ML20057D266
| ML20057D266 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1993 |
| From: | Kozak T, Louden P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057D260 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-93-21, 50-374-93-21, NUDOCS 9310040047 | |
| Download: ML20057D266 (6) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1993021
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Reports No. 50-373/93021(DRSS); 50-374/93021(DRSS)
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Dockets No. 50-373; 50-374
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
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Post Office Box 767
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Chicago, IL 60690
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Facility Name:
LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2
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Inspection At:
LaSalle County Station, Marseilles, Illinois
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Inspection Conducted:
August 11 through 18, 1993
Inspector:
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Patrick
Loode6
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Radiatio Spec'ialist
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Approved By:
Th'omas
. Kozak, Acting Chief
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Radio o cal Controls Section 2
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Lnspection Summarv
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Inspection on Auaust 11 throuah 18. 1993 (Reports No. 50-373/93021(ORSS):
50-374/93021(DRSS))
Areas Insoected:
Routine, announced inspection of the licensee's radiation
protection (RP) program (Inspection Procedures (IP) 83750, 83729, & 86750)
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including changes in staffing, audits and appraisals, contamination controls,
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radioactive waste spills, planning for the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage,.
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and station tours.
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Results: One violat' ;n associated with an event which indicated willful and
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deliberate acts to bypass radiological control barriers (Section 4) was
identified. One weakness was identified with respect to management attention
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to the hose control program at the station which resulted in a significant
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spread of contamination (Section 5). The licensee has established an exposure
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goal of 4.24 person-Sieverts (424 person-rem) for the upcoming Unit 2
refueling outage.
Station tours indicated that radiological housekeeping was
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poor.
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9310040047 930927
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ADOCK 05000373-
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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Licensee staff
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- J. Arnould, Regulatory Assurance
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- J. Bell, Supervisor, Maintenance Support Group
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- J. Burns, Regulatory Performance Administrator, Downers Grove
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- G. DuBois, Training Department-
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- K. Francis, RadWaste Coordinator
- J. Lewis, Operational lead Health Physicist
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@*J. Lockwood, Supervisor, Regulatory Assurance
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- J. McIntyre, Superintendent, Station Quality Verification
- T. Nauman, Master Mechanic, Mechanical Maintenance
- L. Oshier, Health Physics Services Supervisor
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@*M. Reed, Superintendent, Technical Services
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- J. Schmeltz, Superintendent, Operations
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- T.
Shaffer, Administrative Assistant to the Site Vice President
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- M. Tyrell, Acting RadWaste Coordinator
- R. Willian.s, Regulatory Assurance Engineer
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Nuclear Reaulatory Commission
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- C. Phillips, Resident Inspector
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The-inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel in various
departments in the course of the inspection.
- Indicates those present at the exit meeting on August 18,'1993.
@ Indicates those present at the phone conversation on September 1, 1993.
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Chances (IP 83750)
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A new Health Physics Services Supervisor (HPSS) had been assigned to the
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RP department since the last inspection. The individual is a degreed
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health physicist possessing eight years of operational and technical
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power plant health physics experience, four of which was in a lead
supervisory role. The inspector reviewed the qualifications of the -
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individual and determined that American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) requirements for individuals holding Radiation Protection Manager
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positions were satisfied.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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3.
Audits and Aooraisals (IP 83750)
The inspector reviewed recently performed field monitoring reports
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(FMRs) documented by station quality verification (SQV) personnel. Many
of the observations were of minor radiological control procedure
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discrepancies and were immediately addressed by RP. One FMR addressed a
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concern with the proper use of a hose within the radiologically
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controlled area (RCA). Similar concerns were addressed by the inspector
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as a result of reviews of a contamination incident discussed in Section
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Overall, the inspector noted that a decline in field monitor
activities had occurred in recent months and discussed this observation
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with SQV management. The inspector noted-to SQV management that the
monitoring activity. of the field auditors would be reviewed during
future inspections.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
4.
Control of Contamination. Surveys. and Monitorino (IP 83750)
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The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding a personnel
contamination event and subsequent discovery of a contaminated ~ area.
posting which had been cut down within the turbine building.
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Event Description
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A station laborer was contaminated on August 10, 1993, at
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approximately 0850 while installing what was thought to be an
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uncontaminated hose on a diaphragm pump on the 687' elevation of
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the turbine building (within the RCA).
Contamination levels on
the individual were 5,000 dpm/100cm' (83.3 Bq/100cm').
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In response to this contamination, a radiation protection
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technician (RPT) was dispatched to the work area and the hose
storage cage to perform smear surveys. Survey results in the work
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area revealed contamination levels up to 40,000 dpm/100cm j666.6
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Bq/100cm*) on the internals of the hose and 4,000 dpm/100cm -(66.6
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Bq/100cm') on the connector to the pump used by the station
laborer. Contamination levels found in the' hose storage. area
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100,000 dpm/100cm' (1,666 Bq/100cm*) (on the
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included up to
internals of some hoses and up to 2,000 dpm/100cm
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Bq/100cm') on the floor. The RPT posted the storage cage as a
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contaminated area by stringing ribbon across the cage door and
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hanging a " Caution Contaminated Area, Radioactive Materials" sign
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on the ribbon.
The RPT discussed his findings with the Contamination Control
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Coordinator (CCC) at approximately 1030 while the CCC was entering
the RCA to conduct his daily rounds.
The CCC continued on his
tour and approached the hose storage cage at approximately 1110.
The CCC discovered the cage unposted and noted that a piece of
ribbon was still attached to each side of the cage door. The area
was searched and the posting (remaining ribbon and sign) was
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discovered in a nearby laundry hamper.
Examination of the ends of..
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the ribbon indicated that it had been cut
Security was called to -
the scene and retained the ribbon and sign for possible
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fingerprinting if needed.
The CCC recalled seeing an individual
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carrying a hose from the elevation of the storage area.
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The area was reposted and an investigation was initiated.
Initial
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investigations revealed that the individual seen with a hose
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stated that the posting was not in place when he was in the area.
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Event Investication and Corrective Actions
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After this information was received, the licensee's investigation
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proceeded -slowly.
The inspector informed station management of
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the significant nature of what appeared to be a willful delitarate
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action to circumvent radiological controls. The investigation was
subsequently heightened and fingerprinting was performed of the
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radiological control sign. Results of the fingerprinting were
inconclusive.
In response to this event the station held
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communication sessions to alert workers of the hose control
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program and the need to adhere to the established program. The
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communication also recanted the event and discussed the
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unacceptable nature of the event.
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Inspection Conclusions
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The inspector informed station management at the exit meeting
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(Section 8) that the hose control program was either not
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understood or not being adhered to by the work groups and that
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management effectiveness in ensuring the program was meeting their
expectations was poor. The program uses a hose color coding
system to designate the proper area.of use for particular hoses.
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This program has been ineffective because workers have
inappropriately used clean hoses for contaminated jobs and then
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returned them to the clean hose storage cage in the turbine
building. This led to the worker being contaminated while using a
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hose which he thought was clean. The licensee's investigation
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into the contamination event revealed that the hose storage cage
was contaminated. After the area was properly posted, an
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individual cut and removed the posting to gain access to the
storage area. The incident, while inconclusive as to an actual
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guilty individual, reflects a careless disregard for radiological
controls.
Further, had the hose control program been properly
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adhered to, the hose storage cage would not have needed to be
controlled as a contaminated area. The NRC remains concerned with
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radiation worker performance at the station which has been
discussed in past inspection reports (irs). The failure to post
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an area which contains radioactive contamination levels greater
than 1,000 dpm/100cm' (16.6 Bq/100cm") is a violation of station
radiation protection procedures (Violation 50-373/93021-01; 50-
374/93021-01). This issue was discussed at the exit meeting
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(Section 8) and conveyed to licensee management during a
subsequent phone conversation on September 1, 1993.
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One violation was identified for failure to post a contaminated area.
One weakness was identified with respect to management overview of the
hose control program.
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5.
Radioactive Waste Spill Event
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The inspector reviewed the circumstances surrounding a radioactive waste
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spill which occurred on July 29, 1993 while radioactive waste sludge was
being transferred from the Chemical Waste Drain Tank to the Waste Sludge
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Tank.
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Event Description
On July 29, 1993, sludge from the Chemical Waste Drain Tank was
being transferred to the Waste Sludge Tank on the 663' elevation
of the turbine building.
The transfer arrangement consisted of an
air diaphragm positive displacement pump and a 3" transfer hose
(two sections). This arrangement for transferring waste from one
tank to another had been successfully accomplished in the past.
Sludge had been sluiced for approximately 30 minutes when orders
were received to secure the job due to time limits defined in the
work procedure.
The transfer was suspended and the hose was being
flushed with clean condensate water to remove any residual sludge
in the hose.
Soon after the flushing began, a pinhole leak
developed in a section of the hose. A station laborer monitoring
the transfer process was standing nearby and became contaminated
by the spray from the hose. The flushing process was immediately
stopped and the RPT covering the job assisted the contaminated
individual to the decontamination facility.
Two other individuals
contaminated their shoes while touring the area subsequent to the
incident. The contaminated individual initially had contamination
levels greater than 500,000 dpm/100cm' (8,333 Bq/100cm') on his
head and arms. A large area of the 663' elevation was also
contaminated as a result of the event. A containment tent was
built to mitigate the spread of contamination and decontamination
efforts ensued.
Event investiaation and Corrective Actions
The investigation into the event identified many problems with the
evolution. The system engineer was not adequately involved with
the selection of material and the job performance. The hose used
for transferring the waste was a suction hose not a discharge
hose. The clean condensate flush water was at a pressure well
above the 100 psia rated value of the hose.
The temperature
rating may have been exceeded when preparing the hose for
couplings which may have weakened the integrity of the hose.
Immediate corrective actions included the discontinued use of
these types of hoses during transfers, a General Information
Notice to alert workers of proper hose considerations and usage,
and the modification of procedures to include caution statements
addressing the use of proper hoses,
inspection Conclusions
The inspector determined that this event indicated another example
of poor management attention and effectiveness in ensuring that
the station hose control program was being adequately implemented.
The inspector discussed this issue at the exit meeting (Section 8)
and indicated the need for management to ensure that established
programs are understood by the workers and that these programs are
meeting their expectation-levels.
Additionally, a mechanism
should be established to provide the workforce a manner in which
to feed back program performance enhancements and deficiencies to
station management.
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No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
One example of poor
management attention to the hose control and usage program was
identified.
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Unit 2 Refuelina Outaae Exposure Goals and At, ..ities (L2R05)
At the time of the inspection the licensee was preparing for the
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upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage (L2R05).
The planned 77 day outage
will include Low power Range Monitor replacement, in-service-
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inspections, motor operated valve work, control rod drive changeouts,
and other miscellaneous valve repairs.
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The dose goal for the outage is 4.24 person-Sieverts (424 person-rem).
Source term reduction efforts for this outage include soft shutdown of
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the reactor, under vessel sump filtration, modified flood-up procedures,
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and the extended operation of Reactor Water Cleanup after shutdown. The
inspector will monitor the station's performance during the refuel
outage.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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Station Tours
During tours of the turbine and reactor buildings, the inspector noted
that radiological housekeeping within certain areas of the turbine
building was poor.
In particular, the general cleanliness within
designated contaminated areas was poor which indicates a general lack of
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attention by radiation workers.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified.
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Exit Meetina
The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee
representatives (Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on
August 18, 1993.
Licensee representatives did not identify any
documents or processes reviewed during the inspection as proprietary.
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Specific items discussed at the meeting were as follows:
lhe event regarding the apparent deliberate violation regarding a
cut radiological barrier in the turbine building
The observed weaknesses in the management of the hose control
program which led to a radioactive spill during a sludge transfer
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Continued concerns with radiation worker performance and the poor
radiological housekeeping at the station
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