ML20057E964
| ML20057E964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1993 |
| From: | Black S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057E965 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9310130431 | |
| Download: ML20057E964 (19) | |
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i E UNITED STATES g<, ss. j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION w
e wash NGTON. D.C. 20555-0001
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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO t
CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NO. 50-498 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 54 License No. NPF-76 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company *
(HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees) dated August 5,1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (11) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
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9310130431 931004 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P
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I 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and, zagraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby i
amended to. read as follows:
2.
Technical Soecifications j
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. - 54, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
i 3.
The license amendment in effective as of its date of issuance and to be implemented not later than the completion of the fourth refueling outage l'
for Unit 1.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Suzanne. Black, Director Project Directorate IV-2 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications 1
Date of Issuance:
October 4, 1993 i
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UNITED STATES 5
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-k.....,/
wAsurwcrow, o.c. noeuwooi HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY l
CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NO. 50-499 i
1Q TH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 43 License No. NPF-80 i
1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company *
(HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service i
Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL), and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees) dated August 5, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Houston Lighting & Power Company is authori.ed to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
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2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 43, and the Environmente! Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
l 3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h
M(
Suzanne. Black, Director Project Directorate IV-2 i
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications i
Date of Issuance:
October 4, 1993 i
I 1
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9 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 54 AND 43 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND Sn-? H t
i Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.
i REMOVE INSERT 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-14 3/4 1-14 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-1 3/4 5-10 3/4 5-10 3/4 9-l~
3/4 9-1 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-2 B 3/4 1-3 B 3/4 1-3
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B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 i
A.
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t REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS f
BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN
.q LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water. sources shall be OPERABLE:
i a.
A Boric Acid Storage System with:
1)
A minimum contained borated water volume of 3200 gallons.
2)
A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and 3)
A minimum solution temperature of 65'F.
j i
b.
The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with-1)
A minimum contained borated water volume of 122,000 gallons for MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons for MODE 6, and j
2)
A boron concentration between 2800 ppm and 3000 ppm.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.
ACTION:
With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
i SURVElllANCE REOUTREMENTS 4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:
'I Verifying the boron concentration of the water, a.
b.
Verifying the contained borated water volume, and Verifying the boric acid storage tank solution temperature when it c.
is the source of borated water.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-13 Unit 1 - Amendment No. E,54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40 43
3 l
1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i
I BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION t
f 3.1.2.6. As a minimum, the following borated water source (s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2 for MODES 1, 2, cnd 3 and one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification i
3.1.2.1 for MODE 4:
a.
A Boric Acid Storage System with:-
1)
A minimum contained borated water volume of 27,000 gallons, 2)
A minimum boron concentration of 7000 ppm, and I
3)
A minimum solution temperature of 65*F.
i b.
The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:
1)
A minimum contained borated water volume of 458,000 gallons,-
and i
2)
A boron concentration between 2800 ppm and 3000 ppm.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
('
ACTION:
t With the Boric Acid Storage System inoperable and being used as one-a.
of the above required borated water sources, restore the system to t
OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least the limit as shown in Figure 3.1-2 at 200*F; restore the Boric l
Acid Storage System to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be j
i in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
~
b.
With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within i
I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 1-14 Unit 1 - Amendment No. H,54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40,y3 l
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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEPsATION 3.5.1 Each Safety Injection System accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
The isolation valve open and power removed, b.
A contained borated water volume of between 8800 and 9100 gallons, c.
A boron concentration of between 2700 ppm and 3000 ppm.
l d.
A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 590 and 670 psig.
APPLICABILITY: HODES 1, 2, and 3*.
ACTION:
a.
With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve or the boron concentration outside the required limits, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, b.
With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either open the isolation valve within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
c.
With the boron concentration of one accumulator outside the required limit, restore the boron concentration to within the required limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
SURVEfttANCE REQUIREMENTS
- 4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by:
1)
Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated
)
water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 4
2)
Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.
b.
At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to 1% of tank volume by 1
verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution; and
- Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. M,54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40,43 I
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS i
SUDVEILLANCE RE001REMENTS (Centinuedi
]
c.
At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above 2000 psig i
by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is removed.
d.
At least once per 18 months by verifying that each accumulator isola-tion valve opens automatically under each of the following conditions:
4 1)
When an actual or a simulated RCS pressure signal exceeds the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Block of Safety Injection) Setpoint, and i
l 2)
Upon receipt of a Safety Injection test signal.
t i
l
- 4. 5.1. 2 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel s'ha11 be demon-strated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by the performance of an ANALDG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, and i
b.
At least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CAL]BRATION.
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SOUTH TEXA5 - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-2 t
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 (This specification number is not used.)
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SOUTH TEXA5 - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-9 e
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I!!{RGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.5 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
A minimum contained borated water volume of 458,000 gallons, and b.
A boron concentration between 2800 ppm and 3000 ppm.
l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REOUTREMENTS 4.5.5 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by:
a.
Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and b.
Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 5-10 Unit 1 - Amendment No. &l, 54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40, 43, 4,
C.
3 /4. 9 REFUELING OPERATIONS I
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3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION llMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:
a.
A K,,, of 0.95 or less, or b.
A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2800 ppm.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.*
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is r,e,s,tored to greater than or equal to 2800 ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:
a.
Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.
Withdrawal of any full-length control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.
4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
4.9.1.3 Valves FCV-110B, FCV-111B, CV0201A, and CV0221 shall be verified closed and secured in position by mechanical stops or by removal of air or electrical power at least once per 31 days.
- The reactor shall be maintained in MODE 6 whenever fuel is in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. M,54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40,4(
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REFUELING OPERATIONS 3 /4. 9. 2 INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR ODERATION 3.9.2 As a minimum, two Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors shall be OPERABLE, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 6.
ACTION:
With one of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, 4.
immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
b.
With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SUDVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:
a.
A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.
An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.
c.
a I'
a SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-2 3
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3/4.1 react!v!TYcowtRDL$YSTtg assrs i
3/4.1.1 BDRaTION COWTADL j
3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 $NUfDDW MRGIN i
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suberitical from all operating conditionsA sufficient $NUTD l
(1 the reactor can be made cisted with postulated accident conditions, a(2) the r)eactivity tra limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficientlre controllable preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition y suberitical te fuel depletion, RCS baron concentration, and RCS TS l
on of most restrictive condition occurs at E0L, with T,,,.
In MDDES 1 and 2 the temperature
,,, at no load operating resulting un, controlled RCS cooldown.and is associated with a p einimum SHUTDDA MRGIN of 1.75% auk is required to control th In the analysis of this accident transient.
14 foot fuel using silver-indium-cadmium and/or Hafa a
i Table 4.3-3).
4 u
or the is based upon this limiting condition and is consistentAcc l
ysis assumptions.
and 2 1
at RDL, ee the berer, concentration is,the greatest.In MDES with FSAR safety anal-reoufrement, which is a function of the RCS boron i
I ement and a variable SHUTDDA MRGIN requirement of 1.75% auk is based on an ration.
The constant -
co<n from a steamline break accident.
uncontrolled RCS cool-is based on the results of a boron dilution accident aThe variable SH einima of 15 minutes for operator action after a nalysis to a loss of all SHUTDDW MRGIN.
on, to guarantee a on alara, prior i
The boron dilution analysis assumed a connon RCS volume dilution flow rate for MDDES 3 and 4, and a different
, and maximun :
MDI 5. The MDE 5 conditions assumed liatted mixing in thvolume and with the RHR system only.
reactor coolant pump was operating.In MDDES 3 and 4 it was assumed tha e RCS and cooling If at least one reactor coolant pump is not operatin shall apply.g in MDE 3 or 4, then the SHVfDOW MRGIN *squirem 3/a.1.1.3 MDERATDR TEMPERATURE CDEFFICIEKf to ensure that the value of this coefficient reaafas wi condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analysesn the l provided m1 ant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC va han those explicitly stated will requir at conditions other 4
c set of order to permit an accurate comparison. e extrapolation to those conditions in 4
3DUTH TEXA5 - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No.10 I
Unit 2 - Amendment No. 2 s s
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS i
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BASES MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)
The most negative MTC value, equivalent to the most positive moderator i
density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analysis to nominal operating conditions. These corrections involved:
(1) a conversion of the MDC used in the FSAR analysis to its equivalent MTC, based on the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and (2) subtracting from this value the largest differences in MTC observed at EOL, all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER conditions, and those most adverse conditions of moderator temperature and pressure, rod insertion, axial power skewing, and xenon concentration that can occur in nominal operation and lead to a significantly more negative EOL MTC at RATED THERMAL POWER. These corrections transformed the MDC values used in the FSAR analysis into the limiting EOL MTC value specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR). The 300 ppm surveillance HTC value specified in the COLR represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup anti soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration, and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting HTC value.
The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron cor. centration associated with fuel burnup.
3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than 561*F. This limitation is required to ensure:
(1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT,.3 temperature.
3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include:
(1) borated water sources, (2) charging pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.
With the RCS average temperature above 350*F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.75% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F. The maximum expected boration capability requires 27,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 458,000 gallons of 2B00 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage l
tank (RWST). The RWST volume is an ECCS requirement and is more than adequate for the required boration capability.
54 SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-2 U. it 1 - Amendment No. N,M,M,43 a
LS.it 2 - Amendment No. H,M,4
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES B0 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)
With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one biron injection flow path / source is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection flow path / source becomes ' inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 350*F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.
The boration capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a variable SHUTDOWN MARGIN based on the results of a boron dilution accident analysis where the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is varied as a function of RCS boron concentration after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition requires 3200 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage system or 122,000 gallons of 2800 ppm borated water from the RWST for MODE 5 and 33,000 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the RWST for MODE 6.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
The OPERABILITY of one Baron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that:
(I) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
Verification that the Digital Rod Position Indicator agrees with the demanded position within i 12 steps at 24, 48, 120, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Control Banks and 18, 234, and 259 steps withdrawn for the Shutdown Banks provides assurances that the Digital Rod Position Indicator is operating correctly over the full range of indication.
Since the Digital Rod Position Indication System does not indicate the actual shutdown rod position between 18 steps and 234 steps, only points in the indicated ranges are picked for verification of agreement with demanded i
position.
l SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS I & 2 B 3/4 I-3 Unit I - Amendment No. M, 54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40, 4}
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REACTIV8TY CORTR0 SYSTEMS BASES MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met.
Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions pro-vide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.
In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.
The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop tire used in the safety analyses.
Measurement with T,yg greater than or equal to 561'F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the e
measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.
Control red positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more fre-quent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.
These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.
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SOUTH TEXA5 - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 1-4 y
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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENT'lATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:
(1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K includes a 1% Ak/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. Simil$ly, the boron concentration value of 2800 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty l
allowance of 50 ppm boron. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.
3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses for the rapid refueling design.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-1 Unit I - Amendment No. H,54 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 40,43'-.
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REFUELING OPERATIONS BASFs d
3 /4. 9. 6 REFUELING MACHINE The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that: (1) the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist will be used s
for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive liftin event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations. g force in the 3/4. 9. 7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING i
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The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the. nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other l'oel assemblies in the storage pool, unless handled by the single-failure proof main 4
hoist of the FHB 15-ton crane, ensures that in the event this load is dropped:
(1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array.
release assumed in the safety analyses.This assumption is consistent with the activ 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat remo' val (RHR) loop be in' operation ensures that:
(1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140'F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than i
23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat i
removal capability.
With the reactor vessel head removed and at idrast 23 feet i
of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is avail *-
able for core cooling.
Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge and exhaust penetrations.will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels in the purge exhaust.
The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
i SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-2
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