ML20057A001
| ML20057A001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20057A002 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309100265 | |
| Download: ML20057A001 (4) | |
Text
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PRr.SSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:
a.
A maximum heatup of 100'F in any 1-hour period, b.
A maximum cooidown of 200*F in any 1-hour period, and A maximum spray water temperature differential of 583'F.
c.
APPLICABILITY:
At all times.
ACTION:
With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the ef fects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.9.2 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during auxiliary spray operation.
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CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-33 i
9309100265 930907
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l PDR ADOCK 05000483 P
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CVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following groups of two Overpressure Protection devices shall be OPERA 8LE when the Reactor Coolant System (RCS is not i
depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to.2 s)quare inches:
Two residual heat removal (RHR) suction relief valves each a.
with a Satpoint of 450 psig t 3%, or b.
Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with setpoints which do not exceed the limit established in Figure 3.4-4, or i
One RHR suction relief valve and one P0RV with Setpoints as c.
described above.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE 3 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than i
or equal to 36B'F, MODES 4 and 5, and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.
ACTION:
With one of the two required overpressure protection devices a.
inoperable in MODES 3 or 4, restore two overpressure protection devices to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
b.
With one of the two required overpressure protection devices inoperable in MODES 5 o' 6, restore two overpressure protection 3
devices to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or depressurize and i
i vent the RCS with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 i
square inches within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
t With both of the two required overpressure protection devices c.
inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2 square inches within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
d.
In the event either the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves, or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.g.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs, or the RHR suction relief valves or RCS vent (s) on the transient, and any. corrective action necessa,ry to prevent recurrence.
The provision of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
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I CALLAWAY UNIT 3 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 83 w-
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l 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops-in opera-l tion and maintain DNBR above the safety analysis DNBR limits during all normal l
operations and anticipated transients.
In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
l In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal j
capability for removing decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal
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j accident; however, single failure considerations require that three loops be i
A single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal if a i
l bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip-l System breakers.
In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single l
reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability-for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at l
1 east two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERAliLE.
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In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not. filled, aisingle RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure j
considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.
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T.ne operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent'strat.ification and produce gradual j
reactivity changes during coron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant t
System.
The reactivity change rate associatid with boron reduction will,
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thereft < e, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.
j The restrictions on starting a reactor coolant pump in MODES 4 and 5 l
are provided to prevent RCS pressure transiet..ts, caused by energy additions-i from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50.
The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients
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and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of.the l
RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50*F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.
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i CALLAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No; 15-
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REACTOR COOLANT $YSTEM
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SASES 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Lielt of 2735 psig.
Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown.
In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, 1
an operating RNR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.
In addition, the Over-pressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against ACS l
overpressurization at low temperatures.
2 During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERA 8LE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig.
The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuelag no Reactor trip and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.
Demonstration of the tafety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.
3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the para-atter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation.
lhe maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus i
the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system.
The requirement that a sinimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.
3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES i
The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure and prevent a high pressurizer pressure reactor trip l
during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease witn steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely r
operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.
The PORVs are equipped with autumatic actuation circuitry and manual control capability.
Because no credit for automatic operation is taken in the FSAR analyses for MODE 1, 2 and 3 transients where operation of the PORVs has a beneficial impact on the results of the analysis, the PORVs are considered i
OPERABLE in either the manual or automatic mode. The automatic mode is the preferred configuration, as this provides pressure relieving capability i
without reliance on operation action.
i CALEAWAY - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-2 Amendment No.83 i
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