ML20057C559
| ML20057C559 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 09/20/1993 |
| From: | Cox C, Mccormickbarge, Reidinger T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C549 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-282-93-16, 50-306-93-16, NUDOCS 9309290116 | |
| Download: ML20057C559 (44) | |
See also: IR 05000282/1993016
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION III
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Reports No. 50-282/93016(DRSS); 50-306/93016(DRSS)
Dockets No. 50-282; 50-306
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Licensee: Northern States Power Company
414 Nicollet Mall
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Minneapolis, MN 55401
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Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station
Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota
Inspection Conducted: August 30-September 2, 1993
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Inspectors:
O.v%o
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C. Cox
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T. fieidinge P
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H. 'Simons '
Dit'e"
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Accompanied By:
R. Bywater
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R. Paul
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Approved By: h-[ -
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ud. W. McCormick-Barger,# hief
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Non-Power Reactor Section
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection on August 30-September 2. 1993 (Report Nos. 50-282/93016(DRSS): 50-
306/93016(DRSS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of the Prairie Island
Generating Plant's annual emergency preparedness exercise, involving:
review
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of the exercise scenario (IP 82302); observations by five NRC representatives
of key functions and locations during the exercise (IP 82301); and review of
licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301).
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' Resul ts: No violations or deviations were identified. The licensee's overall
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exercise performance was very good; however, four inspection follow-up items
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were identified regarding guidance for declaration of emergency events, lack
9309290116 930920
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of contamination control, no confirmatory air samples taken, and a lack of
radiological information for the Operational Support Center. Control Room
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Simulator crew, Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the
Emergency Operations Facility staff performance, scenario challenges, and a
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critical self-evaluation were strong points for this exercise,
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A significant concern was identified in the inspection followup item regarding
the guidance in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) F3-2
" Classification of Emergencies" for declaration of emergency events.
EPIP F3-
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2 states that the 15 minute notification clock does not start until the
notification form has been approved and signed by the Emergency Manager. The
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NRC position is that the 15 minute notification clock starts as soon as the
Emergency Manager recognizes or should have recognized the conditions that
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warrant declaration of an emergency.
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DETAILS
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NRC Observers and Areas Observed
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C. Cox, Control Room Simulator (CRS) and Operational Support Center
(OSC)
R. Bywater, CRS
T. Reidinger,_ Technical Support Center (TSC) _
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R. Paul, OSC and inplant teams
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H. Simons, Emergency Operations facility (E0F)
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2.
Licensee Representatives
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E. Watzl, General Manager, Prairie Island
M. Wadley, Plant Manager
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F. Fey, Manager, Nuclear Radiation Services
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J. Sorensen, General Superintendent, Plant Operations
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D. Schuelke, General Superintendent, Radiation Protection
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M. Reddemann, General Superintendent, Electrical and Instrument Systems
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M. Ladd, Superintendent,-Technical Training
D. Reynolds, Superintendent, Operations Training
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M. Johnson, Superintendent, Simulator Engineering
M. Agen, Engineer, Emergency Plan
J. Delkers, Nuclear Quality Department
The above personnel and 7 additional licensee personnel attended the
exit meeting on September 2, 1993.
The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the course
of the inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items (IP 82301)
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a.
(Closed) Inspection Followuo Item Nos. 50-282/92016-01 and
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306/92016-01:
Inadequacies in the conduct of the accountability
drill during the 1992 exercise resulted in the drill taking over
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35 minutes to complete accountability.
An accountability drill was held as part_of the August 31, 1993
Exercise. Accountability was completed within 25 minutes.
Exceptions lists were kept to a minimum with controllers and
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evaluators using keycard readers for accountability when possible.
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This item is closed.
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4.
General (IP 82301)
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An announced daytime exercise of the Prairie Island Nuclear Power
Plant's emergency plan was conducted at the Prairie Island Plant site on
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August 31, 1993. The exercise tested the capabilities of the licensee's
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emergancy organization to respond to an accident scenario involving the
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simulated release of radioactive effluent. The attachments to this
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inspection report summarize the licensee's scope of participation and
the exercise scenario.
5.
General Observations (IP 82301)
The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly, and timely.
If the
scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would
have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit State and local
authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health
and safety.
6.
Soecific Observations (IP 82301)
a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The CRS performance and operator use of procedures were excellent.
Annunciator Response Guides were used when required and the Shift
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Supervisor (SS) diligently followed the Emergency Operating
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Procedures (E0Ps). Crew briefings were excellent.
The Shift
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Manager (SM) provided numerous updates and solicited inputs from
all the operators.
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Communications in the CRS and between the CRS and the other
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facilities were good.
Some problems were noted in response to E0P
actions, with the Technical Support Center (TSC) questioning the
path taken by the CRS. However, those problems were resolved.
Classification of the Unusual Event (UE) and the Alert were
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proper.
Timeliness of the classifications was acceptable.
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However, the declaration of the UE was delayed while further
verification of the earthquake was sought after associated
problems from the earthquake were reported. The Alert was also
delayed due to delays in obtaining accelerometer information from
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the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians. Another minor
delay in declaration was noted due to guidance provided in Section
5.3 of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) F3-2
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" Classification of Emergencies", which directed declaration of an
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emergency classification after notification forms were filled out.
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The logic behind the guidance was to provide a concise time for
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when to declare an event. However, the NRC position is that event
declaration must be made when the conditions warranting a
declaration are recognized by the Emergency Manager.
During the
exercise, the SM in the CRS and the Emergency Manager in the
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Emergency Operations Facility (E0F) delayed complete assessments
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of the conditions for declarations during the time it took for the
notification forms to be completed. While the observed delays
were very minor and did not detract from the timeliness of the
notifications, in a real event any delay in fully assessing
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conditions for emergency classification would be unacceptable.
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The licensee acknowledged the NRC position on classification and
agreed to revise EPIP F3-2 to reflect the NRC position. NRC
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review of the licensee's proposed revision to EPIP F3-2 will be
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tracked as an inspection followup item (Inspection Followup Item
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Nos. 50-282/93016-01; 50-306/93016-01).
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No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Technical Support Center (TSC)
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The performance in the TSC was very good. Activation of.the TSC
was timely. The transfer of command and control from the SM, in
the CRS, to the Emergency Director (ED), in the TSC, was good.
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Briefings in the TSC were very frequent and informative. Good
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command and control was demonstrated with priorities being set and
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status of tasks being tracked. Status boards were kept up-to-date
and the staff in the TSC closely monitored the parameters
available and noted changes.
Especially noteworthy was the
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decision to separately track the status of the shutdown of Unit 2
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during the emergency on Unit 1.
Communications within the TSC were adequate. However, a problem
from past exercises with noise in the TSC was again noted.
Side
conversations were a major contributor to the noise during plant
briefings. A problem was also noted in the announcement
concerning the EOF assumption of command and control.
The ED
announced that the "E0F was up and running".
It was not clear,
from that announcement in the TSC, that the EOF had taken command
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and control.
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The engineering and operation support personnel actively pursued
the problems presented by the degraded plant conditions.
For
example, a complete walkdown of both units was planned during the
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emergency to fully assess the potential damage from the
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The radiological assessment group did a good job of monitoring
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plant conditions in anticipation of the unmonitored release.
Meteorological conditions were properly monitored and posted on
the status board. However, the radiological assessment group
relied on previous experience with fuel rod leakers and a past
release to the Auxiliary Building to determine the airborne hazard
rather than taking actual survey data. Only one air sample was
taken in the Turbine Building during the emergency and the iodine
results from the survey were discounted by the radiological
assessment group based on the previous experience. At least one
other air sample should have been taken to verify the first sample
rather than rely on past experience to reject the air sample
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results.
NRC followup of the licensee's corrective actions
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concerning the rejection of an actual field reading without a
followup reading will be tracked as an inspection followup item
(Inspection Followup Item Nos. 50-282/93016-02; 50-306/93016-02).
Habitability was properly monitored in the TSC.
However, the step
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off pads were not promptly set up after the activation of the TSC
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when it was apparent a steam generator tube rupture was in
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progress. Also it was noted that contamination control practices
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at the step off pad demonstrated poor frisker use and improper use
of the step off pad. Contaminatior. control at the medical scene
was not demonstrated because the controller ended the medical
drill too early to allow the radiation protection technicians
(RPTs) to properly recover from the contamination problems
associated with the medical drill. NRC review of the licensee's
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corrective actions associated with the contamination control
problem at the TSC and the medical drill will be tracked as an
inspection followup item (Inspection Followup Item Nos. 50-
282/93016-03; 50-306/93016-03).
Recovery discussions in the TSC were very thorough. A complete
review of the events was conducted and specific short term and
long term recovery actions were identified.
Included in the
discussions were the quarantining of damaged and failed equipment
and the need to evaluate the root causes for the numerous
equipment failures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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c.
Operations SuoDort Center (OSC) and Inolant Teams
Overall, the OSC performed very well, functioning in a effective
manner. The activation of the facility was timely and efficient.
Habitability was quickly established.
The dispatch and tracking of teams were very good, with over 25
teams being dispatched during the course of the exercise.
Team
briefings were comprehensive. Status boards were used effectively
to track available personnel, the teams that were dispatched, and
task priorities. The OSC Coordinator and his assistants
maintained good communications with the dispatched teams.
Briefings in the OSC were thorough and the OSC Coordinator ensured
that the briefings were relayed to the OSC overflow area where
personnel awaiting team assignments were staged.
Contamination control within the OSC was good. When the release
started and teams returning to the OSC were contaminated, the OSC
staff improvised and established a larger contamination control
area.
Contaminated teams were kept in the larger area until it
was decided that the teams could be re-dispatched since the
contamination levels were low.
No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
Emeroency Operations Facility (EOF)
Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility was very good.
The E0F was fully staffed and ready to assume command and control
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within 50 minutes of the Alert. The turnover brief from the ED to
the Emergency Manager (EM) was very good.
Update briefings in the EOF were excellent.
The EM would ask each
functional area manager to provide the EOF with an update and
every manager used their update forms as checklists to ensure the
briefings were thorough.
The EM properly classified the Site Area Emergency (SAE) and the
General Emergency (GE). Offsite notifications were timely. The
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small release did not require any general protective action
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recommendation but one special group protective action
recommendation was made for the nearby casino.
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Overall problem solving activities were very good.
The Technical
Support Staff (TSS) did an excellent job monitoring plant
parameters. The TSS quickly recognized the need to classify the
SAE because the steam leak was not isolable. The Radiation
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Protection Support (RPS) staff effectively directed field
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monitoring teams and was able to develop dose assessments for the
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unmonitored release path. However, the first dose projection was
not completed until one hour after the release began. Numerous
equipment problems with the dose projection model contributed to
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the time delay and the staff appeared reluctant to perform a
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manual calculation.
Recovery activities were very good. The EM directed each support
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group to develop action plans. Or ' the ED arrived from the TSC,
all actions were then reviewed by the EM and his managers to
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formulate a master plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Medical Drill
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The exercise scenario contained a medical drill involving two
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contaminated injured workers as a result of the Turbine Auxiliary
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Feedwater (TAFW) Pump overspeed.
The medical response was prompt
and appropriate.
The RPTs arrived and tried to establish
contamination control points but were unable to do so because of
the nature of the release. The RPTs' plan of action was to allow
the medical team to treat the victims and prepare them for
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transportation to a hospital. Once the victims were loaded on the
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ambulance, contamination control would then be established for the
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responders and they would be surveyed and decontaminated as
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needed.
However, the controller ended the drill before
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contamination control could be established. NRC review of the
licensee's corrective actions associated with the failure to
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demonstrate contamination control will be tracked as the
inspection followup item described in Section 6.b.
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Exercise Ob.iectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
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The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenacio were
submitted to the NRC well within the required timeframes.
No problems
were identified during the review of the scenario or objectives.
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The scenario was-very challenging with numerous equipment failures, real
time accountability and post-accident sampling. The unmonitored release
path which caused contamination problems within the Turbine Building and
dose projection problems was especially challenging.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Control and Exercise Simulation (IP 82301)
Exercise control and simulation was very good. There were generally
adequate controllers to control the exercise and good scenario play.
However, problems were noted in the handling of radiological information
within the OSC. There was no controller assigned to provide the
radiological data that was developed for the OSC. The lead OSC
controller had to provide the data when it was noticed no one else was
assigned to do so. Also, the OSC continuous air monitor and the
portable frisker at the OSC contamination control point lacked data to
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accurately simulate the Turbine Building release. NRC review of the
licensee's corrective actions associated with the lack of radiological
data for the OSC will be tracked as an inspection followup item
(Inspection Followup Item Nos. 50-282/93016-04; 50-306/93016-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Licensee Critioue (IP 82301)
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with
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the participants immediately following the exercise.
Several of these
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critiques were observed and were determiried to be detailed.
Inputs from
all participants were sought.
A formal critique was held on September 2,1993, prior to the NRC exit
interview. The licensee identified several improvements in how to deal
with the type of contamination problems that the Turbine Building
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release presented during the exercise. A summary of the licensee's
preliminary, self-identified, performance strengths and weaknesses was
presented, which were generally in agreement with the inspectors'
preliminary findings.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Exit Interview
On September 2,1993, the inspectors met with those licensee
representatives identified in Section 2 of this report in order to
present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings.
The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were
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proprietary in nature.
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Attachments:
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Scope of Participation and
Exercise Objectives
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2.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
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1993
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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY
SECTION II: OIlJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
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pitc/E-Plan
Page I of 29
SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES
Northern States Power Company (NSP) will exercise its Emergency Response Plan on
August 31, 1993. The Exercise will include mobilization of the organizations named
below such that the capability to adequately respond to a simulated accident at the
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) can be verified.
State and County
agencies will not participate in this Exercise.
Objectives and guidelines have been developed for the conduct of this Exercise. NSP's
objectives and guidelines are contained in the text of this section.
Exercise participants will include the following organizations:
A.
Northern States Power Company
1. Onsite Emergency Itesponse Organization
a.
Control Room
c.
Operations Support Center
d. Emergency Operations Facility
2. Corporate Emergency Itesponse Organization
Headquarters Emergency Center (Communication Only)
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B.
Dakota. Goodhue/ City of Red Wing, and Pierce Counties and supporting local
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agencies, as identified in their Emergency Response Plans for the Prairie Island
Nuclear Generating Plant, will provide communication only.
C. State of Minnesota - Division of Emergency Management and supporting
agencies, as identified in the Minnesota Emergency Response Plan for nuclear
power plants, will provide communication only.
D. State of Wisconsin - Division of Emergency Government and supporting
agencies, as identified in the Wisconsin Peacetime Radiological Emergency
Response Plan for nuclear power plants, will provide conununication only.
Active participation in the Exercise will only be required of the above listed
organizations.
If the Exercise scenario requires that any other organizations and/or
officials be contacted, they shall be contacted only for the purpose of checking
communications.
Each objective is followed by guideline statements which define the " extent of play" by
the participants.
Plant and Corporate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures
(EPIPs), which may be used to support the objective, are also listed for each objective.
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pitc/E-Plan
Page 2 of 29
SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
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1993
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES FOR TIIE NSP (LICENSED)
EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION
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I. ANNUAL ELRMENTS
Objective #1.0: Accident Detectian_and Assexsment
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Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate
detection and assessment of plant operational parameters and operational data.
Guidelines:
1.1
Plant systems and effluents (non-radiological) will be monitored and
assessed in the Control Room, TSC and EOF for accident conditions.
1.2
Radiological assessment will include initial and continuing assessment
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of the accident through evaluation process and area radiation monitors.
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The following EPIPs may be used to support the objectives stated above:
PINGP F3-2
Classifications of Emergencies
PINGP F3-6
Activation and Operation of TSC
PINOP F3-7
Activation and Operation of OSC
PIN GP F3-8
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
Actions
PINGP F3-13
Offsite Dose Calculations
PINGP F3-17
Core Damage Assessraent
PIN GP F3-20
Manual Determination of Radioactive
Release Concentrations
PINGP F3-24
Recordkeeping During an Emergency
PINGP F3-26.1
Operation of the TSC ERCS Display
PINGP F3-26.2
Radiation Monitor Data on ERCS
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PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of EOF
PINGP F8-5
Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective
Actions
PINGP F8-10
Recordkeeping in the EOF
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Page 3 of 29
SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
1993
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Objective #2.0: Emergency Classification
Given simulated accident conditions, appropriate PINGP site personnel shall
correctly identify and classify the emergency as an NUE, ALERT,
SITE AREA or GENERAL EMERGENCY as specified in the Prairie Island EPIP
F3-2.
Guidelines:
2.1
When given initiating conditions of an emergency action level, the
Emergency Director / Emergency Manager will classify the emergency
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consistent with the PINGP's emergency classification scheme. The
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postulated plant conditions will necessitate classifications beginning
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at a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT and escalating to a SITE
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AREA EMERGENCY.
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2.2
The responsible person will find the initiating conditions of the accident
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scenario in F3-2 " Classifications of Emergency".
The following EPIP will be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-2
Classifications of Emergencies
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
i
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
Objective #3.0: Natificatinn of nnsite and Offsite Rmergency Respanaers
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Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall promptly
complete accident notifications to the appropriate State and County / City agencies
(15 minutes), the NRC (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />), PINGP personnel and NSP Corporate
Emergency Response Organization (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).
Guidelines:
3.1
Notifications of emergency classifications to the States of Minnesota and
Wisconsin, and the counties of Dakota, Pierce and Goodhue/ City of Red
Wing will be completed within 15 minutes. Initially, these notifications will
be made by the Shift Emergency Communicator (SEC) at the plant.
Emergency communicators at the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will
assume these responsibilities as it becomes operational.
3.2
The SEC and NSP System Operation will notify and mobilize NSP
Emergency Response personnel at the. ALERTlevel of classification (within
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1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />).
3.3
The SEC or EOF Communicator will notify state and local organizations
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using the plant or EOF Notification Report Form.
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3.4
The cee<< > aee- 1 tr < sac -ti> =ettri the e'"or Per
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emergency classification and changing emergency conditions via the plant
page as necessary.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-3
Responsibilities During a NUE
PINGP F3-4
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site
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Area or General Emergency
PINGP F3-5
Emergency Notifications
PINGP F3-5.1
Switchboard Operator Duties
PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
PINGP F8-2
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site
Area or General Emergency in the
EOF (Sec. 4.5)
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
Objective #4.0: rnmmunicarians
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Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall initiate and
maintain communication links with the NSP Emergency Response Organization,
and state and local Emergency Response Organizations.
Guidelines:
4.1
The following communications will be used:
4.1.1
24-hour communication links for notification and activation of
state and local EROS, and if appropriate, their alternates.
4.1.2
All other communications links to state / local EROS.
4.1.3
Communication links to Fe/ ral Emergency Response
Organizations as appropriate.
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4.1.4
Communications links among the plant and the EOF, HQEC,
Radiation survey teams and JPIC.
4.1.5
Communications links that activate the various emergency
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organizations.
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4.1.6
Communications links with the NRC Region III and NRC
Headquarters and the EOF.
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The following objective would normally be demon-
b;gggR strated during the annual Emergency Medical Exercise.
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4.2
The communications link between the plant and the fixed or mobile
medical support facilities will not be demonstrated.
4.3
Emergency Notification Followup Message form will be generated on a
periodic basis from either the TSC or EOF, depending on what
organization is in charge of conununications with State EROS.
4.4
Procedures and equipment used to alert, notify and mobilize the NSP
Emergency Response Organization will be demonstrated.
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
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1993
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Objective #4.0: c'ammunientions (cont'd)
4.5
NSP will demonstrate prompt communications to state / local emergency
organizations regarding recommendations for protective actions to the
general public within the 10-mile EPZ regarding changes in protective
action recommendations.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-5
Notifications
PINGP F3-6
Activation and Operation of TSC
PINGP F3-7
Activation and Operation of OSC
i
PINGP F3-8
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
Actions
PINGP F3-8.1
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
i
Actions for the On-Shift Emergency
Director / Shift Supervisor
PINGP F3-15
Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey
Teams During a Radioactive Airborne
Release
PINGP F3-16
Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey
Teams During a Raumactive Liquid
Os
,
Release
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PINGP F4
Medical Support and Casualty Care
PINGP F8-2
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site
Area, or General Emergency in the EOF
PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
PINGP F8-5
Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective
Action Recommendations
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Rev. 0
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1993
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Objective #5.0: Radiologi, al Frpnwre rnntrol
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Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shallinitiate and
maintain a program of emergency radiological exposure control.
Guidelines:
5.1
Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides may be
considered for undertaking corrective actions, performing assessment
actions, and performing personnel decontamination,
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5.2
Procedures for authorizing doses in excess of 10CFR 20 may be considered,
as appropriate.
5.3
Dosimetry shall be issued and read and recorded at appropriate intervals in
the various emergency centers.
5.4
De. contamination action levels shall be considered and appropriate
decontamination completed.
5.5
Radiological monitoring of personnel evacuated from the site shall be
considered as appropriate, but a site evacuation is not expected for this
Exercise.
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5.6
The need for respiratory protection, protective clothing and radioprotective
drugs shall be considered, as appropriate.
The following EPIPs may be use.d to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-4
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area
!
or General Emergency
,
PINGP F3-6
Activation and Operation of TSC
,
PINGP F3-7
Activation and Operation of OSC
PINGP F3-9
Emergency Evacuation
PINGP F3-11
Search and Rescue
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PINGP F3-12
Emergency Exposure Control
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PINGP F3-18
Thyroid Blocking Agent
PINGP F3-19
Personnel Monitorin' and Decontamination
PINGP F3-21
Establishment of a Secondary Access
Control
PINGP F3-24
Reentry
PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
PINGP F8-6
Radiological Monitoring and Control at the
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
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1993
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Objective #6.0: Erotective Actinn Recomrnendarinns
,
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall develop and
promptly communicate protective action recommendations for the protection of the
health and safety of the public.
Guidelines:
6.1
Recommended protective actions for the general public offsite will be
considered and communicated to the appropriate state agencies as
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appropriate.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-1
Onsite Emergency Organization
PINGP F3-5
Emergency Notifications
PINOP F3-8
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
Actions
PINGP F3-8.1
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
Actions for the On-Shift Emergency
Dire-ctor/ Shift Supervisor
PINGP F3-13
Offsite Dose Calculations
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PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
PINGP F8-5
Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective
Action Recommendations
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
1993
Objective #7,0: Staff Augmentation
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall promptly
activate and maintain emergency organization staffing requirements as required
by the Prairie Island Emergency Plans.
l
Guidelines:
,
7.1
Concepts of operation in NSP emergency operating centers (EOCs) will
be tested.
7.2
24-hour coverage for all emergency organizations will be considered.
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7.3
The Emergency Operating Facility (EOF) will be staffed to augment the
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plant staff.
7.4
Augmentation of contractor services will be simulated.
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e follouing ol>jectiu uould nonnally be dernon-
!
' NOTE.'
strated during the annual Emergency Medical Exercise.
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7.5
Demoistration of agreements with local police, fire ambulance and
hospital support for a medical emergency will not be demonstrated.
,
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
'
PINGP F3-1
Onsite Emergency Organization
PINGP F3-6
Activation and Operation of TSC
PINGP F3-7
Activation and Operation of OSC
PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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4
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Objective #8.0: ShifLStaffing
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Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate
normal shift staffing as .ctated in the appropriate Emergency Plan.
Guidelines:
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8.1
Normal staff personnel will demonstrate adequate shift staffing of emergency
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organization positions.
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8.2
The Interim Emergency Director position and his associated responsibilities
will be demonstrated.
8.3
Turnover from the Interim Emergency Director to the designated Emergency
Director will be demonstrated.
8.4
Specified positions in the Emergency Plan as stated in the Participant
section will demonstrate their assigned duties.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the obhetive stated above:
PINGP F3-1
Onsite Emergency Organization
PINGP F3-3
Responsibilities during a Notification of
O
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PINGP F3-4
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area
or General Emergency
PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
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1993
OII. QUINOUENNIAI. FI.EMENTS
Objective #9.0: Off HourtStaffbig
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate off
hours shift staffing.
Guidelines:
9.1
PINGP site personnel will not demonstrate off hours shift staffm' g during
this exercise.
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
,
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1993
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Objective #10.0: Activation nf Emergency Nnn Onter
Given simulated accident conditions, NSP Corporate personnel shall demonstrate
staffing of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC).
Guidelines:
-
10.1
The duties of the Executive spokesperson and Communications
representative will not be demonstrated.
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
.
1993
Objective #11.0: llenf Fire Cnntrn! Teams
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate staffing
of the Fire Brigade in response to a simulated fire.
Guidelines:
11.1
The scenario will not demonstrate staffing or implementation of fire
control teams.
11.2
Use of trained fire brigade personnel will not be demonstrated.
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
,
1993
Objective #12.0: Ilse of Firo Aid ondlar Resene Trame
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate first aid
capability.
Guidelines:
12.1
Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides will
be demonstrated for removal of an injured person, providing first aid and
medical treatment and providing ambulance service.
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12.2
Implementation of procedures for authorizing doses in access of
10CFR 20 to support a contaminated injured person will not be
demonstrated.
12.3
The issuance and control of dosimetry to support a contaminated injured
person will be demonstrated.
12.4
Decontamination procedures for support of a contaminated injured
person will be demonstrated.
12.5
Onsite first aid capability will be demonstrated.
O
12.6
Use of trained first responders /EMTs for support of a contaminated
injured person will be demonstrated.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-4
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area
or General Emergency
PINGP F3-9
Emergency Evacuation
PINGP F3-11
Search and Rescue
PINGP F3-12
Emergency Exposure Control
PINGP F3-18
Thyroid Blocking Agent
PINGP F3-19
Personnel Monitoring and Decontamination
PINGP F3-21
Establishment of a Secondary Access
Control
PINGP F3-24
Reentry
PINGP F4
Medical Support and Casualty Care -
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Rev. 0
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1993
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objective #I3.0: Ihe.nf AtedicaLSupport Persnnnel
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate the
capability of treating a contaminated injured person.
Guidelines:
13.1
A medical emergency drill will be conducted on site. Offsite support will
not be demonstrated during this exercise.
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13.2
Arrangements for local and back-up hospital and medical services for
the treatment of a contaminated injured person will be simulated.
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13.3
Arrangements for the transport of a contaminated injured person will be
'
simulated.
<
13.4
The use of trained first responders /EMTs to a simulated contaminated
injure.d person will be demonstrated.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
1
PINGP F4
Medical Support and Casualty Care
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
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Ohicctive #14.0: the of Headquarters Support Perennnel
Given simulated accident conditions, Corporate personnel shall demonstrate
the capability of activation and staffing of the Headquarters Emergency Center
(HOEC).
Guidelines:
14.1
The staffing and activation of the HQEC will NOT be demonstrated.
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
,
1993
O
Objective #13.0: Use nf Security Persnnnel in Provide Prnmpt Arrets for
Emergency FrjuipmenLand Supparl
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP security personnel shall demonstrate
the capability of providing emergency equipment and prompt access for emergency
support vehicles (e.g., fire and ambulance).
Gu'.delines:
mm
$5 - These objectives would no mally be
?? NOTE:bf =4 ~'Medical Exercise
demonstrated during the annual Emergency
>
n7
l~7
15.1
PINGP security personne' will not demonstrate the capability '
providing access for emergency personnel and vehicles.
15.2
PINGP security personnel will demonstrate support of a medical
emergency.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F4
Medical Support and Casualty Care
PINGP F5
Fire Fighting
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
O
Obieclivc #16.0: Ilse of Backup Commnnicarinnn
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate the
capability of providing backup communications in the event of a failure of primary
communications links.
Guidelines:
16.1
The use of backup communications equipment will be demonstrated if the
I
primary means of communication fails to operate.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-5
- Notifications
PINGP F3-6
Activation and Operation of TSC
,
PINGP F3-7
Activation and Operation of OSC
PINGP F3-8
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
Actions
PINGP F3-8.1
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
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Actions for the On-Shift Emergency
Director / Shift Supervisor
PINGP F3-15
ResponsibiUties of the Radiation Survey
O
Teams During a Radioactive Airborne
Release
PINGP F4
Medical Support and Casualty Care
,
PINGP F8-2
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area,
t
or General Emergency in the EOF
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PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
PINGP FS-5
Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective
Action Recommendations
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
~
1993
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Objeetive #17.0: Riunar_Cantrol
'
Given simulated accident conditions, Corporate personnel shall demonstrate the
capability of providing rumor control.
Guidelines:
17.1
The Media Liaisons in the HOEC and JPIC will not demonstrate rumor
control procedures specified in the Nuclear Emergency Communications
Program.
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
O
Objective #18.0: 11sewf Emergency Power
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate the
capability of continued operation of the affected emergency center (s) in the event
of a failure of primary power.
.
This objective refers to Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) that have
[$QTE:..
their own non-automatic backup power. NSP ERF's have automatic
backup power, therefore we would never expect to demonstrate this
objectiv .
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.O
.
1993
Objective #19.0: Eracuation of EmergencyJtesportsp FacilitiMERF) and
Reinention_ta Rarleup RRFe
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Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall
demonstrate the capability of evacuation of and relocation to a backup ERF.
Guidelines:
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19.1
Evacuation of ERFs will not be demonstrated.
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SECTION P
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
.
1993
O
Objective #20.0: Ingesdon Eaduray
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall
support the demonstration by State and Local Government Ingestion Pathway
requirements.
Guidelines:
20.1
Ingestion Pathway requirements with State / Local Governments will not
be demonstrated.
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
1993
r.
Objective il2I.0: Eield_ Monitoring
Given simulated accident conditions, P]NGP and Corporate personnel shall
demonstrate monitoring of offsite radiological releases through a program of
surveying, sampling 2nd analyzing.
Guidelines:
21.1
FicV Monitoring teams from Prairic Island will be dispatched;
F# .wcello Field Monitoring Teams will be simulated.
.
21.2
M nitoring will include the collection and/or analysis of beta / gamma
surveys, contamination surveys and air samples as required.
21.3
Monitoring of water, soil, and air will be demonstrated or simulated as
appropriate.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-15
Responsibilitics of the Radiation Survey
Teams During a Radioactive Airborne
Release
Ox
PINGP F8-3
Activation and Operation of the EOF
PINGP F8-6
Radiological Monitoring and Control at
the EOF
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
.
1993
Objective 22.0: Sown Ternt Analyk
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP and Corporate personnel shall
demonstrate the capability for determining the magnitude and impact of a
radioactive release.
i
Guidelines:
'
22.1
The Meteorological Information and Dose Assessment System (MIDAS)
will be used to estimate the total amount of activity released.
22.2
MIDAS will be used to determine projected doses under varying
meteorological conditions.
22.3
Manual dose projections may be demonstrated in this Exercise.
22.4
The Radiation Monitoring teams may be dispatched to verify the dose
projections.
'
22.5
Iodine sampling will be completed as appropriate by the field survey
teams.
22.6
Dose projections from MIDAS or actual field data will be used to
determine protective action recommendations.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-4
Responsibilities During an Alert, Site Area
or General Emergency
PINGP F3-8
Recommendations for Offsite Protective
Actions
PINGP F3-13
Offsite Dose Calculations
PINGP F3-15
Responsibilities of the Radiation Survey
Teams During a Radioactive Airborne
Release
PINGP F8-5
Offsite Dose Assessment and Protective
Action Recommendations
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SECTION II
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
O
Objective 23.0: Ihst=AccidenLSampling
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate the
ability to obtain and analyze various inplant liquid and air-type samples.
Guidelines:
23.1
Inplant post-accident sampling may include sample analysis of reactor
coolant, containment atmosphere and Shield Building vent as appropriate
within three (3) hours of sampling.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-20
Determination of Radioactive Release
Concentrations
PINGP F3-23
Emergency Sampling
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
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EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
O
Ohicctive #24.0: Batassiwn_ Iodide
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate the
ability to distribute potassium iodide.
Guidelines:
24.1
The scenario will not require the need for use of Potassium Iodide for
personnel in the Emergency Response Organization.
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLA.N EXERCISE
Rev. 0
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1993
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Objective #25.0: Assembly and. Accountability
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP personnel shall demonstrate a plant
evacuation and perform personnel accountability within 30 minutes following a
plant evacuation.
Guidelines:
25.1
Upon declaration of a plant evacuation, personnel accountability will be
completed within 30 minutes.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objective stated above:
PINGP F3-9
Emergency Evacuation
PINGP F3-10
Personnel Accountability
PINGP F3-29
Emergency Security Procedures
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev.0
1993
O
Objective #26.0: Rccarcy_and_Rcenty
Given simulated accident conditions, PINGP site personnel shall demonstrate
recovery and reentry procedures.
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Guidelines:
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26.1
Activation of the Recovery Organization may be demonstrated by
involving the Recovery Manager in staff planning and discussion with
the Emergency Manager and the Emergency Director.
The following EPIPs may be used to support the objectives stated above:
PINGP F8-9
Event Termination or Recovery
PINGP F3-30
Recovery
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 2
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1993
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SECTION VI Part I: NARRATIVE SUMMARY
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SECTION VI Part I
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 2
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O
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? EVENT SUMMARYJ
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0715
Turnover is completed for the operating crew
INITIAL CONDITIONS:
Units 1 and 2 are operating at 100%
Small amount offailed fuel; Temporary Memo to 1C1.4
restricts power ramp rates to 0.5%Imin.
13 Heater Drain Pump is isolated and cooling down for a
maintenance PM.
121 Air Compressor is isolated and disassembled for repair
work.
0720
A seismic event occurs resulting in:
1.
11 Charging Pump electrical contactor opens; the pump stops, resulting
in a loss of charging flow /RCP seal injection. The operator will start a
2nd Charging Pump and initiate an investigation into the failure of 11
Charging Pump; no problems will be found.
2.
D5 starts due to a failure in the SIMR relay circuit. D5 cannot be
shutdown from the control room. D5 shutdown can be accomplished by
using the Emergency Stop push-button on the local operating panel; D5
will be rendered inoperable by this action-Unit 2 will be placed into a
7 day LCO.
3.
A tube leak (approx. 7 gpm) develops on 11 Steam Generator (SG);
this leakrate exceeds Tech Spec limits (T/S 3.1.C) and thus will require
the plant to be shutdown and placed into Hot Shutdown.
0730
The Lockmaster reports that a tremor has caused one roller gate at lock #3 to
become dislodged from its moorings and river level control has been
,
temporarily lost.
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0735
An NUE is declared based on EAL 20B (Tech Spec Required shutdown)-
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and/or EAL19A (Confirmed seismic event) and/or EAL 4A (Primary to
Secondary leak rate exceeding Tech Specs).
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SECTION VI Part 1
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev 2 -
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Crpwr-wnwmm
pmmmmmmemwnemm5
iTIMEP
2
R
fEVENT SUMMARY
4
M uw w w a a n w a?m ed
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The Control Room receives confirmation from I&C that an " Operational
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Based Earthquake (OBE)" has occurred as well as a confirmation from the
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Duty Chemist that a SG tube leak has developed.
0800
An ALERT is declared based on EAL 19B (OBE).
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0900
The tube leak on 11 SG develops into a 300 gpm Steam Generator Tube
Rupture (SGTR).
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0910
The size of the SGTR requires a plant trip and SI initiation. When SI
actuates, the following will occur:
1.
The 11 Turbine-Driven Aux Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) will auto-start.
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2.
A failure of the turbine speed control governor and overspeed
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protection device results in the TDAFP overspeeding without tripping.
3.
The TDAFP undergoes blading failure and throws blades through the
casing. These thrown blades cause the following to occur-
)
The air supply vent valve (AR-292) to CV-31998 (11 TDAFP
a.
Steam Supply) is damaged, resulting in CV-31998 failing open
and disabling remote control capability.
b.
Two maintenance workers were just preparing to enter the ARV
Pump Room (Unit I door) as the 11 TDAFP disintegrates.
,
Both workers are injured by the flying debris. The door is
unable to close (unconscious worker and tool cart) allowing
contaminated steam to escape and generating a security alarm
for which a Security Officer will be dispatched. The Security
Officer will find the injured workers, assist in getting the door
closed and initiate EMT response.
A steam leak in the ARV ' Room resulting in a fire alarm and
c.
Steam Exclusion actuation.
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SECTION VI Part 1
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 2
1993
O
~
TIME '
TEVENT SUMMARYL
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0930
The operators have progressed through E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Recovery) and transition to E-2 (Faulted SG lsolation).
When attempting to isolate the steam supply to the TDAFP from the ruptured
11 SG, the steam supply motor-operated valve (MV-32016) fails and cannot
be closed either electrically or manually.
Maintenance personnel will be dispatched to continue attempts to close
{
MV-32016 to isolate steam to the TDAFP.
Personnel may also be dispatched to attempt to close CV-31998. This valve is
locked inside the security box located outside of the AFW Room. Access
'
will not be allowed at this time due to heavy steam in the area.
t
0940
A SITE AREA EMERGENCY will be declared based on EAL 4D and/or 7C
(Ruptured SG that is also Faulted outside of CTMT). .A plant evacuation
should be declared.
0955
On-site medicrl exercise portion completed.
)
'
1030
If access to CV-31998 becomes possible, a pressurized air or nitrogen supply
I
will be used to close the steam supply to the TDAFP. The radioactive steam
,
leak will be isolated.
1100
The plant is heading towards cold shutdown using procedure ECA-3.1. The
RCS is either being cooled by RIIR or is close to being cooled by RIIR at
this time.
1130
Exercise stops for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> time step.
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Page 4 of 5
SECTION VI Part 1
1
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PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE
Rev. 2
1993
O
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L TIME-
^ JEVENT SUMMARY;
.u
a_
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.
,
1200
Exercise resumes; new conditions:
,
1.
No significant radioactive releases from the site occurring.
2.
Iloth units are in Cold Shutdown; all safety systems have been inspected
with no damage found (except for 11 TDAFP)
3.
MV-32016 has been repaired and closed.
,
1300
R6covery is initiated.
i
1330
Exercise is terminated.
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Page 5 of 5
SECTION VI Part I