ML20056F310
| ML20056F310 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/04/1993 |
| From: | Carter D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Wigginton J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-93 NUDOCS 9308260356 | |
| Download: ML20056F310 (2) | |
Text
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O O
June 4, 1993 1'
MEMORANDUM FOR:
James Wigginton, Chief Facilities Radiation Protection Section Radiation Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRR FROM:
Daniel Carter, Health Physicist Facility Radiation Protection S2 tion Radiation Protection Branch l
Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRR l
SUBJECT:
FOLLOW-UP ON EBERLINE CONTINU0US AIR MONITOR FAILURES l
As you requested, I contacted Et'erline Corporation in reference to an article found in the DOE Operating Experience Weekly Summary dated April 23-29, 1993, (See Enclosure).
In conversation with Mr. Julian Wells, Manager of Quality Assurance at Eberline, it was determined that wiring insulation problems with continuous air monitor (CAM) Model 3A-1 were isolated to one specific order supplied to one Westinghouse Hanford DOE site.
The problem dealt with a design change on 20 of 44 CAM's.
Eberline stated that they have taken actions to correct the problem and have modified their design change to prevent this type of problem from occurring in the future.
Since this type of CAM has not been supplied to NRC licensees, as we have discussed, this memorandum documents that PRPB will take no further action on this matter.
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\\ 4.N w Daniel Carter, Health Physicist Facility Radiation Protection Section Radiation Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, NRR
Enclosure:
As stated Distribution:
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Another event occurred on April 23,1993, when personnel at Rocky Flats reported at certain types of special nuclear materials had been stored outside of glov l
an process lines (typically in sealed cans) at several facilities without the re 'ed visu 'nspections for corrosion that could raise the material's pyrophoricity This result in violation of the Health and Safety Practices Manual requireme
. Site personn {dentified this condition in buildings 371, 707, 771, 776, 777/and 779.
Subject mal er experts determined that there was no imminent safety 6zard posed by the mate I, although potential safety and operational hazard existed. On January 17,1 2, another incident occurred when facility pers nnel discovered several bottles o plutonium and hydrochloric acid mixture in uilding 779 stored improperly. (oRPs Re ort RFo-EGGR slTEWIDE-1993-ooo2)
These events emphasize ge importance of administratively ontrolling special nuclear materials. There have begn numerous events at De drtment of Energy facilities conecming the improper stora e of these types of m rials. In one event on May 7, 1992, oersonnel at Rocky Flat uilding 771 disco red several bottles containing a plutonium solution improperly s ced, resultin m a nuclear material safety limit violation (oRPs Report RFo--EGGR 771o 1992-oos. On October 31,1990, personnel at the Oak Ridge Y-12 facility improp ly tr nsferred special nuclear material and inadvertently left the material on a loa dock, resulting in a potential personnel exposure hazard (oRPs Report oRo-MMEs-2 ETLPRP-1990-o443). Many of the incidents i
that have occurred at other Depa ment Energy facilities involved procedural inadequacies, failure to properi implement Conduct of Operations program l
requirements for work control, p rsonnelerrors a sociated with inattention to detail, have resulted in unplanned r diation exposure to improper packaging, and traini deficiencies. Som of these events potentially could personnel. Compliance with proper storage requirem ts of special nuclear mater criticality control meas es.
i DOE Order 5480.24, " Nuclear Criticality Safety," states that fi gionable material shall l
be produced, pr essed, stored, transferred, disposed, or handle (in such a manner that the proba ility of a criticality incident is acceptably low. The Order also provides requiremen for a criticality safety program including the storage and transportation of fissile aterials. Additionalinformation concerning controlof nuclear terials can be fou in DOE N 5480.6, " Radiation Control Manual;" DOE Order 5633
" Control and countability of Nuclear Materials, Responsibilities, and Authorities;"
E Order 54 0.3, " Safety Requirements for the Packaging and Transportation of Haz dous aterials, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes;" and DOE Order 15 Q.2,
" Hazardous Material Packaging for Transport - Administrative Procedures."
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2.
EBERLINE CONTINUOUS AIR MONITOR FAILURES On April 19,1993, personnel at the Hanford 1100 Materials Receipt Area reported wiring discrepancies in 40 new Continuous Air Monitors (CAMS) supplied by the Eberline Corporation, potentially affecting the monitor's ability to operate in cold environments. During acceptance testing of the CAMS, facility personnelidentified i
several wires not properly insulated in accordance with the component design drawings. In addition, they found some of the wires discolored and damaged. Upon discovery, facility personnel contacted the vendor and initiated an inspection of installed CAMS with similar circuitry. (oRPs Report RL--WHC WHC11ooEM-1993 oo11)
Page 2 of 9 oE WeeU summary 93-17
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l The follow-up investigation determined that the vendor had installed the incorrect type of wire in the internal heater circuitry. The Eberline CAM Model AMS-3A-1 has a heater for use in cold environments. The defective units bad a blue-insulated wire instead of the required heat resistant Teflon-insulated wire used in the heater circuitry. (Facility personnel report that the unheated units should not be used in environments below 20 degrees Fahrenheit.) Facility personnel are conducting a root cause investigation concerning the wiring discrepancy and degradation.
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Department of Energy facilities using Eberline Model AMS-3A 1 CAMS should determine the applicability of this event to their facilities. If applicable, facilities should contact Eberline personnel for resolution of any identified discrepancies.
Eberline recommended that the defective CAMS at Hanford be returned to the manufacturer for repair or replacement.
3.
FA!!.URE TO WEAR RESPIRATOR Oriqpril 27,1993, four workers at Rocky Flats Building 771 failed to don respirato protection subsequent to receipt of a Selective Alpha Air Monitor alarm, violating requirehents of the Health and Safety Practices Manual. The workers ente e'd an area andigard an alarm on a portable Selective Alpha Air Monitor. Acc ding to procedure, the workers should have immediately donned the respiratory hey were carrying. Inste'a4 the workers exited the area without putting on the endipment. The workers were trained in the use of respiratory equipment and stated'that they were I
aware of the proced ral requirements to follow during a Selective / pha Air Monitor Al alarm condition.
The follow up investigation f the event identified addijt'onal procedural infractions committed by workers. In one ase an individual faited)o comply with direction given by a radiological technician to ad{ust her respirator and perform a fit test prior to entering a radiological controlled arb The inves,tifation also determined that two of the workers had not read the radiolo I work permit in approximately one year, and the other two never read the permit. T s acts were a violation of the Health and Safety Practices Manual.
The Office of Nuclear Safety report in Operatinq Experience Weekly Summary 93-16 about a similar event involvin failure to property wear respiratory protection. On April 14,1993, personnel at t Oak Ridge Alpha Handling facility identified a worker wearing a respirator with t the required filter canliitqrs, increasing the risk of airborne contaminationfxposure. Although investigatior of the root cause is in progress, the worker,ppparently forgot to properly assemb(legnd test the respira before initiating w k in the glovebox. (oRPS Report oRo--MMES X1 CHEMTEC-1993-ooo5) l In both thes
- idents, serious consequences could have resulted i ere had been airborne ac,1 ity present. These events emphaske the importance procedural l
compliajc'e and respirator qualification training. Department of Energy Ord(r S480.4, "Envjir hmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Standards," mandates the requirements contained in American National Standards Institute Standard h 8.2, "Fractices for Respiratory Protection," and 29 CFR 1910.134 for implementation f 1
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j Page 3 of 9 OE Weekly Summary 93-17 l
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