ML20058A939

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Rev 13 to CNC-1503.13-00-026, SE for PIR 0-C89-0370 Nonuse of Boron Concentration Measurement Sys
ML20058A939
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  
Issue date: 01/31/1990
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20058A935 List:
References
CNC-1503.13-, CNC-1503.13--26, CNC-1503.13-00, CNC-1503.13-00-026, NUDOCS 9010290315
Download: ML20058A939 (4)


Text

,

rb 0107707.m FORM 101.1 REVISION 13 CERTIFICATION OF ENGINEERING CALCULATION STATION AND UNIT NUMBER Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 TITLE OF CALCULATION Safety Evaluation for PIR 0-C89'0370.. Non-Use of the Boron concentration Measurement System CALCULATION NUMBER CNC-1503.13-00-0265 ORIGINALLY CONSISTING OF:

PAGES 1

3 THROUGH-TOTAL ATTACHMENTS 0

TOTAL MICROFICFc. ATTACHMENTS 0

TOTAL VOLUMES 1

TYPE I CALCULATION / ANALYSIS YESO NO 6 TYPE I REVIEW FREQUENCY THEbE ENGINEERING CALCULATIONS COVER QA CONDITION 1

ITEMS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES, THE QUALITY HAS BEEN ASSURED AND l CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE CALCULATION HAS BE O IGINATED, CgKED OR APPROVED AS NOTED BELOW:

DATE S!

ORIGINATED BY d-V DATE U

b CHECKED BY APPROVED B DATE

/

-N m

'/

ISSUED TO TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION DATE RECEIVED BY TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION DATE MICROFICHE ATTACHMENT LIST: O Yes 6 No SEE FORM 101.4 REV CALCULATION PAGES(VOL)

ATTACHMENTS 0/OL)

VOLUMES ORIG CHKD APPR TE REVISED DELETED ADDED REVISED DELETED ADDED DELETED ADDED DATE DATE DATE

- hE i

l j

.I i

9010290315 901023 PDR ADOCK 05000413 P

PDC

l Cac-1503.13-00-0265 Rov. O MCNE-90-15 Sheet f3 By M

Datet.7/,M

Purpose:

The purpose of this evaluation is to review PIk 0-C89-0370 for its impact on plant safety. Although the criteria of 10CTR50.59a(2) does not directly apply in this situation, this type of a review will be performed to adequately determine the impact of this issue on plant safety. Thus, this calculation does not serve as a 50.59 evaluation of the subject PIR.

Modification

Description:

Thia PIR addresses. the non-use of the Boron concentration measurement system. This safety evaluation is based solely upon the technical aspects of non-use of the Boron concentration measurement system (ENC) Reguletrwy aspects associated with its non-use and NRC review are not addressed.

The Boron concentration neasu'rement system is a part of the Chemical and Volume control system (NV). The Boron concentration measurement system monitors boron concentration in the reactor coolant and provides continuous readout (both L. E. D. and chart recorder) in the control room as scales of concentration 0-1250 ppa and 0-5000 ppa. The 0-5000 ppa range is also monitored by the computer. (Ref 5).

Safety Review and USQ Evaluation:

The Boron Concentration Measurement System is designed for use as an advisory system. It is not designed as a safeguards system or component of a safeguards system. The Boron Concentration Measurement System is not part of a control element or control system, nor is it designed for this use. No credit is taken for this system in any accident analysis. There fore, redundancies of measurement components, self-checking subsystems, malfunction annunciation, and diagnostic circuitry are not included in this system. As a general operating aid it provides information as to when additional check analyses are warranted rather than a basis for fundamental c

operating decisions (Ref 1).

Boron concentration addition and dilution accidents are protected for by j

use of the boron dilution sitigation system, which has completely redundant alaras, while in Modes 3. i, 5 and 6 (Ref 1, 2, 7).

Wen in Modes 1 and 2 the operator is alerted to che dilution event by the overtemperature Delta-T reactor trip and/or the rod insertion limit alara, and by the power ratge high neutron flux low setpoint reactor trip, respectively. (Ref 3).

Wile during str.ctup, a boron dilution event is protected for via redundant alarns of the Source range High Flux Level Reactor Trip" Uef 2, 8).

Boron concentration is directly measured by chemical analysis on a twice daily basis $uring all modes (ref 7).

Since this systes possesses no control or protective functions, and since the system is not being physically removed at this time (Ref 1, 6, 9) and it is not used as a basis for fundamental operating decisions (Ref 1), it is concluded that non-use of-the boron concentration measurement system j

If

J 'W

\\

CBC-1503.13-00-0265. Revo 0 McWE-90-15 M

Sheet 2 of 3 By: 4 //g' Datet JVNf 0 4

does not increase the probability of an accident evaluated ta the SAR.

since this systes is not part of a safeguards system. Control element, control system and no credit is taken for this system in any accidentor analyses (Ref 1), the non-use of this system does not increase the consequence of an accident evaluated in the SAR. Since this eystem provides no control functions, indications for fundamental operating decisions, nor does its non-use adversely interact with any other system, its non-use does not create the possibility for an accident of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR. Since 64 interact with any equi,.40 important to safety (Ret 6)non-use of this system does not not increase the probah

, its non-use does safety evaluated in the SAR.4ty of a malfunction of equipment important to Since this system is neuher used nor taken credit for in any accident analysis, its non-use does not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to' safety evaluated in the SAR. Since this system does not provide the basis for any fundamental operator decisions, posses any control functions nor does its non-use adversely affect any equipment important to eafety, its non-use does not create the possibility for a malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the SAR. Since no plant parameters, setpoints, operating conditions or basic operator decision making information sources are altered by the non-use of this system, the margin of safety as described in the bases to any technical specification is not reduced.

Comelusion:

Based purely on the technical aspects of this review, the response to all seven questions was negative and properly justified, therefore, there is no adverse nuclear safety impact associated with the non-use of this system.

l

CBC-1503.13-00-0265 Rev. O MCNE-90-15 6>

Dates 7/TAWh Referase :

1.

Catawba FSAR.1988 update.

2.

Catawba Technical Specifications. Amendments 62 and 68 inclusive.

3.

Catawba SER and supplements 1 thru 6.

Flow diagrams CN-1554-1.6. rev. 5 and CN-2554-1.6. rev. 5.

5.

Electrical Systen Description. Chemical and volume control System.

CNSD-0157 01, rev. 10.

6.

Drawings CNN 1210.09-81 rev. 0 CNM 1210.09-82 rev.1 CNN 1210.09-83 rev. O CNM 1210.09-84 rev. O CNN 1210.09-85 rev. O CNN 1210.09-86. Sh 1 rev. O CNN 1210.09-86. Sh 2. rev. O CNN 1210.09-86. Sh 3. rev. O CNN 1210.09-86. Sh 4. rev. 1 CNN 1210.09-154 rev. 0 7.

Memo from R. K. Sensely to R. G. Kurilla, dated January 16, 1990.

8.

Electrical System Description. Nt of Core Instrumentation (ENB),

CNSD-0172-02, rev. O.

9.

Memo from R. G. Kurilla to R. Monichelli, dated January 22, 1990.

l