ML20056H397
| ML20056H397 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1993 |
| From: | BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056H390 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9309090254 | |
| Download: ML20056H397 (31) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _. . _ _ _ . _ . _ - . _ _-. . ATTACHMENT (1) 1 1 j UNIT 1 , TECIINICAL SPECIFICATION , I REVISED PAGES l 3/4 1-11 l t 3/4 1-14 l 3/4 3-16 1 3/44-2 i 3/44-4 l l 3/4 4-27 ; 3/4429 ' i 3/4 4-30 3/4 4 ! 3/4 4-33 ! I 3/45-4 ; ! 3/45-7 ! l 1 B3/44-1 B3/44-6 B3/44-7 B3/44-8 B3/44-9 B 3/4 410 B3/45-2 B3/45-3 l 9309090254 930903-PDR P ADOCK 05000317-l py _
3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS , Flow Paths - Shutdewn i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION' l . 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and i one associated heat tracing circuit shall be OPERABLE: l
- a. A flow path from the boric acid storage tank via either a boric ;
acid pump or a gravity feed connection and charging pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.7a is OPERABLE, or
- b. The flow path from the refueling water tank via either a charging ;
pump or a high pressure safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the refueling water tank in Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE. . APPLICABILITY: MODES S and 6. ! ACTION: With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least t one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status. M SURYEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ! 4.1.2.I At least one of the above required flow paths shall be i demonstrated OPERABLE: !
- a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the l heat traced portion of the flow path is above the temperature !
limit line shown on Figure 3.1.2-1 when a flow path from the ; concentrated boric acid tanks is used. j t
- b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual. l power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, ;
sealed, or othentise secured in position, is in its correct : position. l Q h
' AtQiSF and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI shall be in pull- !
to-lock and will not start automatically. At F and less, HPSI ! pump use vill be conducted in accordance with i nnical
^
Specification 3.4.9.3. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 AmendmentNo.2fg/
, . . . , , - . , - . , , . . , . . . . ,,.n
t 3/4.1 REACTXVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS , 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS ! l Charcino Pumo - Shutdown ! LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.1.2.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection - pump in the baron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to i Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus. i i APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. j ACT!ON: With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump l l OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive l reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to
- i OPERABLE status. !
l : SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5. 6% i s Ath.?F and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI o shall be in pull- l to-To'ck and will not start automatically. At F and less, HPSI l pump use will be conducted in accordance with nical Specification 3.4.9.3. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1. 3/4 1-14 AmendmentNo..f(/ 9 _ ~ - .
e . 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION Containment isolation of non-essential penetrations is also initiated by SIAS (functional units 1.a and 1.c). When the RCS ei erature is: JFr : (a) Greater t an F, the required OPERABLE HV: pumps must be able l l to st t aut ally upon receipt of a SV) signal, Jer . . _ . _ __ b _.. t (b) Between F an F. a transition region exists where the OPERABLE PSI pump will be placed in pull-to-lock on a cooldown d restored to automatic status on a heatup. 3&S (c) At F and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in l pull-to-lock and will not start automatically. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Must be OPERABLE only in MODE 6 when the valves are required OPERABLE and they are open, g (*) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE when pressurizer pressure - is < 1800 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is > 1800 psia. IC) Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 785 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 785 psia. I 1 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 3-16 Amendment No. Adk
- - . - ~ - .
s - I 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i
- 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION j 7 HOT STANDBY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 !
3.4.1.2 a. The reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE: 1 1. Reactor Coolant Loop fil and at least one associated ! ] reactor coolant pump. a i ! 2. Reactor Coolant Loop #12 and at least once associated l j reactor coolant pump. > j b. At least one of the above reactor coolant loops shall be in i j operation . l APPLICABILITY: MODE 3". I 1 ACTION: 1 5 a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, i restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or :
- be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. r 1 !
! b. With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations ! N involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor [ Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the ! required loop to operation within one hour. i i All reactor coolant pumps may be de-energized for up to I hour (up to ; 2 hours for low flow test) provided (1) no operations are pennitted ,
, that would cause dilution of. the Reactor Coolant System boron !
concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least i 10 F below saturation temperature. i A reactor coolant pump 11 not be started with the RCS temperature less. than or equal to g' r5fF unless (1) the pressurizer water level is l i less than or equal to 170 inches, and (2) the secondary water , temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 F ! above the RCS temperature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less ) than or equal to 300 psia. l l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-2 Amendment No.47J
* ^
3/4.4 REACTOR C00LA'fT SYSTEM fi I l 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION
/ t Shutdown i t
I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION i 3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be ; OPERABLE.
- 1. Reactor Coolant Loop fil and its associated steam (
generator and at least one associated reactor coolant ' pump,
- 2. Reactor Coolant Loop #12 and its associated steam !
generator and at least one associated reactor coolant l pump, l l 3. Shutdown Cooling Loop fi1*,
- 4. Shutdown Cooling Loop f12*. i l b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in i operation **.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 4***' and 5***'. i O ACTION:
- a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, initiate corrective action ta return the required coolant loops }
to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within l 24 hours. j! The nomal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5. All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de-energized for up to I hour provided (1) no operations are pemitted I that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10 F below saturation temperature. A reactor coolant pump 1 not be started with the RCS temperature less than or- equal toe /SF unless (1) the pressurizer water level is l less than or equal to 170 inches, and (2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 F above the RCS temperature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less than or equal to 300 psia. j See Special Test Exception 3.10.3. ! CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-4 Amendment No. S i
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor Coolant System LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:
- a. A maximum heatup of:
Maximum Allowable Heatuo Rate RCS Temperature 30 F in any one hour period 70 F to 164 aurc 40*F in any one hour geriod _ >_164_ F_to_ S29fF
.ne- -_ .....=a
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- b. A maximum cooldown of:
Maximum Allowable Cooldown Rate RCS Temperature 100 F in any one hour period > . if 20 F in any one hour period ayo . F to 18 F 10 F in any one hour period < 184"F (E4
- c. A maximum temperature change of 5 F in any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure.
APPLICABILITY: At all times. ACTION: With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature anc/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours andreducetheRCST,,lhefollowing30 respectively, within hours.and pressure to less than 200 F and CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-27 AmencmentNo.2IE' m _m
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i 0 100 200 300 400 500 i 600 INDICATED REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE T , 'F C FIGURE 3.4.9-2 CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 COOLDOWN CURVE 1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS 1 2 FOR FLUENCE s2.61 x 10 n/cm AT THE INNER SURFACE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL
e
.a 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS i
Overpressure Protection Systems LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 The following overpressure protection requirements shall be met: )
- a. One of the followinl three Overpressure Protection Systems shall .
be in place
- 1. Two power rated relief valveslPgwith a _tr .
setpoint sia or 4/sW;e cu&e ja Fgute J.Kf-J # :
- 2. A single PORV with a trip setpoint nd a l l Reactor Coolant System nnt of 11.M~ nches, or *
- 3. A Reactor Coolant System (RCS) vent t 2.6 square n1ches.
- b. Two high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps' shall be !
disabled by either removing (racking out) their motor circuit breakers from the electrical powei supply circuit, or by locking shut their discharge valves.
- c. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOVs)' shall be prevented g from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to.the PCS by placing - i their hand switches in pull-to-override.
- d. No more than one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump
, with suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to ' l inject flow into the RCS and when used.. it must be under manual - l control and one of the following restrictions shall apply: l 1. The total hig ressure safety injection flow shall be ! limited to 5 g OR l
- 2. A Reactor Coolant System vent of 3 2.6 square inches shall l exist.
j e. When not in use, the above OPERABLE high pressure safety ,
- injection pump shall have its handswitch in pull-to-lock.
APPLICASILITY: When the RCS temperature is 5 and the RCS is vented l to < 8 square inches. y,('F
? , ;
n//be L 429psIt W i i EXCEPT when required for testing. f l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-32 Amendment No.f Gy l
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- ._a. _.:.. _ g 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 ACTUAL REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURECT , F FIGURE 3.4.9-3 I
CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 MAXIMUM PORY OPENING PRESSURE vs TEMPERATURE FOR FLUENCE s2.61 x 10" n/cm2 AT THE INNER SURFACE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL , i l l 4 as ,, v
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) l ACTION:
- a. With one PORY inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORY to OPERABLE status within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 1 1.3 square inch vent (s) within the next 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.
- b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a 12.5 square inch vent (s) within 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until ehher one OPERABLE PORY and a vent of 3 1.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status.
- c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent (s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
- d. With less than two HPSI pumps' disabled, place at least two HPSI pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes and disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours.
- e. With one or more HPSI loop MOVs' not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, imediately place the MOV handswitch in pull-to-override, or shut and disable the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, and implement the ACTION requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3 and 3.5.3, as applicable.
- f. With HPSI flow exceeding gpm while suction is aligned to the l RWT and an RCS vent of < 2 6 square inches exists,
- 1. Ime f ately take action to reduce flow to less than or equal to gpm. l
- c
- 2. Verify the excessive flow condition did not raise pressure above the maximum allowable pressure for the given RCS temperature on Figure 3.4.9-1 or Figure 3.4.9-2.
l l EXCEPT when required for testing. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 4-33 Amendment No. d l b
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) SURVEILLANCE REMIIREMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE *:
- a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:
Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position
- 1. MOV-659 Mini-flow Isolation Open
- 2. MOV-660 Mini-flow Isolation Open
- 3. CV-306 Low Pressure SI Open
. Flow Control
- b. At least once per 31 days by:
i
- 1. Verifying that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves open.
I 2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position. i 29 c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, l trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could ! be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of ! the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be perfonned:
- 1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and
- 2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
- d. Within 4 hours prior to increasing the RCS pressure above 1750 psia by verifying, via local indication at the valve, that CV-306 is open.
1W enever flow testing into the RCS is required at RCS temperatures of L93F and less, the high pressure safety injection pumo shall l ~ recirculate RCS water (suction from RWT isolated) or the controls of Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 shall apply. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 211' l . l
j * * !. s , ! 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) f . ., 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3 (< 1750 PSIA) AND 4 l '( i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1 _ a t
- 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be !
, OPERA 8LE- ' i
- a. One' OPERABLE high-pressure safety injection pump, and. i i b. An 0? ERA 8LE flow path capable of taking suction from the !
refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and '
- automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a j Recirculation Actuation Signal. _ _ _
} APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* an) 4. f f 1 i ACTION: 4 l j a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS f 4 subsystem to 0PERA8LE status within I hour or be in COLD $NUTDOWN l l within the next 20 hours. ! } j b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the l 4 Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and i
- submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 ;
- within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and -
- the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. '
} l 3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i j ( 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the ! j applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2. ! i ! l i l (i
-i i l (of I
Betweenh*F and ^F, a transition region exists where the OPERABLE l ! HPSI pump will be p aced in pull-to-lock on a cooldown and restored to l 4 automatic status on a heatup. At@ F and less, the required OPERABLE ] HPS pump shall be in pull-to-locF nd will not start automatically. A *F and less HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with l M echnical Specification 3.4.9.3. y { With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 S-7 AmendmentNo.Nby f
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and associated reactor coolant pumps in operation, and maintain DNBR above 1.195 during all nonnal operations and anticipated transients. A single reactor coolant loop with its steam generator filled above the low level trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal capability for core cooling while in MODES 2 and 3; however, single failure considerations require plant shutdown if component repairs and/or corrective actions cannot be made within the allowable out-of-service time. In MODES 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, if the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this specification requires two shutdown cooling loops to be OPERABLE. The operation of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one shutdown cooling pump i provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevents stratification and l produces gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control. , g% 3' The restrictions on startinga eactor Coolant Pump during MODES 3, 4 and 5 with the RCS temperature 5855'F are provided to prevent RCS pressure l transients, caused by energy 7dditions from the Secondary System, which C could exc the limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G (see Bases 3/4.4.9). !C "m4j Fo rztwrX the reactor coolant pumps the following criteria apply; (1) res ng the water volume in the pressurizer (170 inches) and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into and (2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the indicated secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 F above the Reactor Coolant System temperature, (3) limit the initial indicated pressure of the pressurizer to less than or equal to 300 psia. - 3/4.4.2 SAFETY YALVES 4 %s l3 The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS fonn being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each safety valve is designed to relieve approximately 3 x 105 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during
- shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating l
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. RY l l I +~
INSERT A The limit on initial pressurizer pressure will prevent the PORV from lifting during the t pressure transient. l l l i l l
i 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i i BASES Figure 3.4.8-1 increase the 2 hour thyroid dose at the SITE BOUNDARY by a ! factor of up to 20 following a postulated steam generator tube rupture. l l Reducing T.,, to < 500 F prevents the release of activity should a steam ; generator tube rupture since the saturation pressure of the primary coolant is belcw the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The surveillance recuirements provide adequate assurance that excessivespecific activity levels in the primary coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action. Infor nation obtained on iodine spiking will be used to assess the parameters associated with spiking phenomena. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained. 3/4.4.9 PRESSURE /TEuPERATURE LIMITS All components in the Reactor Coolant System are designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. These cyclic loads are introduced by normal load transients, reactor trips, and STARTUP and shutdown operation. The various categories of load cycles used for design purposes are provided in Section 4.1.1 of the UFSAR. During STARTUP and shutdown, the rates of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that the maximum specified heatup and cooldown rates are 6pg consistent with the design assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic operat1on. Operation within the appropriate heatup anu cooldown curves assures the integrity of the reactor vessel against fracture induced by comoinative thernal and pressure stresses. As the vessel is subjected to increasing fluence, the tougnness of the limiting material continues to decline, and ever more restrictive Pressure / Temperature limits must be observed. The current limits, Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2, ar 2 ceak neutron fluence.y to the inner sm f.tce of the r actor f 10" J -
<6 m a =rr=;cra :s :p;m ma_., Effatiw m i rc c cr: (EP . ,
0::cr:ti a. dw The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial RTm; the results of these tests are shcwn in Section 4.1.S of the UFSAR. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron (E > 1 MeV) irradiation will cause an increase in the RTm. The actual shift in RT, of the vessel material will be establishec periodically during operation by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance scecimens installec near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. The numoer of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frecuencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in UFSAR Table 4-13 and are approved by the NRC prior to imolementation in comoliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. - The snift in the material fracture toughness, as represented by RTm, is yeulated usin'g Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. For a fluence of g;t10"N/cd he adjusted reference temoerature (ART) value at the 1/4 T j position is 45+:3 F. At the 3/4 T position the ART value is@F. Q W CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 5 3/4 4-6 Amencment Go. 272' l
INSERT B This fluence corresponds to the Pressurized Thermal Shock Screening Criteria defined in 10 CFR 50.61 for weld 2-203 A,B,C. t i 1 i l l l I
U b N
~
3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 1 BASES . i These values are used with procedures developed in the ASME Boile? Itnd Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G to calculate heatup and cooldown limits in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR PartJO, Appendix G. To develop composite pressure-temperature limits for the heatup transient, l the isothermal,1/4 T heatup, and 3/4 T heatup pressure-temperature limits j are compared for a given thermal rate. Then the most restrictive pressure-temperature limits are combined over the complete temperature interval resulting in a composite limit curve for the reactor vessel beltline for the heatup event. rd g ' , n W5cN ! To dcycfc- ' composite pressure-temperature limit for the cooldown everth, .
.neMnkTWNoturc TiinTt'ETXWcElcJeted. inc !
-isethe-al press"re-temperature limit is then compared to the pre 3sure-tec eratur blimit as:Ociated with & cceling rote end the T. Orc restrictive-allowable praunra-temperaturs limit is chcsca resulting in o composite 14-it curve for the reac4er vc::el beltliT;e. - -
--+--
AAA DLSCA$ G Both 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G and ASME, Code Appen x Y require the development of pressure-temperature limits which are applicable to inservice hydrostatic tests. The minimum temperature for.the inservice i ,N;. hydrostatic test pressure can be determined by entering the curve at the a l test pressure (1.1 times nonnal operating pressure) and lo'cating the co asponding temperature. This curve is shown for a fluence of 5 :.' 10"N/cm on2 Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2. Similarly,10 CFR / art 50 specifies that core critical limits be established based on material considerations. This limit is shown on the heatup curve, Figure 3.4.9-1. Note that this limit does not consider the core reactivity safety analyses that actually control the temperature at which the core can be brought critical. The Lowest Service Temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures above 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure l (625 psia). This temperature is defined as equal to the most limiting RT, l ' for the balance of the Reactor Coolant System components plus 100*F. per Article NB 2332 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code. The horizontal line between the minimum boltup temperature and the Lowest l Service Temperature is defined by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code l as 20% of the pre n rational hydrostatic test pressure. The change in the ' line at 150 F ona : rWm cereDis due to a cessation of RCP flow I ( induced pressure deviition, since'no RCPs are permitted to operate during a i cooldown below 150 F. I
- F' de MN l
l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-7 AmendmentNo.XW 1
i i
)
INSERT C is developed similarly. The Appendix G limits in Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 assume the following number of RCPs are running: l l Heatup Indicated RCS Temperatur_e Maximum Number of RCPs Operating 70 Fto 330 F 2
>330 F 4 Cooldown l Indicated RCS Temperature Maximum Number of RCPs Operating
>350 F 4
, 350 F to j50 F 2
<150 F 0 i
l l i l t i l i l l
\
. s 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The minimum boltup temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures below 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure. The minimum is defined ts the initial RT, for the material of the higher stressed region of the reactor vessel plus any effects for irradiation per Article G-2222 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Yessel Code. The initial reference temperature of the reactor vessel and closure head flanges was deternined using the certified material test reports and Branch Technical Position MTEB 5-2. The maximum initial RTm associated with the stressed region of the closure head flange is
-10 F. However, in order to comply with the 10 CFR 50, Appendix G limits, the minimum allowable reactor vessel temperature with the reactor head attached is 70 F. Hence, the minimum boltup temperature used in Figures p and 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2.
AMori a4-y Theafesion_ basis events in the low temperature region are:
- An RCP start with hot steam generators; and,
- "E - An inadYertent HPSI actuation with concurrent charging.
N Any measures which will prevent or mitigate the design basis events are sufficient for any less severe incidents. Therefore, this section will discuss the results of the RCP start and mass addition transient analyses. Also discussed is the effectiveness of a pressurizer steam bubble and a $4 single PORY relative to mitigating the design basis events A a hsert F The RCP start transient is a severe LTOP challenge for 1 RCS. Therefore in water solid operations all four RCP e ta a out of serY CQ. 'Bily553 M5N5 th6ii-
, oc.y c0atNlle_ by
-p.am; restricticns cr three parreters: i nitial pressurizer pressure and
%+G
' ' kt, r
-levd -;W Lhe sewnd r -Le-primcry tc perature di'ftrcre - n ee r s ric ions in p ace, the an en s equa contro led without the assistance of the PORVs.
A u '.T.a r~ i~ : L __ _- , , he-m2 dve rt an t a_ et n a t h n OfOneHPS! p"m in zenjunction with ; sm; is the masrt-severe-mas,s--additi^a eve re m *izat4 pnuce tnTs' eveRTTfcmTagenN1Giter'soTidM"ae at)pu=ps To and two charging pumos are tagged out-of-service during water solid operations. ll CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-8 Amendment No. 2 h 4 9
1 . s . l i l l INSERT D The Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system consists of administrative i controls coupled with low-pressure setpoint PORVs. The administrative controls provide the first line of defense against overpressurization events; the PORVs provide a backup to the administrative controls. The following section discusses the bases for the PORV l setpoint and administrative controls. l Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection uses a variable PORV setpoint to take advantage of the increased Appendix G limits at higher RCS temperatures. Reactor Coolant System temperature is measured at the cold leg RTDs. This ,rovides an accurate temperature indication during forced circulation, and is also acequate for natural circulation. However, the Tm RTDs are not accurate when on shutdown cooling (SDC) because they are not in the flow stream. For this reason, the lowest PORV setpoint is l maintained whenever on SDC. This setpoint, which is independent of RCS temperature,is , manually set when SDC is initiated and maintained until forced circulation is established after the RCPs are started. The PORV setpoint is chosen to protect the most limiting of the heatup or cooldown l Appendix G limits. Figure 3.4.9-3 shows the maximum PDRV opening pressure. This i includes corrections for static and dynamic head, and pressure overshoot to account for PORV response time and the maximum pressurization rate. The actual PORV setpoint is controlled by procedure and accounts for device uncertainty, calibration uncertainty and loop drift. ! INSERT E These transients are most severe when the RCS is initially water solid. 1 l i INSERT F i that can quickly exceed the Appendix G limits INSERT G l
- and their motor circuit breakers are disabled. However, the transient is adequately l mitigated by restricting three parameters: 1) the initial water volume in the pressunzer to 170 mches (indicated), thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to
- 2) the indicated secondary water temperature for each steam unerator to F above the 30, expa RCS temperature; and 3) the initial pressure of the pressurizer to 300 psia.
l l ,
I
. s .
l INSERT H I i Failure to maintain one of the initial conditions could cause the PORVs to open following an RCP start. ; I INSERT I The mass addition transient from HPSI or multiple charging pumps is a severe LTOP challenge for a water solid system due to PORV response time. l l t l i i l l
l 3/4.4 REXTOR COOLANT SYSTEM ; l i- BASES __ _ __ _
- awn ~.m.s w.?: .,
HPSI, _ r~s~T w.s emeie& nd-one chargin Ana1Yses were Derformed for a
" the expansioR@the RCS water yo ume owing oss of' oeiTy"' pumMriiu removal, assuminq one 20Ea_yaRaAlf.L33e to single-failure criteria) wit.. the tt crime-area c. 1.29 irh This mass addition, determine a the
@ point wnen' solid conditions, must be less than the capability of a single PORY to limit the LTOP ' event. Sufficient ;
l overpressure protection results when the equilibrium pressure does not l exceed the limiting Appendix G curve pressure. Because the equilibrium pressure exceeds the minimu endix G limit for full HPSI flow, HPSI flow e gpm indicated when the HPSI pump is used d 1s throttled to no more tha l for mass addition. The HPSI ow limit includes allowances for instrumentation uncertainty, charging pump flow addition and RCS expansion following loss of decay heat removal. The HPSI flow is injected through only one HPSI loop MOV to limit instrumentation uncertainty. No more than one charging pump (44 gpm) is allowed to operate during the HPSI mass addition.
. -~m
- Ccc..;;;rie:" of the PCT! di cha ;e presswe-with the analytical limit critic:1 pre::urf re pre::ur; af 444.S p;i: indicate: th;t adequate prot:: tion is prsvided t:y a- singic PCRV for RCS temper:ture cf 70 e or u
w_ _ a. ~_ _. , ..m. ..
- e. r %. . , . u ,,,4 . s . , 9nn ,, l 6 N...r--
sy -=>ah3
. Ma r'- -- ------ --
,..a m __...,, nneu
***w ^***' *w"8 u_
6' ' e' _ 4e-tacini is wuif+Ll.ed by-fraui riscedm es end is ::1culated as4dering e9 =c:;:On:: time :nd tot:1 1:0p unc;rtaintier. Total 100? uncert:M4" includ; allewances for Ice; drift, ::libratica uncertain'f ac 'ad fr.stramc, devic; uncertaint-ic:. n e 1c0; d.if;. was c;nsidcred i- the technical
-spa Tiustien trip setpoint "ich -i; an .llewab!: valu: ::lcul tcd pe-i ty of freric: Standard ISLS57.04r To provide single fail ump mass addition transient when in MPT en6ble, the HPSI loop MOV handswitches must be place l in pull-to-override so the valves do not automatically actuate upon receipt of a SIAS signal. Alternative actions, described in the ACTION statement, ,
I are to disable the affected MOV (by racking out its motor circuit breaker-i or ecuivalent), or to isolate the affected HPSI header. Examples of HPSI header isolation actions include; (1) de-energizing and tagging shut the
~
HPSI hea. der isolation valves; (2) locking shut and tagging all three HPSI
- s l Three 100% capacity HPSI pumps are installed at Calvert Cliffs. Procedures g will require that two of the three HPSI pumps be disabled (breakers racked out) at RCS temperatures less than or equal to and that tne remaining l HPSI pump handswitch be placed in pull-to-lock. dditionally, the HPSI pump normally in pull-to-lock shall be throttled to less than.or equal to b {t9fDgpm when used to add mass to the RCS. Exceptions are provided for ECCS testing and for response to LOCAs.
l l l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 33/44-9 Amendment No. /p F 1
l
. ~ 1 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES 1
[k pressurizer Ieam YOlu*e and ! ;inglO OCUV Will ""nVid8 'aIi;f:OtOIf
<0ntrol of all m :: Odditian tran:fent: 'ith the exceptica of a spue40e5 l actu:ti n of full fle ' rem a uPS! pump. 0Yerpres:uri::t!On due to this l
tr:nsicat will be preclud:d for tuaperaturcs 255^F and las; by di::bling l
-two HPSI pump:, placing the third 4a pull-te-leck, :nd-by thrcttling the l third pu;g to le;;-than Or equal to- 200 gpm fl w when it is g5ed ts-s l
.... ._ iu_ ere mudd ww v4N d werT l . te that caly the desic2- ses-evan.: are ascus:cd in det2il rince the l
less-stver; transients ane beended by the RCP start and inadvErtsat ""SI ! astesRen analy:ic. RCS temperature, as used in the applicability statement, is determined as follows: (1) with the RCPs running, the RCS cold leg temperature is the l appropriate indication, (2) with the Shutdcwn Cooling System in operation, l the shutdown cooling temperature indication is appropriate, (3) if neither the RCPs or shutdown cooling is in operation, the core exit thermocouples are the appropriate. indicators of RCS temperature. l l 3/4.4.10 T ST_RG TURAL INTEGRITY The inspection programs for the ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity of these components will be maintained ! .- at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. To the extent ldbR$ applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. 3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL MOVEMENT This specification is provided to ensure early detection of excessive core barrel movement if it should occur. Core barrel movement will be detected by using four excore neutron detectors to obtain Amplitude Probability Distribution (APD) and Spectral Analysis (SA). Baseline core l barrel movement Alert Levels and Action Levels will be confirmed during i each reactor startup test program following a core reload. Data from these detectors is to be reduced in two forms. Root mean squar'e (RMS) values are computed from the APD of the signal amplitude. These RMS magnitudes include variations due both to various neutronic effects and l internals motion. Consequently, these signals alone can only provide a gross measure of core barrel motion. A more accurate assessment of core barrel motion is obtained from the Auto and Cross Power Spectral Densities (PSD, XPSD), phase (o) and coherence (COH) of these signals. These data result from the SA of the excore detector signals.
~
A modification to the required monitoring program may be justified by an l analysis of the data obtained and by an examination of the affected parts I during the plant shutdown at the end of any fuel cycle. t l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-10 Amendment No. 322' l
. ~..
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) BASES pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long tenn core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recoverf , period. Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are comon to both subsystems. This includes the low pressure safety injection flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four low pressure safety injection loop isolation valves. Although the poruons of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to reci rculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis. ; The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility i of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0._ The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures. The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each g' component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The l surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance ! configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points ( in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and l (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points l equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS LDCA analyses. Minimum HPSI l flow requirements for temperatures above *F are based upon small break l l LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not , system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Scecification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis t assumptions. l i l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3 3/4 S-2 Amendment No. 271 4 d a;
1 l l 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) l BASES l Os!6 2 @S 34D t tem eratures o '355 and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to less ' EIO % in n r ecua o J ;gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. Wi_th e'xcessi CS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could i h exceed an HPSI flow o gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling other param ers, such as RCS pressure and subcooling. This l provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis nas been perfonned which shows this flow rate is more than e adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assumptions. HPSI pumps are 4 not required to auto-start when the RCS is in the MPT enable condition. The Safety Injection Tanks provide inmediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time' for an operator to take action to start a HPSI pump. Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is' required to ensure pump OPERABILITY. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to gpm or an RCS vent l greater than 2.6 square inches must be provided. A10 3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT) The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient !
- e. supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to pennit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
i The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. i 9 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. $ V 4-n i
. - . =. -. . _. . . . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - - - _ .
RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE OPERATING LIMITS 11 A oR 11B AND 12A OR 12B RCP (22 EFPY)
;n100 . . . . . . . . . . . .
O y;!og _
- - -. -- _ _ - . z m ;,000 --
m w a e i m i300 _ _ _ .._ .__ _ = _ . m S I' lON -Ol 'ERATIN G -- -
/ _
g> g iGOO I f 1 100 _. _ ___ _ _ _ h
/ o O I
w 1POO - - - - - -- 3sa ,
/ --
o z i g
!S m x
m 1000 a w
'/
o z m m g 800 ,,, ,u, , , , , , .,,so,, o g.E,-t k nao _unamm ,s u s., n.. m
-- .s amn-_
oo , ..s,.> q y
/ _qy ?
4 p
,100 H -"w--
-q- --- --- --- E - -
8 _ - y cf
- C POO - - - -- - -- - --
E e . . . . . . . . . . . . . g 0 50 100150 200 250 300 350 <100 <150 500 550 600 650 REACTOR COOLANI SYSlEM T EMPERATURE , ro - _.-.......,,....-,-w. -...c- -, - . - . . - . _ , . . . . . . . . . - - . - . . , . . . . - . , . - . , . . . . . . .4 ..--._.- . .-. , _ .--* -
.e.. w w-
. . . ~
RCS PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE OPERATING LIMITS 11 A AND 11B RCPs (22 EFPY)
;^1()0 . . . - - . - - . . . .
a b'l __ _. . ...- ... .--. .-. -_ . - - . . _ . . -. 7000 _ __. . . . .-_ _ _ _ . _ _ . Lij c
- 1800 - - - -- - -- - -- - - ----- ---- a a
F lON -O PERATlbl GAREA . - - - , _ . . . .- . - . . l e ii; > El
- n. 1 <100 -- - - -- - - - ---
/ 8 y o e m I tu 1 2 0 0 E '
( W8 F) m = gio00 - .
--x, _ i
/ f g N :
lE 000 AAAll Ali OWApt f l'3[55tJfe[
-= = ==-
IS I [$', it TAN 358 8
-o==-
(4! Ol
/ nN N .
5
,ioo _4 8. , _ _ ___ _. _ _'S'A) (1_ _ _
200 - ---- - - - + -- --- ' d N ONE H00s> ort RAfini ARfa , O ' O 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 REACTOR COOLANl SYSTEM TEMPERATURE { N E m _ _ - - . . - _ . _ _ _..__..__________.____.___._._.______________..-m. _ . . m,,-.. _ . _ ...w, -_.-.v .~, _ .,-.m.,..,,... . . , . . . . , . . . .
. . . - . , _ _ _ . . . . , = , , . _ .}}