ML20057D439
| ML20057D439 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 09/28/1993 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057D438 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-93-23, NUDOCS 9310040221 | |
| Download: ML20057D439 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1993023
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APPENDIX
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-298/93-23
License:
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Licensee:
Nebraska Public Power District
P.O. Box 499
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Columbus, Nebraska
Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station
Inspection At:
Brownville, Nebraska
Inspection Conducted: July 18 through August 28, 1993
Inspectors:
R. A. Kopriva, Senior Resident Inspector
W. C. Walder, Resident Inspector
W. B. Jones, Project Engineer
M. E. Murphy, Reactor Inspector
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Approved:
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E. p gliardo, Chief, Project Section C
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Inspection Summary
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of plant status, onsite
response to events, operational safety verification, maintenance and
surveillance observations, and followup.
Results:
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The initial response to the area flooding was very good. The licensee
appropriately implemented its emergency procedure for the Missou.1 k'ver
level approaching flood stage.
The decision to shut down the plant
based on concerns with the states' abilities to adequately s'pport the
emergency plan and the closure of evacuation routes demonst,ated the
appropriate awareness for the unique flooding challenges.
The
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licensee's coordination with the states to assure that tie emergency
plan could be well implemented prior to proceeding with :he plant
restart was very good (Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.5).
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A lack of management and plant personnel sensitivity to potentially
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degraded plant conditions was noted.
Significant water inleakage into
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the plant had occurred because of the flood conditions which had not
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been evaluated for the potential effects on plant equipment and
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components. Actions were also not promptly implemented to assure that
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building water inleakage was diverted away from plant equipment and
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components. The resident inspectors had expressed concerns about the
inleakage in mid-July (problem documented in Section 3.2 of NRC
Inspection Report 50-298/93-22), but a corrective action plan which
addressed plant recovery and actions required to restart the plant was
not developed until after further questioning by NRC-(Sections 2.1.3 and
2.1.4).
Appreciable licensee management involvement was required to assure that
the corrective action program was implemented in accordance with
management's expectations for the unexpected breaker trip in the 345 kV
switchyard (Section 2.2).
Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a manner that provided for
proper communication of plant status from one sh!ft to the other.
However, the operators demonstrated a willingness to accept an operator
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aide for the offsite electrical lineup which was incorrect
(Section 3.1).
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The standby gas treatment system duct expansion sleeves were degraded,
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The licensee did not conduct a comprehensive review of all the expansion
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sleeves which may have been affected until prompted by the inspector
5 weeks later (Section 3.3).
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Station security personnel appropriately implemented the security plan
for the NRC emergency site team access during the Notification of
Unusual Event (NOVE).
Security compensatory measures were well
implemented for flooding problems within the protected area
(Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, and 3.4).
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The maintenance and surveillance activities were well implemented. The
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technicians were knowledgeable of the recent hydrogen / oxygen analyzer
system design changes and revised test procedure (Sections 4.1 and 5.1).
The licensee's employee concern program provided several processes for
employees to voice concerns.
None of these processes specifically
emphasized the reporting of nuclear safety issues and the protection of
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employees who raised concerns (Section 6.1).
Attachments:
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Attachment - Persons Contacted and Exit Meeting
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DETAILS
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1 PLANT STATUS
At the beginning of this inspection report period, Cooper Nuclear Station was
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in Day 135 of the refueling / maintenance outage that was originally scheduled
to be 56 days in length.
On July 21 a reactor startup was commenced. On July
23, with the plant at approximately 15 percent thermal power, a reactor
shutdown was initiated based on concerns with the surrounding states' and
local authorities' ability to adequately support the emergency plan because of
flooding of the Missouri River and its tributaries. At 6:19 p.m. (CDT) the
same day, an NOUE was declared, as required by the licensee's emergency action
level, when the Missouri River level increased to 899 feet (mean sea level)..
On July 27, at 5:10 p.m. (CDT) the NOUE was exited, in part because the river
level was at 897.4 feet mean sea level and decreasing.
On July 29, after verifying that the state and local authorities would be able
to support the emergency plan if required, the licensee commenced a reactor
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st artup. At the end of the report period the plant was operating at
100 percent power.
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2 ONSITE RESPONSE TO EVENTS (93702)
2.1 Site and Area Flooding
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2.1.1
Plant Shutdown
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On July 21, 1993, the licensee commenced a reactor startup from the
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refueling / maintenance outage. At the time the licensee decided to commence
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the reactor startup, the Missouri River level was at 896 feet and slowly
decreasing.
This was down from a previous high level of 898 feet on July 13.
However, on July 22 and 23 a rapid increase in river level occurred.
Later
that day, with reactor power at approximately 15 percent thermal power, the
licensee was notified by Atchison County, Missouri, emergency personnel that,
due to road and weather conditions, the county would not be able to support an
evacuation of county residents in the event of an accident.
The highways in
the county were in danger of flooding due to heavy rains, with the continuing
threat of additional rains.
Based on this information, the licensee made a
conservative decision to implement a precautionary reactor shutdown at
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10:35 a.m. (CDT) on July 23. At 3:46 p.m. the licensee had completed the
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reactor shutdown and was continuing to take the reactor to cold shutdown. The
plant was placed in cold shutdown early on July 24.
The licensee took actions in preparation for the possibility that river level
might exceed the levee level of 902 feet. These actions included installing
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water dams at all the ground level entrances to the turbine, radwaste,
augmented radwaste, and control buildings.
In addition, water dams were
installed at the entrances leading to the diesel generator rooms, service-
water pump room, and entrance to the radiological controlled area. Dams were
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not installed within the radiological controlled area and the technical
support center due to the fact that these barriers would have hampered access
and egress to those areas that were routinely toured by the licensee. Other
actions performed included verifying the availability of communication methods
outside the plant, sand bagging the openings to the water wells, filling the
potable water and demineralized water tanks to 100 percent capacity, and
securing additional emergency diesel fuel oil.
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2.1.2 NOUE Declaration
At 6:19 p.m. on July 23, the licensee declared a NOUE as required by its
emergency action level for the Missouri River level reaching an elevation of
899 feet. The required offsite notifications were completed within the time
established in its emergency plan. The licensee initiated the required-
communication link with NRC headquarters and the Region IV emergency response
facility, utilizing the emergency notification system. These communications
were maintained throughout the period the licensee was in the NOUE. The
licensee also supplemented the required plant staffing during the initial days
of the NOUE to ensure adequate personnel were available to support emergency
response activities for an Alert classification.
The river continued to rise throughout the night and into the morning of
July 24. At 12 noon on July 24, the river was at 900.2 feet. The increased
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river level resulted in the closure of several roads, including a portion of
Route 136 in the state of Missouri.
This closure isolated one of the planned
emergency evacuation routes for those individuals located within the 10-mile
emergency evacuation zone. However, individuals located near the Missouri
River levee, and within the 10-mile evacuation zone, were required to evacuate
their homes when the Missouri River levee failed upstream of the plant,
resulting'in extensive flooding across the river from the plant.
The licensee dismissed all nonessential personnel and the plant staffing was
maintained with a double shift of essential personnel, including security and
emergency response personnel. The essential personnel were to remain on site
until licensee management determined that the conditions would permit
unimpeded access to the plant.
NRC emergency response personnel arrived
during the period of July 23-24. Security personnel promptly implemented
aspects of the security plan which pertained to the NOVE declaration. On the
morning of July 24, 1993, NRC Region IV entered the monitoring mode in order
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to closely track the licensee's response activities.
2.1.3
Site Conditions
The inspectors conducted tours of the facility inside the protected area,
vital areas, and radiologically controlled areas. These tours were conducted
on July 24-25. The purpose of these tours was to assess the licensee's
actions to mitigate any effects the flood waters had on the plant.
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it was observed that the required security compensatory postings had been
implemented for the protected area boundaries which had been adversely
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affected by the flood waters.
The sewer drains within the protected area were
observed to be filled, resulting in an elevated water table along the
buildings.
The licensee had installed water dams at all the ground level
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entrances to the turbine, radwaste, augmented radwaste, and control buildings.
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These dams were found to be effective in mitigating water intrusion into the
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plant from the water sitting above ground after heavy rains.
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The vital area rooms outside of the radiologically controlled areas were found
to be relatively dry, with minor water inleakage occurring through the
concrete walls located below the ground elevation. However, the below grade
rooms located within the turbine building and the reactor building, which were
inside the radiologically controlled area, were found to have extensive water
inleakage.
In some cases, the water inleakage significantly challenged the
capacity of the floor drains. An example was noted for water inleakage within
the turbine building.
The lower hallway was found to have standing water,
with additional inleakage occurring around safety-related cable trays. The
turbine-driven feedwater pump rooms were found to have water dripping on
control boxes, and the floor drain system had backed up such that standing
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water from within identified radiologically contaminated areas had migrated
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out into designated clean areas.
It was observed that plant personnel had not
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taken actions to identify the areas where building water inleakage was
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occurring and had not established measures to divert the water away from the
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plant components.
Similar problems were observed in the reactor building quadrant rooms and in
the torus room.
The water inleakage into the reactor building quadrant room
containing the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) pump had water impinging
on RCIC electrical components. The water inleakage inside the torus area was
impinging on electrical junction boxes and other electrical components.
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On the morning of July 25, the inspectors and an NRC manager discussed the
conditions identified inside the turbine and reactor buildings with licensee
management.
It was determined that the licensee had not initiated specific
actions to quantify and determine the effect the water inleakage may have had
on plant equipment and components.
In addition, NRC questioned whether there
may be other specific areas in the plant where the water inleakage was
occurring but had not been identified. After being questioned by NRC
management about the excessive water inleakage, the licensee pumped the sewer
drains with portable pumps and significantly reduced the inleakage into the
turbine building.
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2.1.4
Plant Recovery
The licensee subsequently tasked three maintenance engineers to work with the
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operations department to quantify and identify the areas and plant equipment
which was impacted by the water inleakage. Actions were also initiated to
begin diverting water away from plant equipment and to remove the standing
water from the building floors and clear the floor drains.
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The subsequent morning the inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions to
quantify, identify, and reduce the water inleakage. The licensee had
quantified the inleakage at approximately 50 gallons per minute. The
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activities performed by the operations department and maintenance engineers
had identified the areas where the water inleakage was occurring. However,
the inspectors concluded, based on their review, that these individuals had
not been sensitized to the potential impact that the inleakage could have on
vital equipment and, as such, had only provided a general assessment of the
areas and equipment affected.
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Later on the morning of July 26 the licensee initiated a task force to conduct
a thorough review of the building leakage concerns.
The team was managed by
the engineering manager and each building was designated with a team leader.
The quality assurance organization subsequently became involved to
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independently assess the adequacy of the inspections performed. The
inspectors noted that, at this time, plant personnel and management
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sensitivity was appropriately directed at identifying and correcting the
building water inleakage concerns.
A recovery and startup plan was subsequently developed which identified the
scope of the inspection activities, the corrective actions which were taken or
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would be taken to divert or seal the areas where the inleakage was occurring,
and the actions which were required to be completed prior to restarting the
plant. The licensee's plan was reviewed by the NRC Region IV staff and by
representatives of NRR. The plan was found to be acceptable in addressing the
NRC's concerns.
2.1.5 Plant Startup
The inspectors observed the licensee's inspection activities relative to
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equipment which could have been adversely affected by the water inleakage.
This included the inspection of cable conduit and junction boxes. One
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electrical junction box inside the torus room contained a small amount of
water, but no adverse effects were noted by the licensee or the inspectors.
An annunciator was subsequently received for a ground in the RCIC 250 Vdc
electrical circuitry.
This ground appeared to have been caused by water
inleakage into a RCIC starter rack.
The condition was promptly repaired.
The licensee's efforts to remove the water from the protected area drains and
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to route the water inleakage away from plant components was effective in
reducing the amount of water inleakage and in protecting plant equipment and
components.
The licensee was effective in working with the local and state emergency
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management agencies as well as the regional and headquarters Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
The status of the offsite notification sirens and the
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abilities. of the state agencies to support the emergency plan were thoroughly-
assessed and personnel evacuation issues were resolved prior to initiating a
plant restart.
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The river level continued to decline following its peak on July 24.
Region IV
exited the monitoring mode on the afternoon of July 25. A levee failure north
of the plant on the Missouri state side contributed significantly to an
initial decline in the Missouri River level. The river level decreased below
the 899.0 foot elevation on July 26 at approximately 4 p.m.
The licensee
subsequently terminated the NOVE on July 29 at 5:45 p.m.
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On July 29, the licensee commenced preparations for a reactor startup after
completing the appropriate surveillances, including those on equipment which
were affected by the water inleakage. At 5:45 p.m. the licensee exited the
limiting conditions for operation pertaining to river level being greater than
895 feet, as river level was at 894.8 feet and decreating. The reactor mode
switch was placed to start up at approximately 11:31 p.m.
The reactor was
taken critical at 1:45 a.m. on July 30.
The licensee synchronized the main
generator to the grid on August 1, ending their refueling / maintenance outage.
There were no subsequent equipment or component failures identified which were
attributed to the water inleakage problem through the end of the inspection
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period.
2.2 Loss Of power Supply To 345 kV Switchyard
On August 18, the licensee received annunciators indicating an electrical
malfunction in the 345' kV switchyard.
Upon investigation it was determined
that a 400 amp circuit breaker had tripped. This breaker fed the 345 kV
switchyard power Panel PCI, which supplied power to the backup battery
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chargers, lights, air-conditioning, well pumps, and compressors used in the
Preliminary investigation indicated cracked insulation on the wire feeding the
400 amp breaker box, which shorted out, causing the breaker to trip.
The wire
made a sharp bend into the breaker box which could have contributed to the
wire failure.
Approximately 5 minutes after the breaker tripped, a fire
protection annunciator was received in the control room. A station operator
was dispatched to the 345 kV switchyard that observed smoke but no fire. The
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plant remained at 100 percent power throughout the event. The licensee
entered Abnormal Procedure 2.4.6.6, "480 V Transformer or Electrical
Distribution Panel Failure." A section of wiring and the breaker was
replaced.
The inspectors noted that appreciable licensee management involvement was
required to assure that the plant staff utilized the corrective action process
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to evaluate the breaker trip. The licensee documented the breaker trip in
Deficiency Report 93-367 and is in the process of evaluating additional
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breaker boxes which could have similar wiring problems. Additionally, as
discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/93-22, Section 3.1, the licensee
determined that a better definition of boundaries pertaining to who is
responsible for certain activities within the switchyard (plant personnel or
Nebraska Public Power District line crews) was needed. A licensee review of
procedural controls for switchyard work is ongoing.
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2.3
Conclusions
The licensee effectively implemented its emergency procedure for site area
flooding.
Licensee management's initial response to the area flooding was
very good. The decision to shut down the plant based on concerns with the
states' abilities to adequately support the emergency plan demonstrated the
appropriate awareness for the unique flooding challenges.
The declaration and
offsite notifications required for the NOUE were well performed. The
coordination with the states to ensure the emergency plan could be well
implemented prior to proceeding with the plant restart was very good.
A lack of management and plant personnel sensitivity to potentially degraded
plant conditions was noted. Significant water inleakage had occurred because
of the flooded conditions which had not been evaluated for the potential
effect on plant equipment.
Corrective actions were not promptly implemented
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to assure that the building water inleakage was diverted away from plant
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equipment and components. A corrective action plan which addressed plant
recovery and actions required to restart the plant was not developed until
after questioning by NRC.
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Appreciable licensee management involvement was required to assure that the
corrective action process was properly implemented in accordance with its
expectations for the unexpected breaker trip in the 345 kV switchyard.
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3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)
3.1 Control Room Observations
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On a daily basis, when on site, and periodically during back shift
inspections, the inspectors observed control room operations and shift
turnover activities.
The operators exhibited adequate communications with
personnel inside and outside the control room.
Shift turnover meetings were
conducted in a manner that provided for proper communication of plant status
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from one shift to the other. Discussions with the operators indicated that
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they were aware of plant and equipment status and reasons for lit
annunciators. The inspectors observed that Technical Specification limiting
conditions for operation were properly documented and tracked.
Plant
management was observed in the control room on a daily basis.
The inspectors routinely reviewed control room valve and switch indications
for proper alignment of systems such as safety injection, containment
integrity, and normal and emergency power supplies. The operators' and shift
supervisor's logs were reviewed and found to properly document plant status.
One instance was identified in which operators demonstrated a willingness to
accept an operator aide, which did not reflect the actual plant electrical
lineup. On July 24, the inspectors noted that an operator aide located next
to the shift supervisor's cubicle did not reflect the actual onsite and
offsite electrical lineup.
The lineup had been inadvertently marked with an
indelible pin which could not be erased.
The depicted lineup condition had
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been in effect since before the plant startup on July 21, 1993.
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inspectors questioned the control room operators about the operator aide and
the actual plant electrical lineup. The operators demonstrated that they were
cognizant of the current lineup and what actions would be required to backfeed
through the main transformers if the offsite power supply was interrupted.
The inspectors determined that the immediate safety significance was minimal.
The operator aide was subsequently removed.
3.2 Plant Startup Following Refueling / Maintenance Outage
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The inspectors observed plant startup activities following the completion of
the refueling / maintenance outage. The operators conducted appropriate
briefings to assure that all personnel involved with the plant _startup were
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cognizant of their responsibilities. The plant startup and power ascension to
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15 percent thermal power was conducted in accordance with the procedure
requirements.
3.3 Plant Tours
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On July 28, the inspector conducted a tour of the control, reactor, and
turbine buildings. The inspector noted a large quantity of heavy brown paper
and a large quantity of opaque white polyethylene plastic being used for
masking purposes in preparation for painting. This was observed in the
reactor water cleanup system filter precoat area at Elevation 958 of the
reactor building.
In the control building corridor, Fire Area VIII, Fire
Zone 19A, there was a large amount of radiological contamination protection
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clothing, (e.g., plastic boots, caps, and anticontamination coveralls). This
was located on wooden bins and shelves. Only a small area in the building
corridor was protected by an active fire suppression system.
The inspector discussed this observation with the Fire Protection and
Industrial Safety Supervisor. The inspector was informed that the
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polyethylene was purchased as fire retardant material; however, the Fire
Protection and Industrial Safety Supervisor was not aware of the brown paper.
After further review, the licensee determined that the craft personnel had
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obtained a transient combustible permit for the painting activity,
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reviewing the transient combustible permit, a determination was made that the
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brown paper was not specifically included in the permit; however, the fire
loading resulting from the paint products negated the fire loading resulting
from the paper.
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The inspector was informed that the protective clothing in the hallway did not
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exceed the established fire loading for that area.
It was noted that a design
change had been initiated to extend the sprinkler coverage to account for
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increased fire loading in the area since the hall was used as a primary
storage area.
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3.3 Walkdown of Essential Ventilation Systems
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Th'e inspector conducted a walkdown of the accessible portions of the
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ventilation systems in the reactor, control, and turbine buildings. The
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inspection included an assessment of the physical condition of the ventilation
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equipment.
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On July 12, the inspector observed a hole in one of the four cross-connect and-
discharge duct expansion sleeves for the standby gas treatment system. This
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was brought to the attention of the licensee, who subsequently initiated a
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work request and replaced all the expansion sleeve material on the standby gas
treatment system. The expansion sleeve material was replaced utilizing
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Maintenance Work. Request.93-2908. The work activity was completed on July 20.
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On August 19, the inspector conducted a walkdown of the ventilation system
ducts in the reactor, control, and turbine buildings. The inspector
identified that expansion sleeves on the ventilation ducts in both emergency
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diesel generator rooms had holes in them and appeared to need replacement.
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The inspector discussed the condition of the emergency diesel generator
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expansion sleeves with the licensee and whether inspections of other
ventilation system expansion sleeves had been performed. The licensee
indicated that additional inspections had been conducted on other ventilation
systems after the degraded expansion sleeve on the standby gas treatment
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system was identified; however, the inspection had not included the emergency
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diesel generator ventilation duct expansion sleeves.
Because the plant was in the refueling outage when the defective sleeve in the
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standby gas treatment ducting was discovered, the licensee decided that there
was no safety significance to the event, and an operability determination was
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not performed. The licensee did not perform an operability determination for
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the defecting expansion sleeves in ducts of the diesel generator rooms because
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they believed that the holes in the sleeves were minor and would not impact on
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the ventilation system's ability to perform the safety function.
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The inspector reviewed Nonconformance Report 93-172, which was initiated on
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July 19, 1993, to document the degraded standby gas treatment system cross-
connect and discharge duct expansion sleeves. On August 19, the inspector
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inquired about the status of the nonconformance report. The licensee
identified that the report would exceed the 30-day evaluation due date_because
of a backlog resulting from an increase in the number of nonconformance
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reports being written. On August 23, the licensee provided a litter
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(CNSS937211) which identified that the control room ventilation, diesel
generator ventilation, and battery room exhaust fans (nonessential) should be
replaced during the next outage. The four main reactor building quadrant fan
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coil units showed signs of aging but should only require inspection during the
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next outage.
The licensee's preliminary
view identified that the degraded expansion
sleeves resulted frorr the inck of periodic or preventive maintenance on the
The inspector
mied that the licensee had not been effective in
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identifying the degraded expansion sleeve conditions until noted by the
inspector. The inspector concluded that the licensee's initial review of this
concern following the identification of the degraded condition on the standby
gas treatment system was not thorough in that they did not consider the
emergency diesel generator ventilation system. -This is another example of a
continuing implementation weakness with the corrective action process.
3.4 Security Observations
On July 6, the licensee instituted security compensatory measures due to high
water levels inside the protected area around the elevated release point
tower. The compensatory measures are still in effect due to cleanup and loss
of some of the normal security surveillance equipment around the previously
flooded area.
The inspector observed the security staff and found them attentive during
performance of these compensatory measures on the day shift and the back
shift. Also personnel and packages entering the protected area were observed
to be properly searched.
3.5 Radiation Protection Activities
Health physics technicians generally demonstrated a heightened awareness for
the potential spread of contamination outside the posted areas.
Frequent
sampling of water within the radiologically control area provided for the
prompt identification of contamination outside the posted areas. No
identifiable increase in personnel contaminations was noted-by the licensee
because of the building water inleakage.
3.6 Conclusion
Shift turnover meetings were conducted in a manner that provided for proper
communication of plant status from one shift to the other.
However, the
operators demonstrated a willingness to accept an operator aide for the
offsite electrical lineup which was incorrect.
The essential ventilation systems were found to be appropriately aligned.
The
licensee's walkdowns of the sytems had not been effective in identifying the
degraded expansion sleeves and in promptly identifying all the ventilation
which may have been affected.
The licensee was generally effective in controlling transient combustibles.
Security and radiological compensatory measures were well implemented for the
problems resulting from the protected area flooding and building water
inleakage.
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4 MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)
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4.1 Repair of 250 V Starter for RCIC System
On July 25, 1993, the inspector observed corrective maintenance activities
associated with the repair of the RCIC 250 Vdc starter rack for the barometric
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condenser vacuum pump. A ground condition had resulted because of water
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inleakage into the starter rack. Maintenance Work Request 93-2956 was issued
to dry out the 250 Vdc starter rack, clean the relay and fuse contacts, and
replace the power fuses.
The postmaintenance test was performed in accordance
with the established test instruction and demonstrated operability of the RCIC
barometric condenser vacuum pump.
In addition, the RCIC condensate pump
250 Vdc starter was inspected because it had water on the outside of the
cabinet.
No adverse conditions were identified.
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4.2 Conclusion
The maintenance activity was performed in accordance with the work
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instructions, and the work activity was properly documented in the work order.
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5 SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)
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5.1 Testing of Hydrogen /0xygen Analyzer
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On August 23, 1993, the inspector observed the monthly performance of testing
to calibrate and verify functionality of the analyzer used to provide
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indication of the drywell and torus hydrogen and oxygen concentrations. The
test was conducted in accordance with Surveillance Procedure 6.3.1.14,
Revision 11, " Division II H,/0, Analyzer Calibration and Functional Test."
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The inspector. reviewed Surveillance Procedure 6.3.1.14 for quality and .
adequacy and found that the procedure being used had handwritten procedure
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change markups in several places. The changes had been made in accordance
with the temporary procedure change requirements. The handwritten portions of
the procedure were clear and did not adversely affect the performance of the
test.
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The surveillance test was performed by a qualified instrumentation and control
technician. The test was performed in accordance with the test requirements-
and the acceptance criteria were met.
The inspector reviewed the test results
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and noted no discrepancies for the hydrogen or oxygen portion of the test.
Test results for the oxygen portion of the analyzer required a new internal
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calibration to be performed.
The inspector also verified the restoration of
the system and the complete documentation of the post-test results.
5.2 Conclusion
The technicians were knowledgeable of the test procedure and the recent design
changes which were implemented to the hydrogen / oxygen analyzer system.
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6 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAMS FOLLOW UP (TI 2500/028)
The objective of Temporary Instruction 2500/028 was to determine the
characteristics of employee concerns programs that licensees have implemented
to provide employees, who wish to raise safety issues, an alternate path from
their supervisor or normal line management to express these concerns and to
encourage people to come forward with their concerns without fear of
retribution.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Employee Concerns Program with plant and
management personnel. The Nebraska Public Power District has a district-wide
employee suggestion program, which rewards employees for suggestions which are
determined to help the district run more efficiently. They also have a
program called " Talk To The Top," which allows employees to ask top managers
in the district questions which are answered in the district newsletter. The
Cooper Nuclear Station has several additional programs,
i.e., Corrective
Action Program Overview Group (CAP 0G), and As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA) suggestions. The CAP 0G has been in existence for
approximately 4 months and ALARA since 1987. These programs place more
emphasis on concerns dealing with plant procedures and operations.
6.2 Conclusions
The licensee's Employee Concerns Program provided several processes for
employees to voice concerns.
None of these processes specifically emphasized
the reporting of nuclear safety issues and the protection of employees who
raised concerns.
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ATTACHMENT
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I PERSONS CONTACTED
1.1 Licensee Personnel
L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
J. W. Dutton, Training Manager
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J. R. Flaherty, Engineering Manager
M. D. Hamm, Security Supervisor
H. T. Hitch, Jr., Site Services Manager
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G. R. Horn, Vice President, Nuclear
E. M. Mace, Senior Manager Site Support
D. N. Madsen, Licensing Engineer
J. M. Meacham, Site Manager
C. R. Moeller, Technical Staff Manager
S. M. Peterson, Acting Plant Manager
J. V. Sayer, Radiological Manager
M. E. Unruh, Maintenance Manager
1.2 NRC Personnel
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G. E. k'erner, Resident Inspector, Commanche Peak
The personnel listed above attended the exit meeting.
In addition to the
personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this
inspection period.
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2 EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting was conducted on August 31, 1993. During this meeting,
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Mr. W. B. Jones and Mr. W.' Walker reviewed the scope and findings of this
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report.
The licensee did not identify as' proprietary any informat ion provided
to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
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