ML20057D011
| ML20057D011 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/23/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057D009 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309300243 | |
| Download: ML20057D011 (3) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.165 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DRP-71 AND AMENDMENT NO.196 TO FACILTY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-62 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS, 50-325 AND 50-324
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 28, 1992, the Carolina Power & Light Company (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 (BSEP), technical specifications (TS).
The requested changes to the TS (1) delete operatinnal condition 5 from the applicability requirements of TS 3.1.5 regarding the standby liquid control system (SLCS),
(2) remove the associated action statement for operational condition 5, (3) delete both the operability and surveillance requirements in Table 3.3.2-1, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, and Table 4.3.2-1, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements, that are associated with the SLCS initiation while in operational condition 3, and (4) make editorial corrections adding the word " operational" before the words " conditions" and
" condition", respectively, in the applicability and action statements of TS 3.1.5 to correspond with current TS terminology.
2.0 EVALUATION In the BSEP plant design, the purpose of the SLCS is to provide a backup method, independent of control rods, which will bring the reactor from rated power to a subcritical condition, and keep the reactor from going critical again as it cools. To accomplish this task, the SLCS is capable of delivering i
sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor at a rate equivalent in capacity to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62 for an anticipated transient without scram.
i in the current TS 3.1.5, the SLCS must have an operable flow path from the storage tank to the reactor core containing two pumps and two in line explosive injection valves in operational conditions 1, 2, and 5.
While in operational condition 5, only a single control rod can be withdrawn from a core cell containing fuel assemblies.
The reactor mode switch must also be locked in the refueling posi. tion. This initiates the refueling position of one-rod-out interlock which prevents the selection of a second control rod for movement when any other control rod is not fully inserted. When more than one 1
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2 control rod is removed from a core cell containing fuel assemblies, the potential exists for a criticality configuration. Section 3.9.10.2, Multiple Control Rod Removal, currently allows the refuel position of one-rod-out interlock to be bypassed only if the four fuel assemblies are removed from the core cell surrounding each control rod to be removed. The refuel position one-rod-out interlock and adequate shutdown margin (SDM) ensures that the reactor will not become critical. Therefore, based on the criteria stated above, the staff determined that the SLCS is not required to be operable in operational condition 5 and the associated action statement can be removed.
Currently, TS Table 3.3.2-1 and Table 4.3.2-1 require the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) isolation signal to be operable in operational conditions 1, 2, and 3.
The RWCU system is isolated when the SLCS has been initiated to prevent dilution and removal of the boron solution by the RWCU system. The RWCU isolation signal, designated as the "SLCS Initiation" signals in the Tables 3.3.2-1 and 4.3.2-1, is generated from the two SLCS pump start signals.
The licensee is requesting that the two channels of the SLCS initiation function be required to be available and operable in operational conditions 1 and 2 only. This would be consistent with the applicability statements of the SLCS (LCO 3.1.5) which do not require the SLCS to be operable in operational condition 3.
To substantiate the request, the licensee stated that the TS Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, requires that the reactor mode switch in shutdown position instrumentation be operable in operational conditions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
This instrumentation allows the operator to bypass the scram discharge volume high level scram trip and reset the reactor protection system (RPS) scram signal when the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown or refueling position. Actuation of the bypass initiates a control rod block which ensures that no control rods are withdrawn in operational condition 3.
Table 1.2, operational conditions, requires all rods to be fully inserted to be considered in operational condition 3 with the following exceptions (1) the reactor mode switch may be placed in the refueling position while a single control rod is moved provided the refueling position of one-rod-out interlock is operable, and (2) the reactor mode switch may be placed in the run or startup/ hot standby positions to test the switch interlock functions provided that the control rods are verified to remain fully inserted by a second licensed operator or other technically qualified member of the units technical staff. Therefore, based on the criteria stated above, the staff has confirmed the licensee determination that the standby liquid control system is not required to be operable in operational condition 3.
Since the SLCS is not required to be operable in operational condition 3, the RWCU isolation signal, which depends upon the SLCS, is also not required to be operable.
The staff has reviewed the proposed TS changes which include the removal of the operability and associated surveillance requirement for (1) the standby liquid control system in operational condition 5, and (2) the RWCU isolation i
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signal upon SLCS initiation in operational condition 3.
The staff finds that the control rod block, the refueling position of one-rod-out interlock, and i
adequate shutdown margin ensures that the reactor will not become critical in operational conditions 3 and 5.
1 Therefore, the staff determimed that the changes are acceptable. The staff l
also notes that the proposed changes are consistent with the standards of
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NUREG-1433 for the SLCS and the primary containment isolation instrumentation.
The addition of the word " operational"-in the applicability and action statements of TS 3.1.5 is an administrative change requested for consistency _
l within the TS and, therefore, is acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
l In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of North Carolina j
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State
{
official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a-facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes the Surveillance Requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, l
and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative -
l occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding ( 58 FR 16852). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 1
prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, j
that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the l
public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such I
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
i Principal Contributor: Kerri Kavanagh Date:
September 23, 1993 I
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