ML20055B164
| ML20055B164 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 07/09/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055B162 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8207200430 | |
| Download: ML20055B164 (3) | |
Text
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.,#* "*'%,h UNITED STATES s'
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
,j WASHINGTO N, D. C. 20555 D.
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 73 TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-19 AMENDMENT NO. 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICElGE NO. DPR-25,. AND AMENDMENT NO. 80 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29, AND AMENDMENT NO. 74 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30 COMMONWEALTH EDIS0N COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 3 QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1 QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254, 50-?65 Author:
J. Hegner 1.
Introduction By letter dated April 29, 1982 the Commonwealth Edison Company (the licensee) proposed a Technical Specification (TS) change to the Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3 and Quad Cities Station, Units 1 and 2 TS to delete that portion of the surveillance requirements that requires the automatic pressure relief sub-system be demonstrated operable daily upon declaring the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system inoperable.
===2.
Background===
The Dresden and Quad Cities Stations' TS currently require that certain ECCS systems, including the automatic pressure relief subsystem, be demonstrated operable immediately and daily thereafter when it is determined that the HPCI is inoperable. The change requested is to delete only the repetitive daily requirement to cycle each automatic pressure relief subsystem valve for the remaining six days in which the affected reactor unit is permitted by the Technical Specifications to operate with the HPCI inoperable.
8207200430 920709 PDR ADOCK 05000 P
2 On two previous occasions (
Reference:
Amendment No. 65 to DPR-19 for Dresden Unit 2 and Amendment No. 57 to DPR-25 for Dresden Unit 3) the licensee has been granted temporary relief from the provisions of this TS on an emergency basis.
3.
Evaluation The licensee has proposed that the portion of t surveillance test requirement that requires daily testing of the automatic pressure relief subsystem be deleted.
The licensee shall still be required to demonstrate the operability of the automatic pressure relief subsystem immediately upon declaring the HPCI inoperable.
Based on a review of BWR operating experience, it appears that the original TS surveillance requirement is overly restrictive in that the review identified certain undesirable consequences that can occur as a result of repeated testing of the automatic pressure relief subsystem. There have been instances in the past in which relief valves have failed to reseat after opening, and the testing of these valves causes repeated significant thermal and mechanical shocks to the reactor vessel and suppression chamber.
Based on this review, we have concluded that performance of the surveillance test immediately upon declaring the HPCI inoperable adequately demonstrates the operability of the automatic pressure relief subsy: tem. We have also concluded that the increased probability of having one of the pressure relief valves stick open during the repeated daily testing outweighs the benefits gained by such testing and that the safety of the facility will not be adversely affected by deleting the requirement to test these valves daily after the initial demonstration of their operability.
As a compensatory measure for the inoperable HPCI system, the licensee has proposed and will be required to have the feedwater pumps operable during the same period of permitted operation. The operability of the feedwater pumps will provide assurance, as long as offsite power is available, that a high pressure makeup capability is available for transients that do not cause.feedwater isolation.
Based on this evaluation and on similar evaluations conducted by the staff in issuing Amendment No. 65 to DPR-19 for Dresden Unit 2, dated Septer.ber 14, 1981 and Amendment No. 57 to DPR-25 for Dresden Unit 3, dated December 23, 1981, we find the licensee's proposed TS change to be acceptable.
4.
RPS Bypass Permissive Setpoint Error (Dresden Unit 3)
By letter dated May 25,1982 the. licensee informed the staff that Note No. 3 on page 24 to the TS for DPR-25 (changed in Amendment No. 59) was incorrect due to a typographical error in the page provided by the licensee in its March 18,1982 submittal. Specifically, the note should read:
"Pergissible to bypass when reactor pressure is < 600 psig." The note was issued as
< 100 psig." The staff has confirmed that 600 psig is the correct setpoint and will amend the note accordingly.
OS
3 5.
Surveillance Frequency Error for ADS testing (Quad Cities 1 and 2)
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The licensee informed the staff by 1etter dated April 29, 1982 that TS 3.5.D.1 to DPR-29 and 30 incorrectly specifies a surveillance test fr2quency pertaining to auto-initiation of the ADS valves every six Aonths. The test is intended to be performed during refueling outages. We have tonfirmed that~ each refueling outage is the correct frequency and will amend tTie specifications accordingly.
6.
Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environ-i mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the
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issuance of these amendments.
7.
Conclusion j
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, do not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendments do not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and. safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in. compliance with the Commission's regulations and the.
issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: July 9,1982 I
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