ML20056E386
| ML20056E386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/13/1993 |
| From: | Remick NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9308230289 | |
| Download: ML20056E386 (3) | |
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RESPONSE SHEET
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SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION FROM:
C0f41ISSIONER REMICK
SUBJECT:
SECY-93-092 - ISSUES PERTAIllING TO THE ADVANCED REACTOR (PRISM, MHTGR, AND PIUS)
AND CANDU 3 DESIGNS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO CURRENT REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS
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APPROVED /
DISAPPROVED ABSTAIN iiOT PARTICIPATING REQUEST DISCUSSION COMMENTS:
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SIGNATURE RELEASE VOTE
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ENTERED ON "AS" YES v'
NO
){ftc7 588888sR!tlR8?23 CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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t Commissioner Remick's comments on SECY-93-092:
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1 I approve the staff's recommendations that a prototype for the i
CANDU-3 is not required for design certification and that insafficient information has been provided on the advanced l
reactor designs at this time to pursue rulemaking on any of the l
10 issues.
i I also approve, with comments, the following staff I
i recommendations identified in Enclosure 1 of the SECY paper.
A.
Accident Evaluation j
I approve the staff's recommendation as well as its response to the ACRS comment.
I 4
B.
Source Term
.i I approve the staff's recommendation, including its agreement i
with the ACRS comment.
t C.
Containment i
I approve the staff's recommendation, including its agreement with the ACRS comment.
t 1
D.
Emercency Plannina (EP)
I approve the staff's position (1) that it proposes no changes to i
the existing regulations governing emergency planning for advanced reactor designs at this time, but (2) that the staff l
1 will provide regulatory direction at or before the start of the i
i design certification phase so that any EP implications on design l
can be addressed.
I agree with the ACRS' recommendation and the staff's agreement
- that the work on EP should be closely correlated with work on j
Accident Evaluation and Source Term, in order to avoid i
unnecessary conservatism.
1 4
The staff should include consideration of the advanced reactor and CANDU-3 designs when responding to my separate comments and questions to the EDO on SECY-93-087 pertaining to EP.
i E.
Reactivity Control System 9
I approve the staff's recommendation, including its agreement with the ACRS comment.
t F.
Operator Staffino and Functions I approve the staff's recommendation, including its agreement with the ACRS comment.
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G.
Residual Heat Removal I approve the staff's recommendation, including its agreement with the ACRS comment.
H.
Positive Vpid Reac,tivity Coefficient I
I approve the sd.*f's recommendation, and its agreement with the ACRS comment.
I.
Control Roon rnd Remote Shutdown Area DesiSD I strongly agree with the staff "that, at this time, justification for r.ecommending departure from current requirements is not established."
However, I agree with both the staff and the ACRS that the staff should be receptive to considering such justification, if it can be provided by the applicants.
i J.
Safety Classification of Structures, Systems and Components 4
I approve the staff's recommendation, as well as its response to the ACRS comment.
General Comments t'
In approving the staff's recommendations on these issues, in a number of cases the Commission is accepting general statements or approaches by the staff on how it will proceed with its preapplication reviews of the advanced reactor and CANDU-3 designs.
If and when it becomes apparent that one or more of these designs will be submitted for design certification, it will be necessary for the staff to identify the data, analyses, acceptance criteria, confirmatory research, and program plans in t
much greater detail in order that the Commission, the vendors, and the public are more fully aware of the technical regulatory i
requirements for prototype demonstration (N/A to CANDU-3) and design certification.
On page 12 of Enclosure 1 to SECY-93-092, it is stated for the MHTGR design that
"...(2) there is a significantly long time expected for the core to return to criticality after being shut down by the Doppler coefficient without the reactor protection system functioning (i.e.,
about 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />)."
I would appreciate either receiving a copy of the analysis or an informal briefing which explains the above statement.
In particular, a common plot of fuel temperature, core power level, and reactivity versus time would be appreciated, if readily available.
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