ML20058C626
| ML20058C626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/15/1982 |
| From: | Fay C WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| To: | Hind J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058C584 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8207260403 | |
| Download: ML20058C626 (4) | |
Text
'.
TZIUGTPAL STAFF tsia Wsts 1
3/D PA0 s/n 10 WlSCORSin Electnc rowca courany
,,,,F r 231 W. MICHIGAN, P O. BOX 2046. MILWAUKEE, WI 53201 DFSDF
=
June 15, 1982t!Ib&05
{ Fila O$
\\
Mr. J. A. Hind, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Operational Support U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
Dear Mr. Hind:
DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 IE INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-266/82-08 AND 50-301/82-08 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 This is in reference to your letter of April 29, 1982 which addressed the emergency plan exercise held at Point Beach Nuclear Plant on March 9, 1982.
We are concerned that, notwithstanding satisfactory and favorable press releases by NRC, FEMA, and the State of Wisconsin regarding the exercise, the tone of your letter appears to imply serious failure to meet minimal requirements.
Phrases j
such as "particularly concerned with" and repeated generalized l
descriptors such as " inadequate" are not consistent with the conclusion in the attached inspection summary that "no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, however, specific problems regarding emergency plan implementation were identified".
Further, your letter adopts a tone of reproachment in stating "In the future, we expect your staff to follow the provisions of FEMA Guidance Memorandum No. 17...".
Contrary to the implication, the submittal of our exercise scenario conformed to the directives in Mr. J.
G. Keppler's letter of January 12, 1982.
In that letter, NRC withdrew its previous two-week submittal requirement and adopted FEMA's 75/45 day schedule.
The letter i
further provided that licensees (like ourselves) already within l
the 75 or 45 day period prior to the exercise should contact your office.
We contacted your office by telephone and subsequently confirmed our schedule by Mr. Fay's letter to Mr. Keppler dated January 25, 1982.
Hence, we have consistently followed NRC's lead on these schedular matters and will continue to do so in the future, including adoption of the 75/45 day FEMA schedule. 8207260403 820720 jQ)k16lggg PDR ADOCK 05000266 G
=
Mr. J. A. Ilind June 15, 1982 i
As you are aware, both the industry and the government suffer from a lack of credibility when viewed by the public, and matters of tone in correspondence can have a substantial impact on public perceptions of nuclear power.
While we may sometimes differ on details of implementation, our concern for matters relating to public health and safety is the same as that of NRC.
IIence, we believe that the spirit of cooperation can be enhanced l
by correspondence which minimizes the possibility of misinterpre-tation by readers not completely familiar with the details.
The attachment to this letter addresses each of the items identified in Appendix A to your April 29 letter.
If you have any questions regarding this submittal, please feel free to contact us.
very truly yours, i
Assistant Vice President i
C. W. Fay l
Attachment Copy to NRC Resident Inspector i
l i
1 i
ATTACHMENT This attachment describes our planned actions for improving each of the items identified in Appendix A to the April 29, 1982 letter from Mr. J. A.
Hind to Mr. Sol Burstein.
The following items are presented and numbered in the same order as Appendix A.
1.
Radiological data and equipment status trends will be maintained on the new computer and display system associated with the SPDS.
This will be completed and available on a schedule consistent with our most recent response on scheduling associated with NUREG-0737 items.
2.
During the initial stages of the emergency exercise of March 9, 1982, the control room staff tried to use various methods of solving system failure problems.
The controllers informed the control room staff, as they proceeded through emergency operating procedures, that emergency equipment was unavailable and that broken equipment could not be fixed or would take too long to be effective.
After a few hours of this type of response, the control room staff began paying more attention to the emergency plan procedures and less to fixing the plant.
This was an artificial training situation brought about by the scenario emphasis on the use of the emergency plan and procedures.
In an actual emergency, Technical Support Center personnel establish emergency plan and maintenance priorities and control room personnel establish the priorities for operations related items.
3.
We agree that the shift supervisor should not be continuously involved in telephone conversations.
However, the most efficient flow of information is direct communication.
The type of equipment to be installed shortly in the control room for communication with the Technical Support Center will make it possible for the shift supervisor to move around the control room and also talk on the phone.
It is also possible for the shift supervisor to delegate the communication function.
However, it is necessary to allow the shift supervisor to put himself in the position at which he can be most effective.
4.
The keeping of logs in the control room, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Support Center will be covered in the training programs provided to the personnel responsible for maintaining those logs.
Their function will also be covered under a procedure for status updates.
This training will be done during the 1982 retraining program.
EPIP 1.2,
" Plant Status", will be revised to allow for periodic updates of the plant status. 1 I
k
,. -,. - -.~
~
s 5.
Plant facility map status boards will be installed in the Technical Support Center and the operations Support Center.
These maps will be used for dose rate display and search and rescue coordination.
The boards will be installed by October 1982.
6.
The Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures have been revised to remove the responsibility for off-site dose projection from the Chemistry and Health Physics supervisor after the activation of the Emergency Support Center.
If the move of the Emergency Support Center to Milwaukee is approved by the Commission, the transfer of this responsibility will be quicker than experienced during the March exercise.
7.
To augment the staffing of the Emergency Support Center, we are proposing to the Commission that we move the Emergency Support Center and its functions to the corporate headquarters in Milwaukee.
This will make staff and communications available in a more timely manner.
This move will also resolve habitability concerns.
8.
See Item 6, above.
9.
EPIP 1.5,
" Protective Action Evaluation", has been revised to reflect the NUREG-0654 guidance on evacuation sector shape.
10.
A new radio system is being planned and will be implemented this year to facilitate in-plant communications, including in-plant surveys during an emergency situation.
11.
The new radio system discussed in Item 10 will include a radio system with adequate range and portable units to address the problems of Site Boundary Control Center communication and will provide for adequate units for use by Kewaunee teams with radios on the same frequency.
12.
The Joint Public Information Center will have extra phones installed for the use of Wisconsin Electric employees.
The news persons will, during a real emergency, be supplied with adequate phones.
There is a one hundred pair cable which will be installed this summer connecting the Joint Public Information Center with the local Two Rivers switching facility.
General Telephone has indicated that many phones can be installed in a timely manner for an emergency situation.
1 i
_ _. _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _.