ML20057F994
| ML20057F994 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1993 |
| From: | Milhoan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Horn G NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057F995 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-93-137, NUDOCS 9310200057 | |
| Download: ML20057F994 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1993017
Text
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UNIT E D STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGloN IV
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 400
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ARLINGTON TEXAS 76011-8064
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OCT I 21993
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Docket No. 50-298
License No. DPR-46
EA 93-137
Nebraska Public Power District
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ATTN:
Guy R. Horn, Nuclear Power
Group Manager
Post Office Box 499
Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTIES -
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$200,000 (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-298/93-17)
This is in reference to the inspection conducted March 29 through April 2 and
May 3-7, 1993, at the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS), Brownville, Nebraska.
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This inspection was conducted specifically to evaluate the effectiveness of
Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) processes for identifying and resolving
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deficiencies and determining the operability of systems affected by
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deficiencies. A report documenting the results of this inspection was issued
on June 17, 1993.
On August 13, 1993, you and other Nebraska Public Power
District (NPPD) representatives attended an enforcement conference in the
NRC's Arlington, Texas office to discuss NRC's preliminary conclusion that
potentially significant violations of NRC requirements and plant Technical
Specifications had occurred.
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Based on the information developed during the inspection and the information
that NPPD provided during the enforcement conference, the NRC has determined
that the following significant violations of NRC requirements did occur and
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that civil penalties should be assessed:
1) several violations of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, which are itemized in the enclosure and which
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collectively indicate a breakdown in NPPD's corrective action program
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($75,000); 2) a violation of plant Technical Specifications involving
inoperable containment hydrogen / oxygen analyzers ($75,000); and 3) a
violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) involving a failure to include essential
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portions of the CNS service water and reactor equipment cooling systems in the
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required inservice inspection program ($50,000).
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The circumstances surrounding these violations are described in detail in the
June 17 inspection report. At the August 13 enforcement conference, NPPD
characterized these violations as having minimal safety significance but
acknowledged the regulatory significance of the violations taken as a whole.
From the NRC's perspective, these particular violations have both regulatory
and safety significance because:
1) the breakdown in NPPD's corrective action
program had the potential to affect the reliability of many safety-related
systems and components; 2) the failure to maintain the containment
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hydrogen / oxygen analyzers in an operable condition is a specific example where
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an important component may not have provided reliable information when it is
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9310200057 931012
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counted on,
i.e., under accident conditions; and 3) the failure to include the
service water and reactor equipment cooling systems in the inservice
inspection program since initial plant operations, specifically the failure to
conduct pressure testing of these systems, placed into question the long-term
reliability of these systems.
In addition, NPPD failed to detect this problem
despite a similar violation in 1991 and a third-party review of its inservice
inspection program to determine whether other nonconformances existed
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(Inspection Report 50-298/91-26).
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With regard to the violations indicating a breakdown in NPPD's corrective
action programs, the NRC recognizes that NPPD was cited on March 30, 1993, for
a similar violation (EA 93-030) and that a $100,000 civil penalty was proposed
and was subsequently paid.
In an April 29, 1993 response to that enforcement
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action, NPPD noted the development of a Corrective Action Program Overview
Group (CAP 0G) to review the effectiveness of its programs and described its
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plans to have a consultant review personnel-related and management oversight
issues.
The NRC acknowledges that NPPD's long-term corrective actions for
EA 93-030 could not have prevented the violations cited in section I.A of the
enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, most
of which occurred prior to the date of NPPD's written response.
However, NPPD
was clearly aware of the NRC's concerns about its corrective action programs
prior to the dates of the violations in the enclosure and its employees should
have been more sensitive to the need to formally document and systematically
resolve problems.
For example, the plant's secondary containment system
failed a test on March 8, 1993, and failed an undocumented follow-up test on
March 10, 1993.
Despite a history of secondary containment test failures,
plant personnel declared it operable on March 12, 1993, prior to determining
the cause of the failures, and generated a nonconformance report documenting
the test problems only after NRC inspectors questioned plant personnel.
NPPD's subsequent investigation found that an error during plant construction
resulted in a missing loop seal in a 10-inch pipe between the reactor building
and the radwaste building.
From the NRC's perspective, NPPD personnel should
have been keenly aware in March 1993 of the need to document and promptly
resolve such problems in that the NRC had described its concerns in a SALP
report issued in March 1992 and had continued to document its concerns in
inspection reports issued following the SAi.P report.
Additionally, the circumstances surrounding the testing of the secondary
containment and the problems associated with the hydrogen / oxygen analyzers
illustrate a serious NRC concern with maintenance and testing practices at
CNS.
Performing preventive maintenance prior to conducting a test of
secondary containment and excessive draining of the filter bowls on the
hydrogen / oxygen analyzers to eliminate erratic instrument readings are
practices that had the potential to mask unsatisfactory system performance and
to permit system problems to go undiscovered and uncorrected.
Therefore, based on the regulatory and safety significance that the NRC
attaches to these particular violations, each of the above violations has been
classified at Severity Level III in accordance with the " General Statement of
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Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," (Enforcement Policy) 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C.
The results of NPPD's investigation into the causes of these violations, as
well as the violations that are not being assessed civil penalties, confirm
the NRC's concerns about the effectiveness of NPPD's processes for ensuring
that deficiencies are identified to the proper level of management and
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resolved adequately and in a manner that precludes their recurrence.
NPPD's
investigation determined that the following causes contributed to the
occurrence of these violations: a willingness to correct deficiencies without
documenting them in the corrective action program, a rigid corrective action
program that made its use undesirable, a lack of problem ownership, a
perception that the corrective action program was an NRC program as opposed to
a program that provided benefits to NPPD, a perception that corrective action
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documents were negative performance indicators, a perception that managers
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responded negatively to problems, production pressures (in one instance), and
a lack of personal accountability.
While these causes are disturbing, their identification is essential to the
development of an effective resolution.
NRC recognizes that NPPD has
initiated broad corrective action in an attempt to resolve these weaknesses in
its corrective action programs. However, the NRC also recognizes that the
resolution of such fundamental weaknesses will require a substantial effort
for an extended period of time and that NPPD may have to take additional steps
as it continues to obtain information from the efforts already underway.
To emphasize the significance that the NRC attaches to these violations and
the importance that the NRC attaches to NPPD's efforts to resolve deeply
rooted and fundamental weaknesses in employee attitudes toward identifying and
resolving problems, I have been authorized after con ultation with the
Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, to issue the enclosed
Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties (Notice) in the
amount of $200,000 for the violations described above.
The base value of a civil penalty for a Severity Level III violation or
problem is $50,000.
The civil penalty adjustment factors in the Enforcement
Policy were considered and resulted in the following:
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1.
For the breakdown in the corrective action program, the base penalty was
increased by $25,000, resulting in a penalty of $75,000, because the NRC
identified the individual violations that comprise this Severity
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Level III problem. Although these violations are an indication of
continuing poor performance in this programmatic area, the NRC did not
increase the penalty based on the Licensee Performance factor because a
previous civil penalty (EA 93-030) for a similar violation was increased
for the same reason and because NPPD had not had the opportunity to
complete its long-term corrective actions in response to EA 93-030.
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2.
For the inoperable hydrogen / oxygen analyzers, the base penalty was
increased by $25,000, resulting in a penalty of $75,000, because the NRC
identified the violation and because NPPD had multiple opportunities to
identify and correct this problem prior to this inspection. These
increases were balanced against mitigation for NPPD's specific
corrective actions.
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3.
For the failure to include the service water and reactor equipment
cooling systems in the inservice inspection program, the base penalty
was not adjusted, resulting in a penalty of $50,000.
In this case, the
fact that the NRC identified this violation was balanced against NPPD's
specific corrective actions.
The remaining civil penalty adjustment factors were considered for each of the
above civil penalties but no further adjustments were considered appropriate.
In addition to the violations discussed above, the Notice contains several
Severity Level IV violations which have not been assessed a civil penalty.
These violations include:
1) the failure of workers to follow the provisions
of a maintenance work request; 2) the failure of a worker to follow procedures
for racking out an electrical breaker, resulting in a temporary loss of
shutdown cooling; 3) the failure of workers to sign a special work permit
prior to entering a radiologically controlled area; 4) the failure to maintain
adequate procedures for conducting functional tests of the hydrogen / oxygen
analyzers; 5) the failure to have an appropriate rationale for relying on
reverse-direction testing of containment isolation valves; and 6) the failure
to test the internals of the hydrogen / oxygen analyzers to the required
pressure.
Based on the NRC's consideration of NPPD's arguments at the enforcement
conference and other relevant information, the NRC is not issuing citations
for several issues which were identified as apparent violations in the
inspection report.
The apparent failure to identify overtime deviation
requests, while a violation of procedures, is not being cited because it is
not considered significant and therefore meets the criteria in Section VII.B.1
of the Enforcement Policy. The apparent failure to take adequate corrective
action to address relief valve setpoint drift problems is not being cited at
this time but is considered an unresolved item (298/9317-09). The NRC plans
further review of this issue to determine whether NPPD efforts to resolve this
problem are adequate.
The remaining issues are not being cited either because
the NRC has insufficient information to conclude that a violation occurred or
because the circumstances do not appear to have resulted in a violation of
requirements. Those issues are:
1) the apparent failure to maintain
compliance with the Technical Specifications regarding secondary containment
integrity; 2) the apparent failure to proceduralize steps necessary to restore
power to containment radiation monitors; 3) the apparent failure to properly
log the status of critical plant components; and 4) the apparent failure to
have adequate procedures for integrated leak rate testing.
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NPPD is required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions
specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing its response.
In its
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response, NPPD should document the specific actions taken and any additional
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actions it plans to prevent recurrence.
After reviewing NPPD's response to
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this Notice, including its proposed corrective actions and the results of
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future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement
action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of
this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
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The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject
to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required
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by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Sincerely,
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0,L.77/$
ames L. Milhoan
egional Administrator
Enclosure:
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties
cc w/ Enclosure:
Nebraska Public Power District
ATTN:
G. D. Watson, General Counsel
P.O. Box 499
Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499
Cooper Nuclear Station
ATTN: John M. Meacham, Site Manager
P.O. Box 98
Brownville, Nebraska 68321
Nebraska Department of Environmental
Control
ATTN:
Randolph Wood, Director
P.O. Box 98922
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-8922
Nemaha County Board of Commissioners
ATTN: Richard Moody, Chairman
Nemaha County Courthouse
1824 N Street
Auburn, Nebraska 68305
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Nebraska Public Power District
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Nebraska Department of Health
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ATTN: Harold Borchert, Director
Division of Radiological Health
301 Centennial Mall, South
P.O. Box 95007
Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007
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Kansas Radiation Control Program Director
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