ML20056F952
| ML20056F952 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/06/1993 |
| From: | Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 2.206, NRRL-600, NUDOCS 9309010072 | |
| Download: ML20056F952 (11) | |
Text
i p nov I
UNITED STATES t
[ kLfl j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- sggg,j WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 0001 gs.
August 6, 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR:
All NRR Employees FROM:
Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
NRR OFFICE LETTER 600, REVISION 3, " PROCEDURES FOR l
HANDLING REQUESTS UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 (DIRECTOR'S DECISIONS)"
PURPOSE This Office Letter establishes procedures for (1) ensuring prompt and appropriate notification and distribution of actions handled in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206; and (2) coordinating information from the Office of Investigations (01) in preparing a Director's Decision in response to a petition submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.
This revision supersedes NRR Office Letter 600, Revision 2, November 7, 1988.
DEFINITION A 10 CFR 2.206 petition is a request filed by any person, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206, requesting a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license or for such other action as may be proper. A person need not cite 10 CFR 2.206 in order for the request to be treated as a 10 CFR 2.206 petition.
The petition must demand, essentially, that a license be modified, suspended, or revoked, or that other enforcement-related action be taken. However, a request to modify an existing license should be distinguished from a request to deny an initial license or a pending amendment.
The latter type of request should be handled with the relevant licensing action, not under 10 CFR 2.206.
Petitions must specify the action requested and specify the facts that constitute the bases for taking that particular action.
General opposition to nuclear power or a general assertion, without supporting facts, should not be treated as a formal petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
Such letters should be treated as routine correspondence.
A 10 CFR 2.206 petition based on wrongdoing consists of assertions of either (a) deliberate violations of regulatory requirements or (b) violations resulting from careless disregard of or reckless indifference to regulatory requirements, or both (a) and (b). A reasonable basis for belief of wrongdoing exists when the circumstances surrounding a violation of a regulatory requirement indicate that the violation more likely than not was deliberate or resulted from careless disregard or reckless indifference, rather than resulted from error or oversight.
Requests for 01 investigations should be prepared in accordance with NRC Office Letter 1000.
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F All NRR Employees RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES Office of the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) a.
Assigns a green ticket to each request under 10 CFR 2.206 and forwards it to the Office of the General Counsel (0GC) for initial review.
As necessary, consults with OGC prior to assigning a green ticket to determine whether the incoming correspondence constitutes a request under 10 CFR 2.206.
b.
Approves each NRR request to 01 for an investigation into matters raised in a 10 CFR 2.206 petition.
c.
Assigns the initial schedule for completion of the acknowledgement letter and the Director's Decision, and approves each request for an extension.
Office of the General Counsel (OGC) a.
Performs initial review of the request to confirm that it should be treated as a petition filed under 10 CFR 2.206.
Assuming confirmation that the request should be handled under Section 2.206, prepares the Federal Reaister notice and draft letter of acknowledgement to the petitioner, including an identification of information that NRR needs to provide to respond to requests for immediate action.
Forwards these documents to the Director, NRR, if NRR is the appropriate office to handle the petition.
b.
Reviews all correspondence written in connection with the petition for legal sufficiency.
c.
Gives advice on all 10 CFR 2.206 matters.
Director. NRR a.
Authorizes all 01 referrals related to matters raised in Section 2.206 petitions that NRR forwards to the ED0 for final approval.
b.
Approves and signs all documents pertaining to 10 CFR 2.206 actions. No changes will be made to the package after the Director, NRR, has signed all documents in the package.
The Associate Director for Proiects. NRR Approves each NRR extension request and forwards the extension request to the EDO.
The Division Director. NRR Has overall responsibility for 10 CFR 2.206 actions assigned to his or her Division.
4
t All NRR Employees The Project Director. NRR a.
Has lead responsibility for coordinating all 10 CFR 2.206 actions assigned to his or her project directorate.
b.
Concurs on all correspondence that leaves the office involving the 10 CFR 2.206 petition.
The Project Manaaer. NRR a.
Coordinates the 10 CFR 2.206 package, works closely with the OGC case attorney, and monitors the progress of OI investigation, if one is t
conducted.
BASIC RE0VIREMENTS Upon receiving a 10 CFR 2.206 request, a letter of acknowledgement is prepared and sent to the petitioner.
A.
Acknowledaement of Recuest After reviewing the 10 CFR 2.206 petition for appropriate handling, if NRR is the appropriate office to handle the petition, OGC will refer it by memorandum to the Director, NRR, within 2 weeks of receipt, list the key issues that must be addressed, include a draft letter of acknowledgement to the petitioner and a draft Federal Reaister notice, and identify the OGC contact.
The lead project directorate will ensure that the appropriate licensee is sent a copy of the letter of acknowledgement and a copy of the incoming 10 CFR 2.206 request at the same time as the petitioner.
If appropriate, the licensee will be requested to provide a response to the NRC on the issues in the 10 CFR 2.206 petition, normally within 60 days.
The exception to the involvement of the licensee in the resolution process is where a licensee could compromise an investigation or inspection because of knowledge gained from the release of information.
The decision to release information to the licensee in this case shall be made by the Director of the action office.
If the licensee is to be asked to respond i
to the petition, the staff should inform the petitioner of this request in the letter of acknowledgement. All letters of acknowledgement require the office director's signature. The project manager should ensure that the i
petitioner receives copies of all correspondence with the licensee i
pertaining to the 10 CFR 2.206 petition by placing the petitioner on distribution for all NRC correspondence to the licensee that pertain to the petition.
Additionally, the licensee should be encouraged to place the petitioner on distribution for any responses to the NRC pertaining to the 10 CFR 2.206 petition.
If the licensee does not include the l
petitioner on distribution for their response, the project manager should forward a copy of the licensee's response to the petitioner.
4 l
All NRR Employees The petitioner should also be on distribution for other NRC correspondence that relates to the issues raised in the petition, including generic letters or bulletins that are issued pertaining to the petitioner's Concern.
l If the 10 CFR 2.206 petition contains a request for immediate action by the NRC, such as to immediately suspend reactor operation until final action is taken on the request, the letter of acknowledgement must respond l
to the immediate action requested.
If such imediate action is denied,
)
the staff must explain the basis for the denial in the letter of acknowledgement.
The lead NRR project directorate will issue the final version of the acknowledgement letter and the Federal Reaister notice by the date
/
l specified on the green ticket. The acknowledgement letter must be sent to the NRR mailroom at least 4 working days before the due date to give the office director time to review it. The green ticket remains active until
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the final Director's Decision is made.
B.
Director's Decision After receiving the 10 CFR 2.206 petition, the staff should immediately begin to evaluate the petition, determine if the schedule is sufficient, I
and prepare the Director's Decision.
The Director's Decision is due 90 days from the issue date of the letter of acknowledgement. This date is the revised due date that is issued by the ED0's office.
OGC must be informed of this date.
However, the 90-day response time may not be feasible if an OI investigation is necessary to respond to the 10 CFR 2.206 petition, or if other reasons dictate that additional time is needed to prepare the Director's Decision.
In these instances, the staff should immediately prepare a request for schedule extension.
The project manager has lead responsibility for coordinating all information required from other divisions and branches and from 01 (if required) and will work closely with OGC.
In addition, the project manager has lead responsibility to ensure that the petitioner is notified
- at least every 60 days of the status of the 10 CFR 2.206, and to provide the petitioner the opportunity to ask further questions.
The staff can prepare a partial Director's Decision when the technical 4
i issues associated with the 10 CFR 2.206 petition can be completed without resolving the remaining concerns and if significant schedular delays are anticipated. The 01 investigation (if applicable) must be completed for the petition to be denied or granted in whole.
Petition Denied I
After 01 completes its investigation (if applicable), and if the petition is denied in whole or in part, NRR should prepare a " Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206," explaining the basis for the denial and discussing j
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i All NRR Employees -
all matters raised by the petitioner in support of the request. The staff will send a letter to the petitioner transmitting the Director's Decision along with a Federal Reaister notice explaining that the request has been denied. The licensee and individuals on the service list are informed of the denial by copy of the transmittal letter. The petitioner's copy is to be dispatched before issuance of the licensee's and service list copies.
Petition Granted When 01 completes its investigation (if applicable), and if a portion of the petition is granted, the Director's Decision should explain the respects in which the petition has been granted and identify the actions that the staff has taken or will take to grant that portion of the petition.
If the petition is granted in full, no Director's Decision is required. Generally, an Order under 10 CFR 2.202 will be issued.
It may be appropriate to cite the petitioner's request (for such an Order) in any Order that is issued.
If the request is granted by issuing an Order, the staff will send a letter to transmit the Order to the licensee.
The staff will prepare another letter to explain to the petitioner that the 10 CFR 2.206 request j
has been granted and will enclose a copy of the Order.
C.
Action by the Proiect Manaaer Upon receiving OGC's referral memorandum, the project manager will discuss the issues with the project director to ensure agreement between NRR and OGC or to address any differences about the issues.
The project manager will then obtain OGC's "no legal objection" to a final acknowledgement letter, after filling in any of the reasons or details identified by OGC as falling within NRR's responsibility and expertise, and Federal Reaister notice.
Before writing a decision, the project manager will discuss an outline and the intended approach and format with OGC.
0GC will provide, upon request, several issued Director's Decisions as models for the appropriate level of detail and format for the decision to be prepared.
If appropriate, before completing an entire decision on all issues, the project manager will submit a partial decision on one or several issues for NRR management and OGC review.
If a different approach, format, or level of detail is appropriate, these can be resolved at this early stage rather than after an entire decision is prepared.
When all 10 CFR 2.206 concerns have been satisfactorily addressed, the project manager will submit a complete decision to the project director, assistant director, and division director for their review and will incorporate their revisions. This decision must be submitted sufficiently before the NRR due date to allow for OGC review and subsequent revisions i
requested by OGC. Technical editor review and concurrence is obtained on the decision following concurrence by the project director, and prior to
All NRR Employees I technical staff or 0GC review. Any changes resulting from a review by a technical editor must be incorporated before OGC review. If the decision is based on, or references, a completed 01 investigation, 01 concurrence is obtained on the decision prior to OGC review. The project manager will submit a complete decision to OGC for legal review, allowing 2-3 weeks for OGC to complete its review, depending on the length and complexity of the decision.
The project manager will revise the decision to address OGC's comments and submit the revised decision to the project director, assistant director, and OGC for final review.
Allow a minimum of I week (2-3 weeks is not uncommon) for final OGC management review and OGC's "no legal objection" before signature by the NRR Office Director.
It is important to identify and resolve any differences between NRR and 0GC regarding the scope, format, level of detail or other issues early in the process of preparing a decision.
If the project manager and OGC case attorney cannot resolve a matter, it should be presented to NRR and OGC management for resolution.
D.
Distribution A denial under 10 CFR 2.206 consists of a letter to the petitioner, the Director's Decision, and the Federal Reaister notice.
The lead project directorate will contact the OGC enforcement attorney's office at 504-1681 to obtain a Director's Decision number (e.g., DD-YEAR-00). This number is assigned to each Director's Decision in numerical sequence. This number is typed on the letter to the petitioner, the Director's Decision, and the Federal Reaister notice.
The lead project directorate licensing assistant will review the 10 CFR 2.206 package before it is sent to the NRR Mailroom and will properly distribute copies.
The technical division staff are not to dispatch 10 CFR 2.206 packages The following requirements are to be performed on the day the Director's Decision is issued.
1.
Telephone the following individual to advise them that the Director's Decision has been issued:
I The Docketing and Services Branch, SECY 2.
The PD Secretary is to immediately HAND CARRY to the following:
The Docketing and Services Branch, SECY 5 copies of the Director's Decision 2 courtesy copies of the entire decision package 1
2 copies of the incoming request a
i
All NRR Employees Deputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement, OGC I copy of the Director's Decision It is imperative that these requirements are followed promptly, because, after filing the Director's Decision with the Office of the Secretary, the Commission has 25 days from the date of issuance to determine whether or not the Director's Decision should be reviewed.
The final version of the Director's Decision is then copied onto a diskette in Word Perfect.
This diskette, two paper copies of the Director's Decision after signature, and other documents referenced in the Decision are sent to NRCI Project Officer, Technical Publications Section, Publications Branch, Mail Stop P-211, along with a completed NRCI Transmission Record Form.
Forms can be obtained from the Technical Publications Section, Publications Branch, ADM.
When writing opinions, footnotes, or partial information (errata) on the diskette, be sure to identify the opinion, the Director's Decision number, and the month of issuance at the becinnina of the disk.
Clearly identified information on the diskettes will help to avoid administrative delays and improve the technical production schedule for proofreading, editing, and composing the documents.
Although 10 CFR 2.206 actions are controlled as green tickets, use the following guidelines when distributing copies internally and externally.
The original 2.206 petition and any enclosure (s) will accompany the Docket / Central File copy of the first response (letter of acknow-ledgement). Copies are issued to the appropriate licensee and individuals on the service list. The distribution list should include the following individuals:
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i All NRR Employees Distribution Docket or Central Files (w/ enclosures)
Docketing and Services Branch, NRC PDR SECY*
Local PDR Deputy General Counsel for ED0 Reading File Licensing and Regulations, OGC*
EDO Deputy Assistant General Director, NRR Counsel for Enforcement, ADPR, NRR OGC-WF*
NRR Mailroom (ED0#--)
ASLBP PD Reading File Director, OCAA Division Director ACRS (10)
Assistant Director NRCI Project 0fficer, Technical Project Director Publications Section, ADM Project Manager P-211 (w/2 cpys of Director's Licensing Assistant Decision and NRCI Regional Contact, DRP Transmittal Form)
OPA Other individuals listed on OCA concurrence EDO Mailroom (EDO#__)
cc:
Licensee and Service List
- Handcarry EFFECTIVE DATE This office letter is effective immediately.
Thomas E. Hurley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
Samples:
Letter of Acknowledgement and the Federal Reaister Notice Director's Decision (granted in part)
Director's Decision (denied) and the Federal Reaister Notice NRCI Transmittal Form Request for Extension of Due Date cc:
See next page
. All NRR Employees Distribution Docket or Central Files (w/ enclosures)
Docketing and Services Branch, NRC PDR SECY*
Local PDR Deputy General Counsel for E00 Reading File Licensing and Regulations, OGC*
EDO Deputy Assistant General Director, NRR Counsel for Enforcement, ADPR, NRR OGC-WF*
NRR Mailroom (ED0#-)
ASLBP PD Reading File Director, OCAA Division Director ACRS (10) j Assistant Director NRCI Project 0fficer, Technical i
Project Director Publications Section, ADM Project Manager P-211 (w/2 cpys of Director's j
Licensing Assistant Decision and NRCI j
Regional Contact, DRP Transmittal Form)
OPA Other individuals listed on OCA concurrence EDO Mailroom (ED0#_)
cc:
Licensee and Service List l
- Handcarry EFFECTIVE DATE This office letter is effective immediately.
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7 Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
Samples: Letter of Acknowledgement and the fgleral Reaister Notice Director's Decision (granted in part)
Director's Decision (denied) and the Federal Reaister Notice NRCI Transmittal Form Request for Extension Due Date cc:
See next page
- See previous concurrence OFC jTA:DRPW
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DATE j6/A/93 l06/02/93 l06/15/93 l2/1/93 l07/20/93 0FC jD:DRPW lU:DRPE*
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EFFECTIVE DATE i
This office letter is effective immediately.
Thomas E. Murley, Director i
Office of fjdclear Reactor Regulation j
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Enclosures:
Samples:
Letter of Acknowledgement and i
the Federal Reaister Notice
/
Director's Decision (granted in'part)
Director's Decision (denied) /
and the Federal Reaister Notice i
NRCI Transmittal Form
/
Request for Extension Due Date cc:
See next page
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- See previous concurrence
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J. Taylor, EDO 17G21 J. Sniezek, EDO 17G21 T. Martin, RI S. Ebneter, RII A. Davis, RIII J. Milhoan, RIV J. Martin, RV B. Hayes, 01 J. Lieberman, OE P. Norry, ADM SECY 16G15 P. Bird, OP R. Bernero, NMSS E. Beckjord, RES OGC 15G15 NRC PDR 01 3E4
-Central Files M. Malsch J. Goldberg C. Cater V. Yanez R. Ingram (original +5 copies)
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August 26, 1992 Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 (10 CFR 2.206)
Michael D. Kohn, Esquire National Whistleblower Center 517 Florida Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20001-1850
Dear Mr. Kohn:
I am writing to acknowledge receipt of the Petition you filed with the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on behalf of Messrs. Macktal and Hasan (Petitioners) on June 11, 1992. The Petition presented the Petitioners' concerns about the Texas Utilities Electric Company's (TU Electric's; the licensee's) Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (CPSES). By letter dated August 6,1992, a copy of which was provided to you, TU Electric responded to the Petition.
In accordance with Title lo of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2, Section 2.206, the Petition has been referred to my office to prepare a response.
The Petition alleged the discovery of new evidence of a continuing practice by TU Electric to pay " hush money" to keep significant information about CPSES from Petitioners and the NRC. Specifically, the Petition referred to a January 30, 1990, settlement agreement between the licensee and the Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas, Inc. (Tex-La), a former co-owner of CPSES, that allegedly contains restrictive language in violation of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act (the Act) and 10 CFR 50.7.
On the basis of this information, the Petitioners requested (1) orders suspending TV Electric's license to operate CPSES Unit I and its permit to construct CPSES Unit 2; and (2) that the expiration date of TU Electric's permit to construct Unit 2 not be extended. Petitioners also requested that the Commission take imediate actions; specifically (1) that a licensing board be established to allow public scrutiny into TU Electric's alleged practice of paying " hush money"; (2) that the NRC notify TU Electric and former minority owners that no settlement agreement can preclude employees, attorneys, agents, s
consultants or others from providing information to persons involved in proceedings before the NRC; (3) that copies of the TU Electric minority owner agreements be made public and provided to petitioners' counsel; and (4) that the NRC notify the counsel to Tex-La that he and others are free to disclose safety-related information about CPSES to others.
With regard to your request in the Petition for immediate NRC actions, we have determined that you have not set forth a basis for the imediate actions.
However, we are reviewing the subject settlement agreement between TU Electric and Tex-La and will render a decision with respect to your requests upon i
completion of that review.
The January 30, 1990, agreement is an amendment to a settlement agreement dated March 23, 1989, which was submitted to the NRC as 1
g g e w o-%,
l Michael D. Kohn, Esquire August 26, 1992 i
part of the application to amend the construction permits for CPSES to reflect the transfer of Tex-La's ownership interest to TU Electric. The March 23, i
1989, and the January 30, 1990, agreements do not differ in any material t
respect with regard to the matters raised in your Petition. The staff has reviewed both of these agreements and has determined that they do not appear i
to violate the provisions of the Act or 10 CFR 50.7. A fuller analysis of the provisions in the settlement agreement to address the points raised in your Petition will be contained in our decision under 10 CFR 2.206. Both agreements are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelsan Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20555, and i
at the University of Texas at Arlington Library ~, Government Publications / Maps,
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701 South Cooper, P.O. Box 19497, Arlington, Texas 76019.
i The NRC issued an Order, dated July 28, 1992, that extended the latest construction completion date for CPSES Unit 2.
The Order, which responded to TU Electric's February 3,1992, application, extended the latest construction completion date specified in Construction Pernit No. CPPR-127 to August 1, 1995. The NRC staff's evaluation of the requested extension concluded, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(b), that good cause had been shown for the delay l
and that the requested extension was for a reasonable period of time.
i As provided by 10 CFR 2.206, the NRC will take appropriate action regarding the specific issues raised in your Petition within a reasonable time.
I have enclosed for your information a copy of the notice that is being filed with l
the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
l Sincerely, Original signed by l
nocasI. Marley i
Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
Enclosure:
Notice TECH ED cc w/ enclosure:
NBeeson See next page 8/7/92
- See Previouse Sheet for Concurrence s
OFFICE PDIV-2/LA PDIV-2/ INT PDIV-2/PM PDIV-2/PD OGC*
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0FFICIAL RECORD COPY FILENAME: B:\\ TEX-LA.206 i
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. Michael D. Kohn, Esquire August 26, 1992 cc w/ enclosure:
Senior Resident Inspector Jack R. Newman, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Newman & Holtzinger P. O. Box 1029 1615 L Street, N.W.
(
Granbury, Texas 76048 Suite 1000 Washington, D. C.
20036 l
Regional Administrator, Region IV j
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Chief, Texas Bureau of Radiation Control 631 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Texas Department of Health i
Arlington, Texas 76011 1100 West 49th Street Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President Citizens Association for Sound Energy Honorable Dale McPherson i
1426 South Polk County Judge Dallas, Texas 75224 P. O. Box 851 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Owen L. Thero, President Quality Technology Company ec w/ enclosure & incoming:
Lakeview Mobile Home Park, Lot 35 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.
4793 East Loop 820 South Group Vice President Fort Worth, Texas 76119 TU Electric 400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 Mr. Roger D. Walker, Manager Dallas, Texas 75201 i
Regulatory Affairs for Nuclear Engineering Organization Texas Utilities Electric Company 400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 i
Dollas, Texas 75201 Texas Utilities Electric Company I
c/o Bethesda Licensing l
3 Metro Center, Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland 20B14 1
William A. Burchette, Esq.
Counsel for Tex-La Electric i
Cooperative of Texas Jorden, Schulte, & Burchette 3025 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20007 i
GDS Associates, Inc.
i Suite 720 i
-1850 Parkway Place I
Marietta, Georgia 30067-8237
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l Michael D. Kohn, Esquire 1 i
DISTRIBUTION:
Docket file (w/ incoming letter)
HRC PDR Local PDR TMurley/FMiraglia JPartlow BBoger MVirgilio TBergman R5chaaf EPeyton OPA OCA NRR Mail Room (EDO-7878)
PDIV-2 Reading JGoldberg, OGC LYandell, Region IV 1
i
r 7590-01 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPHISSION DOCKET N05. 50-445 AND 50-446 TEXAS UTILITIES ELECTRIC COMPANY C0KANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 RECEIPT OF PETITION FOR DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206 Notice is hereby given that Mr. Michael D. Kohn, on behalf of Messrs.
Macktal and Hasan (Petitioners), submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory i
Con-ission (NRC) on June 11, 1992, a Petition requesting certain enforcement i
and other actions.
As a basis for this request, the Petitioners allege the discovery of new evidence of a continuing practice by Texas Utilities Electric Company (TU Electric; licensee) to pay " hush money" to keep significant informattor,about Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2 (CPSES) from the Petitioners and the NRC. Specifically, the Petitioners refer to a January 30, 1990, settlement agreement between the licensee and the Tex-La Electric i
Cooperative of Texas, Inc. (Tex-La), a fomer co-owner of CPSES, which allegedly contains restrictive language in violation of Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act and 10 CFR 50.7.
On the basis of this information, the Petitioners requested (1) orders suspending TV Electric's license to operate CPSES Unit I and its permit to t
construct CPSES Unit 2; and (2) that the expiration date of TU Electric's permit to construct Unit 2 not be extended. Petitioners also requested that I
the Comission take imediate actions; specifically (1) that a licensing board be established to allow public scrutiny into TU Electric's alleged practice of paying ' hush money *; (2) that the NRC notify TU Electric and former minority owners that no settlement agreement can preclude employees, attorneys, agents, C
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consultants or others from providing information to persons involved in proceedings before the NRC; (3) that copies of the TU Electric minority owner agreements be made public and provided to petitioners' counsel; and (4) that the NRC notify the counsel to Tex-La that he and others are free to disclose safety-related information about CPSES to others.
In a letter dated August 26, 1992, I have determined that the Petitioners have not set forth a basis for the imediate actions raised in the Petition.
The Petition has been referred to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. As provided by 10 CFR 2.206, appropriate action will be taken regarding the specific issues raised by the Petition in a reasonable time.
An Order extending the construction permit date was issued on July 28, 1992.
The NRC staff's evaluation of the requested extension concluded, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(b), that good cause had been shown for the delay and that the requested extension was for a reasonable period of time.
The NRC has obtained a copy of the subject settlement agreement from TU Electric. Copies of the Petition and the settlement agreement are available for inspection at the Comission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
20555, and at the University of Texas at Arlington Library, Government Publications / Maps, 701 South Cooper, P.O. Box 19497, Arlington, Texas 76019.
+-
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of August 1992.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 9
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4 WA&MINGTON. D.C. M
%' - ~f October 5, 1992 Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499 Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr.
7881 Piper Lane Lake Worth, Florida 33463
Dear Mr. Saporito:
I am responding to your Petition filed on February 10, 1992, with the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR i 2.206). You requested that the NRC institute a proceeding pursuant to Section 2.202 and take a number of imediate and swift actions in the areas of physical security, maintenance activities, compliance with technical specifications and procedures, and traiM ng cased on concerns you identified at the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (ST?) of the Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P).
In your Petition you requested the NRC to initiate swift and effective actions to cause the licensee to adequately train all STP employees in Security Procedures, use of the Work Process Program, Maintenance Work Practices and Requirements, and use of the Planner's Guide, as well as all STP Security Force personrcl in the use of security procedures. After receiving your Petition, a special NRC team inspection was conducted that substantiated some of your concerns and a Notice of Violation was issued to the licensee. The licensee in response to the inspection findings, implemented corrective actions. Therefore, those aspects of your Petition, substantiated by the NRC j
inspection and corrected by the licensee, are b m by granted. With regard to your request for action pursuant to Section 2.266 for the institt. tion of proceedings pursuant to Cettien 2.202 and for imediate revocation of all escorted access at the STP site and an imediate stand-down of all maintenance activities there, the NRC stafi sas found minimal safety significance associated with the concerns raised in your Petition and, as noted above, the licensee has taken ecceptable actions. On these bases I have denied those portions of your petition.
The reasons for my decision in this satter are stated in the enclosed Director's Decision (DD-92-05). A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Comission for the Comission to review in accordance with Section 2.206(c). As provided by this regulation, the Decision wW constitute the final action of the Comission 25 days after the date of i
issuance of the Decision unless the Comission, on its own motion, institutes 1
a review of the Decision within that time.
i hh/0NO 71f (f
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Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. October 5, 1992 I have enclosed a copy of the notice, which is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication.
Sincerely, l
E Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
Enclosures:
1.
Director's Decision 2.
Notice cc w/ enclosure:
See next page c
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cc w/entfiosure:
Mr.
- 1. Tapia Jack R. Newman, Esq.
Ser.ior Resident Inspector Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1615 L Street, N.W.
P. O. Box 910 Washington, D.C.
20036 Bay City, Texas 77414 Licensing Representative Mr. J. C. Lanier/M. B. Lee Houston Lighting and Power Company City of Austin Suite 610 Electric Utility Department Three Metro Center P. O. Box 1088 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Austin, Texas 78767 Bureau of Radiation Control Mr. K. J. Fiedler State of Texas Mr. M. T. Hardt 1101 West 49th ITreet City Public Service Beard Austin, Texas 78756 P. O. Fox 1771 San Antonio, Texas 78296 Rufus S. Scott Associate General Counsel Mr. D. E. Ward Houston Lighting and Power Company Mr. T. M. Puckett P. O. Box 61B67 Central Power and Light Company Houston, Texas 77208 P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Mr. Donald P. Hall Group Vice President, Nuclear INPD Houston Lighting & Power Company Records Center P.O. Box 1700 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Houston, Texas 77521 Atlanta, Georgia 30339-3064 Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie 50 Bellport Lane Bellport, New York 11713 Judge, Matagorda County Natagorca feanty Courthouse 1700 Seventh Street Bay City. Texas 77414 Mr. William J. Jump 1
Manager, Nuclear Licensing i
Houston Lighting and Power Company j
P. O. Box 289 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 e
Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. DISTR /BUTION:
Docket File JSniezek NRC PDP, MThompson Local PDR JBlaha PDIV-2 R/F MHayfield, DEDO TMurley BClayton FMiraglia TGibbons JPartlow BBoger MVirgilio SBlack GDick EPeyton OPA ETana (EDO 7469)
DMorris (EDO 7469)
JTaylor LChandler, OGC JMilhoan, Region IV JLieberinan WRussell FGillespie DChamberlain, Region IV VYanez (2)
CCarter, SECY MMalsch, OGC JGoldberg, OGC OCA ASLBP ACRS (10)
DPowers, Region IV TDexter, Region IV LRicketson, Region IV WJones, Region IV R
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DD-92-05 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPHISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Thomas E. Murley, Director In the Matter of
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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER
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Docket Nos. 50-498 COMPANY
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and 50-499
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10 CFR i 2.206 (South Texas Project,
)
Units 3 and 2)
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DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 5 2.206
- 1. INTRODUCTION On february 10, 1992, Mr. Thomas J. Saporito, Jr. (the Petitioner) filed a Petition with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) pursuant to 3D CFR ! 2.205 requesting actions be taken regarding the South Texas Project, Units 3 and 2 (STP) of the Houston Lighting and Power Company (HL&P or licensee).
Specifically, the Petitioner requested the NRC to institute a proceeding pursuant to 10 CFR i 2.202 and to take swift and effective actions because of the Petitioner's concerns in the areas of physical security, r.aintenance activities, compliance with technical specifications and procedures, and training at STP.
in the area of physical security, the Petitioner requested that the NRC cause the licensee to revoke all escorted access to the %uth Texas site and to adequately train all employees and security force personnel in using relevant security procedures. Wi*.h regard to maintenance activities the Petitioner requested that the NRC cause the licensee to invoke an imediate standdown of all maintenance activities, to adequately train personnel in the use of Revision 3 of the Work Process Program, Revision 0 of the Maintenance 3
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' Work Practices and Requirements, and Revision 0 of the Planner's Guide. The Petitioner also requested that the NRC take swift and effective actions to cause the licensee to comply with the South Texas Project's technical specifications and procedures. On February 18, 1992, the Petitioner met with the NRC staff in the Region !Y offices to discuss certain issues presented in the Petition and other concerns.'
On March 24, 1992, I informed the Petitioner that the Petition had been referred to my Office for the preparation of a Director's Decision.
I further informed the Petitioner that, after receiving the Petition, the NRC staff 1 mediately evaluated reactor safety at STP and performed a special team inspection to evaluate the concerns raised in the Petition. As a result of the evaluation and inspection, the NRC staff found that the concerns either could not be substantiated, or if they were substantiated did not involve nuclear safety, or were not safety concerns of such importance to warrant the innediate and swift actions requested in the Petition. Therefore, I denied the Petitioner's request for the NRC to take imediate action.
I also informed the Petitioner that the NRC would take appropriate action within a reasonable time regarding the specific concerns raised in the Petition.
The licensee also responded to t!.e issues raised in the Petition. The licenste voluntarily submitted inforsation to the NRC on March 11 and May 1, 1992, regarding the issues raised by the Petitioner.
My Decision in this matter follows.
At this meeting, the Petitioner raised a number of concerns other than those set out in the Petition. Those other concerns have been handled separately by the NRC staff.
a
3-II. DISCUSSION In response to the Petition and other concerns raised by the Petitioner, the NRC staff conducted a special team inspection at STP which included an evaluation of the concerns raised in the Petition. The five-member team was onsite during March 9-13, March 23-27, and April 14, 1992. On June 1,1992, the NRC staff issued Inspection Report 50-498/92-07; 50-499/92-07 documenting the results of the inspection.
In a letter of June 18, 1992 to the NRC Chairman, the Petitiorer corsnended the NRC staff inspection effort as extremely definitive with very comprehensive results.
While the inspection team considered all of the concerns of the Petitioner, this Director's Decision responds only to those issues raised in the Petition, specifically the 12 items listed in the ' Basis and Justification" section of the Petition.
In evaluating the physical security concerns during the recent NRC special team inspection, the NRC staff gathered specific information on the training and implementation of the security plan for the areas of concern to the Petitioner, including the control of visitors, the transfer of visitors t>etteen escorts, and tailgating. The NRC inspectors reviewed general employee training (GET) lesson plans, the qualification and size of the instructional staff, and the examinations taken by individuals at the end of instruction.
The inspectors reviewed lessen plans for both the initial training and requalification training of security personnel.
In this way, the team could determine the canner in which the saterial was presented to the employees and could determine if the employees understood the requirements.
In determining how effectively the requirements were implemented, the inspectors reviewed security plans, procedures, and records governing the access and control of
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the visitors at STP.
The team also interviewed employees who were trained as escorts and those who had been escorted because they had at one time been classified as visitors.
The inspection team found the licensee's staffing for conducting the GET program marginally acceptable. The allocated number of instructors, which had been recently decreased, could cause significant stress on the licensee's staff, especially when large groups of people must be trained within a short time period. The licensee's GET thequately covered the escort requirements that were in effect at the time of,he NRC inspection. The licensee addressed the issue of escort changes in the initial training for security personnel although this issue was not reinforced during requalification training.
However, the inspection team noted that most of the employees and security officers interviewed could not successfully explain all of the aspects of visitor access and escort control.
The NRC inspectors reviewed the records and found that, on numerous occasions between January 15 and February 19, 1992 (the time period selected for inspection), visitors were transferred from assigned escorts to other escorts, but the visitor escort change logs did not reflect the escort changes.
In some instances, the visitors telephoned security badging locations and requested escort changes at the request of the assigned or new escorts. Some security force members admitted they knew that visitors were requesting changes and did not realize such actions conflicted with specific procedural requirements. Some plant employees who directed visitors to contact security for escort changes also indicated that they dirl not realize this conflicted with the licensee's procedures.
A
-5 Through interviews, it was confirmed that visitors were not always adequately controlled.
It was apparently routine practice in the Instrumentation and Control (11C) shop to leave visitors within the protected area in the shop while escorts went to adjacent areas (such as restroces).
In ene instance, an escort exited the protected area ahead of a visitor.
In that instance, the security officer apparently did not realize that this act conflicted with the licensee's procedures and did not take the procedurally required action in response to the incident.
On March 13, 1992, the NRC staff first informed the licensee of the team's initial findings concerning the apparent security violations. After this notification, the licensee briefed security officers in the proper way to conduct escort transfers. During a reeting on April 14, 1992, the NRC staff and the licensee discussed the complete results of the inspection and the apparent violations. The licensee senior management's inrrediate response to the inspection findings was to discontinue all visitor access.
In a letter of May 1,1992, the licensee inforred the NRC that, until making a permanent i
change. *the supervision of GET training has been temporarily assigned to report to the same manager that directs HP training." This action, the licensee asserted, would allow control and coordination to quickly and easily support additional GET instructors as required. The licansee further informed the NRC that it had revised its escort procedures to require the following:
(1) specially qualified escorts, (2) visual contact with the visitor at all times, (3) a card carried by the visitor with the escort's name, and (4) provisions for changing escorts by requiring the new escort to sign the visitor's card. The procedures no longer require'the notification of security regarding the transfer of visitor escorts. The NRC staff has concluded that
, the organizational changes and revised procedures address the deficiencies noted by the inspection team and will assess their implementation in future routine inspections.
On June 1, 1992, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to the licensee for two violations based on the aforementioned security inspection results.
One violation was for the failure of the licensee's employees to comply with the physical security plan's implementing procedure governing escort view and control of visitors. The second violation was for the failure of the licensee's employees to comply with the procedure governing the transfer or exit of visitors from the protected area.
In evaluating the maintenance concerns of the Petitioner, the NRC special inspection team reviewed both the training and implementation aspects of the concerns. The inspectors reviewed the training procedures listed by the Petitioner, the lesson plans upon which instruction was based, the qualification of the instructors, and the results of tests at the end of the instruction sessions. The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel whose jobs were influenced by the maintenance instruction. The inspectors reviewed completed work packages and interviewed licensee personnel, some of whom were associated with the work packages. Others were interviewed to permit the inspection team to assess maintenance implementation at STP.
The inspection team determined that the licensee had a good maintenance work control process program. This program enabled the licensee to find equipment problems, evaluate the effect of these problems on operability and the technical specification limiting conditions of operation, prioritize work activities, plan work orders, conduct maintenance activities, and close l
7-i packages. The inspection team concluded that the training provided on Station t
procedure OPGP03-IA-0090, Revision 3 (concern identified by the Petitioner) i was appropriate to meet the course objectives. The inspection team concluded i
i that course objectives were based on procedure requirements.
In meeting the objectives, the licensee ensured that the fundamental program requirements could be implemented by the I&C technicians, planners, owners (i.e., the l
11censee's assigned system representatives), and supervisory personnel.
While overall implementation of maintenance activities was adequate, there were instances where personnel did not fully comply with some procedural requirements. For example, there were instances where individuals did not obtain work-start authority before giving work packages to craft people, individuals did not use the configuration control change log for lifting leads, and in two instances technicians worked on work requests without i
signing the work orders. However, the majority of the procedural requirements were being met.
The identified instances of less than full compliance alth maintenance procedures only concerned maintenance performed on non-safety equipment.
Examples are the conductivity instrumentation for the' makeup dimineralized water and the level switches for the sodium hypochlorite dissolver tank. None i
of the equiement was required for safe shutdown of the plant, mitigation of accidents, or would affect offsite radiological exposure to the public.
Consequently there was no violation of NRC requirements, the STP licenses, or the technfcal specifications. Nevertheless, the NRC staff was concerned about two aspects of the findings. First, the procedural violations of the
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licensee's requirements while performing nonsafety-related activities could also occur while performing safety-related activities because a single set of I,
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administrative controls applied to all maintenance activities. However, during interviews with personnel, they indicated that their awareness was enhanced with regard to procedural requirements for safety-related activities and those requirements that could affect personnel safety. There were indications of poor morale (e.g., worker attitudes) among some maintenance workers, but there was no evidence that poor morale had adversely impacted safety related work.
The inspection team found that the work order planning process has been improved to provide uniform guidance on developing work instructions. The work instructions have become more detailed and appeared to restrict some types of work activities that had previously been performed by the " skill of the craft.* The planning process provided (1) for review of work instructions and, in some cases, an independent technical review, (2) for foremen or planners to make revisions to work instructions depending on scope of the work activity, and (3) for a means of providing feedback on work instructions to the planners and owners. These improvements should not only enhance worker efficiency, but also improve safety in that they should provide additional
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barriers to human error.
The inspection team ascertained that guidance provided to the plant staff on implementation of equipment clearance orders (ECOs) was not properly received or was not well understood. The licensee's staff, responsible for implementing the equipment clearance progrun, indicated that the program was generally carried out in accordance with the procedural requirements. Within the scope of the inspection, the team did not find instances of improper execution of ECOs for safety-related equipment. Consequently, there were no cited violations.
Because of the potential impact on safety-related e
e
l activities, the team recommended that.the licensee consider including guidance on implementing the program within the procedure. The licensee's representatives stated that they would review the guidance and expected to
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conduct training on this matter.
Some signatures and corresponding dates on completed maintenance work packages appeared inconsistent with the t s when the packages should have '
f actually been signed and dated. During interviews of I&C technicians, 3
foremen, supervisors, and management, it became clear that the licensee had not established a policy for late signing of a completed work package. The j
inspection team informed the licensee that this lack of a consistent policy for backdating signatures was a weakness. The licensee subsequently issued a station procedure to instruct employees in the acceptable method for the late l
t signing of documents.
The Petitioner expressed concern with maintenance, primarily regarding the use of the Work Process Program (OPGP03-ZA-0090). Revision 3, which at the time was a recent procedure. On March 9, 1992, the licensee issued Revision 4 of this procedure, in which it had corrected problems that it found in the previous revision.
In July 1992, the licensee issued Revision 5, which was intended to further improve use of the procedure. While the Petitioner's major concerns related to Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0090, Revision 3, he also had concerns regarding Maintenance Procedure OPM01-ZA-0040, ' Maintenance Work l
Practices and Requirements,' and the Planner's Guide, Revision D.
Through interviews, the inspection team concluded that I&C technicians demonstrated that they understood the program requirements referenced in the procedures.
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Although the Planner's Guide is not required by the NRC and is not a controlled document, the NRC staff determined that maintenance activities were being improved through its use.
The inspection team findings related to physical security and maintenance were discussed with licensee senior management on April 14, 1992, and are documented in the special team inspection report IR 50-498/92-07; 50-499/92-07. The NRC staff will continue to monitor licensee performance in these areas as a 5 art of the routine inspection program activities.
I The following are the issues raised by the Petitioner, each followed by the NRC staff's evaluation.
i A.
Current established licensee policies and procedures do not provide reasonable assurances for the ' Physical Control of STPEGS" In 10 CFR Part 73, the NRC specifies the requirements for establishing and maintaining a security program for the physical protection of plants and materials. Before a plant can be licensed, the applicant must submit to the NRC a security plan addressing the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 and the licensee's policies for the physical protection of the plant. Approval of the security plan is a requirement for plant licensing. Such a plan was submitted by the licensee and approved by the NRC staff.
In its Supplement 4 to HUREG 0781, ' Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of the South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2,* the NRC staff concluded that the protection I
provided against radiological sabotage by implementing the licenste's plan met
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the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 and that the health and safety of the i
public would not be endangered.
Licensees are permitted to make changes to the plan pursuant to 10 CFR i 50.54(p) as long as the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the security plan.
- II -
The NRC periodically inspects each licenste's security program to determine if it is being maintained and implemented in a satisfactory manner.
In the most recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) for the period ending May 31, 1991, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee management continued to demonstrate a strong connitment to implementing the security program (IR 50-498/91-99; 50-499/91-99).
In August 1991, the NRC conducted a team inspection of the security program at STP. The inspection found that, with isolated exceptions, the licensee was meeting its plans and implementing an effective program to protect its facility against radiological sabotage (IR 50-498/91-21; 50-499/91-21).
The recent NRC special inspection team, as discussed above, found instances of improper control of visitors, improper transfer of visitors from one escort to another, and an improper exiting sequence of a visitor and escort, all of which were violations of the licensee's procedures. The team found that certain maintenance workers and security officers had a relaxed attitude toward visitor escort requirements and that certain personnel failed to comply with the implementing procedures for the security plan. The team
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documented this failure in its Inspection Report (IR 50-498/92-07; 50-499/92-07), and the NRC issued a Notice of Violation with the report.
In part the Petitioner's concern was substantiated. However, the NRC staff found no indications of a programmatic breakdown in the plant physical security such that the licensee could not reasonably ensure it was in full control of the site.
On March 13, 1992, the NRC inspection team initially informed the licensee of apparent violations regarding the visitor escort procedure.
In a j
meeting on April 14, 1992, the NRC staff further discussed these issues with
the licensee. The licensee senior management immediately discontinued all escorted access until it revised the procedures and trained the personnel.
In its letter of May 1,1992, the Itcensee informed the NRC staff that its revised procedures for escorting individuals took effect on April 15, 1992.
The revised procedures required the following:
(1) specifically qualified escorts, (2) visual contact with the visitor at all times, (3) a card carried by the visitor with the escort's nam.t. and (4) provisions for changing escorts by requiring the new [ receiving) escort to sign the visitors' cards. The licensee trained the identified escorts and implemented the new procedure.
Upon conducting the reviews and inspections, the NRC staff concluded that the licensee's policies and procedures for physical security, properly implemented, would provide reasonable assurance that the South Texas Project i
is adequately protected.
Implementation will be monitored through future NRC inspections.
B.
Licensee employees are not adeountely trained and knowledaeable of gristina STPEGS security orocedures which address escort responsibilities.
In reviewing the licensee's GET program, the special inspection team i
r2 viewed security training including staffing, lesson plans, student materials, and tests. The licensee's GET adequately addressed the l
requirements for visitor escorts.
j The inspectors reviewed the licensee's GET tests and found that they b
typically included two to four questions pertaining directly to escort responsibilities. Conceivably, individua'is could miss one particular area of i
the test year after year and still receive a passing grade. However, upon reviewing successive test results for selected individuals, the inspectors
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found no patterns suggesting that individuals did not know the requirements.
Moreover, as part of the training program, the trainees signed statements affirming that they had been informed of the correct answers to the questions that they had missed.
In spite of this information, the inspection team noted that most of the employees interviewed could not successfully explain all of the necessary aspects of visitor access and escort control. The Petitioner's concern was substantiated. However, the NRC staff concluded that implementing the revised procedures as dis:ussed in A. above will adequately satisfy the escort requirements.
C.
Licensee ecoloyees are not adeoustely trained and knowledoeable of existino STPEGS security orocedures which address tailaatino into protected and vital station areas The special inspection team found the licensee's GET training, which included instructions for properly entering and exiting the plant acceptable.
However, the team found that the staffing levels for providing the training were rearginal.
The licensee addressed this issue in its May 1, 1992, letter through organizational changes that will provide for additional instructors as discussed above.
Further, the inspection team reviewed the access control records from the period of January 1,1992 through February 15, 1992. The NRC staff found only one possible tailgating event in the records reviewed. The records of this event did not show that a visitor entatred a vital area but indicated that the assigned escort had entered that vital area. HowcVer, at the next vital door requiring access, both the visitor and escort badges were recorded.
Consequently, the visitor apparently did not attempt to surreptitiously enter a vital area.
The Petitioner's concern was not substantiated.
. l D.
Licensee's security force eersonnel are not adeountely trained and knowledoeable of existino ETPEGS security erocedures which address escort responsibilities The licensee's security personnel were initially trained through the GET followed by training specific to the security staff. The special inspection team also reviewed the specific training for security personnel and found it to contain all the requirements necessary for a security officer to understand l
and effectively perform duties concerning visitor access and escort control requirements. However, the team noted that, during the requalification training, the licensee did not reinforce the training objectives from the initial training regarding escort transfers. As discussed above, the team found that members of the security force had failed to comply with the procedures for escorting visitors. During interviews, the team found that some security personnel did not fully understand all aspects of the procedures for escorting visitors. The Petitioner's concern was substantiated.
Responding to the NRC findings, the licensee briefed all security officers on the proper wry to transfer visitors between escorts and posted signs to remind personnel of escort requirements. The licensee revised the procedures for escorting visitors and completed training on the new procedures. The NRC staff concluded that the changes in escort procedures are acceptable.
Initial implementation has been satisfactory. The continued implementation will be monitored by the NRC staff through the routine i
inspection program.
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- E.
Licensee's security force eersonnel willfully and intentionally falsified STPEGS security documents.
During the February 18, 1992 meeting, the Petitioner gave the NRC staff the date of the alleged willful falsification, a reference to the falsified document, and the identity of the responsible person. The inspection team inspected the subject document, interviewed the involved personnel, and found no indication of the escort record being falsified. The Petitioner's concern was not substantiated.
f.
Licensee's security force eersonnel willfully violated STPEGS security Drocedure, As noted in the response to Concern D, examples were found where security personnel were not fully knuledgeable of all aspects of the procedures regarding the escorting of visitors. The staff determined that, for some instances of notification of escort transfer by telephone, security force members did not know that it was the visitors who requested the changes.
The security force members documented the transfers because all of the information provided concerning badge numbers and names appeared correct. Some security forc, merroers admitted knowing that visitors were requesting changes and did act re lize such actions conflicted with specific procedural a
requiremrnts.
It appeared to the NRC inspection team that instances of failure to adhere to procedures by security personnel regarding transfer of escorts resulted from a lack of reenforcement during requalification training, cumbersome procedure, and difficulty in verifying personnel identities on the telephone. However, there were no indications the actions of the security 1
personnel were willful or that the security personnel intentionally tried to cor. promise physical security at STP. The Petitioner's concern that security i
procedures were violated was substantiated. However, the inspection team did not substantiate that the licensee willfully violated procedures.
The licensee was first informed of the team's findings on March 13, 1992. On March 27, 1992, the licensee briefed security officers in the proper way to conduct escort transfers. Subsequently, the licensee temporarily discontinued visitor access, then made organizational and procedural changes and conducted training on the procedural changes. The corrective actions as described above, are considered adequate.
G.
Licensee's eerlovees willfully and intentionally violated STPEGS securitv crocedures.
The inspection team found instances where employees violated security procedures for controlling visitors. As mentioned earlier, there were instances where the receiving escort telephoned security to transfer a visitor or where visitors telephoned security badging locations at the request of the assigned or new escort to request escort changes. Also, there were instances in the I&C shop when visitors were left within the protected area in the shop while the escorts went to adjacent areas. However, durir.g interviews with plant personnel, it did not appear that there was an effort made to specifically subvert the security procedures and the special inspection team noted that the personnel believed that they maintained adequate control of their visitors.
Ir. stead, the NRC staff found that employees did not fully comply with procedures because they did not completely understand them or believed that they were complying with the intent of the procedures in escorting their visitors. The inspection team did r,ubstantiate that there were procedural violations in this area. However, the team did not substantiate that the procedures were willfully and intentionally violated
17 _
with the intent to subvert the security at STP. As mentioned previously, the escort procedures have been revised adequately to address the concerns.
H.
J.pur licenst t's current work cractices do not orovide reasonable assurance for the safe eneration of STPEGS and therefore the health and safety of the ceneral oublic The maintenance portion of the special team inspection was in response to Petitioner's Concerns H through L, addressed in this Decision, and specific information obtained during a reeting of February 18, 1992 with the Petitioner regarding other concerns. The inspection team concluded that the licensee had established a good maintenance work control process for finding equipment problems, evaluating the effect of these problems on equipment operability and the technical specification limiting conditions for operation, prioritizing work activities, planning work orders, conducting maintenance activities, and closing maintenance work packages. Some personnel did not fully adhere te some procedural requirements as noted previously. However, most of the procedural requirements were being met.
The licensee adequately completed i
work activities.
In general, the personnel interviewed believed that shift turnovers were adequate and that their awareness was enhanced for procedural adherence with regard to procedural requirements for safety-related activities and those requirements that could affect personnel safety. During interviews with some maintenance employees the inspection team found some evidence of poor morale. This issue was previously discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-49B/91-16; 50-499/91-16. Principal issues adversely affecting maintenance workers' attitudes were the move to a new building, upcoming realignment of and duration of shift schedules, and the perceived limited training opporti;nities for journeymen. There was no evidence that the concerns had l
18 adversely impacted safety-related work. These matters were discussed in general terms with the licensee's senior management on April 14, 1992. The Petitioner's concern was not substantiated.
j Although the maintenance activities described by the Petitioner during the February 18, 1992 meeting were conducted on nonsafety-related systems, the team expressed concern that the licensee used tog same administrative controls j
for both safety-related and nonsafety-related activities. Carryover problems i
from non-sai;ty.> safety-related maintenance have not been identified.
Nevertheless, tne NRC staff will continue to monitor licensee performance in this area as part of the routine inspection program activities.
I i
1.
Licensee employees are not adecuately trained and knowledoeable of the current STPEGS Work Process Procram (OPGP03-ZA-0090) Revision 3 During the first part of 1992, the licensee made several changes to its work process program. The principal change was to consolidate into one procedure the various procedures for finding and requesting work activities and for conducting and closing out work packages. The licensee revised Station Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0090, " Work Process Program," several times.
Revision 3 of Station Procedure OPGP03-ZA-0090 became effective January 31, 1992.
During interviews, the instrumentation and control (!&C) technicians described the training as appropriate to meet the course objectives. When completing the training, many IEC technicians believed they could properly implement the procedural requirements of the saintenance process. However, when called upon to use the procedure, several I&C technicians said they had to use the maintenance process flow chart (distributed during training) to assist them in implementing the procedure.
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To assess the t,vality of training given regarding this procedure, the inspection team reviewed the procedure, lesson plans used by the instructors, student materials, examinations, and course critiques. The team interviewed instructors, numerous planners, I&C technicians, and supervisory personnel who had received training on the procedure.
In the meeting on February 18, 1992, the Petitioner stated several concerns with training on the Work Process Program Procedure. The Petitioner alleged that the training was insufficient and included incorrect information in some cases, that testing was inadequate, and that instructors did not resolve concerns.
The Petitioner objected to the licensee's definition of
- unplanned exposure to radiation" and stated that (1) the licensea gave incorrect information to the class regarding the composition of lubricants used at the plant, (2) the licensee's policy of adherence to procedures was vague, and (3) training was inadequate to test the worker's knowledge because the workers were allowed to complete the examination using materials distributed previously.
The inspection team confirmed that the licensee gave incorrect information regarding the lubricant composition. As part of maintenance equipment qualification training (on January 30, 1992, following Lesson Plan M55108.01), the class watched a film on the use of lubricants at nuclear power facilities that was produced by the Electric Power Research Institute. The film included a statement that oils consisted of 80 to 98 percent base oil and the remainder was additive. The examination following the training contained a test question asking the percentage of base oil required at the licensee's facility. The correct answer, go percent, was not discussed by the instructor during the training. Possible answers to the examination question regarding
)
j 20 i
site-specific requirements included multiple choices that were within the i
i range of values given in the film. Consequently, four to five trainees 1
answered the examination question incorrectly. As a result of student coments on the course critique, the licensee agreed to take action to emphasize that the information in the film was general and to highlight the site-specific value, which was within the range given in the film.
During interviews, the team found that some individuals did not fully understand the licensee's policy on procedural compliance. The petitioner contended that guidance involving instruction on the licer.see's policy of l
adherence to procedures was iague. Revision 1 of the trainee handout used with lesson Plan MSS 108.01 stated:
" Verbatim compliance allows no deviation from procedural steps.... Procedural adherence implies meeting the intent.... Deviation is expected in cases where; A. Personnel safety... B.
Equipment safety" [is placed at risk). No other discussion was included.
Workers receiving work precess program training had mixed responses when
[
questioned about their understanding of these terms and as to which term described the policy in effect at the licensee's facility. While all i
understood that the licensee's policy was that there should be procedural adherence, some were not sure about verbatis compliance and one stated that i
verbatim compliance was expected.
Instructors pointed out that the issue was not listed as an objective in that specific training; therefere no r
examination questions addressed the issue to test (and document) workers' knowledge of the policy.
In response to the uncertainty of some employees regarding the i
definitions of procedural compliance and verbatim compliance, the licensee's Revision 2 of the trainee. handout (dated February 28,1992) expanded the I
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i Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Jack R. Newman, Esq.
P. (l. Box 1029 Newman & Holtzinger 1615 L Street, N.W.
Grarioury, Texas 76048 Suite 1000 Regional Administrator, Region IV Washington, D. C.
20036 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory comission Chief, Texas Bureau of Radiation Control 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Texas Department of Health Arlington,_ Texas 76011 1100 West 49th Street Mrs. Juanita Ellis, President Austin, Texas 78756 Citizens Association for sound Energy Honorable Dale McPherson 1426 South Polk County Judge Dallas, Texas 75224 P. O. Box 851 Owen L. Thero, President Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Quality Technology Company Lakeview Mobile Home Park, Lot 35 Mr. Wiliam J. Cahill, Jr.
4793 East Loop 820 South Group Vice President, Nuclear TU Electric Fort Worth, Texas 76119 i
400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Roger D. Walker, Manager Regulatory Affairs for Nuclear Engineering Organization Texas Utilities Electric Company 400 North Olive Street, L.B. 81 Dallas, Texas 75201 Texas Utilities Electric Company c/o Bethesda Licensing 3 Metro Center, Suite 610 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 William A. Burchette, Esq.
Counsel for Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas 1
Jorden, Schulte, & Burchette I
1025 Thomas Jefferson street, N.W.
2P' 07 Washington, D.C.
s GD5 Associates, Inc.
Suite 720 1850 Parkway Place Marietta, Georgia 30067-8237 l
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Ms. Sandra Long Dow Mr. R. Hickey Dow DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File tiRC PDR total PDR PDIV-2 R/F TMurley FMiraglia JPartlow JRoe HVirgilio SBlack TBergman DSkay EPeyton OPA DCA
__3 tiRR Mail Room (EDO 7781) 12/G/18 DMorris (EDO 7721)
"d JTaylor LChandler, OGC JLieberman WRussell FGillespie VYsnez (2)
CCarter, SECY MMalsch, OGC JGoldberg, DGC ASLBP ACRS (10)
JSniezek HThompson JBlaha JMilhoan, Region IV O
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DD-92-06 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION i
Thomas E. Murley, Director In the matter of
)
)
TU ELECTRIC COMPANY
)
Docket Nos. 50-445
)
and 50-446 (Comanche Peak Steam Electric
)
10 CFR f 2.206 Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206
!. INTRODUCTION 4
On May 19, 1992, Ms. Sandra Long Dow, Disposable Workers of Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, and Mr. R. Micky Dow (the. Petitioners) filed a request (the Petition) with the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, requesting that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission (NRC) take action regarding the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES),
i Units 1 and 2.
Petitioners requested that the Comission order the imediate shutdown of Unit 1 of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station and institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke the license held by l
the Texas Utilities Electric Company (licensee) for Unit 1.
They also requested that the NRC suspend considering whether to extend or modify the construction permit for Unit 2 of the facility until resolving any proceeding regarding the ifcense for Unit 1.
Petitioners allege, as a basis for this request, that the licensee has failed to demonstrate the necessary character and capability that are the primary factors to be 6
ptM 4
2
=
considered in granting a license, and has shown a " downward spiral" in violations, reportable incidents, and NRC staff concerns. Petitioners allege that the NRC staff failed to respond to requests for information about several of these incidents. Petitioners also offered, as they have i
previously, to give the Commission transcripts of 16 reels of audio tapes that contain conversations between the licensee and certain individuals that allegedly indicate duplicity between Region IV and the licensee.
Previously, on February 20, 1992, Petitioners filed a motion for late intervention to reopen the CPSES operating license proceeding (Docket Number 50-445) and the construction permit amendment proceedings I
(Docket Number 50-446). On April 4, 1992, Petitioners filed a motion seeking to present oral argument before the Commission on their February 20, 1992 motions. On August 12, 1992, the Commission denied these requests.
Texas Utilities Electric Coreany (Comanche [eakSteam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12. Additionally, Petitioners' re;uest to reopen the proceedings for the operating license for Units 1 and 2 because of alleged deficiencies in the labeling of pressure valves and limit switches was referred to the staff for consideration as a Petition submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. That issue will also be addressed herein.
In my letter of June 10, 1992, I acknowledged receipt of the May 19.
1992, Petition and stated that the NRC would take action on Petitioners
- 1 i
4
3 request within a reasonable time.' In an Order dated July 28, 1992, the staff extended the construction completion date for CPSES Unit 2 to August 1995.
This action constituted a partial dental of the Petition, specifically the request to suspend consideration of extension or I
modification of the construction permit for Unit 2.
In a letter of July 28, 1992, I informed Petitioners of the partial dental.
The staff based its decision on 10 CFR 50.55(b), which states that the construction corpletion date may be extended for a reasonable period of time upon a showing of good cause. In its request dated February 3,1992, the licensee demonstrated that the delay in construction of Unit 2 was necessary to concentrate resources on the completion of Unit 1.
The NRC agreed that a period of three years is necessary for construction and testing, plus a period for unanticipated delays.
I have evaluated the Petition and have determined, for the reasons set forth below, that no adequate basis exists to '. eve action against the licensee for CPSES, Units 1 and 2.
Accordingly, the Petition is denied.
!!. 015C055105 Petitioners support their request with several incidents that occurred since November 1991.
Petitioners allege that the following matters demonstrate the inadequate character and capability of the licensee to hold Itcenses:
Because Petitioners assert wrongdoing by the NRC Region IV staff, the Petition was also referred to the Office of the Inspector General on June 10, 1992, for such action as it may deem appropriate.
i 1
1.
A leak in a pressure tank caused 100 mile-per-hour winds in i
the access tunnel between Units 1 and 2, which resulted in a i
female employee being blown into a radiation area.
4 2.
Resin spilled into the core because of personnel error and I
misaligned valves.
i J
i 3.
A " hot" valve in Unit I was cut in two, causing a radiation i
release and exposure to several individuals.
4 Sample lists of NRC documents available in the public document room were submitted with the Petition.
The lists contain 26 documented " reportable incidents", numerous areas j
i t
showing direct concern by Region IV, and at least six reactor trips.
5.
The NRC proposed fines for violations by the license'e totaling close to 3100,000 for 1992.
6.
An additional reactor trip occurred, after which the spent
~
fuel pool for Unit I was without cooling water for l
1 j
approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> causing an abnormal rise in temperature. Petitioners submit this incident as evidence of a continuing problem involving the use of improperly trained i
control room personnel, i
7.
The Petitioners submitted, as an attachment to the petition, a photograph which they assert shows Comanche Peak control i
room staff to be asleep, which they state is known to be the i
4
" common manner" for control room personnel.
5 4
1 l
8.
Petitioners allege that the licensee has failed to label and mislabeled pressure valves and limit switches on both units.
Petitioners submitted several written statements from Texas Utilities employees and local citizens expressir,g concern about safety of the plant in support of the Petition. ThE statements of Ron Jones and Dobie Hatley allege specific safety concerns, which the NRC previously evaluated when it considered the February 20, 1992, motion of Petitioners to reopen the record.
The Comission found that these statements did not raise substantial safety concerns. Teras Utilities Electric Co cany (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, (August 12, 1992). The remaining statements express a general concern for the safety of the plant or the treatment of employees but present r,
facts or evidence to support Petitioners' request.
Sixteen signed statements express support for Petitioners' Hotion to Reopen the Record but do not address issues raised by the Petition herein.
Five affidavits or letters, addressed to whom it may concern, express general concern about the operation of Comanche Peak and about the presence of waste disposal sites containing toxic and radiation contaminated materials.
The NRC previously determined that waste disposal sites at Comanche Peak do not raise a substantial safety concern and denied a request for I
enforcement action under 10 CFR 2.205. Texas Utilities Electric Co.
(Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), D0-91-04, 34 NRC 2011 (1991).
Each of the issues raised in the Petition is sunnarized and evaluated below.
.s.
A.
Erslovee iniured in airlock Petithners claim that a leak in a pressure tank caused 100 mph winds in the access tunnel between Units 1 and 2 and resulted in a w employee being injured when she was blown into a radiation area so hard that she bent welded piping.
In its review of this allegation, the NRC staff found that the licensee had informed the resident inspector of the incident and provided him with copies of a written report, Operations Notification Evaluation Form FX-91-1102.
The incident occurred on October 6, 1991, in the personnel airlock between Unit I containment and the safeguards building The airlock consists of two air-tight doors which are only allowed to be opened individually during operation to preserve containment integrity.
At the time of the incident, Unit I was shut down in preparation for a refueling outage. Under these conditions, both doors of the airlock are allowed to be open since the containment atmosphere has very low radiation levels.
The operators were in the process of opening the airlock to provide access to containment.
The outer door was open and the differential pressure across the inner door was measured to be 0.2 psid.
A negative pressure in containment is desirable for containment integrity.
The operators did not recognize this as a high pressure differential that could be dangerous. The operators also did not close the containment purge supply and exhaust dampers prior to defeating the door interlocks, contrary to operating procedures.
When the inner door was unlatched, the force swept the employee into containment.
The actual speed of the wind is not known. The employee hit a 3-inch insulated pice s
[
with her forearm and was then pulled around a corner where she struck
{
more piping. There was no report of an overexposure of radiation to the employee. The employee was examined on site and returned to work when no i
injuries were found. Examinations and x-rays taken later by the t
empipyee's doctor revealed no broken bones or deformities.
The licensee evaluated the incident to determine root causes. The licensee took corrective action by informing all employees of the event, emphasizing the failure to close the purge dampers before opening the doors, and the failure to recognize the danger of opening a door against a differential pressure. The licensee added this incident to the training program and revised the training to cover the potential danger of a differential pressure. The licensee also changed the procedure for opening airlock doors to address these concerns.
1 Petitioners are concerned that Region IV treated this incident as unreportable.
The NRC requires employee injuries to be reported only when a radioactively contaminated person is transported to an offsite medical facility for treatment.
10 CFR f 50.72. The employee in this incident was treated at the site. The event did not result in damage to any safety equipment, did not change plant conditions, and did not affect the safety of the plant. Because it was not in any of the categories mentioned, the event is not required by regulations to be reported to the NRC. Moreover, the licensee informed the resident inspector of the event and provided him with copies of the internal report containing several written statements by eye witnesses, a thorough review of the root causes, and copies of documents which implemented the corrective actions.
.g.
Although the event was not reportable, the NRC was informed of the event by the licensee at the tire of occurrence. The NRC sta'f followed up to ensure that the licensee took appropriate actions to correct deficiencies in its training and procedures. Petitioners provide no new information and no basis to conclude that the licensee is unable or unwilling to operate CPSES in a safe s;anner. Accordingly, I conclude that the incident does not present a substantial public health or safety centern that justifies the requested action.
E.
Resin in the core Petitioners contend that resin was spilled into the core as a result of personnel error.
In its review of the incident, the NRC staff found that on November 6, 1991, some fine particles of resin and three resin beads bypassed the resin traps on a demineralizer filter for the spent fuel pool. The demineralizer is part of the spent fuel pool cooling and purification system which has two redundant trains, each consisting of two cooling pumps, two coolers, two purification pumps, two demineralizers, and several filters and skimmers. At the time of the incident, both trains of the purification system were running. When resin particles were discovered in a routine sample taken at the outlet of demineralizer 2, the licensee shut down that train of the purification system and isolated it to avoid releasing any more resin into the spent fuel pool, the refueling cavity, and ultimately into the reactor coolant system.
Train I continued to purify the refueling cavity. The cause of the resin release was a failed resin trap and not operator error as
-- ~
'I i
1
-g-4 alleged by Petitioners. Shortly after the event, the licensee informed the resident inspector and gave him a copy of the written report of this i
i incicent, Operations Notification Evaluation Form FX-91-1455.
As a short term corrective action to maxial.te cleanup of the spent I
fuel pool and reactor coolant system, the operators increased the amount i
of reactor coolant sent through the chemical and volume control system I
and placed three temporary filters in service.
i i
s Westinghouse Electric Corporation evaluated the effect of resin in
{
the reactor coolant system in a letter to the licensee dated November 19, i
1991.
Westinghouse stated that the resin products are not considered to i
i be terrosive to primary system piping and that ncrtal use of the chemical j
j and volume control system is adequate for control of system cleanup.
l
(
{
Eased on the small quantity of resin released, Westinghouse concluded i
that the material could have had no adverse consequences on fuel assembly I
I k
integrity or operations. Upon review of the letter, the NRC staff came to the same conclusion.
i At the time of the incident, the NRC staff determined that the i
licensee took appropriate corrective actions and that the incident was
{
not detrimental to the safety of the plant. Petitioners provide no facts l
to contradict these findings. Therefore, I conclude that Petitioners have not raised a substantial health or safety concern.
4 J
i i
t d
i i
i l
i
.. C.
" Hot
- valve cut in two Petitioners claim that a " hot" valve in Unit I was cut open, causing a radiation release and exposure to several individuals.
On March 17, 1992, a work request was written to have work performed on valve 2CS-704BA, a valve located in Unit 2.
However, personnel disas'sembled and reassembled valve IC5-704EA, in Unit 1, a valve similiar to the Unit 2 valve which was the subject of the work request.
Upon reviewing the work logs after maintenance was completed, a radiation protection technician thought the contamination levels appeared excessively high for what should have been a Unit 2 valve. The contamination levels were consistent with the normal levels in that area of Unit 1.
Before the maintenance work was performed, a radiation protection technician had established a radiological barrier around the Unit I valve.
Because of the barrier, personnel working on the valve took appropriate precautions and did not receive an overexposure of radiation. Af ter ciscovering the mistake, personnel performed the required maintenance on the Unit 2 valve.
On August 23, 1992, the NRC issued a Severity Level IV violation for failure to follow authorized work instructions, citing both this incident and a similar incident that occurred on February 23, 1992 in I
Unit 1.
The NRC documented the incident in Inspection Report Nos.
50-445/92-08 and 50-446/92-08, April 23, 1992.
The NRC staff found the licensee's corrective action to be suitable.
After the event, Unit 2 management suspended all activities to disassemble or reassemble components within the operations controlled m_._--
. area for permanent plant equipment in Unit 2 until the licensee reviewed the incident.
After reviewing the incident, the licensee took short-term actions requiring double verification of component identification before beginning work.
A Unit I task team had been formed previously in response to the February 23, 1992, incident. The team was exploring a number of corrective actions regarding procedural compliance to be implemented in Unit 1.
The staff found no reason to conclude that the licensee could not or would not operate CPSES safely.Petitioners provide no facts to conclude otherwise. Therefore, I conclude that the event doe: not present a substantial health or safety concern.
D.
Reoortable incidents and rearter tries Petitioners submitted a sample of weekly reports which they claim contain reports of 26 reportable incidents and at least 6 reactor ' trips, which Petitioners find excessive. The weekly reports cover the period fecm January 19 to April 18, 1992, and consist of the Local Public Document Room list of correspondence between the NRC and TU Electric, such as inspection reports, licensee event reports (LERs), periodic operating reports, and general correspondence.
Upon reviewing these documents and HRC records, the NRC staff found I
that the licensee submitted 10 LERs during this period.
These 10 LERs are written reports of nonemergency incidents that occurred at CPSES.
NRC regulations require that licensees report shutdowns, deviations from technical specifications, and events that result in degradation of safety barriers or place the plant in a condition outside of its design basis.
The licensee is also required to include in the report an assessment of
, the safety consequences and a description of all corrective actions.
10 CFR $ 50.73.
This reporting process ensures that the plant is in a safe condition after the event and that steps are being taken to avoid repeating the problem.
The 16 other documents that Petitioners cite were updates or revisions to LERs of events that occurred several months (or years) earlier, and 10 CFR Part 21 reports of defects in components that could affect performance.
The monthly operating reports for the period between January 19 and April 18, 1992 show that no reactor trips occurred during this period The licensee reduced power four times to make repairs but did not shut down the reactor.
During the 19 months between January 1991 and July 1992, Unit I was shut down 11 times. The licensee manually shut down the reactor four times for maintenance; once the unit w's shut down a
for a refueling outage; twice the reactor automatically tripped because ecuipment failed; and four trips were caused by operator error.
Therefore, nearly half of the shutdowns were initiated by the licensee to improve plant performance or comply with regulations.
The two automatic j
reactor trips that resulted from equipment failure were the result of I
problems with the main turbine and did not affect the nuclear or safety-l related portion of the plant. In each case of operator error-related trip, the licensee evaluated the causes of the event and implemented appropriate corrective actions. Ee 3 event and corrective action was reviewed by the NRC resident inspectors and was found to have no safety significance.
In each reactor trip, all systems functioned as expected
, to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition.
The 10 reportable incidents which occurred during the time period specified by Petitioners did not place the plant in an unsafe condition and the reactor did not trip during this period. The six automatic trips which. occurred between January 1991 and July 1992 did not affect the safety of the plant. Petitioners have not provided any information to contradict this conclusion. The NRC was informed of each of the events at the time of occurrence and determined that the licensee took accropriate corrective actions. Accordingly, I conclude that Petitioners have not raised a substantial safety concern.
E.
Fines of $100.000 Petitioners claim that civil penalties of approximately $100,000 irposed for violations by the licensee during 1992 demonstrate that the licensee cannot safely operate the plant.
In evaluating violations to determine the appropriate enforcement action, the NRC staff assesses the safety and regulatory significance of the violations, the licensee's corrective actions to prevent future occurrences, and other relevant factors. Pering its review, the NRC considers whether a violation warrants shutting down a plant.
In neither of these cases did the NRC staff conclude that the licensee was unable or unwilling to safely operate the facility, or that shutdown of the plant was warranted.
On December 4,1991, the NRC proposed imposition of a civil penalty of $25,000 on the licensee. Texas Utilities Electric Company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2), EA 91-189 (December 27, 1
1991). This incident is documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos.
50-445/91-62 and 50-446/91-62, December 27, 1992. The violation involve a misalignment of the residual heat removal system which would have prevented the system from actuating automatically in an emergency.
The system was misaligned for 53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> while the plant was in hot standby mode.
No events occurred during this time that would have required the use of the residual heat removal system, and if this had been necessary, the system could have been properly aligned by opening two crosstie valves.
Therefore, while this was a violation of the operating license, the misalignment did not pose a sericus safety concern.
The NRC staff concluded that the licensee identified the misalignment, promptly corrected the lineup, and took appropriate actions to avoid recurrence and assure proper control of plant configurations.
In July 1992, the NRC proposed imposition of a civil penalty of 5125,000 on the licensee. Texas Utilities Electri _Comoany (Comanche t
Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2), EA-92-107 (July 23,1992).
The violation resulted from a loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool.
The plant was never in an unsafe condition. This event is discussed in detail below in Section II.F.
The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's corrective actions for both of these violations and concluded that the licensee's canagement adequately implemented its comitments and demonstrated the proper concern for safety to operate CPSES. Petitioners present no new information and no basis to change these conclusions. Therefore, I find that Petitioners' contention is without merit and does not present a substantial health or
35-safety concern.
F.
Loss of cooline to seen_t fuel oool Petitioners claim that the spent fuel pool was without cooling for 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, resulting in an abnormal rise in temperature which would have caused a meltdown if not detected by the resident inspector.
Both the licensee and the NRC evaluated this incident in great detail.
The NRC proposed imposition of a civil penalty of $125,000. Texas Utilities Electric Coreany (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units I and 2),
EA-92-107 (July 23, 1992).
This incident is documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-445/92-20 and 50-446/92-20, June 9, 1992.
The spent fuel pool is a large pool of water located outside the containment.
Fuel bundles that are depleted of most of their uranium are stcred in the pool after being removed from the core.
The fuel emits a small amount of decay heat (less than 0.001 percent of the heat generated during operation) into the water of the spent fuel pool.
The water is cooled by passing through heat exchangers that are cooled by the tempenent cooling water system. At the time of this event, the pool contained only 64 fuel assemblies. The pool has a capacity of 554 fuel assemblies and therefore, the heat in the pool was only a fraction of the design heat load.
On May 12, 1992, the spent fuel pool was without cooling for 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> because the component cooling water system was misaligned.
This allowed the temperature to rise 5 degrees from 80 to 55'F.
The maximum fuel pool temperature allowed in the final Safety Analysis Report is 152'F.
Therefere, the pool was never in danger of overheating.
Since i
l
, the spent fuel pool water is part of a system completely separate from the reacto coolant system, the fuel in the core was never in danger of a meltdown.
The resident inspector discovered the problem upon finding a discrepancy in the alignment of valves on the control board, not by noticing a semperature rise as alleged by Petitioners.
If the alignment discrepancy had not been discovered, the operators would have become aware of the problem when thi temperature reached 139'T by an alarm in the control room.
Upon learning of the problem, the operators corrected it by aligning the Unit 2 cooling water to the heat exchanger. This acticn was a violation of the Unit I operating license since the Unit 2 cooling system was not under full control of the operations department and was not incorporated into the licensing basis for Unit 1.
The NRC assessed a civil penalty of $125,000 for this violation, primarily because the event demonstrated that managers were not exercising proper control of licensed actions, not because of the safety significance of the event.
petitioners also claim that the incident was caused by using undertrained operators and that this has been a continuing proble:a of concern to the NRC as evidenced by an NRC letter of December 15, 1989.
This letter was a request for additional information about the operating experience of the control room staff. A request for additional information is the standird means of obtaining information needed for the NRC to complete reviews and does not imply that the NRC has a safety concern or that the licensee has withheld information. The licensee's
i response of December 28, 1989, demonstrated that the licensee had I
satisfied all requirements for training and experience.
i i
In reviewing this event, the NRC identified minor training deficiencies related to operator knowledge of design modifications and procedural changes. NRC Inspection Report Mos. 50-445/92-20 and 50-446/92-20, June 9, 1992. The licensee took corrective actions that included developing more effective methods of informing operators of I
design changes, and providing operators with a list of systems that could be crosstied.
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Petitioners also refer to a reactor trip that occurred 4 days before i
the loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool and which Petitioners allege was caused by undertrained personnel. This trip was not related to the loss of cooling event as implied by Petitioners. The trip on
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May 8,1992, was caused by an inadvertent actuation of the reactor l
.rotection system when technicians opened an incorrect power supply breaker while calibrating the power monitor module.
LER 92-009, June 4, i
1992: NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-445/92-14 and 50-446/92-14, July 1, 1992.
The licensee determined that the root cause was using personnel who were inexperienced in b t, a of calibration. To correct this problem, the licensee no- *nout es that an experienced technician supervise all sensitive tasks being perfonned for the first time.
This event generated no safety consequences since all systems responded as i
expected.
The July 23, 1992, enforcement action prompted the licensee to i
evaluate the loss of coolitig to the spent fuel pool thoroughly.
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licensee and the NRC found no substantial health or safety concern.
Petitioners have presented no facts or basis to reach a different conclusion.
G.
Photo of sleeoino coerators Petitioners submitted a copy of a photograph allegedly showing a member of the CPSES control room staff asleep. Petitioners state that the photograph is the subject of in-plant humor, since sleeping is known i
to be the " common manner" for control room personnel.
It cannot be ascertained from this poor quality copy either whether the person is sleeping or whether the room shown is in fact the Comanche Peak control room.
1 The NRC considers inattentiveness by control room operators a very i
serious offense.
The NRC requires control room operators to be fully attentive at the controls to monitor plant safety status and to trke corrective action if abnormal circumstances arise. Random control room observations by the resident inspectors allow the NRC to check the adequacy of the licensee's programs for enforcing this requirement.
The senior resident inspector at CPSES confirmed that the four resident inspectors normally make control room observaticas several times during normal working hours and several times a month during night and weekend hours.
The residents have never found an operator asleep or inattentive in the control room at CPSES.
I find that Petitioners have failed to demonstrate any merit to their contention and have not substantiated a health or safety concern.
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19-H.
Labelino deficiencies Petitioners allege that an employee of CPSES testified that the l
i licensee failed to label components and mislabeled pressure valves and limit switches on both units.
While conducting an inspection in October 1989, the NRC found minor labeling deficiencies. NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-445/89-200 and 50-446/89-200, February 14, 1990. The inspectors found a number of valves without identification labels, unofficial hand-written tags used to label rooms, and small metal label tags on some components which were difficult to read. The inspectors believed that this could cause operator errors.
The licensee had identified the missing labels earlier and was in the process of installing temporary tags. The licensee had initiated a program to improve labeling in 1988 but had delayed -
implementation.
This inspection prompted the licensee to implement the propram sooner than planned. The licensee also audited the labeling program and revised administrative procedures to give guidance to i
i personnel on performing independent verification of labeling.
The licensee labeled each of the rooms in Unit 1, and equipment containing both Unit I and Unit 2 components, before the licensing of Unit 1.
The licensee scheduled to complete the upgrade program during the first refueling outage in December 1991. The NRC inspected the labels four more times and found that the program was on schedule and was being implemented effectively. The NRC documented its findings in
Inspection Report Hos. 50-445/90-20 and 50-446/90-20, July 23, 1990; 50-445/91-32 and 50-446/91-32, August 22, 1991; 50-445/91-41 and 50-445/91-41, October 9, 1991; and 50-445/91-70 and 50-446/91-70, February 12, 1992.
During the last inspection, documented in Report Nos.
50-445/91-70 and 50-446/91-70, the staff found that the licensee had completed 95 percent of the label upgrade in Unit I with the remaining labels to be hsndled by the ongoing label maintenance program.
The NRC considers this to be a closed item because the licensee' labeling program exceeds NRC requirements.
The components and systems in Unit I have been labeled with clear and informative labels which as the plant operators and maintenance personnel to accur.;tely identify equipment. On March 24, 1992, William D. Johnson, senior Resident Inspector at Comanche Peak Unit 1, submitted an affidavit in support of the staff's response to the Petitioners' February 21, 1992, motion to reopen the record.
The affidavit summarizes the NRC staff's evaluation of and conclusions about the effectiveness of labeling in the plant.
Therefore, I conclude that the Petitioners have presented no basis to change the NRC staff's conclusion that the licensee's labeling program reets NRC requirements. Petitioners have failed to raise a substantial safety concern.
III. CONCLUSIONS The NRC staff has reviewed the allegations in the Petition that the licensee does not demonstrate the appropriate character or capability to operate a nuclear plant. The incidents described in the Petition, as
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. examples of the licensee's inability to operate the plant, are either events which had been evaluated and resolved by the NRC staff or are unfounded accusations with no technical merit, and provide no basis for the requested action.
i The staff assessed the inspections, enforcement actions, NRC documents, and evaluations conducted by both the licensee and the staff, related to Petitioners
- concerns. The staff evaluated the 10 exhibits attached to the Petition. Most of these documents are NRC i
inspection reports or letters and therefore do not present any new informa tion.
The remaining exhibits consist of statements written by TU employees or members of the public which either do not address safety issues or discuss events that do not relate to the issues of this petition.
Petitioners have presented neither any information nor any reason to question the continued safe operation of CPSES.
The institution of proceedings in response to a request in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206 is appropriate only when substantial health and safety issues have been raised. See Censolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173,176 (1975) and Washinoton Public Power Sueoly System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2).
DD-84-7, 19 NRC 899, 923 (1984). I have applied this standard to determine if any action is warranted in response to the Petition.
For the reasons discussed above, I find no basis for taking any action in response to the Petition as no substantial health or safety issues have been r ised by the Petition. Accordingly, the NRC is taking no action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206 in this matter.
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A copy of this Decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for the Comission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c).
i FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION
?r8 44" Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 19th day of November 1992 2
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1 7 %0-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0+4ISSION DOCKET NOS. 50 a45 AND 50-446 TEXAS UTitITIES ELECTRIC COWANY COMANCHE PEAX STEAM ELECTRIC 51 ATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 ISSUANCE OF DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR s 2.206 Notice is hereby given that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has taken action with regard to a Petition for action under 10 CFR 2.206 received from Sandra Long Dow and R. Micky Dow (Petitioners) dated May 19, 1992, regarding the Comanch: Peak Steam Electric Station, t
Units 1 and 2.
The Petitioners requested that the Comission order the imediate shutdown of Unit 1 of the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station and institute a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke the license held by the Texas Utilities Electric Company (TV Electric or the licensee) for Unit 1.
The Petitioners also requested the Comission to suspend any consideration of extending or modifying the construction permit for Unit 2 of the facility until resolving any proceeding on the license for Unit 1.
Petitioners asserted as a basis for their Motion that the licensee failed to demonstrate the necessary character and capability that are the primary factors to be considered in granting a licensa, and has shown a
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- downward spiral" in violations and reportable incidents. Petitioners also assert wrongdoing by the NRC Region IV staff. To support this general assertiin, the Petitioners alleged that numerous specific f
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- I incidents occurred since November 1991 including:
(1) 100 mile-per-hour winds in the access tunnel between Units I and 2 resulted in an employee being blown into a radiation area; (2) resin was spilled into the core; (3) a " hot
- valve was cut in two causing a radiation release and exposure t
to several individuals; (4) 26 d6:umented " reportable incidents",
numerous areas showing concern by Region IV, and at least 6 reactor trips; (5) the NRC proposed fines for violations nearing $100,000 for 1992; (6) the spent fuel pool was without cooling water for approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> causing an abnormal rise in temperature; (7) a photograph showing control room personnel asleep is widely circulated in the plant; and (8) the licensee failed to label and mislabeled pressure valves and limit switches.
The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has decided to deny the Petition. The reasons for this denial are explained in the " Director's Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206," (DD-92-06) which is available for public inspection at the Comission's Public Document Recm.
the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the Local Public Document Room for the Comanche P?ak Steam Electric 4
Station, at the University of Texas at Arlington Library, Government i
Publication / Maps, 701 South Cooper, P.O. Box 19497, Arlington, Texas 76019.
A copy of the decision will be filed with the Secretary for the Co=ission's review in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c) of the Comission's regulations. As provided by this regulation, the Decision will constitute the final action of the Comission 25 days after the
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date of issuance of the deci:1;n unless the Commission on its own motion institutes a review of the decision within that time.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of November 1992.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI5510N Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f
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I NRCI TRANSMISSION RECORD Slip Opinion, pp.
Opinion / Decision Date Headnote Date Date Dir. Decision, Transmitted to Trans.
Transmitted Trans-Transmission or Errata No.
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May 18, 1993 NOTE TO: James G. Partlow Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM:
Jack W. Roe, Director Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF DUE DATE ON GREEN TICKET EDO 7878 (2.206 PETITION TO EVALUATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN TU ELECTRIC AND A FORMER CO-0WNER)
This is a request to extend the EDO due date of May 14,1993 (NRR mailroom date of May 10,1993) for this green ticket. The green ticket is a 2.206 petition (dated June 11,1992) filed by Michael D. Kohn.
Petitioners allege discovery of a settlement agreement between the licensee and a former co-owner of CPSES that contains language that violates 10 CFR 50.7.
The Office Director has raised a policy issue that must bs resolved with EDO and DCC before the Decision can be signed. Therefore, we request a revised due date of May 25,1993 (NRR mailroom date of May 19, 1993).
'd i
ack W. Roe, Director divisionofReactorProjectsIII/IV/V Dffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation APPROVAL:
a lames G. Partlow
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cc:
M. Virgilio S. Black T. Bergman (2)