ML20058B678
| ML20058B678 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1982 |
| From: | Huffman G, Jenkins G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058B666 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-327-82-11, 50-328-82-11, NUDOCS 8207260103 | |
| Download: ML20058B678 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000327/1982011
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., sulTE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303
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Report Nos. 50-327/82-11 and 50-328/82-11
Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street Tower II
Chattanooga, TN 37401
Facility Name:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Docket Nos. 50-327 and 50-328
License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79
Inspection at the Sequoyah site near Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee
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G. R. Jenkins, Chief "
Date Signed
Emergency Preparedness Section
EPOS Division
SUMMARY
Inspection on May 24-28, 1982
Areas Inspected
This routine, unannounced inspection involved 34 inspector-hours on site in the
area of follow-up on emergency preparedness findings.
Results
In the area inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8207260103 820702
PDR ADOCK 05000327
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. McGriff, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- R. Kitts, Health Physics Supervisor
- D. Craven, Electrical Maintenance
- E. Sliger, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Supervisor
E. Craigge, Safety Supervisor
L. Nobles, Operations Supervisor
J. Ingwerson, Emergency Planning Supervisor
B. Childs, Health Physics Shift Supervisor
J. Taylor, Chemical Unit Supervisor
W. Watson, Special Projects Maintenance Supervisor
M. Harding, Nuclear Compliance Supervisor
M. Halley, Preoperations Testing Supervisor
T. Crittenden, Security Chief
- W. Webb, Jr., Project Engineer
- C. Mills, Nuclear Engineer
- A. Carver, Nuclear Compliance Engineer
NRC Resident Inspector
E. Ford
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 28, 1982, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings
(Closed) Violation (327/80-34-07):
Fire Brigade training.
An inspector
reviewed and verified the corrective actions as stated in TVA's letter of
October 20, 1980.
(Details, Paragraph 6.b)
(Closed) Violation (327/81-20-03, 328/81-24-03):
Inadequate emergency
implementing procedures. An inspector reviewed and verified the corrective
actions as stated in TVA's letter of September 24, 1981.
(Details,
Paragraph 9)
(Closed) Deficiency (327/81-20-12, 328/81-24-12):
Inadequate procedure for
accident classification. An inspector reviewed and verified the corrective
action as stated in TVA's letter of September 24, 1981.
(Details, Para-
graph 10.a)
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(Closed) Deficiency (327/81-20-10, 328/81-24-10): Vent assessment proce-
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dures and monitor. An inspector reviewed and verified the corrective action
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as stated in TVA's letter of September 24, 1981.
(Details, Paragraph 10.a)
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(Closed) Deficiency (327/81-20-01, 328/81-24-01): Assignment of specific
emergency responsibilities. An inspector reviewed and verified the correc-
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tive actions as stated in TVA's letter of September 24, 1981.
(Details,
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Paragraph 5.a)
(Closed) Deficiency (327/81-20-02, 328/81-24-02):
Emergency training
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program. An inspector reviewed and verified the corrective actions as
stated in TVA's letter of September 24, 1981.
(Details, Paragraph 6.a)
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In addition to the above, the inspector reviewed actions taken by the
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licensee on emergency preparedness improvement items as addressed in TVA's
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letter of October 30, 1981. The status of these items is discussed in the
Details of this report.
4.
Unresolved items
Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.
5.
Onsite Emergency Organization
The inspector evaluated this area of the licensee's program through discus-
sion with licensee representatives and review of Section 4.0 of the Sequoyah
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Radiological Emergency Plan (SQN-REP); SQN-REP Implementing Procedure 6
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(SQN, IP-6), Activation of the Technical Support Center; SQN, IP-7,
Activation of the Operations Support Center; SQN, IP-14, Health Physics
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Procedures; and TI-66, Post Accident Sampling and Analysis Methods.
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a.
The Emergency Plan now provides a clear description of functional
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responsibilities for the emergency organization down to the working
level.
SQN, IP-6 provides procedures for the OSC staff, SQN, IP-14
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defines the functions of the Health Physics group, and TI-66 provides
procedures for the Radio-Chemistry group. No onsite organizational
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chart had been assembled; however, the licensee agreed to complete one
by August 2, 1982.
Based on the above findings, the previously iden-
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tified deficiency in this area (50-327/81-20-01; 50-328/81-24-01) is
closed. The completion of the onsite emergency organization chart will
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be evaluated during a subsequent inspection (50-327, 328/82-11-01).
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b.
The licensee has revised SQN, IP-7 to assign responsibility to the
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Assistant Shift Engineer (ASE) for briefing and dispatching teams from
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the OSC. The Shift Engineer is assigned overall responsibility for the
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operation of the OSC and briefing the ASE. Based on the above find-
ings, the previously identified improvement item (50-327/81-40-02;
50-328/81-49-02) is closed.
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6.
Training
The inspector evaluated this area of the licensee's program through discus-
sion with licensee representatives, review of SQN, IP-19, Radiological
Emergency Plan Training, and review of Administrative Section Instruction
Letters (ASILs), Radiation Control Instructions (RCIs), Health Physics
Section Instruction Letters (HPSILs), Dosimetry and Training Section
Instruction Letters (DSILs), Physical Security Plan Implementing Procedure
13 (PHYSI-13), and selected individual training records.
a.
Emergency Response Personnel
SQN, IP-19 is the basic document for emergency organization training.
This procedure requires that all station personnel who require unes-
corted access to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SNP) must be trained in
the SQN-REP as part of their health physics training. This training is
updated biennially.
Key personnel are also specified in SQN, IP-19 and
they must be trained annually.
In addition, it states that anyone else
with specific emergency response duties must be retrained annually.
Training for all the above must include:
(1) The Radiological Emergency Plan (SQN-REP)
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The Implementing Procedures (SQN-IPs)
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The Emergency Management Organization
(4
Communications Systems Familiarization
(5) Emergency Conditions
(6) Emergency Facilities and Equipment
(8) Recovery
Beyond SQN, IP-19, the specific training tailored to meet the emergency
needs of each group is specified by separate documents and individual-
ized lesson plans.
For example, training for the Site Emergency
Director and his alternates is specified in Administrative Section
Instruction Letter 14 (ASIL-14) and that for Health Physicists is
covered by ASIL-9. The ASILs appear to be the basic training documents
for all training at the site. The lesson plans for each functional
group must be reviewed.
For example, ASIL-9 and ASIL-14 specify what
SQN-IPs must be included in the training for the above groups. ASIL-9
further specifies that all Health Physicists must review and sign off
on a long list of documents semi-annually which bear on their ability
to respond to an emergency. This includes other ASILs, Radiation
Control Instructions (RCIs), Health Physics Section Instruction Letters
(HPSILs), and Dosimetry and Training Section Instruction Letters
(DSILs).
From a review of all of the above mentioned documents, it
appears that the SQN-REP training meets the criteria of NUREG-0654.
To determine if the above training had been provided as required, the
records were checked for several individuals at different levels in the
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Emergency Response Organization. The records were fragmented, but it
appears from the sample that the training and retraining meets the
criteria of NUREG-0654.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified deficiency
(50-327/81-20-02;50-328/81-24-02) and inspector followup items
(50-327/80-34-05; 50-327/80-34-06) in this area are closed.
b.
Fire Brigade Members
To assure compliance with PHYSI-13, the Safety Section reviews the
training of all potential Fire Brigade members quarterly.
In addition,
as the Duty Roster is posted each day, a clerk in the Operations
Supervisor's office and another clerk in the Shift Engineer's office
check the records to assure the personnel assigned to the Fire Brigade
are qualified. Also, on one day, the training records of all five
personnel assigned to the Fire Brigade on that day were reviewed. All
five were qualified by having successfully completed retraining no more
than seven months previously.
Based on the above findings, the pre-
viously identified deficiency in this area (50-327/80-34-07) is closed.
a.
Emergency Operations Facility (E0F)
The inspector discussed this area with licensee representatives and
reviewed pertinent correspondence.
In a letter dated May 1, 1980 from
Mr. L. M. Mills, Manager, Nuclear Radiation and Safety, TVA, to Mr. L.
S. Rubenstein, Acting Chief, Light Water Reactors Branch No. 4, NRC, it.
was proposed that the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) be used
as an EOF for all TVA sites. The NRC accepted this proposal with
certain specifications, by letter of March 19, 1981 from Mr. D. G.
Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, to Mr. H. G. Parris, Manager
of Power, TVA. Based on the above findings, the previously identified
inspector followup item in this area (50-327/80-34-01) is closed.
b.
Offsite Laboratory Facilities
The inspector discussed this area with licensee representatives. The
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licensee's position is that both the radiochemistry laboratory where
routine analyses are normally processed and the laboratory at the
Training Center are under the Director, Division of Nuclear Power, and
the Training Center Laboratory would be made available in an emergency,
if needed. Based on the above findings, the previously identified
improvement item in this area (50-327/81-20-04; 50-328/81-24-04) is
closed.
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8.
Emergency Communications Equipment
a.
Data Transmission and Handling
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The inspector discussed this area with licensee representatives and
inspected c';mmunications facilities and equipment.
To eliminate problems in transmitting data, times, and dose assessment
information, the licensee has decided to depend solely on computer
Videoterminals (CVs) for the transmission of critical information.
There are from one to three CVs at each emergency facility and they can
be used for the electronic transmission of messages as well as receiv-
ing real-time data readouts from such sources as the meterological
towers.
Each site is also equipped with a digital printer for the
hard-copy recording of any data received via the CVs.
The computer
system supporting the CVs is user-friendly and an operating manual
accompanies the CVs at each location.
Dose assessment data will soon be transmitted via a separate Plume
Tracking and Dose Assessment System which is in place, but not yet
connected for real-time readout from the vent monitors and metero-
logical towers at Sequoyah. When fully operational, dose assessment
data and trend analysis will be immediately available at each location.
In the interim, the data is developed by the MSECC monitoring team and
can be transmitted via the CVs. Reporting units have been standardized
on the new system; however, this system is very sophisticated and can
not be operated by untrained personnel, ever though an operator manual
is kept with the equipment.
To solve the time problem, the licensee has standardized on Central
Daylight Time (CDT) at all emergency facilities.
Each location has a
readily visible clock on CDT and the computers for the above system are
programmed for CDT.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified inspector
followup items for this area (50-327/81-26-03; 50-328/81-33-03 and
50-327/81-26-08; 50-328/81-33-08) are closed,
b.
Emergency Power for NRC Telephones
The inspector discussed this area with licensee representatives,
reviewed records, and inspected the applicable equipment. As per
Workplan No. 9092, emergency power was connected to the NRC ringdown
telephones on April 15, 1981.
Based on the above findings, the IE
Bulletin item for this area (50-327, 328/80-BU-15) is closed.
c.
Alarm audibility
The inspector discussed this area with licensee representatives and
reviewed records of licensee surveys and upgrade conducted since 1979.
Although there was evidence of several surveys being performed, there
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was no indication that all suspect sites, such as the Charging' Pump
Room and Ice Condenser Rooms, had been surveyed.
In addition, there
was no evidence of an additional survey since December 17, 1981, as
agreed to by the licensee (Item 50-327/81-40-06;50-328/81-49-06).
In
response, the licensee agreed to perform another survey.during the
July, 1982 exercise and provide the NRC with their findings and actions
taken to correct any problems by July 16, 1982.
Previously identified
inspector followup items (50-328/81-21-03; 50-327/81-40-06; 50-328/81-
-49-06) and IE Bulletin item (50-327/79-BU-18) remain open.
9.
Implementing Procedures
The inspector evaluated this area through discussion with licensee represen-
tatives, review of Procedures TI-66, MSECC-9, and REPP-15, and inspection of
equipment.
There is no longer a requirement for a procedure for activation and staffing
the nearsite EOF since the need for this facility no longer exists.
The licensee has constructed two carts to transport post accident samples to
the Chemistry Laboratory. Temporary shielding material has also been made
available for use in transporting the samples.
In addition, a pre-
formated, self-sticking label is now provided for post accident samples.
Procedure TI-66 has been revised, and now includes a procedure for high-
activity liquid effluent sampling and makes provision for labeling of post
accident samples.
In addition, TI-66 provides guidance on issuance and use
of dosimetry when taking and processing samples, and provides guidance for
exposures, and designates the Site Emergency Director as responsible for
authorizing exposures above normal limits. A form is provided to be signed
by the Site Emergency Director, specifying the individual and his exposure
limits.
Emergency Offsite Monitoring Teams have been trained in monitoring proce-
dures specified in Procedure MSECC-9, and a Sequoyah Emergency Implementing
Procedure, SQN, IP-20, has been developed based on MSECC-9.
REPP-15, Planning and Conducting Radiological Emergency Exercise, has been
written and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Appraisal Tracking
System has been established to ensure that the Proce. dure is implemented.
This is a computerized system which publishes printouts once weekly. The
printout lists all licensee and NRC appraisal and audits findings as well as
required actions in support of the REP for each item, the person responsible
for required actions, the date on which the action must be initiated, the
completion deadline, the frequency, the status and references.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified violation in this
area (Item 50-327/81-20-03 and 50-328/81-24-03) is closed.
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10. Assessment Actions
a.
High Range Vent ?!onitor
Overlapping low range and high range monitors are now in place, cali-
brated and operating for both Units 1 and 2.
SQN-IP-1 has been revised
through the addition of pages 32A and 32B so that direct readings from
these monitors result in an immediate classification of an accident
condition based on the monitor readings. Required actions for each
classification are given in SQN-IP-2 through S.
Calculation of the-
offsite dose for initial response and protective action recommendations
is covered by SQN-IP-18.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified deficiencies
(50-327/81-20-10 and 50-328/81-24-10; 50-327/81-20-12 and 50-328/
81-24-12) are closed.
b.
Inplant and Onsite Radiological Surveys
SQN-IP-14 was revised to provide specific guidance for health physics
personnel for each level of accident classification and covers both
in-plant and on-site surveys. This procedure covers methods, equip-
ment, communications and radiation protection guidance under emergency
conditions.
In addition, it covers the issuance of KI, sampling, and
decontamination. Specific procedures and the radiation safety measures
associated with those procedures are provided in TI-66 for all reactor
coolant, containment air and building vent sampling and analysis.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement
items in this area (50-327/81-20-13 and 50-328/81-24-13; 50-327/81-
20-14 and 50-328/81-24-14) are closed.
c.
Offsite Radiological Surveys
Only one Nal detector is designated for sampling during an emergency
and it is calibrated against both the MS-2 scaler in the Health Physics
Laboratory and one on the van.
Efficiency factors for each combination
are provided with the scalers. Calibration is repeated quarterly.
Since there is only one Nal detector specified for field use by the
Health Physics Department, the possibility of mismatched calibration
when equipping the van during an emergency is eliminated.
SQN-IP-17 lists most of the emergency preparedness equipment needed to
support the REP by function and location. Attachment 12 to SQN-IP-17
states that the monitoring station keys are kept at the health physics
laboratory, which was verified during the inspection.
A review of all equipment needed to support offsite, onsite and in-
plant monitoring resulted in the purchase of some equipment, as con-
firmed by a review of documents responding to equipment items in the
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Tracking System (see Section 9.h.).
A review of the equipment lists in
SQN-IP-17 appears to show adequate equipment available. A van is
available at all times.
If a second van or automobile were needed, a
pool exists at the site, from which one could be assigned.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement
items in this area (50-327/81-20-06 and 50-328/81-24-06; 50-327/81-
20-07 and 50-328/81-24-07; 50-327/81-20-08 and 50-328/81-24-08; 50-
327/81-20-11and50-328/81-24-11) are closed.
d.
Offsite Particulate and Radiciodine Monitoring
Procedure SQN, IP-20 covers offsite radiological monitoring with
specific guidance on radiciodine analysis. Specifics on when and why
to use silver zeolite cartridges, along with guidance on sampling in
the rain and the collection efficiency of the cartridges as a function
of flow rate is contained in SQN, IP-14, Health Physics Procedure. The
filter cutter, which is used as part of the radioiodine and particulate
sampling process, originally had long handles and was awkward to use.
It has been replaced with a punch type that appears to be adequate.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement item
(50-327/81-20-09 and 50-328/81-24-09) and inspector followup items
(50-327/81-40-03 and 50-328/81-49-03; 50-327/81-40-04 and 50-328/
81-49-04; 50-327/81-40-05 and 50-328/81-49-05) in this area are closed.
11. Protective Actions
a.
Decontamination
The onsite decontamination facilities are described in SQN-REP-7.1.7.1
with floor plans and the detailed decontamination procedures are in
HPSIL-10.
The approach used is general in nature and is designed to
respond to types and levels of contamination routinely encountered. A
series of decontamination methods are described and should be adequate
for most emergency situations.
The licensee has committed to keeping the door to the decontamination
facility unlocked, and it was found to be unlocked during the inspec-
tion.
In addition, a key is kept in the HP Laboratory about 50 feet
away.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement
items in this area (50-327/81-20-15 and 50-328/81-24-15; 50-327/81-
20-05 and 50-328/81-24-05) are closed.
b.
Evacuation
The owner controlled land outside the Protected Area is under the
control of the Construction Public Safety Department; consequently,
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security guards patrol the area. The area is fenced, entrance is only
by permission and requires that anyone needing access sign in or out.
Section 4.0 of SQN, IP-8 requires that during an evacuation, the names
of personnel leaving the area be checked against the sign in list. Any
persons unaccounted for must be located and evacuated.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified inspector
followup item (50-327/81-26-09 and 50-328/81-33-09) is closed.
12. Drills and Exercises
Section 9.0 of the SQN-REP specifies the types of required drills, who
participates, the frequency and who will critique. REPP-15 assigns the
overall responsibility for developing scenarios and coordinating drills and
exercises to the Manager, Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness
Group. He delegates this authority through the Tracking System (see Section
9.), although his group does the followup to assure that the drills and
exercises are conducted as required.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement item in
this area (50-327/81-20-18 and 50-328/81-24-18) is closed.
13. Review of Emergency Plans and Procedures
SQN-REP, Section 10.0 clearly defines the requirements for document control
and review of the REP, who has the responsibility, and how and when to
proceed. The mechanics for accomplishing the task are clearly described in
REPP-5.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement item in
this are (50-327/81-20-16 and 50-328/81-24-16) is closed.
14. Audits of the Emergency Plan
Section 10.0 of the SQN-REP now covers the Emergency Plan, the Emergency
Plan Implementing Procedures, and the implementation of the program. During
the inspection, two current audit reports were reviewed. They appeared to
be both comprehensive and in-depth in nature. The reports reviewed covered
the Emergency Plan, the Implementing Procedures, facilities, equipment and
program implementation.
Based on the above findings, the previously identified improvement item in
this area (50-327/81-20-17 and 328/81-24-17) is closed.
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