ML20058C513
| ML20058C513 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1990 |
| From: | William Cahill TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC CO. (TU ELECTRIC) |
| To: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| SR-1-90-007-00, SR-1-90-7, TXX-90277, NUDOCS 9011010289 | |
| Download: ML20058C513 (2) | |
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2 F1 e # 10250
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Ref. # 10CFR50.36(c)(5) illELECTRIC w im.. J. r.hm. Jr.
October 29, 1990 l tr<uths She l>tuden*
Mr. R. D. Martin, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011
SUBJECT:
COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (CPSES)
DOCKET NO. 50 445 CHARGING FLOW DIVERTED THROUGH SAFETY INJECTION LINE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR SPECIAL REPORT NO. SR 1 90 007-00 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is a 30 day special report submitted in accordance with CPSES Unit 1 Technical Specification 3/4.5.2 'ECCS Subsystems Tave 1 3500F "
As discussed with members of your staff on October 26, 1990, this report is being submitted on this date in lieu of October 24, 1990 due to an administrative oversight.
Sincerely, William J. Cahill, Jr.
JAA/daj Enclosure c - Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Resident Inspectors, CPSES (3) l l
1 9011010209 901029 PDR ADOCK 05000445 S
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e SpwtalHeport HR 96007 Charging Mow DMeted 'Ihmugh Sahity Iglection Ilne Due to INesonnel Emr 1.0 Hepart hpilmment This Special Report is being submitted in accordance with Comanche Peak Steam Electrical Station Unit 1 Technical Specification 3/4.5.2, ECCS SUBSYSTEMS -
Tavg a 350' F. Specification 3.5.2 requires that in the event the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated cycles to date.
Although this event was not an actual actuation of the ECCS, flow from the Positive Displacement Pump (PDP) was admitted to the RCS via the safety injection flowpath and was therefore considered a thermal cycle requiring a Special Report, l
2.0 EventIhacription
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At approximately 0054 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br />,26 July 1990, a Train B Safeguards Slave Relay K603 Actuation Test was commenced in accordance with procedure OIT 489A. Initial conditions for the test are PDP placed in service and both Centrifugal Charging Pumps shutdown. The procedure also isolates the charging flow path from the high head safety injection flow path. While performing restoration after the slave relay actuation, two steps in the procedure were inadvertently skipped. This resulted in a portion of positive displacement pump flow being diverted through the charging safety injection isolation valve,18801B, during a subsequent step. The operator realized his mistake and ordered the correct steps performed, terminating the event. PDP flow was in progress for approximately 30 seconds. There was no noticeable effect en the RCS level or reactor power.
As of 26 July 1990, this was the second event causing water irdection into the RCS via the high head safety injection nozzles. As of this report date, there have been four total actuations. The two most recent events (1 SR 90 008 and 1.SR 90 009) are addressed in Licensee Event Reports 90 020 00 and 90-02100 respectively. The current value of the usage factor for the Safety injection nozzle is less than 0.70.
3.0 c=== orthe h int Failure of the operator to perform procedural steps in the proper sequence due to a lack of self verification.
4,0 Comethc Actions A meeting was held immediately at the end of the shift to discuss the cause of the event and to determine if there was any weakness in the procedure. Those attending the meeting were, Manager, Operations, Operations Shift Manager, Operations Day Shift Manager, Shift Supervisor and the control room operators. The procedure was found to be satisfactory. The operator was later counselled.
Following review of the event by Operations management, OPT-400 series procedures were reviewed for accuracy and case of following the steps. There were no significant eersections needed, but there were some enhancements made. No corrections were required on OIT 489A.
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