ML20055A281
| ML20055A281 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 07/07/1982 |
| From: | Garrity J Maine Yankee |
| To: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR JAG-82-127, MN-82-131, NUDOCS 8207160062 | |
| Download: ML20055A281 (5) | |
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guaugraf,l,in"gj Qp sD' (207) 623-3521 m9 July 7, 1982 MN 82-131 JHG-82-127 United States tbclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention: Office of tbclear Reactor Regulation Division of Licensing Operating Reactors Branch #3 Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief
References:
- 1) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309)
- 2) MYAPCO Letter to USNRC dated September 18, 1981, FMY-81-141, Control of Heavy Loads
Subject:
Control of Heavy Loads Dear Sir.
This letter is to document our conference call of June 23, 1982, between representatives of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and WESTEC Services, Inc.
Representatives for each of the parties were as follows:
Maine Yankee:
J. H. Garrity, R. F. Prouty, A. J. Cayla, J. F. Dobransky U.S. tOclear Regulatory Commission:
F. Clemonson, C. Nelson WESTEC Services, Inc.:
D. J. Vito, I. H. Sargent The purpose of the conference call was to discuss the draft technical evaluation report (TER) on Maine Yankee's initial submittal reference (2).
Several revisions to the draft TER were agreed to during the course of the l
call:
~33 a)
On page 5, under Fuel Building Yard Crane, the second reason for exclusion should read " Limit switches prevent movement over fuel in j
the spent fuel pool."
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July 7, 1982 Page 2 b)
On pape 6, under trolley for circulating water pump house (monorail),
the reason for exclusion should read "Special purpose lift only, no installed hoisting mechanism."
c)
On page 6, under fuel building crane add the following reason for exclusion " Intervening floors for spent fuel purification pump."
d)
On page 6, under containment annulus manual hoist and monorail change the reason fnr exclusion to read " Intervening floors."
Initial discussions covered the " Summary of Licensee Statements and Conclusions." Three systems were oreviously excluded: a) PAB Holst (lower floors), b) auxiliary feed pump room monorails, c) monorails and hoists for steam and feed valve house.
One additional load handling system was excluded from the general guidelines of NUREG-0612; Trolley for Circulating Water Pumo House. Justification for the trolly for the circulating water pump house is as follows:
The critical volume in the Circulating Water Pump House is associated with the service water pumps, including piping and power cables.
The service water cumps are spaced 17' apart. Their power cables are routed through conduit along the east wall of the service water pump bay.
Sufficient horizontal separation exists such that no load drop can impact on the power cables.
The trolley for the Circulating Water Pump House runs parallel to the discharge header piping between the service water pumps and their discharge valves. There is no installed hoisting mechanism on this trolley.
The monorail is used only for maintenance on the service water pumos or their discharge valves.
It is not used to move loads around the pump house.
Since this monorail and trolley are used for a single purpose only, it should be excluded from the general guidelines of NUREG 0612.
The following load handling systems were not excluded in the draft TER:
a)
Reactor Containment Polar Crane (CR-1) b)
Turbine Hall Crane (CR-2) c)
Fuel Building Yard Crane (CR-3) d)
PAB Holst (Uoper Floors) e)
Fuel Building Crane f)
Containment Annulus Manual Holst and Monorail The seven general guidelines of NUREG 0612 were covered in sequence as addressed in the TER.
Agreement between Maine Yankee and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on each of the guidelines is summarized below.
l Quideline 1 - Safe Load Paths Maine Yankee will provide appropriate drawings showing load paths and the location of systems required for safe shutdown and decay heat removal as recommended in the TER.
These drawings will be provided to the NRC and available for use on site for the six non-excluded load handling systems listed above by August 23, 1982.
July 7, 1982 Page 3 Guideline 2 - Load Handlino Procedures Maine Yankee currently has a procedure which covers the operation of overhead traveling cranes.
Specific procedures coverina the specific applicable loads in Table 3-1 of NUREG-0612 are currently available at the site for the containment polar crane and fuel building crane.
Maine Yankee wili vi tablish general operatino procedures for the other non-excluded load harr h ~l systems by August 23, 1982.(It was agreed that individual loads for these other systems need not be addressed soecifically).
Guideline 3 - Crane Operator Training mine Yankee had previously committed (reference 2) to upgrading the operator training proaram in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976. This program is still under development. We will report the.results available and scope and schedule of remaining open items by August 23, 1982, and indicate the plans to be implemented for the fall 1982 refueling outane.
Guideline 4 - Special Lifting Device Maine Yankee is evaluating the two special lifting devices identified in reference (2) against ANSI N14.6-1978 and will provide the results available and scope and schedule of remaining open items by August 23, 1982.
If insufficient information is available to complete the point by point review specified in the TER, justification or a schedule to complete appropriate alternatives will be provided when the review is forwarded.
Guideline 5 - Liftino Devices (Not Specially Designed)
Maine Yankee is in the process of verifying conformance with the four specific requirements of this guideline as identified in the draft TER, or providino alternatives. The results available and scooe and schedule of remaining open items will be provided by August 23, 1982.
Guideline 6 - Cranes (Inspection, Testing and Maintenance)
Maine Yankee is in the process of reviewing our crane inspection, testing and maintenance program and comparing it with the applicable ANSI standard.
We will describe the results of this comparison by August 23, 1982, and identify any steps required to complete action in this area.
Guideline 7 - Crane Desion Maine Yankee is continuing with its evaluation of the polar crane design to the standards of CMAA-70 and will provide the results available and scope and schedule of remaining open items of the thirteen specific points identified in the TER by August 23, 1982. Additionally, the turbine hall crane, yard crane and fuel building crane desion reviews will be provided at the same time.
July 7, 1982 Page 4 The last area covered during the conference call was the status of the interim protection measures.
Maine Yankee indicated that the TER evaluation made in regards to Interim Protection Measure 1 was inaccurate in that there are no Technical Specifications which prohibit movement of heavy loads over the scent fuel pool.
However, because of the location of the spent fuel pool, Maine Yankee does not anticipate the need to move heavy loads over fuel in the spent fuel pool.
It was also noted that this matter has been addressed with respect to Proposed Change 70.
Interim Protection Measure 6 was inadvertently left out of our initial submittal, reference 2.
This spo.clal review for heavy loads over the core was' the first action taken by Maine Yankee in respondina to the NRC information requests.
This review included a thorough review of all maintenance procedures used for handlina heavy loads over the core during refuelings.
Each procedure was reviewed for completeness and clarity to insure that the loads could be handled safely. Special attention was given to directions given for installation of the lifting devices and for actual movement of the loads.
The major loads handled for refuelings are controlled through the use of a polar coordinate system and diagrams showing travel paths are included within the applicable procedures.
This review also included review of the inspection procedure for the polar crane and ensurina that these inspections were required to have been completed prior to the start of refueling. Deficiencies discovered during crane inspections are required to be corrected prior to crane operation via the maintenance request (MR) system.
Af ter the review of all the maintenance load handling procedures, a Ulorough review of the refueling operation was undertaken to identify any heavy loads not specifically covered by current procedures.
This review identified the reactor vessel stud storage rack as a load not covered by procedure as pointed out in our initial submittal; reference (2). Maine Yankee previously committed to establish adequate controls for the movement of this load and incorporate them into existing procedures prior to the 1982 refueling outage.
The final aspect of the special review was to verify that all crane operators were trained and familiar with accepted hand signals, conduct of operations and procedure content. Maine Yankees conclusion was that this special review satisfied Interim Protection Measure 6.
l l
l
July 7,1982 Page 5 This conpleted the subjects and agreements reached between Maine Yankee and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the June 23, 1982 conference call.
We trust that this information will be satisfactory, however, should you require additional information, please contact us.
Sincerely, MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY John H. Garrity Senior Director Nuclear Engineering and Licensing JHG/vl