ML20057C164
| ML20057C164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 09/09/1993 |
| From: | Cooper T, Lesser M, Maxwell G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057C160 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-369-93-13, 50-370-93-13, NUDOCS 9309280023 | |
| Download: ML20057C164 (12) | |
See also: IR 05000369/1993013
Text
.
- .
.
.
f# a mac\\
UNITED STATES
S
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
y*s
- 4
,
REGloN H
a.
)
S
101 MAR!ETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
7. ( *7
- p
. ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199
Q v ,/
.....
Report Nos. 50-369/93-13 and 50-370/93-13
Licensee:
Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, NC 28242-1007
'
Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370
License Nos.
Inspection Conducted: July 18, 1993 - August 21, 1993
Inspector:
Svlfabe8.1993
~
'
G. F.' Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
Inspector:
A
8'rA% hts 81913
,
'
T.
A'.' C'ooper, Resident Inspector
Date Signed
l
Accompanying Personnel:
P. C. Hopkins, Resident Inspector Catawba
W. H. Miller, Project Engineer Region 11
R. L. Watkins, Project Engineer Region II
.
9A43
\\
Approved by:
~
Date Signed
3
M. S. Lesser, Setion Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
!
SUMMARY
'
,
Scope:
This resident inspection was conducted in the areas of plant
operations, surveillance testing, maintenance observations, plant
!
modifications, and refueling activities.
.
Results:
In the areas inspected, two violations were identified. The first
i
involved an inadequate surveillance procedure, which was not
properly revised to incorporate Technical Specification amendments
(paragraph 3.c.).
The second violation involved multiple examples
i
of failure to follow procedures (paragraphs 4.h. and 4.i.).
In
addition, one Unresolved Item was identified for Problem
Investigation Process initiation issues (paragraph 3.c.).
With
the exception of the noted violations, the licensee met or
surpassed regulatory requirements in the areas inspected.
9309280023 930914
ADOCK 05000369
G
.
.
_
.
..
--
-
.
..
.
.
~
..
.
L
^
'
REPORT DETAILS
I
i.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
I
- D. Baxter, Support Operations Manager
'
A. Beaver, Operations Manager
- J. Boyle, Work Control Superintendent
!
D. Bumgardner, Unit 1 Operations Manager
- B. Caldwell, Training Manager
,
- M. Cash, Engineering Supervisor
7
- W. Cross, Compliance Security Specialist
i
T. Curtis, System Engineering Manager
!
J. Foster, Station Health Physicist
,
F. Fowler, Human Resources Manager
- G. Gilbert, Safety Assurance Manager
i
- P. Guill, Compliance Engineer
'
B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Operations
- B. Harkey, Mechanical Maintenance
B. Hasty, Emergency Planner
,
P. Herran, Engineering Manager
- B. Johansen, Operations
- L. Kunka, Compliance Engineer
- E. Geddie, Station Manager
- T. McMeekin, Site Vice President
R. Michael, Station Chemist
- T. Pederson, Safety Review Supervisor
N. Pope, Instrument & Electrical Superintendent
- R. Roberts, System Engineer
- R. Sharpe, Regulatory Compliance Manager
- D. Tapp, Mechanical Maintenance General Superintendent
B. Travis, Component Engineering Manager
R. White, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,
operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
,
NRC Resident Inspectors
- G. Maxwell, SRI
P. Van Doorn, SRI
- T. Cooper, RI
- Attended exit interview
2.
Plant Operations (71707)
a.
Observations
The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report
period to verify conformance with applicable regulatory
requirements. Control room logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift
turnover records and equipment removal and restoration records
1
. , - .
__ _ __
_
_ _
__
_ _
_ _ _
_
__
_ _ _ . _ _
.
2
,
were routinely reviewed.
Interviews were conducted with plant
operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and
performance personnel.
Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts
i
and at shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were
!
conducted as prescribed in applicable station administrative
l
'
directives.
The number of licensed personnel on each shift met or
surpassed the minimum required by Technical Specifications (TS).
The inspectors also reviewed the Problem Investigation Process
(PIP) to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting
problems and implementing corrective actions. A potential concern
I
about the use of these reports was identified by the inspectors
(paragraph 3.c.).
i
Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were
.
not limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building,
'
electrical equipment rooms, cable spreading rooms, and the station
yard zone inside the protected area.
During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, fire
.
protection, security, equipment status and radiation control
l
,
practices were observed.
j
.
b.
Unit 1 Operations
-
}
The unit began the inspection period at 100 percent thermal power
!
and remained at that power throughout the period. At 12:36 a.m.
,
on August 22, 1993, the unit began a shutdown due to a steam
!
generator tube leak. This issue will be discussed in detail in
!
the next resident inspector report.
j
'
c.
Unit 2 Operations
The unit began the inspection period in a refueling outage. Core
j
unloading was completed on July 18, 1993.
Fuel reload was
,
completed on August 8, 1993. The unit ended the period in Mode 5
!
with refueling activities continuing.
1
!
d.
Roof Fire on the Unit 1 Fuel Handling Building
i
l
On August 12, 1993, at approximately 2:55 p.m., a Radiation
'
Protection technician notified the control room of smoke in the
!
Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool area. At 3:05 p.m. the non-licensed
i
operator notified the control room of open flames (of
i
approximately 4 to 5 feet in length) coming through the northeast
!
corner of the fuel handling building roof.
This area of the
!
building is over the fuel receiving bay, not over the spent fuel
l
pool.
At the time of the fire, contract roofers were repairing the roof.
The process used to apply tar to the roof caused the existing
l
l
l
I
.
i
3
j
insulation on the roof to ignite.
Fire brigade teams were
dispatched to the spent fuel pool area and to the building roof.
By the time the teams arrived, the roofers had placed the burning
_
material in a wheel barrel and had extinguished the fire with a
dry chemical fire extinguisher. The fire was completely
extinguished 7 minutes after the condition had been declared.
1
The inspectors noted some weaknesses in the communications between
the fire brigade and the control room; specifically,. operators
were very informal and used slang phrases during the
communications. Additionally, the fire brigade did not obtain a
charged hose before they responded to the incident.
The fire damaged an area of roof approximately five feet in
diameter. Smoke damage occurred to the fuel handling area.
Temporary repairs to the roof were completed to prevent rain from
entering. All other work in the spent fuel pool area was halted
i
until investigation and repairs were completed and the operability
of ventilation systems was verified. Temporary repairs were
initiated, but were halted by the Safety Department because of
j
inadequate fire precautions. Repairs were later initiated with
'
the necessary fire protection requirements in place.
{
l
The Resident Inspectors are continuing to investigate the adequacy
of the work and fire controls for the task.
i
No violations or deviations were identified.
i
3.
Surveillance Testing (61726)
a.
Observed Surveillance Tests
j
Selected surveillance tests were reviewed and/or witnessed by the
resident inspectors to assess the adequacy of procedures and
)
performance as well as conformance with the applicable TS.
i
'
Selected tests were witnessert to verify that (1) approved
procedures were available and in use, (2) test equipment in use
was calibrated, (3) test prerequisites were met, (4) system
restoration was completed, and (5) acceptance criteria were met.
,
The following tests were reviewed or witnessed in detail:
i
PROCEDURE
E0VIPMENT/ TEST
J
PT/2/A/4350/36A
D/G 2A 24 Hour Run Procedure
i
'
PT/0/A/4400/17
Fire Pump A & B Operability
Test
PT/0/B/4350/018
Bus L.ines Protection Relay
System Test (A Train only)
'
'
i
!
'
.
.
4
l
~
,
b.
PT/2/A/4200/09A, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic
Test
The inspectors observed the portion of the surveillance test
dealing with the Safety Injection, Containment Phase A and B
Isolation, and Loss of Offsite Power actuation logic.
For the
test, Nuclear Service Water (RN) train A suction was aligned to
the standby nuclear service water pond (SNSWP). During the test,
-
the suction of the A train should swap to the lower level intake
(LL1). When the test was conducted, the SNSWP suction valve
e
closed, but the LLI suction valves failed to automatically open.
An operator noted this condition and opened the valves from the
control room to prevent the pump from tripping on low suction
i
pressure. Train B of RN was operable and available during the
test, and the remainder of the test proceeded as expected.
The inspectors verified that a PIP was generated.
Investigation
revealed that a slave relay failed to latch and caused the
,'
problem. The licensee removed the relay from service and could
not identify the cause of the failure. The relay was cleaned and
reinstalled and has operated as expected since that time.
c.
PT/2/A/4350/36A, DG 2A 24-Hour Run Procedure
i
The inspector observed portions of the referenced surveillance
test of the Unit 2
"A"
DG.
Specifically, the inspector
accompanied the operator during preliminary test preparation, DG
start-up and shut-down, and the hot restart within 5 minutes of
the shut-down.
The operator generally followed the test
procedures and demonstrated conscientious attention to his
responsibilities.
On August 3, 1993, the licensee discovered through review of
i
records from the previous outage on Unit 1 that the surveillance
test, TS 4.8.1.1.2.e (8), on IA and IB DGs did not meet TS
,
criteria. The referenced TS requires a 24-hour run of the DG as
well as a hot restart within five minutes of the completion of the
24-hour run. The 24-hour run was successfully completed for both
DGs, but the hot restart did not immediately follow the 24-hour
run for either DG. The licensee conducted the hot restart in
conjunction with an ESF test.
Furthermore, a TS criterion that
the diesel have a minimum two-hour run time prior to the hot
restart was not satisfied for the 1A DG, which ran for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and
46 minutes before the test.
The Licensee had requested changes to the referenced TS and
received TS Amendments 135/17 in February 1993.
The previous TS
specified a 1-hour run time, whereas the amended TS requires a
24-hour run time. This specific change, however, was not
incorporated into the licensee's test procedures. As a result,
the hot restart test was not performed in accordance with TS.
4
J
't
- ,
-
,.
-
,
5
,
Failure to incorporate IS changes into the applicable test
'
procedures is identified as Violation 50-369/93-13-01:
Failure to
I
provide adequate test procedure; for the emergency diesel
generators.
'
l
On August 17, 1993, the licensee submittea a Request for
l
Enforcement Discretion for both Unit 1 DGs.
Based upon review of
l
the course of action proposed by the licensee, the lac staff
communicated its intention to exercise discretion not to enforce
compliance with TS Surveillance 4.8.1.1.2.e(8) until a hot rrrtart
is conducted for both Unit 1 DGs while the unit is at vs. oy
letter to Duke Power Company dated August 18, 1993.
i
The inspectors determined that prior to the 24-hour surveillance
tests substantial maintenance had been performed on lA & 18 DGs.
i
Post-maintenance activities included a series of break-in runs for
durations of five minutes to seven hours.
Break-in runs serve two
purposes: data collection on operating parameters (e.g. bearing
i
deflection) and verification of adequate maintenance (i.e. shake-
down of equipment irregularities).
According to a review of the licensee's DG Test Summaries, the
break-in runs for both DGs revealed component cooling water leaks
(IB DG) and fuel oil leaks'(IA and 18 DGs). The break-in runs
l
were periodically stopped to repair the leaks. However, the same
l
problems also occurred during the 24-hour surveillance tests. The
tests were routinely stopped and the DGs shut down to repair the
leaking water and/or fuel lines, and the tests were classified as
" Invalid Tests" with the explanation that maintenance or testing
was the direct cause of the failure.
The licensee appeared to be
using the 24-hour run as another break-in run rather than a formal
surveillance test.
Frequently, the tests were classified as " Invalid tests" for a
different, more appropriate reason: the test was intentionally
terminated without loading requirements. However, no
documentation was provided to clearly show that the licensee
voluntarily terminated the tests to repair a minor problem that
would not have prevented the DG from completing the 24-hour run
had the problem not been corrected.
The criteria for classifying surveillance test results are
provided in Regulatory Guide 1.108, dated August 1977. According
to this source the uncompleted 24-hour surveillance tests should
have been classified as Valid Test Failures if they were
terminated because of an alarmed abnormal condition that
ultimately would have resulted in DG damage or failure.
Because
the licensee did not provide justification for the classification
of invalid test failures in these instances, the inspector could
,
l
not independently conclude that the test had been properly
'
classified. This potential weakness in the licensee's DG test
results classification scheme was identified. The inspectors will
s
l
-
. . -
.
,
~ .. . _ .
-
- - .
- - - . -
. .
.
.
6
further evaluate the classification of surveillance test results
during subsequent inspections.
A potential concern exists in the licensee's use of their Problem
Investigation Process (PIP). Through discussions with licensee
staff the inspectors determined that both Ur.it 1 DGs had leaks in
their fuel oil lines since two outages ago, and that this has been
a recurring problem since that time. However, the licensee did
not write a Problem Investigation Report (PIR) on this issue, even
though one of the categories of items for which PIRs are required
is recurring failures. As a result, a corrective action program
was not formally established to follow the recurring fuel leaks to
resolution.
Repetitive fuel line failures without formal ongoing
corrective action is identified as an Unresolved Item 50-
369,370/93-13-03:
PIP initiation issues.
One violation was identified.
4.
Maintenance Observations (62703)
Resident Inspectors reviewed and/or witnessed routine maintenan e
activities to assess procedural and performance adequacy and conformance
with the applicable TS.
The selected activities witnessed were examined to verify that, where
applicable, approved procedures were available and in use, prerequisites
were met, equipment restoration was completed, and maintenance results
were adequate.
,
The following maintenance activities were reviewed or witnessed in
detail:
a.
WO 92073343 01, Repair Leak on Diesel Generator Water Heater
Circulating Pump 28.
The pump seals and bearings were replaced by this work order and
the motor and pump were realigned following the repairs. The
following procedures were used to accomplish this work:
MP/0/A/7400/04, Diesel Generator Cooling Water Heater Circulating
Pump Removal and Replacement; HP/0/A/7400/05, Diesel Engine
Cooling Water Heater Circulating Pump Corrective Maintenance;
MP/0/A/7400/90, Coupling Alignment, Check and Correction; and
MP/0/A/7300/01, Rotating Equipment-PM.
The inspectors witnessed
the work in progress and noted that the maintenance personnel
followed the procedures.
b.
WO 93011965 01, Rod and Clean Tubes for Heat Exchanger KD 2B for
the Diesel Generator 2B Cooling System.
This work order prescribed routine cleaning, inspection and
testing of the circulating cooling water heat exchanger for Diesel
Generator 2B using procedure MP/0/A/7650/101, Diesel Cooling Water
i
.
-
'
7
Heat Exchanger Corrective Maintenance. The inspectors witnessed
portions of the cleaning activities and noted that the personnel
were following the procedure req'Jirements.
c.
WO 93038555 01, Obtain Test Data for Rosemont Transmitter 1153 -
IMRNFT5230 (Service Water Flow to KD Cooling Water Heat
Exchangers).
This flow transmitter measures the flow of water from the service
water system to Diesel Generator 2B Cooling Water Heat Exchanger.
The transmitter was tested and recaiibrated as is directed by this
.
'
work order using procedure IP/0/A/3214/05, Rosemont Transmitter
1153 Calibration Procedure.
The inspectors witnessed portions of
the calibrations performed for this transmitter and noted that the
maintenance personnel were properly following the specified
proccdure requirements.
'
d.
WO 93012365 02, Preventative Maintenance on Valve 2RN-174.
Valve 2RN-174 was removed, cleaned and inspected as is directed by
this work order using the following procedures: MP/0/A/7600/43,
Fisher Butterfly Control Valves Corrective Maintenance;
MP/0/A/7650/01, Flange Gasket Removal and Replacement; and
MP/0/A/7700/86, Assessment of QA-1 Repairs and Replacement. The
inspectors witnessed the valve removal and cleaning activities.
No discrepancies were identified.
e.
WO 93017908 07, Add Drain Valve 2RN-1042 and Vent Valve 2RN-1043
to KC Heat Exchanger 2B.
This work request prescribed the addition of vent and drain valves
to KC Heat Exchanger 28. The inspectors witnessed the QC
inspection of the welds for cleanliness and proper fit. No
discrepancies were noted.
f.
WO 93037481 04, Apply Epoxy Coating to KC2B Heater Exchanger.
An epoxy coating is to be applied to the interior ends of this
heat exchanger. The inspectors witnessed portions of the cleaning
and preparation work performed prior to the application of the
epoxy coating of this heat exchanger.
No discrepancies were
noted.
g.
WO 93047728 01, Perform Preventive Maintenance on Main Fire Punp
i
B.
This WO prescribes preventive maintenance on Fire Pump B.
The
maintenance consisted of draining and replacing the motor bearing
oil, taking oil samples, and checking the pump while running to
verify that the pump's vibration was within acceptable levels.
These items were accomplished by procedures MP/0/A/7300/38, Main
Fire Pump Motor Oil Sampling, and Oil Replacement, and
i
i
.
.
,
_.
8
.
MP/0/A/7300/01, Rotating Equipment - Preventive Maintenance. The
inspectors witnessed the performance of these werk activities and
noted no discrepancies.
h.
Fuel Reconstitution Activities
On July 21, 1993, during reconstitution of fuel assemblies by a
contractor technician, a fuel rod was severely bent while being
inserted into the assembly recage template.
During rod insertion per the approved contractor procedure, FS-
113, high loads were encountered.
In accordance with the
procedure, the technician rotated the rod and moved the rod upward
slightly to reduce the load. When the technician began to
reinsert the rod, the gripping collet lost its hold on the rod.
This was not an unusual occurrence for the task, and the
technician attempted, unsuccessfully, to re-engage the collet.
Without further guidance, the technician closed the collet and
attempted to push the rod downward through the guides. This is a
practice that has apparently been used in years past although it
is outside of the procedure and design bases of the tooling.
l
Apparently the rod tip slid to one side of the collet and it began
to exert outward force on the rod guide. The rod guide installed
in the rod puller was a three-piece design with the pieces screwed
i
together at six-inch intervals. The lateral force was sufficient
i
to pry the three pieces of the rod guide apart and allow the fuel
rod to bulge and press through the rod guide. The subsequent bend
in the rod was severe.
The inspectors eva' * 3 the examination of the bent fuel rod.
The licensee's t
cah
revealed that, even though the rod had
plasticly defor- i, tn ciadding was intact. No local radiation
alarms or proce
rv.ation alarms sounded at the time of the
event.
The inspectors determined that failure to follow the approved
reconstitution procedure caused the fuel rod damage and resulted
in a challenge to fuel cladding integrity. This is an example of
Violation 369,370/93-13-02:
Failure to follow procedure (with
multiple examples).
i.
WO 93053534, Replace Fuse in Potential Transformer 2B D/G
On July 31, 1993, at approximately 10:00 a.m.,
a train "B"
actuation on Unit 2 occurred.
Specifically, the diesel generator
(D/G) load sequencer actuated. After the sequencer eight-second
undervoltage test, the sequencer sealed in and tripped the standby
incoming breaker as part of its load shed scheme.
The D/G did not
start because it was tagged out for outage maintenance. All
systems that were still available operated as expected.
i
i
.
.
-
9
.
The inspectors reviewed the analysis of the occurrence and
determined that Instrument and Electrical Maintenance (IAE) was
tasked to perform Work Order (W0) 93053534, which required them to
replace the fuse in the 4160 volt 2B D/G source pot transformer
IAE requested that Operations perform the job
because Operations normally replaced the PT fuses. Operations
performed the task; however, when the IAE supervisor attempted to
close the WO, he discovered that no QA visual inspection had been
performed.
An Operations assistant shift supervisor, the IAE supervisor, and
a QA inspector were dispatched to panel 2ETB-3 to verify correct
fuse installation. All three individuals went to the front of
2ETB-3 and agreed that the fuses inside the cabinet needed to be
pulled for verification. The labeling on the cabinet drawer read
"2ETB BUS PT FUSES." When the fuses were pulled, the ESF
actuation occurred. The fuses they intended to pull and verify
were located on the back of 2ETB-3, in a compartment labeled "DG
28 13KR PT FUSES."
The inspectors spoke with the engineer performing the event's root
cause evaluation and reviewed documentation collected for this
'
evaluation.
The approved WO required QA verification of the job.
Since Operations personnel did not have this verification
performed while the task was being completed, personnel had to
return to the panel to verify correct fuse installation. The
personnel did not go to the fuses described in the W0 and,
subsequently, caused an ESF actuation.
The failure to follow the requirements of the WO constitutes a
failure to follow a procedure.
This is an example of Violation
370/93-13-02:
Failure to follow procedure (with multiple
examples).
'
One violation with multiple examples was identified.
5.
Installation and Testing of Modifications (37828)
Unit 2 Charging System (NV) Letdown Orifices, Modification MG22413
e
Background: On August 8,1992, small leaks were discovered on the
letdown piping inside the containment building. The leaks were
i
attributed to fatigue failure of socket welds induced by
vibration. The letdown orifices were the source of the
vibrations.
A system modification was proposed by Engineering.
Modification: The modification (MG22413) required replacment of
letdown orifices 2NVFE6210 and 2NVFE6200 with new orifices
designed to reduce cavitation. All of the NV piping in the
vicinity of the orifices was replaced with piping that minimized
the need for socket welds.
6
_ _ _
.
-
'
10
.
.
e
Evaluation:
The inspectors reviewed the design package for
MG22413, which contained: 1) the documents and data that resulted
'
in the proposed modification, 2) a completed 10 CFR 50.59
evaluation, 3) modification scope and summary from the various
review groups, 4) modification documents and detailed drawings, 5)
'
procedures, and 6) the prescribed post modification tests to be
completed.
The package and inputs were acceptable and contained
sufficient detail to support the replacement and satisfactory
testing of the new piping and orifices.
e
Observations: The inspectors visually inspected the new orifices
and piping after they had been installed.
The inspectors checked
dimensioas, material types, size, configuration, and mounting
details. The inspectors evaluated the hydrostatic test results
for the replaced piping and orifices. The records indicated that
the test results were satisfactory and in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, MP/0/A/7650/55, Controlling Procedure for
,
Hydrostatic Testing of Duke Class "A," "B,"
and "C" Systems. The
calibration records for the hydrostatic test rig pressure gaage
were current, and the gauge was properly calibrated. The
modification work was satisfactory and in accordance with the
criteria provided in the design modification package.
l
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Refueling Activities - Unit 2 (60710)
The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the following Refueling
Procedures:
3
1
PT/2/A/4550/01, Preparation for Refueling
OP/0/A/6550/24, Fuel Transfer System
OP/0/A/6550/23, Fuel Building Manipulator Crane
OP/0/A/6550/22, Reactor Building Manipulator Crane
j
The evaluation included a comparison of the procedures with FSAR
and TS requirements for refueling.
The procedures were found to
be satisfactory for safe refueling practices.
The inspectors interviewed the plant personnel involved with
e
refueling activities. The staff members were generally familiar
with the procedural controls for fuel transfer operation, fuel
identification, damaged components, operator actions,
communications, and personnel dress.
The inspectors evaluated personnel training records for those who
e
were assigned to perform work associated with fuel movement. The
records showed proper personnel attendance for prescribed training
classes.
n
_
T
.-
_-
i
11
,s
The inspectors identified that the refueling staff pre-plans fuel
e
handling activities. The inspectors determined that this effort
should help minimize errors during refueling.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings identified below were summarized on
August 23, 1993, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1.
The
following items were discussed in detail:
Violation 50-369/93-13-01:
Failure to provide adequate test
procedures for the emergency diesel generators
+
Violation 50-370/93-13-02:
Failure to follow procedure (with
multiple examples)
Unresolved Item 50-369,370/93-13-03:
PIP initiation issues
The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor
,
did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the
inspectors during the course of their inspection.
j
l
1
)
l
.-
.
l
)
-
.
- - .