ML20054H934
| ML20054H934 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1982 |
| From: | Burgess B, Connaughton K, Hayes D, Hinds J, Mcgregor L, Waters J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20054H927 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-82-12, 50-304-82-10, NUDOCS 8206250219 | |
| Download: ML20054H934 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000295/1982012
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No. 50-295/82-12(DPRP); 50-304/82-10(DPRP)
Docket No. 50-295; 50-304
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2
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Inspection At: Zion Site, Zion, IL
Inspection Conducted: April 1 through May 14, 1982
Inspectors:
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Reactor Projects Section IB
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Inspection Summary
Inspection on April 1 through May 14, 1982 (Reports No. 50-295/82-12(DPRP);
50-304/82-10(DPRP)
Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced-resident inspection of licensee action
on previous inspection items, radioactive releases, RCS temperature limits,
Rad Monitor Task Force, Confirmatory Order Application, Anonymous Allegation,
Change in F , Steam Generator Inspection and Repair, Instrument Air Task
Force, Refueling Operations, Operational Safety Verification, Monthly
Maintenance Observation, Monthly Surveillance observation and Licensee
Event Reports. The inspection involved a total of 432 hours0.005 days <br />0.12 hours <br />7.142857e-4 weeks <br />1.64376e-4 months <br /> by five NRC
inspectors including 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the areas inspected one item-of noncompliance (improper by-
passing of Refueling Interlocks, paragraph 4) was identified.
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8206250219 820610
DR ADOCK 05000g
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- K. Graesser, Station Superintendent
- E. Fuerst, Assistant Station Superintendent,' Operations
G. Plim1, Assistant Station Superintendent, Administrative
and Support Services
R. Budowle, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
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J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
- L.
Pruett, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
P. LeBlond, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
A. Miosi, Technical Staff Supervisor
B. Schramer, Station Chemist
F. Ost, Health Physics Engineer
C. Silich, Technical Staff Engineer, ISI
- B.
Harl, Quality Assurance Engineer
- T.
Lukens, Quality Control Engineer
B. Kurth, Master Instrument Mechanic
- Denotes those present at the exit meeting of May 14, 1982.
2.
Summary of Operations
Unit 1
Unit i remained shut down for a scheduled refueling outage during the
entire inspection period. The outage is currently scheduled to be.
completed June 3, 1982.
Unit 2
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Unit 2 operated at power levels up to 100% during the inspection
period. At times power level was limited to less than 50% due to
high conductivity levels in the secondary system. The licensee
believes the conductivity levels are caused by some type of organic
compound as opposed to contamination with lake water. On April 9,
1982 during surveillance testing of the auxiliary feed pumps (AFP)
the secondary system did become contaminated with lake water when a
service water cross connect valve leaked lake water into the AFP
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suction. The AFP's injected the water into the steam generators and
the condensate storage tank. Conductivity levels of 68 micro-mho/cm
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were measured in the steam generators. The unit was shutdown and cooled
down as required by station procedures. After cleaning up the secondary
systems, Unit 2 was made critical April 13, 1982 and tied to the grid
April 14, 1982.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items
Open Item (50-295/82-04-01): Corrective action for components wetted
during flooding of reactor cavity.
As of the end of the inspection
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period the licensee had received a Westinghouse letter stating that
plant conditions and chemical levels in the refueling water should
preclude reaching concentrations that would raise concern for reactor
vessel materials. The letter also suggested monitoring ventilation
loading as a precaution against loss of reflectivity of the mirror
insulation. The station is to receive the results of additional
analysis by the Station Nuclear Engineering Department and the
Systems Materials Analysis Department. Since further information
is required on this matter, the item will remain open. This item
must be resolved prior to plant heat up.
(50-295/82-12-01)
(Closed) Open Item (50-295/82-04-03) Loss of RHR on February 23, 1982:
Further discussions with operations personnel have indicated that there
was no loop seal in the reactor vessel level tubing. The level indi-
cation appears to have been valid. The exact cause of the loss of
RHR suction cannot be determined but it is suspected that the RCS may
have been drained too fast.
4.
Bypassing of Refueling Interlocks
On April 2, 1982, while witnessing fuel handling operations, the
inspector observed operators routinely bypassing an interlock when
moving fuel modules from one core location to another. After with-
drawing a module high enough to clear the core, the operators would
use the interlock bypass switch to override the interlock that pre-
vents bridge and trolley drive operation except when the gripper
tube up position switch is actuated. The bridge and trolley could
then be driven to the new core location with the fuel module not
fully withdrawn into the mast.
Through conversations with operators
the inspector determined that the bypassing of this interlock was
routine practice when moving fuel modules from one core location to
another.
Technical Specification 6.2.A states that " detailed written procedures
including applicable checkoff lists covering items listed below
(Refueling Operations) shall be prepared, approved and adhered to."
Zion Station Fuel Handling Instruction FHI-13 precaution 3.1 states
" Interlock bypasses are for use either in emergencies or to permit
operation in areas where there may be obstructions to free travel
of the mast."
Contrary to the above, on April 2,
1982 operators were observed
routinely bypassing the gripper tube up interlock.
This violation was inspector identified.
This item is designated as Open Item 50-295/82-12-02 pending verifi-
cation of the licensee's corrective action.
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5.
Release of April 27, 1982
At about 1:40 p.m. April 27, 1982 a very small gaseous release of
unknown origin occurred. The release was seen on the recorder for
the auxiliary building vent monitor and was too small to be seen
by any other monitor. The licensee calculated that the total
activity was 120 millicuries with a maximum release rate of about
0.6% of the Technical Specifications limit.
The licensee was unable to determine the source of the release.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Establishment of Lower RCS Temperature Limit
In response to inspector concerns the licensee's nuclear engineering
group determined that the shutdown margin calculations used during
cold shutdown are based on a minimum expected RCS temperature of
68*F. It is possible to cool the RCS lower than 68 F using RHR during
winter months. The licensee has initiated changes to station pro-
cedures GOP-1 and PT-0 to establish 68*F as the lowest allowable RCS
temperature.
No items of noncompliance ;ere identified.
7.
Review of Rad Monitor Program
The inspector reviewed the licensee's program to improve the perform-
ance and reliability of the plant radiation monitors. The program
was implemented in May of 1981. The Unit 1 operating engineer receives
a daily report of rad monitors that are out of service. He reviews
the report and investigates any monitors that have been removed from
service since the previous report.
He is also responsible for expediting
the repair and restoration of failed monitors. Usually there is a weekly
meeting of representatives from operations, technical staff, instrument
maintenance and radiation protection to determine if there have been any
repetitive malfunctions that need long term corrective action and to
ensure that there are no delays in returning monitors to service.
The need for long term corrective actions is referred to the Rad Monitor
Task Force. The task force determines what actions to take,' initiates
the action, and tracks its status. The Task Force consists of the
Assistant Superintendent for Technical Support, the Unit 1 Operating
Engineer, the cognizant Technical Staff Engineer, the Lead Health
Physicist and either the Master Instrument Mechanic or a foreman.
Task force meetings are held every six weeks and formal minutes are
kept.
Some examples of the actions taken by the rad monitor task force are
as follows:
1.
Replacement of multi point recorder with pen recorders for
several important process monitors.
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2.
Institution of a program to silver plate copper contacts to
prevent the corrosion buildup that was causing monitor
failures.
3.
Initiation of a modification to provide reflash alarm circuitry
for the control board on a rad monitor alarm.
4.
Replacement of nylon gears that had exhibited a high failure
rate with steel gears in the check source mechanism of certain
monitors
The licensee has also implemented some of the recommendations contained
in a study of the radiation monitoring system done by Stone and Webster
issued in March of 1981.
Licensee calculations indicate that there has
been a reduction in the average number of rad monitors out of service
on a given day from 7.8 in November and December of 1981 to 5.5 in
January and February of 1982.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Confirmatory Order Requirements as Applied to Crevice Flushing
The February 29, 1980 Confirmatory Order Item A.3 issued to Zion
Station requires that the licensee conduct a low pressure gross leak
test of containment prior to any start up from cold shutdown condi-
tions. As part of the sequence for the Unit i return to operation,
the licensee plans to perform crevice flushing on the steam generators.
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This evolution requires reactor coolant pump heat up to about 230*F
followed by rapid steam off of the S/G which will cool down the RCS
to below 222*F.
This sequence is repeated several times for each
steam generator. The whole process will take about a week and is
followed by a cooldown to remove temporary S/G hand hole plates, with
heat up to criticality temperature to follow immediately thereafter.
In a conference call on May 5, 1982 between licensee representatives,
the Zion Licensing Project Manager, and the Senior Resident Inspector,
it was concluded that the heatups required for crevice flushing did
not constitute a start up and that the low pressure gross leak test
of the confirmatory order need not be repeated. This-conclusion was
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also based on the assumption that none of the systems previously
tested have been disturbed, otherwise they must be re-tested.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
9.
Anonymous Allegations
On May 5, 1982 an anonymous caller alleged to the Senior Resident
Inspector that contractor employees were drinking at lunch time and
returning to the site inebriated. Unit I was in a refueling outage
at the time with a large number of contractor employees on site.
The licensee intensified its monitoring of employees entering the
facility, increased the awareness of the contractor's management,
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and monitored contractor areas and parking lots. No instances of
improper conduct were observed.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
10.
Changes in Unit 1F
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The 498 tubes currently plugged in the Unit 1 steam generators exceed
the assumed 1% tubes plugged in the most recent ECCS/LOCA analysis.
Using Westinghouse sensitivity study, relationships between percent
tubes plugged and peak clad temperature, and between peak clad
temperatures and F the licensee has determined that a new F limit
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of 2.13 will accomodate the effect of the tube plugging. The "80
case" analysis for Unit I cycle 7 shows a maximum expected F of
2.091.
Since this is below the new proposed limit of 2.13, surveil-
lance using the Axial Power Distribution Monitoring System will not
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be required. The licensee intends to submit and obtain approval for
a Technical Specification change establishing 2.13 as the new F limit
for Unit 1.
Approval of this change will be required prior to Unit 1
start up.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
11.
Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Repair and Plugging
Due to primary to secondary tube leakage and damage to the ID S/G
tube ends (see Inspection Report 50-295/82-04; 50-304/82-04) an
extensive tube examination and repair program was conducted during
the current refueling outage. All tubes in all four steam generators
were examined using eddy current testing and helium leak testing.
The number of tubes plugged in the A, B, C and D steam generators
was 116, 120, 103 and 133 respectively. These numbers include the
94 row 1 tubes plugged in each generator due to concerns of generic
problems in this row.
As a result of the damage to the tube ends by
loose parts in the primary system, all but 296 tubes in the ID steam
generator hot leg side required repair. The repair consisted of
re-ro111ac the tube ends to re-establish circularity and permit eddy
current probing.
Further details of the steam generator work are
contained in Inspection Reports 50-295/82-10 and 50-295/82-08.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
12.
Review of Instrument Air Program
Zion Station has had a history of air operated valves failing to
operate when the solenoid operated air control valves became stuck
in their existing position. This was found to be caused by contam-
inants, primarily oil, in the instrument air system which interacted
with the solenoid valve seals. The licensee has taken various actions
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to correct this program (see Inspection Reports 50-295/81-29; 50-304/
81-27.) One of the licensee's actions was to institute a program to
improve the reliability of the instrument air compressors. There are
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three instrument air compressors and two'are required to supply normal
instrument air system loads.
Thus, if more than one instrument air
compressor is out of service, it is necessary to cross tie instrument
air to the service air system. The service air system has proven to
be the source of most of the oil'in the instrument air system.
The program to improve the instrument air system reliability is admin-
istered by the instrument air task force. The task force is comprised
of the Assistant Superintendent for Administrative and Technical
Services, the Assistant Superintendent for Maintenance,,a Representa-
tive from the Operations Department and the' cognizant Technical Staff
Engineer. Meetings are held every three months and formal minutes are
kept. The task force functions to identify problems, initiate correc-
tive action-and assign responsibility for follow-up concerning matters
affecting the reliability or quality of instrument air system. One of
the first actions taken was to establish a preventative maintenance
program for the instrument air compressors. The compressors are over-
hauled every six months using a specific checklist. They have also
been balanced using a vibration analyser. A trending program has been
established which logs the duration of any crosstie between instrument
and service air systems. Since July of 1981 when the trending began,
the systems have been cross connected for a total time of about 1.7
days. The inspector will continue to monitor the effectiveness of
the licensee's program.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
13.
Refueling Activities
The inspector verified that prior to the handling of fuel in the core,
all prerequisites required by the licensee's procedures had been com-
pleted and verified that during.the outage the periodic testing of
refueling related equipment was performed as required by Technical
Specifications; the inspector observed two shifts of the fuel handling
operations (removal, inspection and insertion) and, except as noted
in paragraph 4, verified the activities were performed in accordance
with the Technical Specifications and approved procedures; verified
that containment integrity was maintained as required by Technical
Specifications; verified that good housekeeping was maintained in
the refueling area; and, verified that staffing during refueling was
in accordance with Technical Specifications and approved procedures.
One item of noncompliance (paragraph 4) was identified.
14.
Operational Safety Verification
The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted discussions with control room operators-during
the months of April and May 1982. The inspector verified the'oper-
ability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and
verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of
Unit 1 containment, the auxiliary building, the crib house and the
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turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibra-
tions and'to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance. The inspector by observation and
direct interview verified that the physical security plan was being
implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the
month of April, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of
the cold leg accumulator system to-verify operability. The inspector
also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls
associated with radwaste shipments.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in conformance with the requirements established under
Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and. administrative procedures.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
15.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and compon-
ents listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were
conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides
and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical
Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: The limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
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radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls
were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs
and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment
maintenance which may affect system performance.
Maintenance on the following components was observed / reviewed:
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a.
Unit 1 cold leg accumulator valves
b.
Unit 1 safety injection pump 1B
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Unit i refueling water storage tank
d.
Unit 1 boron injection tank
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Unit 2 reactor vessel level monitoring system
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"O" diesel generator
Following completion of maintenance on the O diesel-generator, the
inspector verified that it had been returned to service properly.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
16.
Monthly Surveillance Observation
The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance
testing on all four RHR pumps and safety injection pumps and verified
that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures,
that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions
for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected
components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Techni-
cal Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by
personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any
deficiences identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
ECCS full flow test of the RHR and SI systems
No items of noncompliance were identified.
17.
Licensee Event Reports Followup
Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel,
and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to-
determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate
corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent
recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Speci-
fications.
Unit 1
LER NO.
DESCRIPTION
82 03 (update)
Failure of 1A RHR Suction Valve to Open During
Surveillance
82 16
Tave Summator Out of Tolerance
82 17
1A RC Cold Leg Temperature Amplifier Failed Low
Unit 2
LER S0.
DESCRIPTION
82-06
2D SG Level Transmitter Out of rolerance
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82 08
Failure of 011 Battery Charger
No items of noncompliance were identified.
18.
Senior Resident Inspector Position
During the inspection period Mr. Joseph R. Waters was permanently
assigned as.the Zion Senior Resident Inspector.
19.
Augmented Inspection Coverage
During the inspection period the following NRC personnel were
temporarily assigned to Zion Station to augment the resident
inspector coverage:
B. L. Burgess (Resident Inspector-Prairie
Island NPS), K. A. Connaughton, (Reactor Inspection-Region III),
L. G. McGregor (Senior Resident Inspector-Braidwood NPS) and
J. M. Hinds (Project Inspector-Region III).
It is anticipated that
such augeented resident inspector coverage will continue through
August 1982.
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20.
Meetings, Offsite Functions
April 22-23, 1982
Zion SALP Board Meeting Region III Offices
Glen Ellyn, Illinois
April.28-29, 1982
Senior Resident
Region III Offices
Meeting
Glen Ellyn, Illinois
May 3,
1982
Meeting with Licensee
Commonwealth Edison
Management on results
Corporate Headquarters
of special inspection-
Chicago, Illinois
into allegations con-
cerning operation of
Nuclear Plants
21.
Exit Interview
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The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph
1) throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection on
May 14, 1982 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection
activities.
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The licensee acknowledged the inspector's comments.
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