ML20055F140
| ML20055F140 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/04/1990 |
| From: | Remick F NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9007130339 | |
| Download: ML20055F140 (5) | |
Text
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N0TATION-V 9 'T* E" " " " * " " " "
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SAMUEL J. CHILK, SECRETARY OF THE CONB4XSSION FROM:
COW 4ISSIONER REMICK
SUBJECT:
SECY-90-016 - EVOLUTIONARY LIGHT WATER REACTOR (LWR) CERTIFICATION ISSUES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO CURRENT REGULATORY REQUIREMFWTS APPROVED X/in-part DISAPPROVED X/in par't ABSTAIN NOT PARTICIPATING ___
REQUEST DISCUSSION COR4ENTS:
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED COMMENTS nnsog g/ SIGNATURE RELEASE VOTE
/X/
May 4, 1990 DATE WITHHOLD VOTE
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CORRESPONDENCE PDC
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1.
l COMMISSIONER REMICK'S COMMENTS ON SECY-90-Q16 1.
ALWR PUBLIC SAFETY GOAL' s
A.
MEAN' CORE DAMAGE FRanuENCY:
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I' DISAPPROVE THE STAFF'S PROPOSAL TO CONVERT THE INDUSTRY'S DESIGN OBJECTIVE FOR' CORE : DAMAGE FREQUENCY AS A MORE STRINGENT REQUIREMENT FOR : FUTURE PLANT DESIGNS. - 'THE ACRS HAS ALS0 COMMENTED THAT IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR THE NRC To i
CONVERT TIGHTER STANDARDS': SET BY THE INDUSTRY / APPLICANTS AS NRC IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS.
4
. IMPLEMENTING A CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY OF LESS THAN 10 AS A-SUBSIDIARY CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY IS ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH L
THE HIGHER LEVEL LARGE RELEASE GUIDELINE AND HEALTH EFFECTS OBJECTIVES AND CREATES A DE FACTO NEW LARGE RELEASE GUIDELINE:AND HEALTH OBJECTIVES.
4 THE COMMISSION AAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT EXPECTS ADVANCED.
DESIGNS TO REFLECT:
BENEFITS OF SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK; HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATION (INCLUDING DURING MAINTENANCE AND SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES);
EXPERIENCE
. GAINED.IN OPERATING-THE MANY POWER AND DEVELOPMENT REACTORS; t
AND THAT VENDORS ACHIEVE A-HIGHER STANDARD OF SEVERE i
ACCIDENT SAFETY' PERFORMANCE THAN THEIR PRIOR DESIGNS.
l HOWEVER, THE NRC SHOULD NOT IMPOSE INDUSTRY'S DESIGN
'0BJECTIVES'AS REW REQUIREMENTS.
'+
Y I APPROVE kHE STAFF'S-PROFDSED,) FREQUENCY OF A LA B.
1.
RELEASE OF 1 IN 1,000,000 (10 PER-YEAR OF REACTOR OPERATION.7, 2.
ALTHOUGH TNE STAFF'S PROPOSED DEFINITION OF A LARGE RELEASE IS ONE. POSSIBLE -DEFINITION, 'I PREFER E7THER THE ALTERNATINE DEFINITION THAT "A LARGE RELEASE IS ANY RELEASE FNDM A REACTOR EVENT INVOLVING SEVERE CORE DAMAGE, PEIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY FAILURE AND CONTAINMENT. (OR CONFINEMENT) FAILURE," OR THE DEFINITIONiPROPOSED BY COMMISSIONER CURTIUS IN HIS VOTE ON.SECY-8S-102.
t (SEE MY VGTE SHEET ON SECY-89-102.)
6
2.
SOURCE TERM I APPROVE THE STAFF S-PROPOSED APPROACH FOR EVOLUTIONARY ALWRS.
3.
ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS)
I APPROVE THE STAFF S PROPOSED APPROACH TO PROVIDE DIVERSE.
SCRAM SYSTEMS UNLESS THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ATWS ARE ACCEPTABLE.
3 4.
MID-LOOP OPERATION I APPROVE THE STAFF 5 PROPOSED POSITION, AS IDENTIFIED'IN SECY-90-016 AND' STAFF 5 RESPONSE T0 ACRS COMMENTS, THAT EVOLUTIONARY PWR$ SHOULD INCORPORATE DESIGN FEATURES TO ENSURE HIGH RELIABILITY OF THE SHUTDOWN DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM DURING MID-LOOP OPERATION.
5.
STATION BLACKOUT I APPROVE THE STAFF'S PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE AN ALTERNATE AC SOURCE FOR EVOLUTIONARY ALWRS.
t 4
6.
FIRE PROTECTION
-i I APPROVE'THE STAFF'S PROPOSAL ~FOR ENHANCED FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES.
7.
INTERSYSTEM' LOCAL I APPROVE THE STAFF'S PROPOSED RESOLUTION, INCLUDING THE STAFF S RESPONSE TO ACRS COMMENTS.
8.
HYDROGEN GENERATION AND CONTROL
= r I APPROVE THE STAFF'S RECOMMENDATION THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.34(F)(2)(Ix) REMAIN UNCHANGED FOR EVOLUTIONARY ALWRS, INCLUDING STAFF'S RESPONSE TO-ACRS COMMENTS.
THE EQUIVALENT 100' PERCENT CLADDING OXIDATION REACTION ASSUMPTION IS TO BE USED AS'A REASONABLE SURROGATE FOR THE COMBINATION OF BOTH IN-VESSEL AND'EX-VESSEL HYDROGEN GENERATION.
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9.
CORE-CONCRETE INTERACTION - ABILITY TO COOL CORE DEBRIS-ILAPPROVE THE STAFF'S RECOMMENDATION.
10.
HIGH PRESSURE CORE MELT EJECTION I APPROVE THE STAFF'S RECOMMENDATION TO INCORPORATE A SYbN~.4 DEPRES$URIZATION CAPABILITY FOR FUTURE ALWRS.
I ALSO s
APPROVE STAFF'S PURSUIT OF MITIGATING DESIGN FEATURES AS LONG AS THEY ARE REASONABLY ECONOMIC AND DO NOT HINDER REFUELING,: SURVEILLANCE, AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.-
1 11.
CONTAINMENT PERFORMANCE I APPROVE THE STAFF'S PROPOSED FURTHER DEVELOPMENT AND USE
+
~1'
-OF A CONDITIONAL CONTAINMENT FAILURE PROBABILITY OF 0.1 OR A
}.
DETERMINISTIC PERFORMANCE GOAL THAT OFFERS COMPARABLE GUIDELINE OF THE COMMISSION'S SAFETY GOALS' POLICY STATEMENT.
. PROTECTION AS A1 SUBSIDIARY OBJECTIVE TO THE LARGE RELEASE AS INDICATED IN MY VOTE SHEET ON SECY-89-102, I FAVOR THE USE L AS A SUBSIDIARY OBJECTIVE OF "A CONTAINMENT PEgFORMANCE' OBJECTIVE OF LESS THAN ONE CHANCE IN TEN (I.E., 10') FOR A.
LARGE1 RELEASE (FROM CONTAINMENT OR CONFINEMENT) FOR AN APPROPRIATE FAMILY OF CORE DAMAGE SCENARIOS', CONSISTENT WITH-THE ABOVE OVERALL MEAN FREQUENCY. 0F A LARGE RELEASE."
12.
ABWR CONTAINMENT VENT DESIGN I' APPROVE THE STAFF'S RECOMMENDED USE OF A CONTAINMENT OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION-SYSTEM SUBJECT TO THE RESULTS OF FURTHER REVIEW OF POTENTIAL "DOWNSIDE" RISKS.
13.
EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY I APPROVE THE STAFF POSITION THA*6 EQUIPMENT FOR SEVERE ACCIDENT MITIGATION DOES NOT NEED TO MEET THE SAME QUALITY STANDARDS AS~EQU,tPMENT-FOR DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS, BUT NEED TO BE-QUALIFIED BY ANALYSIS OR TEST FOR THE INTENDED SERVICE.
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14.
OPERATING BASES EARTHQUAKE (OBE)/ SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE)
I APPROVE THE STAFF'S RECOMMENDATION THAT FOR THE EVOLUTIONARY REACTORS IT CONSIDER REQUESTS TO DECOUPLE THE OBE FRoM THE SSE oN A DESIGN SPECIFIC BASIS.
15.
INSERVICE TESTING OF PUMPS AND VALVES I APPROVE THE STAFF'S PROPOSED PROVISIONS INCLUDING STAFF'S RESPONSE TO ACRS COMMENTS.
_ _ _ _.