ML20056F353
| ML20056F353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 08/11/1993 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20056F351 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308270022 | |
| Download: ML20056F353 (3) | |
Text
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'S UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT N0.
50 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-58 THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY._EJ_AL.
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO._1 DOCKET NO. 50-440
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated October 30, 1991, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company and Centerior Service Company submitted a request to amend the Technical Specifications (TSs) issued to the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1.
The proposed amendment consisted of changes to TS Table 3.3.2-1, " Isolation Actuation Instrumentation," and Table 3.3.3-1, " Emergency Core Cooling System l
Actuation Instrumentation." The changes proposed by the licensee would clarify the requirements for instrumentation used to isolate the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) test return line and to actuate the HPCS system. The licensee also proposed to identify specific actions to be taken if one of the l
HPCS reactor vessel water level or drywell pressure instruments becomes inoperable.
2.0 EVALUATION Section 1 of TS Table 3.3.2-1 is applicable for actuation of the primary containment isolation valves. These valves belong to Division 1, 2, and 3.
The Division 1 and 2 isolation logic employs double trip systems and the Division 3 isolation logic employs a single trip system. The current wording i
l of Item 1.a (Reactor Vessel Water level-low, level 2), Item 1.b (Drywell pressure-high), and Item 1.e (Manual initiation) are based on double trip systems. These items are also applicable to HPCS test return line isolation valve 1E22-F023 which is a Division 3 valve with a single trip system using a i
one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic. The current TS permits a minimum of two operable channels per trip system for all items listed in Section 1 of TS l
Table 3.3.2-1.
However, the instrumentation logic used for valve IE22-F023 l
requires all four operable channels in its trip system to avoid loss of this valve under all combinations of inoperable instruments without resorting to l
any TS action. To overcome these limitations, the licensee proposed to add references stating that the current Items 1.a,1.b, and 1.e belong to Division 1 and 2 (redesignating them as Items 1.a, 1.c, and 1.g, respectively) and add three new corresponding items (Items 1.b, 1.d, and 1.h) for Division 3 instrumentation including addition of Notes (d) and (e).
Note (d) is applicable to new Items 1.b (Reactor vessel water level-low, level 2 (Division 3)), and Item 1.d (Drywell pressure-high (Division 3)). Note (d) states, " Division 3 has only one trip system consisting of four channels logically combined in a one-out-of-two-twice configuration which only closes the HPCS Suppression Pool Test Return Valve (1E22-F023). Note (e) is I
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Note (e) states, " Division 3 Manual Initiation consists of a single channel in a single trip system."
The licensee proposed Action 28 for new Items 1.b, l.d, and 1.h.
The current Action 28 states, "Within one hour lock the affected system isolation valves closed, or verify, by remote indication, that the valve (s) is closed and electrically disarmed, or isolate the penetration (s) and declare the affected 4
i system inoperable." The licensee proposed to add a comma between " isolate the penetration (s)" and "and declare the affected system inoperable." Without this comma, the current Action 28 may be interpreted to mean that " declaration of the affected system inoperable" is applicable only after isolation of the penetration (s).
It is the intent of Action 28 that the affected system be declared inoperable no matter which of the isolation actions is taken within Action 28. This clarification is achieved by adding a comma between the two statements.
The TS Table 3.3.3-1 specifies trip logic requirements for emergency core cooling system actuation instrumentation.
The licensee proposed to modify i
Action 34 and replace Action 31 by Action 34, for Item C.I.c of Table 3.3.3-1.
Item C.1.a of Table 3.3.3-1 covers instrumentation of reactor vessel level-i low, level 2.
Item C.1.b covers instrumentation of drywell pressure-high, and Item C.1.c covers instrumentation of reactor vessel water level-high, level 8.
i Current Items C.I.a and C.I.b refer to Action 34 which is based on a two trip j
system and states:
"With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum i
OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement i
a.
For one trip system, place that trip system in the tripped condition within one hour or declare the HPCS system inoperable, b.
For both trip systems, declare the HPCS system inoperable."
The existing instrumentation logic of Items C.1.a and C.I.b employs only one trip system belonging to Division 3.
Therefore, the current Action 34 is not appropriate for Items C.l.a and C.I.b.
To overcome this inconsistency, the j
licensee proposed to reword Action 34 to make it appropriate for a single trip system.
The current Item C.I.c calls for Action 31 which reads, "With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function requirement, declare the associated ADS trip system or ECCS inoperable." The licensee proposed to use Action 34 for Item C.I.c because the Items C.I.a, C.I.b, and C.I.c employ the same type of instrumentation logic.
To a large extent the proposed changes agree with the current TS for Grand Gulf, Unit I and Clinton, Unit 1.
, We have reviewed the justification provided by the licensee and agree that the current wording of the TS Table 3.3.2-1, Section 1, and Table 3.3.3-1, Section C.1 is inappropriate, can cause compliance problems, and loss of containment isolation during an accident condition.
The proposed TS changes would better represent the existing instrumentation logic, clarifying TS requirements, and improving plant safety, and therefore they are acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSVLTATION In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Ohio State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Dart 20 or changes a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 64651). Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this-amendment.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
l (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such l
activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendwm will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the berlth xd safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
S. Mazumdar Date: August 11, 1993 l
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