ML20058D233
| ML20058D233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058D230 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9011050415 | |
| Download: ML20058D233 (4) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFF_ ICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.148 TD FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-71 1
AND AMENDMENT NO. 178 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY. et 41 BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRif PLANT. UNITS 1_ g DOCKET NOS, 50-325 AND 50-324 a
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated February 15, 1989, as supplemented February 23 and October 23, 1990 Carolina Power & Light Con' i
changes to the Technical Specifications (TS)pany submitted a request for related to the isolation actuation instrumentation for secondary containment isolation for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSCP), Units 1 and 2.
The February 23, 1990, letter revised the TS pages to incorporate changes related to recently issued license amendments and did not change the initial detennination of no significant hazards consideration published in the Federal Register.
The amendment is related particularly to Table 3.3.2-1, Item 2.a., Action 23, which is applicable for Operational Conditions (00) 1, 2, 3, 5, and *.
Operational Condition 5 is defined as when the unit is in refueling, and OC
- is defined as handling irradiated fuel in secondary containment.
Action 23 provides action statements to be taken when the secondary containment isolation function of the reactor building exhaust high radiation monitors is inoperable. When a high level of radiation is detected by the reactor building exhaust radiation monitors, either of the two related trip channels will initiate the closure of secondary containment automatic isolation dampers (SCAID) to establish secondary containme.it integrit gas treatment (SBGT)y, and simultaneously start both trains of the standby (detection / actuation) ystem. At least one channel per trip system s
is required to be operable for all OC 1, 2, 3, 5 l
and *.
If less than one channel per system is operable. Action 23 must be taken.
The amendment revises Action 23 to differentiate the action requirements when the unit has lost its secondary containment integrity when in OC 1, 2, 3, 5, and
- requiring separate actions when the units is in OC 1.2, and 3 and when the unit is in OC 5 and *.
9011050415 901025 DR ADOCK ODOOO324 P
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2 2.0 EVALUATION Action 23 currently requires that, for OC 1, 2, or 3, secondary containment integrity be established (with the standby gas treatment (SBGT) system operating) within one hour. Failure to meet this requirement within one hour when the unit is in OC 1, 2, or 3 could lead to invoking TS 3.0.'4, (i.e., the unit be placed in at least hot shutdown in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and ccio shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />). Furthermore, current Action 23 doet. sot specify alternate ~ actions fer the situation when the unit is in OC 5 or
- and the secondary containment integrity with the SBGT system operating cannot be establishted within one hour.
To determine the appropriateness of the proposed change, the staff reviewed other TS sections relatted to containment integrity and found that:
(1) TS 3.6.5.1 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers, requires that the secondary containment integrity either be restored l
within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> for the case when secondary containment integrity is lost, or: (a) if the unit is in OC 1, 2, or 3, be in hot shutdown in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; (b) if the unit is in OC 5 or *, then irradiated fuel handling be insnediately suspended. The provision in TS 3.0.3 is not applicable.
(2) TS 3.6.5.2 Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers, i
requires that when one or more SCAID dampers (not in the same penetration) shown in Table 3.6.5.2 1 should become inoperable, operation may(continue until secondary containment integrity is demonstrated i.e., inoperable dampers are restored to operable aatus) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
If this requirement is not met, then:
(a)forOC1,2,and3,beatleastinhotshutdownwithinthenext 12 hwrs and cold shutdown in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; and (b) for 0C 5 or *,
suspend irradiated fuel handling in the secondary containment, core alterations, or activities that could reduce the shutdown margin.
(3) TS 5.6.6.1 Stand by gas treatment system, r3 quires all fuel handling be suspended when the unit is in OC 5 and
- for the case when SBGT system (i.e.,bothtrains)isnotoperable. The provision of TS 3.0.3 is not applicable.
From the above TS sections, the staff determines that the most restrictive action requirement is TS 3.6.6.1.
The action required in TS 3.6.6.1 is the innediate suspension of fuel handling in secondary containment when both trains of the SBGT. system are inoperable.
In order to make Action 23 more compatible with the above. discussed TS actions required for maintaining containment integrity. -the licensee proposed to revise Action 23 by providing separate actions for OC 1, 2, and 3 and for OC 5 and *. These include specifically those actions for situations when the unit is in OC 5 or
- and has lost containment integrity with or without the SBGT system operating.
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The staff has evaluated the proposed statement of actions in the revised Action 23 and has found that in OC 1, 2, and 3, the revised Action 23 will requi - that secondary containment integrity be established within one he"
. a the SBGT system operating as currently required.
If this act:
et be met, the requirement of TS 3.0.3 will apply as currently specifd In OC 5 and *, the revised Action 23 will require that secondary containment integrity be established within one hour with both trains of the SBGT system operating as currently specifiedt however, if this requirenent cannot be met, then the handling of irradiated fuel in the secor.dary containment, core alterations, or activities that could reduce i
the shutdown margin will be suspended imediately as currently specified in TS 3.6.6.1.
Although the wording of the proposed amendment does not say "imediate" suspension of fuel handling, the staff's evaluation is based on the assumption that insiediate suspension of fuel handling will occur.
Based on the a.nove evcluation the staff has determined that the proposed amendment TS Action 23 will aid the operators in taking appropriate actions in raintaining secondary containment integrity by providing limiting conditions for operating that are consistent with those currently addressed elsewhere in ot1er TS that are related to secondary containment integrity and operability.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S These amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility com)onent located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. Tie staff has determined that these amendments involve 3
no signiffcant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the f
types of any. effluents that may be released off site and that there is no significantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR51.22(c)(9). Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmentalimpact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission made a proposed determination that these amendments involve
-no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 331102) on July 26, 1989, and consulted with the State i
of North Carolina.
No public coments or requests for hearing were received, and the State of North Carolina did not have any coments.
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The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Com-mission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendnents will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: October 25, 1990 Principal Contributors:
R. Licciardo N. Le e
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