 FAILURE TO ISOLATE CONTAINMENT PROBABILITIES Locks 1.95 x 10-4 Vents 1.142 x 10-2 Steam Line 3.84 x 10-2 Feedwater 1.34 x 10-2, Sumps 3.15 x 10-4 Demin Water 1.142 x 10~7 Treated Waste 5.75 x 10-5 Fuel Pit Drain 1.1 x 10-4 Resin Sluice 3.425 x 10-4 6.42 x 10-2
- The feedwater failure to isolate probability was determined by assuming that Valves VFW6 and VFW2 are made motor operated and generic failure data is applicable.
ma0583-1510a-72-121
V-113 V.6 REFERENCE 3 1.
5.' ASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014), "The Reactor Safety Study," An Assessment of Accident Risks in US Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, NRC (October 1975) 2.
CONTEMPT-LT, A Co:: uter Program for Predicting Containment Pressure-Temperatuue Response to a Loss-of-Coolant Accident, ANCR-1219, Acrojet Nuclear Co (June 1975) 3.
SOIL - See Appendix A of Appendix VIII of k' ASH-1400 4.
INTER:
A Prcliminary Model for Core / Concrete Interactions, by W 5 Murfin, SAND 77-0370 (August 1977) 5.
PVMELT - A Model for Pressure Vessel Melt-Through,Section III of RACAP-1 (Volume II) (Reactor Accident Consequence Analysis Program), DRAFT Version, SAI (July 1980) 6.
The Effects on Populations of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, Report of the Advisory Committee on the Biological Effects of Ionization Radiations, BEIR Report, National Academy of Science - National Research Council, k'ashington, DC (1972) 7.
"Some Observations on Near-Limit Flames," by Furno, A L, et al, Thirteenth International Symposium on Combustion, pp 593-599 (1971) 1 1
ma05Cl-1510a-72-121
1?AHIE V.2A Sumary of Important Accident Sequences for Big Rock Point Probability of Seviutace Probability of Release Cateeory: (1) Civen the Sequence (2) Considering the Sequence Probability Seguence
(
~
1
~
_Per Ye r) _
LRP-1(1}
f3P-jl 1 ERP-2(I)
FjP-2_(R ERP-3(il ERP-3(2)
!!RP-l(T)'
I F 4(2 [ ' BHP-5(l)
_ERP-5(2)~
S E,C 4.0 x 10' g
.026 (a) 1.04 x 10'I 0.01 (b) 4.0 x 10 0.79 (c) 3.2 x 10
-8
-6 Sl 3.7 x 10'0 y
.0642 (b) 2.38 x 10' O.01 (b) 3.7 x 10' O.76 (c) 2.8 x 10-6 SC 4.0 x 10'
-8 y
.0642 (b) 3.57 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.0 x 10
O.76 (c) 3.0 x 10'
-7 SL 3.7 x 10
~8
~9 7
.0642 (b) 2.38 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.7 x 10 0.76 (c) 2.8 x 10'I
~5 S E,L 1.0 x 10 4
3
.026 (a) 2.6 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.0 x 10'I 0.79 (c) 7.9 x 10-6
-6 S E,C 4.0 x 10 3
.026 (a) 1.04 x 10'I 0.01 (b) 4.0 x 10'0 0.79 (c) 3.2 x 10-6 SC 1.0 x 10 4
.0642 (b) 6.42 x 10'0 0.01 (b) 1.0 x 10'0 0.76 (c) 7.6 x 10-5 UL 1.5 x 10'
.0742 (h) 1.11 x 10'O 0.01 (b) 1.5 x 10 0.76 (c) 1.1 x 10'I
~9
~0 UE,UL
- 1. 7 x 10
.0742 (b) 1.26 x 10'7 0.01 (b) 1.7 x 10'O 0.76 (c) 1.3 x 10'0 UE,UL 1.9 x 10'
-6
.0742 (h) 1,41 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.9 x 10'I 0.76 (c) 1.4 x 10-5 UE,UC 6.7 x 10'I
.0742 (h) 4.97 x 10'O 0.01 (b) 6.7 x 10 0.76 (c) 5.1 x 10'I
~9
-6 UE,0C 7.4 x 10
.0742 (h) 5.49 x 10'I 0.01 (b) 7.4 x 10 0.76 (c) 5.6 x 10
~0
~0
-6 UE,UJ
- 5. 7 x 10
.0742 (h) 4.23 x 10'I 0.01 (b) 5.7 x 10 0.76 (c) 4.3 x 10
-8
~0
-6 VE,L 1.7 x 10
.026 (a) 4.42 x 10' O.01 (b) 1.7 x 10 0.79 (c) 1.3 x 10
~8
-6
-I VE,L 6.0 x 10
.026 (a) 1.56 x 10'O 0.01 (b) 6.0 x 10 0.79 (c) 4.7 x 10'I
- I WE,C 6.7 x 10'I
-8
.026 (a) 1.74 x 10 0.01 (b) 6.7 x 10 0.79,(c) 5.3 x 10'
-7 VE,C 2.4 x 10
.026 (a) 6.24 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.4 x 10'I 0.79 (c) 1.9 x 10'I BB E L 9.3 x 10'I
-8 y
.026 (a) 2.42 x 10 0.01 (b) 9.3 x 10'9 0.79 (c) 7.3 x 10'I LB E,L 3.3 x 10'I
.026 (a) 8.58 x 10
O.01 (b) 3.3 x 10"I 0.79 (c) 2.6 x 10'
!!B E,C 3.7 x 10'I
.026 (a) 9.62 x 10 0.01 (b)
- 3. 7 x 10'9 0.79 (c) 2.9 x 10'I
~5 BB Zr,L 4.9 x 10
-6
.0642 (b) 3.15 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.9 x 10'I 0.76 (c) 3.7 x 10-5
-5 BB ZY C 2.0 x 10
-6 g
.0642 (b) 1.28 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.0 x 10'I 0.76 (c) 1.5 x 10-5
-6 TML 1.4 x 10
-6 g gr 99 (8) 1.4 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.4 x 10'8 T AY CL 4.2 x 10' g g
.99 (g) 4.2 x 10'#
0.01 (b) 4.2 x 10
~7 T AB,L, 8.8 x 10 g
.99 (g) 8.8 x 10' O.01 (b) 8.8 x 10 T AB,L, 3.2 x 10
-6
-8 y
99 (g) 3.2 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.2 x 10
TARIF. V.28 Summtry of Important Accident Sequences for Itig Rock Point Probability of Sequence Probability of Release Cater,ory(: (1) Civen the Sequence, (2) Considerinde Segunce Probability Scocence (Per Year)_
BMP-1(1)
ERP-1(2)
ERP-2(1)
BNP-2 i)
IEfL 3.7 x 10~
BRP-3(1) ~ FRPM(2)_
BRP-4(1)
_IOIP-4[2)
Bg-5M
_BPP-5 1
~9
~I'
.026 (a) 9.62 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.7 x 10 (c) 2.9 x 10
~7 TEfC 1.5 x 10
.026 (a) 3.9 x 10 '
O.01 (b) 1.5 x 10 (c) 1.2 x 10
~
~9
~7
~7 72L 3.8 x 10
~8
.0642 (b) 2.44 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.8 x 10 (c) 2.9 x 10~7 YL 4.3 x 10"
-8 g
.026 (a) 1.12 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.3 x 10 (c) 3.4 x 10~
FD:L 1.6 x 10~
~9
~9
~7
.026 (a) 4.16 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.6 x 10 (c) 1.3 x 10 11E,NL 1.7 x 10'
-8
.026 (a) 4.42 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.7 x 10' (c) 1.3 x 10-6
?!E,NL 6.0 x 10
-8
.026 (a) 1.56 x 10 0.01 (b) 6.0 x 10 (c) 4.7 x 10
~9
~7 MEfC 6.7 x 10'
-8
.026 (a) 1.74 x 10 0.01 (b) 6.7 x 10 (c) 5.3 x 10
~9
~7
~7 tlE,hc 2.4 x 10
.026 (a) 6.24 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.4 x 10 (c) 1.9 x 10
~9
~7
~7 ffEfJ 6.0 x 10
-8
.026 (a) 1.56 x 10 0.01 (b) 6.0 x 10 (c) 4.7 x 10
~9
~7
-6 PE,F,L 3.6 x 10
,026 (c) 9.36 x 10~
0.01 (b) 3.6 x 10 (c) 2.8 x 10
~I
-6 PE,F,L 1.4 x 10~
.026 (c) 3.64 x 10~
0.01 (b) 1.4 x 10" (c) 1.1 x 10~
-6 PE,F,F L 2.0 x 10
~
0.01 (b) 2.0 x 10 (c) 1.6 x 10 g
.126 (d) 2.52 x 10
~8
~
-6 PE r,C 3.1 x 10 y
.126 (d) 3.91 x 10' O.01 (b) 3.1 x 10 (c) 2.4 x 10
-8
-6
-5 FE,F,C 1.3 x 10
-6
.126 (d) 1.64 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.3 x 10 (c) 1.0 x 10
~7
-5 PE F,C 5.5 x 10~
d
.126 (d) 6.93 x 10'0
~9
~7 0.01 (b) 5.5 x 10 (c) 4.3 x 10
-6 PE,F,J 1.3 x 10
.126 (d) 1.64 x 10~
0.01 (b) 1.3 x 10 (c) 1.0 x 10
-8
~0
-6 PE,F,J 4.8 x 10
~7
.126 (d) 6.05 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.8 x 10 (c) 3.8 x 10
~8
~0
~
PIF,YL 9.9 x 10
~
1.0 (f) 9.9 x 10 0.01 (b) 9.9 x 10~9
~7 PIF,YC 8.5 x 10 1.0 (f) 8.5 x 10 0.01 (b) 8.5 x 10~9 PQE,F,L 6.7 x 10"
.026 (a) 1.74 x 10' O.01 (b) 6.7 x 10 (c) 5.3 x 10
~9
~I PQE F,C 2.4 x 10" y
.216 (c) 3.02 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.4 x 10 (c) 1.9 x 10'
~
~9
-6 I'QE,F,C 2.5 x 10
~
.216 (e) 3.15 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.5 x-10 (c) 2.0 x 10'
~8 I'Qif,L 1.8 x 10'I 1.0 (f)
I.8 x 10' O.01 (b) 1.8 x 10 '
(c)
~
~7 P41F,C 1.5 x 10 1.0 (f) 1.5 x 10" 0.01 (b) 1.5 x 10 (c)
S E,L 3.7 x 10
~
0.01 (b) 3.7 x 10' O.79 (c) 2.9 x 10 g
026 (a) 9.62 x 10
-5
TA!;Ir. V.28 Suu mary of Irportant. Accidcat Sequences for Big Rock Point Prsbibility of Sequence Probability of Release Category [:(1) Civ-n the Sequence, (2) Considering_the Sequence Probability S
(PerYearl
,KP-1(1)
_(P,P-1J2]_
pkP-211}
BRP-2(
_ BMP-3(U in:P-3(2)
BsP4[1)~ _. BHP-4(2)
BFP-5(1)
BkP-5(2)]
3 uence
~0 T AY L, 1.2 x 10
-6
-8 3 g
.99 (g) 1.2 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.2 x 10
~I T AY o!.,
3.7 x 10
~7
~9 3 g
.99 (g) 3.7 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.7 x 10 T AB,L, 7.8 x 10" 3
.99 (g) 7.8 x 10 0.01 (b) 7.8 x 10 7 A3,L, 2.9 x 10'I
~
4
.99 (g) 2.9 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.9 x 10 7
4.1 x 10
-6
-8 5 ie
.99 (g) 4.1 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.1 x 10 T AB,L S
r (I}
}
T
.x 6 o 'r
.99 g
. x 0.01 N 6.3xId
~0 7 AB,L, 4.6 x 10
-6
~0 7
.99 (g) 4.6 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.6 x 10 T E, 1.7 x 10 g
.99 (g) 1.7 x to 0.01 6) 1.7 x 10 PR,L 1.2 x 10'
~I
~I
-6
.0642 (b) 7.7 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.2 x 10 0.76 (c) 9.1 a 10 RR,C 4.8 x 10~
~I
-6
.0642 (b) 3.08 x 10~
0.01 (b) 4.8 x 10 0.76 (c) 3.6 x 10
~0 11 2 1.1 x 10 0.1 (g) 1.1 x 10"I
~0
~I g
.026 (a) 2.86 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.1 x 10 0.86 (c) 9.5 x 10'I
~I
~I
-8
~
li 3.9 x 10 0.1 (g) 1.1 x 10
.0642 (b) 2.5 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.9 x 10 '
O.76 (c) 3.0 x 10"I y
I E,L 8.3 x IO~
-6
~I
-5 g
.026 (a) 2.16 x 10 0.01 (b) 8.3 x 10 (c) 6.6 x 10 I E,C 7.9 x 10
.026 (a) 2.05 x 10 0.01 (p) 7.9 x 10 (c) 6.2 x 10 g
~
Do 1.8 x 10 1.0 (i) 1.8 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.8 x 10 p
-6
-6 Dx 5.6 x 10
-6
-8 p
1.0 (i) 5.6 x 10 0.01 (b) 5.6 x 10
-5 D,0y 4.1 x 10
-5 1.0 (k) 4.1 x 10 0.01 (b) 4.1 x 10'I (c) 2.8 x 10-5
~0 D,xy 2.3 x 10
~0 1.0 (k) 2.3 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.3 x 10'I (c) 1.6 x 10~0
-6 D oy 1.1 x 10
-6
~8 1.0 (j) 1.1 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.1 x 10
-6 D x 2.8 x 10
-6
~8 1.0 (j) 2.8 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.8 x 10 PE F,KC 2.6 x 10' y
.126 (d) 3.28 x 10 0.01 (b) 2.6 x 10'I (c) 2.0 x 10~5
~
PE,F,f:C
- 9. 7 x 10
.126 (d) 1.22 x 10~
0.01 (b) 9.7 x 10'I (c) 7.7 x 10 -5
-5 II,M:C 1.2 x 10
.026 (a) 3.12 x 10'I 0.01 (b) 1.2 x 10"I (c) 9.5 x 10-6 4
t1E,hyC 3.7 x 10
-8
-8 026 (a) 9.62 x 10 0.01 (b) 3.7 x 10 (c) 2.9 x 10 tT ISC 1.2 x 10
~
0.01 (b) 1.2 x IO (c) 9.5 x 10 y
.036 (j) 4.32 x 10
~I
-6
T.'. DIX V.28 Summ.sry of 1xportint Accident.sequer:ces for Big Pock Point Prab2ollity of Sequence Probabilituf Pelease Cste-ory:jt] Given thelertuence,[(2) Consirieringlic Setsence Pro
- Syjuence, (Per Year)
_htP-l(t)
BRP-1(2)
BRP-2(I)
Edf-2(2)
P.RP-3(11 __BRP-3(2 LRi'-4( 1) 1;RP-4(21 Bpp-5(1]
_ Bi>p-5 (2)_
~
UE 1,KC 1.2 x 10'
-6
-6 m
.036 (j) 4.32 x 10 0.01 (b) 1.2 x 10 (c) 9.5 x 10
-5 LI KC 1.2 x 10'
.026 (a) 3.12 x 10'I 0.01 (b) 1.2 x 10'I (c) 9.5 x 10-6
-6 LI,KC 3.7 x 10
.026 (a) 9.62 x 10'8 0.01 (b) 3.7 x 10 (c) 2.9 x 10'0
-8 was obtained by assuraing Valves VW6 and VIV2 are made motor operated, and generic failure I
er line. This cua.ber l
1 4
l
.