ML20057C702
| ML20057C702 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1993 |
| From: | Perkins K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Conway W ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C703 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309290280 | |
| Download: ML20057C702 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1993033
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 'J
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1450 MARIA LANE
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WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596-5368
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SEP 0 31993
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Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, and 50-530
License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51 and NPF-74
Arizona Public Service Company
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P.O. Box 53999, Station 9082
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-3999
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Attention: Mr. W. F. Conway
Executive Vice President, Nuclear
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-528/529/530/93-33
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This letter refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. G. Meyer, G.
Johnston, and J. Lynch during the week of August 2 - 6, 1993, to assess the
root causes of marginal and declining performance in licensed operator
requalification examinations at Palo Verde. The inspectors discussed their
conclusions with you and members of your staff on August 6, 1993.
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The inspectors concluded that the distributed authority inherent in the Palo
Verde organizational structure related to operator training was the major
cause of continued weak performance. This distributed authority contributed
to ineffective corrective actions from previous requalification examinations,
inadequate communication of management's performance expectations to the
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licensed operators, and slow resolution of useability issues for Palo Verde
emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The departments involved in
operational training weaknesses included the three unit operations
organizations, Operations Standards, and Operator Training.
These findings
are summarized in an Executive Summary (Enclosure 1).
We understand that you have initiated corrective actions to improve the
useability of your E0Ps based on lessons learned from the Unit 2 steam
Please
generator tube rupture event and the NRC requalification examinations.
provide this office with your perspectives and corrective action plans, if
any, in response to the findings of this inspection within 30 days of your
receipt of this report.
The responses requested by this letter are not subject to the clearance
procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork
Reductions Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96.511.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and enclosures (1) and (2) will be placed in
the NRC's Public Document Room.
9309290280 930903
DR
ADOCK 05000528
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SEP 0 31993
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Should you'have any questions concerning this inspection, we would be pleased
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Sincerely,
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senneth E. PerkinssJ
, Director
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Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
Enclosures:
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1. Executive Summary
i. Inspection Report Nos. 50-528/93-33, 50-529/93-33 and 50-530/93-33
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cc w/ enclosures (1) and (2):
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Mr. Steve Olea, Arizona Corporation Commission
James A. Beoletto, Esq., Southern California Edison Company
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Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Manager, Washington Nuclear Operations.
Mr. Aubrey Godwin, Director, Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency
Chairman, Maricopa County Board of Supervisors
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Jack R. Newman, Esq., Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
Mr. Curtis Hoskins, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer,
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Palo Verde Services
Roy P. Lessey, Jr., Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld
Bradley W. Jones, Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer and Feld
Thomas R. Bradish, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, APS
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ENCLOSURE (1)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Inspection Report 93-33 for Dockets 50-528, -529, & -530
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This inspection assessed the root causes of marginal and declining performance
in the licensed operator requalification program.
The performance of the
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requalification program had declined over the previous three NRC administered
requalification examinations. An APS examination in August and September 1992
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and a NRC examination in March 1993 found relatively high failure rates,
particularly on the simulator portion of the examinations.
The inspectors found indications of organizational ineffectiveness in
the slow resolution of E0P useability issues, unclear expectations and
standards for operators, extensive resource allocation to enable
coordination between departments, frequent changes in direction within
the cperations training department, and weak corrective actions
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following the 1992 requalification examinations.
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The inspectors concluded that the high failure rates on the 1992 and
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1993 examinations were caused by an increase in performance standards
for the operators, without a corresponding increase in ope ntor
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performance.
in 1992, the higher standards required closer adherence to
E0P technical guidelines than had been required previously.
In 1993,
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the operators were also subjected to increased simulator scenario
difficulty, for which they were not prepared during training.
The inspectors disagreed with APS's conclusion that the major cause of
the high failure rate en job performance measures (JPMs) was lack of
training and concluded that higher standards for JPM performance was the
root cause.
The arganization did not make difficult decisions (such as changing the
approach on emergency operating procedures [E0Ps]), or implement
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effective corrective actions (such as the corrections made in response
to the APS October 1992 analysis of the September 1992 requalification
examinations). The progress which occurred apparently required
extensive coordination and consensus-building efforts.
The inspectors found that the distributed APS organization related to
operator training hindered the corrective actions necessary to improve
performance. The inspectors concluded that recent marginal
requalification performance was not attributable only to the training
department, but that the three Unit Operations Departments, the
Operations Standards Department (responsible for procedures), and the
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Operations Training Department, were each partially responsible. The
managers of these departments appeared to operate by committee because
they reported to separate general managers.
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SEP 0 3 1993
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bec w/ enclosures (1) and (2):
Docket File
Resident Inspector
Project Inspector
J. Norberg, NP.R
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G. Cook
B. Faulkenberry
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K. Perkins
P. Morrill
G. Johnston
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M. Smith
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