ML20057C310

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Discusses 930917 Meeting W/Util in Region II Ofc Re Sixth Refueling Outage Activities at Plant.List of Attendees & Licensee Handouts Encl
ML20057C310
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf 
Issue date: 09/17/1993
From: Merschoff E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Hutchinson C
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
NUDOCS 9309280202
Download: ML20057C310 (64)
v • d • e


Text

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SEP l 71993 N

D h

Docket No.:

50-416 License No.: NPF-29 i9 Entergy Operations, Inc.

ATTN:

C. R. Hutchinson, Vice President Operations - Grand Gulf Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

- GRAND GULF This refers to the meeting conducted at your request in the Region II Office on September 17, 1993. The purpose of the meeting was for you to present the sixth Refueling Outage Activities at Grand Gulf. A list of attendees and a copy of your handout are enclosed.

It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial in that it provided a better understanding of your present activities. Of particular interest were the actions you have planned with regard to shutdown risk.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclo-sures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact us.

Sincerely, Original signed by:

Ellis W. Merschoff Ellis W. Herschoff, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1.

List of Attendees 2.

Licensee Handout cc w/encls:

Mr. H. W. Keiser, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995 270070

' Jackson, MS 39286-1995 (cc w/encls cont'd - See page 2)

I 9309280202 930917 i

PDR ADOCK 05000416-

s Entergy Operations, Inc.

2 SEP 171913 (cc y/encls cont'd)

General Manager Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 M. J. Meisner, Director Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 756 Port Gibson, MS 39150 Mike Morre, Attorney General i

Frank Spencer, Asst. Attorney General State of Mississippi P. O. Box 22947 Jackson, MS 39225 J. R. McGaha Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.

P. O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 R. B. McGehee, Esq.

Wise, Carter, Child, and Caraway P. O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205 N. _S. Reynolds, Esq.

Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, NW, 12th Floor Washington, D. C.

20005-3502

^

F. E. Thompson, Jr., M.D.

State Health Officer State Board of Health P. O. Box 1700 Jackson, MS 39205 The Honorable William J. Guste, Jr.

Attorney General I

Department of Justice State of Louisiana P. 0. Box 94005 Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005 (cc w/encls cont'd - See page 3)

o er,

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Entergy Operations, Inc.

3 (cc w/encls cont'd)

Office of the Governor State of Mississippi Jackson, MS 39201 Sam Mabry, Chief Hazardous Waste Division Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality P. O. Box 10385 Jackson, MS 39209 President Clairborne County Board of Supervisors Port Gibson, MS 39150 K. G. Hess Vice President Bechtel Power Corporation P. O. Box 2166 Houston, TX 77252-2166 W. W. Watson Project Manager Bechtel Power Corporation P. O. Box 808 4600 W.' Main Russellville, AR 72801 bec w/encls:

P. O'Connor, NRR W. Beckner, NRR F. Cantrell, RII Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 2, Box 399 Port Gibson, MS 39150 RII RP DVerrelli:tj 09/,-/93 b

4 ENCLOSURE I LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC LICENSEE S. Ebneter R. Hutchinson L. Reyes M. Meisner E. Merschoff J. Fowler A. Gibson T. Jablonski D. Verrelli D. Jones J. Shackelford

e ENCLOSURE 2

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j NRC Region ll/ Grand Gulf Meeting Sixth Refueling Outage l

Ji September 16,1993

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Chuck Dugger Tom Jablonski f

Mike Meisner

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Dan Pace Grand Gulf Nuclear Station 4

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Agenda introduction Mike Meisner RF06 Overview Chuck Dugger/ Tom Jablonski Shutdown Risk Evaluation Mike Meisner Cycle 7 Reload John Fowler Selected Engineering initiatives Dan Pace

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Grand Gulf Nuclear Station RF06 Overview e Regulatory Initiatives e Outage Organization eScope

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e New Initiatives / Schedule Enhancements eOutage Goals e Schedule Review e Summary

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Regulatory initiatives e Motor Operated Valve Actuation Testing

-54 initial visits in RF06 e Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Flowrate Test

-High density racks in SFP and UCP

-Reduce dependency on RHR by using FPCCU 1 pump,2 Hx

-Staff required verification of flowrates prior to S/U from RF06 e RPV Level Instrument Reference Leg Degassing

-Perform backfill during cooldown

-Implement 2 modifications:

- Crosstie narrow range variable leg to fuel zone reference leg

- Continuous backfill from CRD eSuppression Pool Cleanliness

-Increased monitoring

-Review / revision to lagging procedure

-inspection / videotaping of pool

-Detailed closeout prior to S/U

-Contractor training i

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-Contractor Coordinator

-ECCS Coordinator

-Switchyard Coordinator

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Scope e Refuel /IVVI e'A' SSW Basin Drain

-replace struts

-inspect, sandblast, paint e D/G PMs e RHR 'A' and 'B' 10 year motor inspections eILRT L

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L Scope (continued) l e Rebuild 193 scram pilot valve solenoids L

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i e Change out D/W cooling coils e Rebuild 'B' circ water pump e Change out SRVs e Erosion / corrosion pipe replacement e Replace 500KV switchyard breaker J5232 1

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eTemp D/W and CTMT cooling during PSW outage e Contractor utilization improvements e Six additional operators available for tagouts, surveillances, and line-ups s Refuel floor critical path reduced

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-IVVI e SSW basin improvements

-vacuuming at power

-improved paint - 60 hour6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> cure time e Switchyard work performed at power

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Ea New initiatives and Schedule Improvements (continued) e Regulatory assistance

-Tech Spec changes allowed:

- LLRT's not required for 2" vent / drain valves

- CTMT isolation valves not required operable during special conditions

-Relief from certain ILRT requirements (CRD penetration)

-Relief from some IWI J

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RF06 Outage Goals i

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<40 Days e Duration

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Shutdown Risk Assessment

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e Purpose e Schedule Review e ORAM-TIPS Results e Risk Control e Conclusions

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Safety Significant Events Comparison of RF01 through RF05 Outage Dates Length # irs # LERs IR/ day LER/ day RF01 09/05/86 -12/03/86 88 days 52 20 0.591 0.23 RF02 11/07/87 - 01/06/88 61 days 46 12 0.754 0.20 l

RF03 03/18/89-04/30/89 44 days 25 5

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Purpose of RF06 Assessment eIdentify high risk issues e Present the findings so that required contingency plans could be prepared eidentify schedule improvements e Review recent industry events /information for insights t,

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Areas Reviewed

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-Decay Heat Removal

-Reactivity Control

-Vessel Inventory Control

-Electrical Power eUFSAR

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-Loss of Coolant Accident

-Fire e Results were similar to RF05

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e Documents used as a standard:

lNPO 92-005, Guidelines for the Management of Planned Outages at Nuclear Power Stations NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management e Documents issued after GGNS RFO5 Clinton Power Station RFO Assessment Review NRC Inspection Report 50-298/93-201 review lEN 92-085 - Potential Failures of ECCS Caused by Foreign Material Blockage lEN 93 Degradation of Shutdown Cooling System Performance SER 01 Loss of Safety-Related BUS Due to inadequate Outage Work Controls SER 02 Inadequate Control of Reactor Water Level at a Shutdown BWR SER 17 Undetected Loss of Shutdown Cooling Review the recommendations of reports OA-92-05 and OA-92-14 to ensure those applicable to RF06 have been implemented

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Schedule Review e Method similar to RFO5 e Definitions:

- A High Risk condition exists if one equipment failure or operator action can cause a loss of or a reduction in the plant's ability to:

remove decay heat provide electrical power maintain inventory control establish / maintain priman/ or secondary containment integrity when required ensure adequate reactivity control

- A RISK condition is classified as:

- any event which could initiate or inhibit the use of ONEPs, EPs, or EPPs any event that could require an IR or LER to be written any event which causes an unplanned entry into any technical specification action statement

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Schedule Review eThe Outage Schedule was reviewed

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s Assessment Conclusions eThirty-two days of the projected 40 day outage contains one or more High Risk Conditions

-Reactivity control had no safety concerns

-Decay Heat Removal Safety Function had the largest number of high risk days

-Contingency plans were written commensurate with the identified high risk eThe assessment identified three recommended changes:

-Maintaining a reactor recirculation pump in operation during times when the shutdown cooling suction is from the spent fuel pool

- Maintaining ADHRS in operation until HPCS can be made functional

- Evaluate LPCS, HPCS, and RHR C capability without room cooling

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10 20 30 40 T ine,. Days After Outage Start Figure 3: RFO6 RCS Boiling Frequency

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Use of Temp Diesel During RF06.

1 e Risk analysis determined diesel not cosi-beneficial 1

eOutstanding NRC issue for which basis was unclear e Pending better understanding of NRC basis GGNS decided to incorporate temp diesel into RF06 i

e GGNS comments on rulemaking will likely oppose the proposed 2 diesel requirement I

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Risk Control eOutage Risk is controlled by:

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Uses protection plan in development of schedule including:

- Clear, easy to understand schedule

- Schedule completion in time for assessment feedback

- Divisional outage work

- Real time updates during outage Ongoing feedback of safety significant issues

- Operational experience

-Industry SD risk activities

- Outage schedule safety assessment

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L and Suppression Pool cleanliness control

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.,s Safety Assessment During Outage e Safety Assessment Group will as a minimum:

-Monitor outage activities 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day until flood-up p

-Monitor divisional swap and draindown

- Attend twice daily war room turnovers

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-Enter all schedule changes into ORAM-TIP

-Run ORAM-TIP monitoring for risk increases

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Overview e Sixth reload batch supplied by Siemens Power Corporation (SPC) e First reload evaluated under 10CFR50.59 versus license amendment eContinued use of the SPC 9x9-5 fuel design e Reload fuel is mechanically, neutronically, and thermal hydraulically compatible with the 9x9-5 fuel inserted in previous cycles e First full core of all 9x9-5 fuel e No major changes in fuel / core design or analyses results t

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d 4 Cycle 7 Reload Summary Core Description e Cycle 7 core consists of 276 fresh SPC 9x9-5 assemblies - 104 ANF 1.6H assemblies and 172 ANF 1.6L assemblies e Remainder consisting of 252 twice-burned, and 272 once-burned SPC 9x9-5 assemblies e Cycle length remains at 18 months with a nominal cycle energy of 1,763 GWd e Scatter load fuel management scheme - same as Cycle 6 e Spectral shift operating strategy - same as Cycle 6 eThe POWERPLEX core monitoring system will continue to be utilized to monitor reactor parameters at GGNS 1

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-Current TS safety limit values (1.06 & 1.07) applicable to Cycle 7

  • Transient Analyses performed using NRC-approved methods with the following results:

-Load reject no bypass (LRNB) is the limiting event in the 70%-100%

power range. The control rod withdrawal error (CRWE) event is limiting at lower powers.

-Slightly more restrictive power dependent MCPR limits than those for Cycle 6

-No changes for Cycle 7 to the flow and power-dependent LHGR factors (LHGRFACf and LHGRFACp) from Cycle 6

-Continued applicability of SPC's generic control rod withdrawal error analysis was demonstrated u

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-Limiting LOCA unchanged: Double-ended guillotine in recirculation pump discharge line with 1.00 discharge coefficient

-LOCA PCT of 1691 F supports current MAPLHGR limits

-Core wide metal water reaction is less than 1%

-Control rod drop accident bounded by GGNS UFSAR radiological assessment (770 failed rods) eOther Analyses

-Spent fuel pool and upper containment pool criticality analysis performed for Cycle 5 remains bounding for Cycle 7

-Stability analysis confirmed applicability of current stability-related Technical Specifications

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Recirc Pump Update e Root Cause e Modification e Current Status l

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Root Causes eThermal Excessive steady state thermal stress Temperature fluctuations at interface of seal purge and primary coolant e Material Stress risers e Mechanical / Hydraulic Choked flow operation Shaft resonance near running speed "B" pump 1X dynamic torque level

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Impact of Modifications sincrease Design Margin e Eliminate Destructive Processes eimprove Monitoring Ability

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impact of Modifications I

Shaft Sleeve Sulzer Isolate Shaft From Thermal Mixing Soften Mixing impact w/Small Gap Reduces Shaft Thermal Stress Elim; nates Natural Convection Problem Shaft Cap Sulzer Reduces Shaft Thermal Stress HX Sleeve Sulzer Removes Thermal Process Bearing Baffle & Inlet BW/IP Raises Shaft Natural Frequency Above Run Hole Diameter increase Speed Wear Ring & Case BW/IP Ensure Concentric Alignment Machining

& Furmanite Restore Damping to Whirl Mode CAN8 Seals AECL More Reliable Operation Allows Purge Off Operation if Needed 2 gpm Purge Rate GGNS Softens Thermal Mixing Impact on Sleeves Straightened Motor Sulzer Reduces Overall Pump Vibration Coupling Bore Shaft Torque GGNS Actual Shaft Torque Available Transducer

& BNC Possible On-Line Crack Depth UT Inspection Bore GGNS Allow Use of GGNS UT Method

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Pump Case Accelerometer GGNS Compare A & B Frequency Spectra l

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ATWS Set Point GGNS Reduce Probability of Pump Trip

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Current Status eSleeve Inspection RF06 e Continue Monitoring

  • Determine Future Inspection Need e Follow Industry Experience ig,4=

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Lightning Update e Goal - Reduce plant sensitivity to lightning strikes such that power reductions during storm activity are no longer required to prevent SCRAMS t

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i Current Condition e Lightning activity monitored / power reductions on storm activity elmproved instrument response to strikes e Cameras in place to detect strike zone e Dummy loops / test LPRM channels in place e APRM/LPRM recorder in place ve**ver n w*wr e r=== =* " r ev v-* r4

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Protect the Victim eInstall gain reducing resistors on LPRM eInstall fast switching surge diodes

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i Prognosis e Signal may already be normal e Resistors and diodes anticipated to suppress the signals e Mod to be issued early October (may be performed on-line) eTest bed in place now e Float one div of APRMs in RF06 s

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