ML20054L446

Forwards Final Rept of All Inservice Insps Conducted During 1981 Refueling Outage & Completed on 820408

ML20054L446
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	07/02/1982
From:	Morisi A BOSTON EDISON CO.
To:	Vassallo D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20054L447	List: ML20054L446 ML20054L450 ML20054L454 ML20054L460 ML20054L465
References
82-185, NUDOCS 8207080129
Download: ML20054L446 (2)

Text

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l 4 4 9 BOSTON EOisON COMPANY DENERAL Orrects 800 SovLaTON STREET Bo mTQ N, M ABBACHUB ETTs 0 219 9 A. V. M O RISI MANAGER NUCLEAR O PERAf TON S SUPPORT DEPARTM ENT July 2,1982 BECo. Ltr. #82- 185 Mr. Domenic B. Vassallo, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #2 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 License No. DPR-35 Docket No. 50-293 FINAL REPORT OF INSERVICE INSPECTION CONDUCTED DURING REFUELING OUTAGE

Dear Sir:

The 1981 Inservice Inspection of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit #1 was completed on April 8,1982, and, in accordance with the requirements of ASME Section XI, Boston Edison Company is submitting the Final Report of all Inservice Inspection activities conducted during the Refueling Outage.

The Final Report is divided into the following sections:

- Mechanized examination conducted by Southwest Research Institute

- Visual examination of the core spray sparger conducted by Southwest Research

- Analysis of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit #1 vessel specimen conducted by Southwest Research Institute

- Manual and direct visual examinations of Class 1 and 2 pipe welds and components conducted by Magnaflux Quality Services.

The results of the mechanized examination of specific reactor vessel nozzles and seam welds did not reveal any unacceptable results. As required by ASME Section XI, a re-examination was conducted of those indications in the Core Spray Sparger which were previously identified as being unacceptable. The reinspection was conducted utilizing more sophisticated recording equipment, improved lighting techniques, and a video tape enhancement process. As a result of utilizing these techniques, all but two of the indications have been evaluated to be insignificant (grinding marks, or could not be re-established). The remaining indications were found to be stable with regard to crack propagation, gg%

The manual report includes the visual examination results of the Class 1 system i$, l hydrostatic pressure test which is normally conducted at or near the end of th.e L &p inspection interval. Since the outboard isolation valve of each system was closed, 8207080129 820702

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sOsTON EDISON COMPANY July 2,1982 Page 2 the downstream Class 1 attachment weld of each valve was not included in this hydrostatic pressure test. It is anticipated that these welds will be included in the hydrostatic oressure tests of the Class 2 and 3 systems.

The manual examination of specific welds in the control rod drive system revealed an unacceptable flaw. The control rod drive return line was subsequently cut and capped which de-classified the line from Class 2 to non-nuclear. No further action is therefore required.

At the completion of the 1981 Outage, BECo determined that some areas of the In-service Inspection Program were not implemented; these include:

1. Reactor vessel shell-to-flange weld from 116 U to 120 (1 ')

2. Reactor vessel studs #46 and #47

3. Reactor vessel nuts #46 through #56

4. Hydrostatic pressure tests for Class 2 and 3 piping systems.

5. Internal inspection of MOV 2301-4 BECo is proposing to include these inspections as cart of the first period of the second inspection interval; this will be considered as an extension of the first inspection interval as allowed as ASME Section XI,1974 edition, paragraph IWA-2400 (1). In accordance with this paragraph, the inspection interval may be extended as much as one year to permit inspections to be concurrent with plant outages. The first inspection interval will terminate on Dec. 8,1982; since the next refueling outage is scheduled for October 19, 1983, BECo would be extending the interval by ten months.

To be consistent with the inspection of the first inspection interval, the following editions of ASME Section XI would be employed:

1. Reactor vessel shell-to-flange weld, reactor vessel studs #46 and #47 and reactor vessel nuts #46 through #56 - 1972 edition, summer 75 addenda.

2. Hydrostatic pressure tests for Class 2 and 3 systems - 1977 edition, summer 78 addenda (IWA, B & C, D-5000).

Very truly vours ,

Attachments: 3 copies of the Final Report (4 volumes per report) cc: Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I (1 copy of Final Report)

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