ML20055B058

Interim Significant Const Deficiency Rept 57 Re Inadequate Instrumentation & Control Installation & Turnover Documentation,Initially Reported 820702.Reinsp & Rework of Four Sys in Progress.Final Rept Will Be Submitted 820915

ML20055B058
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	07/09/1982
From:	Mclendon G LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, Q-3-A35.07.57, W3K82-0399, W3K82-399, NUDOCS 8207200304
Download: ML20055B058 (7)

Text

,

a LOUISIANA 242 OnanoNoe sinEe1 POWER & L1GHT P O BOX 6008

• NEW OnLEANS. LOUISlANA 70174 * (504) 366 2345

[$ES$sYsM July 9, 1982 G. D. McLENDON Senior Yce President W3K82-0399 Q-3-A35.07.57 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nucicar Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 ,

Arlington, Texas 76012

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 57

" Inadequate Instrumentation and Control Installations and Turnover Documentation"

Reference:

Telecon - L. L. Bass (LP&L) to W. Crossman (NRC) on 7/2/82

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 57, " Inadequate Instrumentation and Control Installations and Turnover Documentation."

If you have any questions, please advise.

Very truly yours, o ha h M Attachment cc: 1) Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (With 15 copies of report)

2) Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 (with I copy of report) 8207200304 820709 PDR ADOCK 05000382 S PDR

LOUISIANA POWER & LIGilT COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT NO. 3 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 57 INADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS AND TURNOVER DOCUMENTATION Reviewed by 4 .

I 2-

)PT f Milhiser -/ Site M6(ager ' Date Reviewed by 7 b

/. 'L.' Wills - Project' Superintendent Date Reviewed by // k ////f/ .4 [b '7' Date

'[L J. liart - troject Liceping Eng"ineer /

Reviewed by 1 [N^ 7/8f2 Date

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W. 'Ta"e ge 'r - Sr. Resid Engineer Reviewed by / NM/

1. [' ["[ 8 -

Date pervisor J.[tierrez#Q. A. Site July 8, 1982

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INTERIM REPORT l SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY No. 57 INADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER DOCUMENTATION l

i i

INTRODUCTION l

This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes

! Instrumentation and Control (I&C) System Installations which are not in accordance with the design specifications. Additionally, the recently prepared system "as-built" drawings do not accurately reficct the actual installed conditions. These problems are considered reportabic under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to

. 10CFR21.

l DESCRIPTION In preparation for ECCS Flow Testing ead Primary System Cold Fydrostatic Testing, Mercury Company of Norwood, Inc., (Installation Contractor for Instrumentation and Control Systems), submitted their installation,

( inspection, and test documentation and "as-built" drawings for th'e following plant start-up systems: ~1 _

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a) Start-Up System (SUS) No. 59 - Containment Spray s b) SUS No. 60A - High Pressure Safety Injection '

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c) SUS No. 60B - Low Pressure Safety Injection -

. _ . s, d) SUS No. 60C - Safety Injection Tanks , -

The Mercury submittal contained exceptions such that final Quality s s_

s Assurance / Quality Control certification was'not provided.' -s - ,

, - ~

Audita of the I&C System documentation in coTdunction'ulth field surveillance revealed that: ,

• ss

) a) The "as-built" drawings did not accurately reflect field conditions.

l Problems such as (1) reverse slope of tubing runs, (2) incorrect seismic support designations, and (3) dimensional errors were identified.

b )' Physical problems existed with the' actual installations such as (1) l

' reverse slope of tubing runs, (2) supports.not installed. (3) improper -

l bolting (4) deformed tubing, and (5) tubing todching track or bolt heads

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not allowing for thermal expansion. -~ s l ~

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SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Instrumentation associated with these systems included Safety Class 2 and 3 instrumentation. These instruments are required for safety system accuation and for plant parameter monitoring by the Reactor Operations. If left uncorrected, these problems *.2uld result in the failure of essential safety-related equipment to operate when required and the failure of the instruments to provide reliable information to the Reactor Operators.

CORRECTIVE' ACTION on June 23, 1982, Mercury Company of f.:orwood, Inc., was directed to:

a) Reassign crafts off safety-related systems installation and rework until directed by the Engineer.

b) Identify rework teams of Craft, Foremen Field Engineers, QC Inspectors Supervision who, upon completion of an immediate retraining program satisfactory to the Engineer, will proceed with rework required for acceptable construction completion, documentation, and turnover of the aforementioned systems.

c) Develop a documented retraining program, related to correcting the problems being encountered, to be submitted to the Engineer for approval no later than June 25, 1982.

d) Upon approval by the Engineer of this retraining program, impicment this program under the purview of the Engineer with the rework teams identified in (b).above.

e) Upon concurrence by the Engineer that this retraining program has been properly executed for the teams, the Engineer will authorize reassignment of craft to safety-related work, f) Extend the retraining program to all Mercury personnel consistent with the training schedule included in the aforementioned retraining p rogram.

g) ~ Implement organizational changes resulting f rom the scheduled meeting with LP&L and Ebasco on June 24, 1982'.

. Reinspection and rework of the four systems listed above (Description Section) is in progress.

Corrective action applicable to the other safety-related instrumentation systems will be established upon assessment of the results of the above defined actions for.the four systems currently in question.

A Final Report will be submitted to the USNRC by September 15, 1982.

1

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LOUISIANA POWER & LICl!T COMPANY WATERFORD SES UNIT No. 3 Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 57 INADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTALLATIONS AND TURNOVER DOCUMENTATION Reviewed by 4 .

I 2----

JPT 4 Milhiser -/ Site M4(ager / Date Reviewed by_ 2 b

/. 1. Tills - Project' Superintendent Date Reviewed by // k# / /// .

/ ((f[ 7' '[k Date J. Ifart - l'rdjecti Licoping Eng"incer /

Reviewed by 1 . [#MTU 7/8 /72 W. Ma"ege'r J Sr. Resid Engineer Date Reviewed by 4 Udb$  ?~ h* $ L A. Site pervisor Date J.[tierrez d' Q'.

July 8, 1982

, s INTERIM REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY No. 57 INADEQUATE INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL INSTALLATION AND TURNOVER DOCUMENTATION INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e). It describes Instrumentation and Control (I&C) System Installations which are not in accordance with the design specifications. Additionally, the recently prepared system "as-built" drawings do not accurately reflect the actual installed conditions. These problems are considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been reported to the Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission pursuant to

. 10CFR21.

DESCRIPTION In preparation for ECCS Flow Testing and Primary System Cold Hydrostatic Testing, Mercury Company of Norwood, Inc. , (Installatien Contractor for Instrumentation and Control Systems), submitted their installation, inspection, and test documentation and "as-built" drawings for the following plant start-up systems:

a) Start-Up System (SUS) No. 59 - Containment Spray b) SUS No. 60A - HabP Pressure Safety Injection c) SUS No. 60B - Low Pressure Safety Injection d) SUS No. 60C - Safety Injection Tanks The Mercury submittal contained exceptions such that final Quality Assurance / Quality Control certification was not provided.

Audits of the I&C System documentation in conjunction with field surveillance revealed that:

a) The "as-built" drawings did not accurately reflect field conditions.

Problems such as (1) reverse slope of tubing runs, (2) incorrect seismic support designations, and (3) dimensional errors were identified.

4 b) Physical problems existed with the actual installations such as (1) reverse slope of tubing runs, (2) supports not installed, (3) improper bolting, (4) deformed tubing, and (5) tubing touching track or bolt heads not allowing for thermal expansion.

e I

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Instrumentation associated with these systems included Safety Class 2 and 3 instrumentation. These instruments are required for safety system accuation and for plant parameter monitoring by the Reactor Operations. If Icft uncorrected, these problems could result in the failure of essential safety-related equipment to operate when required and the failure of the instruments to provide reliable information to the Reactor Operators.

CORRECTIVE ACTION on June 23, 1982, Mercury Company of Norwood, lac., was directed to: l a) Reassign crafts off safety-related systems installation and rework until directed by the Engineer.

b) Identify rework teams of Craft, Foremen, Field Engineers, QC j Inspectors Supervision who, upon completion of an immediate retraining program satisf actory to the Engineer, will proceed with rework

required for acceptable construction completion, documentation, and turnover of the aforementioned systems.

i c) Develop a documented retraining program, related to correcting the problems being encountered, to be submitted to the Engineer for approval no later than June 25, 1982.

d) Upon approval by the Engineer of this retraining program, implement this program under the purview of the Engineer with the rework teams identified in (b) above.

c) Upon concurrence by the Engineer that this retraining program has been properly executed for the teams, the Engineer will authorize reassignment of craft to safety-related work.

f) Extend the retraining program to all Mercury personnel consistent with the training schedule included in the aforementioned retraining program.

g) Impicment organizational changes resulting from the scheduled meeting with LP&L and Ebasco on June 24, 1982.

Reinspection and rework of the four systems listed above (Description Section) is in progress.

Corrective action applicable to the other safety-related instrumentation systems will be established upon assessment of the results of the above defined actions for the four systems currently in question.

A Final Report will be submitted to the USNRC by September 15, 1982.

_. __ _ , ._. ~ __ _- -