ML20054K147
| ML20054K147 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1982 |
| From: | Tompkins B NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8207010242 | |
| Download: ML20054K147 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD Administrative Judges:
Gary J.
Edles, Chairman Dr. John H. Buck SEVED JUN 30196%
Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy
).
In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289 - SP
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(Three Mile Island Fuclear
)
(Restart)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
)
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER June 30, 1982 In the six months since the TMI Restart Board issued its decision on Plant Design and Procedures 1 we have noted three new safety-related matters, all of which appear to be relevant to the TMI-1 reactor.
We would like to raise these issues, sua sponte, in connection with our appellate review of plant design and technical issues.
We believe the matters that we wish to pursue are important to the public health and safety, and can be satisfactorily resolved on the basis of affidavits submitted to this Board.
_1/
Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 NRC 1211 (December 14,
(
1981); (Partial Initial Decision, 25 589-1329).
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This is not the usual operating license proceeding; therefore, we recognize that our proposal may require Commission approval.
See 10 CFR 2.785 (b) (2).
Our review of appeals from the decision of the TMI Restart Board is well underway.
Accordingly, we respectfully request that the Commission promptly approve our. undertaking a review of these issues sua sponte so that we may resolve them along with the parties' appeals.
The proposed new issues are as follows:
As is widely known, -2/ the steam generator tubes 1.
at TMI-1 have been subjected to corrosive attack as a result of contamination of the reactor coolant system.
While steam generator tube corrosion is not directly relevant to the accident at TMI-2, the initiation of a highly corrosive agent into the reactor coolant system may have been the result of poor maintenance or training, which are major areas-being considered in the TMI-1 restart hearing.
There-fore, we should be informed of the results of investigations by licensee and staff into the cause of the reactor coolant system contamination and corrective action proposed to prevent its recurrence.
--2/
- See, e.g.,
letter dated January 25, 1982, from E.
Blake, Jr.,
tc.idministrative Judge Milhollin; also PNO-TMI-81-22, November 23, 1981, and PNO-TMI-81-22A, December 1, 1981.
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A letter dated April 30, 1982, from H.D.'Hukill, GPU Nuclear, to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation discusses the plan for repair of the steam generator tubes.
This will involve a technique of expanding and resealing the tube walls at points below where corrosion attacked the tubes.
The letter indicates that the repair operation will begin after qualification testing of the tube expansion technique.
This resealing of the TMI-l steam generator tubes constitutes a unique operation.
We believe that we should be fully informed of the qualification testing of the tube expansion technique and its acceptance based on those tests.
The results of the inspection program to determine any corrosion damage to reactor internals should also be provided.
Finally, we should be kept informed of the progress of the repair program.
This will enable us to determine promptly whether the proposed repair methods are adequate to reasonably assure the protection of public health and safety.
Based on the above discussion, we request licensee to answer the following questions:
(a)
What are the results of licensee and staff investigations into the cause of the reactor coolant system contamination?
What corrective actions have been implemented to prevent its recurrence?
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(b)
What methods of qualification testing were developed for the tube expansion technique?
What are the results of the qualification testing?
(c)
What are the results of the inspection program to determine any corrosion damage to reactor internals?
(d)
What is the progress pf the steam generator tube repair program?
Reports should be provided periodically.
2.
As a result of the March 1979 accident at Three Mile Island, the Commission ordered the Rancho Seco reactor (another Babcock and Wilcox Facility) to shut down pending the completion of specified short-term actions intended to enhance the reactor's response to certain operational transients.
In addition the licensee was to implement "as promptly as practicable" additional long-term modifications.
During a hearing called to consider whether these actions were necessary and sufficient to provide continued reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients, the hearing board considered, inter alia, the issue of the number of high pressure injections that should be permitted. -3/
The Appeal Board was not
--3/
This concern arose because of the proposal by the staff for greater op. ration of the high pressure injection (HPI) system.
Each operation produces a thermal cycling of the HPI nozzles, which could eventually cause the nozzles to crack.
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catisfied with the resolution of this issue and requested further information.
ALAB-655, 14 NRC 799, 810-11 (1981).
A few weeks after this request to the Rancho Seco licensee, cracking in some high pressure nozzles and/or their thermal shields was discovered in the HPI systems of
-Crystal River and an Oconee unit, both B&W reactors.
The Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), licensee for Rancho Seco, undertook ultrasonic and x-ray studies of its HPI system and discovered one thermal shield missing, two others cracked and loose.
This' led to a program of redesign and replacement of the thermal shields that is still underway.
Because the TMI-l reactor is generally similar to the Crystal River, Oconee anti Rancho Seco reactors and the HPI system is critical to its safety systems, we request licensee to provide full and complete answers to the following questions:
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(a)
Since the HPI nozzle problems in other B&W reactors have become known, have the TMI-l HPI nozzles and their thermal sleeves been inspected by appropriate non-destruc.tive testing methods?
If so, are all sleeves in place?
Is any cracking evident in either nozzles or thermal sleeves?
- (b)
If-the thermal sleeves are held in place only by
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weld buttons (as in Rancho Seco) what is being done at TMI to correct this design to ensure that sleeves will not move l
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6 out of position?
(c).What plans do you have for limiting thermal shock to the HPI nozzles and sleeves?
(d)
What periodic non-destructive testing procedures do you propose for the HPI system when TMI-1 becomes operational?
3.
A situation similar to that in Item 2 arises at TMI because of recent difficulties that some other reactors, including at least two B&W facilities,-have recently faced in connection with the auxiliary feedwater spargers at the top of the steam generators. -4/
Several of these spargers have been found to be distorted and partially separated from their entrance nozzles.
B&W has proposed a new design which is being installed in at least two reactors.
Again~,
because this is a critical safety matter we request the licensee to provide answers to the following questions:
(a)
Is the auxiliary feedwater sparger installed in TMI-1 an internal sparger similar to those which have been found damaged in some other B&W reactors?
(b)
If the answers to Question (a) is "yes", please describe the modifications you propose to make and the schedule for such modifications.
--4/
See PNO-III-82-38, April 13, 1982; also PNO-III-82-38A, April 16 and April 20, 1982, re Davis-Besse and Oconee reactors.
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7 (c)
If the answer to Question (a) is "no",
please describe the auxiliary water injection system that is used at TMI-1 and state either your reasons for believing this is satisfactory, or what modifications you propose.
Subject to Commission approval, licensee's response shall be in our hands by close Qf business on July 26, 1982.
Any replies to licensee's response shall be in our hands by close of business on August 16, 1982.
It is so ORDERED.
FOR THE APPEAL BOARD Ju J t
Barbara A.
Tompkins /
Secretary to the Appeal Board Dr. Gotchy agrees in principle with the matters discussed herein but was unavailable to review this Memorandum and Order.
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